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ABSTRACT
During the 1930s and 1940s there was a huge increase in state interventions into the 
African rural economy, society and environment by both British colonial and settler 
governments. These interventions, carried out in the name of conservation and 
development, have received increased attention from historians in recent years, 
crucially because of the often violent opposition they encountered from the supposed 
beneficiaries, but also because of the apparent continuity between colonial and post­
colonial development interventions.
This thesis traces the history of colonial conservation and development policies in the 
mountain zone of Lesotho. As the vast majority of the area is given over to communal 
grazing it is hardly surprising that these interventions concentrated almost exclusively 
on the livestock sector. The major colonial intervention in the mountain livestock 
sector consisted of a policy to close totally a huge swathe of communal grazing land, in 
order to allow the range to return to its ‘climatic climax’.
The discourse of conservation and development in Lesotho was broadly similar to 
elsewhere in Africa, though the specific policies were largely shaped by local concerns. 
The thesis traces the development of this discourse and identifies the reasons why 
colonial officials became concerned about the mountain environment. The thesis places 
a particular stress on the science that informed colonial officials’ understanding of the 
mountain ecology and allowed them to draw conclusions about environmental change, 
despite the almost total lack of data.
In contrast to many similar policies attempted elsewhere, there are no reports of 
resistance in Lesotho, despite the fact that the major policy (the grazing closures) would 
have had a huge impact on the livelihoods of local communities. The thesis argues that 
the reason that there was no resistance was that the policy was never actually 
implemented, despite the official reports of success. An explanation for this gap 
between rhetoric and reality has to be sought in the realm of local, national and 
international politics.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction
In early 1947 two senior chiefs in the British colonial territory of Basutoland1 agreed to 
a request from the Department of Agriculture to close huge swathes of the communal 
grazing land within the wards falling under their jurisdiction. The Department of 
Agriculture was concerned that these areas, comprising all but the highest plateaux, 
were suffering from severe over-grazing and, as a consequence, the pastures were 
deteriorating and the rate of soil erosion was increasing. Complete resting from grazing 
would allow the natural vegetation to re-establish itself and once this had occurred 
livestock would be allowed to return, but this time with new regulations in place to 
prevent a repeat of the over-grazing. Originally it was thought that the recovery of the 
vegetation would take only a few years but in the end the closure policy lasted for nine 
years. According to official sources the closures were a huge success, local livestock 
owners respected the orders and the veld regained its natural condition.
The closure policy in Lesotho was similar in many respects to other colonial 
conservation and development projects carried out across southern and east Africa in 
the same period. The rapid acceleration of colonial government interventions in the 
African rural economy has led to some academics dubbing the immediate post-Second 
World War period the ‘second colonial occupation’. These interventions into the rural 
economy, society and environment have received a good deal of attention from a 
number of scholars not least because of the myriad resistance movements that arose to 
combat these colonial interventions.
What first attracted me to the closure policy in Lesotho was that, despite the hugely 
disruptive nature of the interventions, there were no published reports of resistance to, 
or even protest against, the project. My reading of literature on rural resistance taught 
me, however, that protest, struggle and resistance was often clandestine and may not 
leave its mark on published materials. Part of my mission was, therefore, to uncover 
the ‘hidden struggles’ and ‘everyday’ forms of resistance to the closure policy.2 But in
Through-out the thesis I use the British colonial name, Basutoland, to refer to the colonial 
administration but I use the Sesotho word, Lesotho, to refer to the geographical area. Within South 
African academia it has become the norm use the term Sotho with out a prefix. This convention has 
not been followed by academics within Lesotho or by most academics working exclusively on 
Lesotho (as opposed to those writing about Basotho resident in South Africa). I have used prefixes 
through-out, hence Basotho (plural) and Mosotho (singular) to refer to people, Sesotho to refer to 
language and culture and Lesotho to refer to the geographical area.
The two phrases reflect the particular influence of William Beinart and Colin Bundy and of James 
Scott respectively on my original approach. See Beinart, W. and Bundy, C. Hidden Struggles in 
Rural South Africa (London, 1987); and Scott, J.C. Weapons o f the Weak: Everyday forms of 
peasant resistance (New Haven, 1985).
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order to understand the policy it was also necessary to ask why the British colonial 
authorities were fearful about environmental degradation in the Lesotho mountains, 
why they chose to entirely close grazing land and why the chiefly authorities agreed to 
the policy, especially if the policy encountered opposition from the very people it was 
supposed to be helping.
Inevitably in attempting to answer these research questions many more became 
apparent. I have not managed to uncover any ‘hidden struggles’ over the closure 
policy, chiefly because (I argue) the policy was never enacted, despite the frequent 
reports of success. The non-implementation of the policy did not mean, however, that it 
was a non-event. The policy was the result of some highly political wrangling and its 
existence had some important political implications, even though it was never actually 
implemented. If anything its lack of impact on the ground makes it all the more 
interesting. This thesis, therefore, attempts to explain both the causes and consequences 
of the policy whilst rejecting the claims of successful implementation and 
environmental regeneration made by the colonial authorities.
1.1. The structure of the thesis
After outlining the structure of the thesis, this introduction places the study in both its 
intellectual and geographical context. It surveys the existing literature on colonial rural 
development and conservation policies in Lesotho and beyond, though detailed 
critiques of aspects of the literature will left to chapter 2, which sets out some off the 
key theoretical issues. Chapter 1 also provides an introduction to the physical and 
socio-economic geography of Lesotho, with particular reference to the mountain zone.
The second chapter examines the theoretical issues that run through-out the thesis. 
Firstly it considers what is meant by the terms conservation and development in a 
colonial setting. While both modem environmentalist and development studies 
literature has tended to see the two concepts as having a negative correlation (more 
development means less conservation) many historians of colonial Africa have used the 
two words almost interchangeably (especially in reference to soil conservation). In 
order to understand this contradiction it is first necessary to dis-aggregate the word 
‘development’ and to make a distinction between an innate process of development 
(growth or capitalist development) and an intention to foster development (usually in 
the form of projects or policies). In the southern African colonial (and apartheid) 
setting the intention to foster development was associated with the desire to stabilise a 
declining rural (reserve) economy and ensure the continuation of the migrant labour 
system. The stabilisation of the rural population had important political implications;
9
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government by indirect rule (or by Bantustan leaders) was founded on the maintenance 
of the ties between individual Africans and ‘their’ rural home(land).
Also associated with the concept of development was the idea of trusteeship, a 
trusteeship that extended to the natural environment as well as to people. European 
colonial officials, drawing on missionary ideologies, saw themselves as trustees of an 
African environment which African people constantly abused. At the same time the 
colonial ‘world-view’ led colonial officials to read the African environment in a 
particular way. An argument that states that different ‘world-views’ lead to different 
‘readings ‘ of the environment does not imply that all ‘readings’ are equally valid. I 
argue that the colonial understanding of the African environment was often a mis­
reading and that this mis-reading contributed directly to some of the difficulties colonial 
officials encountered in implementing their projects and policies.
Colonial fears about the African environment did not remain static over time. During 
the first half of the twentieth century the emphasis of the debate shifted at various 
points and in response to various events and trends. The influence of the United States 
of America was especially important to the debate about soil erosion in southern and 
east Africa, though specific local contexts also shaped the nature of the policy that arose 
in response to these global fears. Chapter 3 traces how an environmentalist ideology 
developed in Lesotho between the late-nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth 
century. The decline of the country’s agricultural economy was one important factor in 
fuelling fears about soil erosion especially during the 1930s, but ironically South 
African debates about the future of ‘white civilisation’ in the aftermath of the Second 
World War also acted as a catalyst for increased concern amongst Basutoland officials.
In order to understand these fears, and the policies that arose in response to them, it is 
also necessary to examine the history of the science which informed the colonial 
officials concerned. Chapter 4, therefore, examines the history of range ecology and its 
specific application to Lesotho. As with the spread of an environmentalist ideology, the 
US connection is central but other links within the British Empire were also important. 
The theory of plant succession, strongly associated with the American ecologist 
Frederic Clements, provided the basis of almost all range ecology and practical range 
management in Africa until very recently. The application of this theory to the southern 
African environment and how the theory was turned into practice are both examined.
An understanding of the theory of plant succession is also crucial to an analysis of the 
way in which colonial officials 'read' changes in the vegetational composition of 
Lesotho’s rangelands. Over the past two decades many of the ecological theories used
10
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by colonial range managers have been fundamentally challenged by new theories of 
range ecology.
Chapter 5 uses some of these new ideas about range ecology to question the ‘reading’ 
of mountain environment by colonial officials and ecologists. As I noted in chapter 4 
the process of ecological change in the mountains was based upon their understanding 
of the pattern of vegetation at that point. If ‘invader species’ were present, this 
indicated an environment undergoing degradation. New ecological ideas have, 
however, rejected many of the notions that informed the colonial officials. Using these 
ideas it is possible to construct and alternative 'reading' that is less certain about the 
process of degradation. Despite the persistence of carefully argued concerns about the 
mountain environment since the early 1930s there is little evidene of a simple process 
of decline and it is not possible to draw firm conclusions about processes simply from 
the spatial pattern of vegetation.
In chapter 6 and 7 the focus shifts away from a history of ideas about conservation, 
ecology and development to the nitty-gritty political context in which the closure policy 
was formulated. Lesotho’s geopolitics, and the fact that the Union government 
constantly lobbied Britain to transfer sovereignty of the territory to South Africa, are 
crucial in explaining the rise of fears about soil erosion in the mountain areas. During 
the colonial period the transfer issue overshadowed the entire administration, from the 
South African Act of Union right through to independence. All policy decisions were 
considered in the light of their implications for the transfer issue, though the opinions 
about transfer within the Basutoland administration varied from individual to individual 
and over time.
Allegations about the possible impact of silt from the Lesotho mountains on the South 
African river system, and particularly plans for dam building along the Orange river, 
were used as a bargain chips by the Union government during discussions about 
transfer. There was, therefore, a strong political motivation to enact the closure policy 
as a way of demonstrating British colonial intentions to prevent increased soil erosion. 
The closure policy was initially successful in deflecting criticism but the coming to 
power of a Nationalist government in South Africa led to renewed pressures on the 
colonial authorities. At this juncture the Union government’s complaints became more 
outspoken and the British colonial authorities decided they needed to come up with 
additional policies to strengthen their case. This resulted in plans to reduce the goat 
population of Lesotho by a quarter and plans to construct a massive system of dams 
within the mountain zone. Neither of these plans were implemented in the colonial
11
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period but the publicity around them was used by the British in their resistance to 
Nationalist party demands for transfer of the three High Commission Territories.
South African complaints about the state of Lesotho’s mountain environment gradually 
fell away during the mid-1950s. Discussions about large-scale hydrological projects on 
the South African section of the Orange river continued through-out the 1950s, but the 
previous concern about the impact of siltation from Lesotho was conspicuous by its 
absence. South African demands for transfer of the High Commission Territories also 
waned from the mid-1950s onwards, though periodic, if increasingly half-hearted, 
demands continued to be made up until Independence. Changing South African 
demands have to be understood in the context of the development of apartheid ideology 
and changing attitudes towards African occupation of land amongst white South 
Africans. Chapter 6 concludes with a section outlining these shifting perceptions.
Nineteenth and early twentieth century settler demands for the alienation of the 
remaining areas of African owned land are central to an understanding of the political 
significance of land in Lesotho. Within Lesotho the concept of land ‘belonging to the 
Nation’ and hence being inalienable was widely seen as an important defence against 
further loss of land to white farming interests. The colonial system of administration 
(indirect rule) was reliant upon maintaining the power of chiefs, and their control over 
land allocation was seen as the key to their continued political power. Chapter 7 
examines the political importance of land within Lesotho and examines how contests 
over both land itself and over definitions of land rights fed into the debate about over- 
grazing and the closure policies. The chapter concludes by arguing that, contrary to 
much of the literature on customary law, colonial codification of land law did not lead 
to an ‘artificial freezing’ of land tenure arrangements but rather was one factor in a 
continuing political contest around the land question.
Chapters 8 and 9 examine the two specific projects attempted in the mountain area in 
the post-war era. Apart from the closure policy the only other project to control over- 
grazing was a pilot project on two small plots in the mountain zone of Maseru district. 
The details of this pilot project are outlined in chapter 8 partially as some findings from 
the experimental plots feed into the closure policy but also to provide circumstantial 
evidence to strengthen my claim that the closure policy only ever existed on paper.
After outlining the archival evidence about the closure policy, chapter 9 presents the 
case that the closure policy in Mokhotlong district was never actually implemented. 
Despite the numerous reports of success, the direct evidence that the policy was
12
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implemented is contained in a handful of reports written after visits by colonial officials 
to the area. Against this is weighed evidence from a series of oral history interviews 
carried out in Mokhotlong district in April/May 1995. In addition a detailed and critical 
reading of the few eye-witness reports, a number of significant lacunas in the written 
record and the simple application of common sense all support the argument that the 
closure policy was not in fact implemented. The arguments presented in chapters 6 and 
7 go a long way towards explaining this gap between rhetoric and reality. There are, 
however, also some crucially important local political issues which also need to be 
examined. Furthermore the mere existence of the policy had some important local 
political implications, even though it was never implemented. Chapter 9, therefore, 
explores these local political issues in some depth.
The Conclusion addresses the question ‘if the livestock development policies did not 
acheive their stated objectives, what did they actually acheive?’. Some outcomes of the 
policies are fairly straight forward, a high profile for the Department of Agriculture and 
a bolstering of a few chiefs political positions for example, while others, such as the 
impact on the question of transfer or on the lives of the local populaton, are not so easy 
to draw conclusions about. Nevertheless it is clear that the policies did ‘do something’ 
even if this was very different from their stated objectives.
1.2. Background
1.2.1.Physical geography of the mountain zone of Lesotho
Most studies of the physical geography of Lesotho divide the country into four physical 
zones: the lowlands, the foothills, the mountains and the Orange river valley (or the 
Senqu river as it is known in Lesotho) (see Figure 1.1). These divisions are, of course, 
somewhat arbitrary and some studies make further sub-divisions, for example making a 
distinction between the lowlands and the border lowlands in the extreme south west.3 
As the names suggest these zones are primarily determined by altitude, the lowlands 
and Senqu/Orange valley zones usually being delimited by the 6,000 foot contour. The 
foothill zone consists of the areas along the western escarpment of the Maluti 
mountains from the 6,000 foot contour up to the main watershed between the 
Caledon/Mohokare river basin and the Senqu/Orange river basin. The mountain zone 
accounts for somewhere between 50 and 60 percent of the total land, depending on 
whose definitions are used.
For example Smit, P. Lesotho a Geographical Study (Pretoria, 1967).
13
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Lesotho’s geology consists of a series of more or less horizontal bands of sedimentary 
rocks overlain by a massive outcrop of basaltic rock. The sedimentary rocks, made up 
of Beauforth and Cave sandstones, are exposed in the lowlands and deepest mountain 
valleys.4 The sandy soils found on these sedimentary rocks tend to be highly erodable 
and nutrient poor. In the mountain areas the basaltic rock has weathered to form dark 
brown clay soils which tend to be more fertile. Though they are not as susceptible to 
erosion they are often fairly thin, especially because of the steep relief. This geological 
pattern is of great significance to an understanding of a full understanding of the 
process of soil erosion, as Meena Singh’s recent research clearly indicates.5
Figure 1.1 Physical environmental zones.6
*v
Lowlands
Foothills
Senqu/Orange valley 
Mountains
The country's topography is heavily influenced by two major river systems, the
Caledon/Mohokare and Senqu/Orange. These rivers and their major tributaries all drain 
south and west across the country cutting deeply incised valleys into the underlying 
rock. This has resulted in a rugged topography consisting of steep sided valleys divided
Early research on geology was carried-out by Stockley, G.M. Report on the Geology o f  Basutoland 
(Maseru, 1947).
Singh, M.V. ‘Geological, historical and present-day erosion and colluviation in Lesotho, Southern 
Africa’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1994).
Adapted from Smit, Lesotho.
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by high plateaux. This topography means that there is a shortage of flat valley-bottom 
agricultural fields and many people are forced to plough steeply sloping land.
The climate of Lesotho is highly influenced by altitude. The mountain zone can 
become extremely cold in winter, with temperatures plummeting far below freezing. 
Frosts can strike even during the summer months and are a significant constraint on 
both crop and grassland production. In the eastern mountains there are on average 90 
days per annum with temperatures below freezing and the frost period averages about 
180 days a year. The lowlands tend to be warmer in winter and hotter in summer, 
though the relationship between altitude and temperature is not always as straight 
forward. The steep sided valleys of the foothills and mountains can act as frost hollows 
and are sometimes significantly colder than surrounding higher areas.7
Figure 1.2 Average Annual Rainfall distribution (mm)8
,000 \
800
800
1,000 )600
Annual rainfall totals tend to be higher in the mountain zone than in the lowlands, with 
the south western lowlands being the driest area of all. On the high peaks along the 
Drakensberg escarpment annual rainfall figures are as high as 1,300 mm per annum 
while in the south western lowlands they average no more than 500 mm per annum.
Smit, Lesotho, p.4.
Limbach, W. E. ‘Current State o f Range Management and Development in Lesotho’ in O’Rouke, J. 
T. (ed.) Institutions for Rangeland Development: Strategies and Lessons Learned. Proceedings o f  
the 1987 International Rangeland Development Symposium (Boise, Idaho, 1987), pp. 71-80.
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Within the mountain zone there is, however, also considerable variability in rainfall 
from area to area. The mountain valleys tend to be in rain-shadows and receive 
significantly lower rainfall totals than neighbouring peaks. In the southern reaches of 
the Senqu/Orange valley annual averages are comparable to the south western lowlands 
(see Figure 1.2).9
Rainfall is highly seasonal with the vast majority of precipitation falling between 
October and March. The only significant exception to this is when the eastern 
mountain zones receive heavy winter falls of snow. Rainfall is also highly variable 
from year to year. Between 1920 and 1970 rainfall data collected in Maseru indicate 
that total annual precipitation varied from 1119 mm to 419 mm. This represented 
variations of 63 percent above to 39 percent below the average of 687 mm.10 Table 1.1 
gives some data on precipitation at various stations in the mountain zone.
Table 1.1 Precipitation data from 5 stations in the mountain zone.11
Station Annual 
average (mm)
Maximum 
annual (mm)
Minimum 
annual (mm)
Inter-annual
rainfall
variability
(CV)12
Mokhotlong
Camp
596 817 381 21%
Sehlabathebe 736 1065 308 25%
Sani Pass, 1036 1442 439 28%
Sehonghong 541 873 323 28%
Mashai 498 761 279 26%
Variable rainfall, unpredictable frosts and summer hailstorms all make arable farming 
in Lesotho a highly risky business. Maize is the major crop grown in the lowlands
9 Wilken, G.C. Agro-climatology o f Lesotho (LAS A Discussion Paper No. 1, Maseru, 1978).
111 Wilken, Agro-climatology o f Lesotho.
11 These figures are calculated from the following runs of data: Mokhotlong Camp, 1930-1994;
Sehlabathebe, 1912-1956; SaniPass, 1932-1947; Sehonghong, 1935-1955 andMashai, 1931-1970. 
All data from Government of Lesotho, Hydrological Survey Department, Meteorological Data to 
December 1970 (Maseru, n.d), except for the data from 1970 - 1994 few Mokhotlong Camp which 
was calculated from monthly rainfall statistics collected from Meteorological Office, Maseru.
*2 The coefficient of variability equals the standard deviation divided by the mean and expressed as a
percent, it can be represented mathematically as:
cv = -=■ x 100% 
x
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whilst wheat dominates in the mountain valleys. The broken topography makes only a 
small percent of the country suitable for arable production and the vast majority of the 
land area, especially in the mountain districts, is given over to grazing land.
1.2.2. Economy and society of the mountain zone
In the late 1940s the mountain zone of Lesotho had only a small population. The 
combined population of the two major mountain districts, Mokhotlong and Qacha’s 
Nek, numbered only about 82,000.13 The majority of this population was concentrated 
into the valley of the Senqu/Orange river and its tributaries. The higher mountain 
valleys and the plateaux areas had extremely low population densities, often no more 
than a handful of people per square mile. This contrasts with the lowland regions where 
rural population densities could be over 200 people per square mile, especially in the 
north around Butha Buthe and Leribe.14
Settlement patterns in the mountain zone were highly influenced by physical 
geography. Along many of the mountain valleys villages tended to be located along the 
edge of the first terrace above a stream or river. Fields are sometimes located along the 
valley bottom in the wider valleys but more often along the valley terraces. Valley 
bottoms are susceptible to frosts as cold air rolls down the valley sides, making them 
unattractive for both residential sites and fields.15
Cattle-posts also tended to be located on spurs or terraces above the higher valleys. 
According to oral informants in Mokhotlong many of the settlements were initially 
established as cattle-posts and cultivation was only started sometime later. Many 
informants reported that their fathers or grandfathers had not owned separate cattle- 
posts in the higher valleys or on the plateaux lands but had grazed their livestock on the 
slopes behind their homesteads on a year round basis. By the 1940s, however, a clearer 
distinction between villages and summer cattle-posts had become apparent. High 
cattle-posts were occupied solely by herd-boys16 who would usually return with the 
livestock to the villages during the winter.17
13 Sheddick, V.G. Land Tenure in Basutoland (Colonial Research Studies, No. 13, London, 1954), p. 
35.
!4  Smit, Lesotho.
15 Smit, Lesotho.
In most of the literature on Lesotho this term is applied to any shepherd, whatever their age. In the 
interests of clarity and consistency I have used the term despite the obvious pejorative connotations 
when applied to adults.
17 Ashton, H. The Basuto: A Social Study o f Traditional and Modem Lesotho (2nd edition, London, 
1967), p. 137.
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There were, however, some families living year round at cattle-posts, especially those 
closer to the main valleys. In the late-1940s the chiefs in Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek 
both attempted to enforce a programme of villagisation and prevent families living at 
cattle-posts or in scattered homesteads in the higher valleys year round.18 While they 
appear to have had some success in moving hamlets further down the valleys19 some 
families remained as permanent residents of cattle-posts or returned to them a couple of 
years after being ordered down to the villages.20
Census data indicates that the absenteeism rate in the mountain zone was significantly 
lower than in the lowlands (see Figure 1.3). Data on the percentage of household 
incomes coming from remittances as compared to agricultural production is not 
available at a district level but lower absenteeism obviously suggests that agricultural 
production was probably a more significant contribution to livelihoods in the mountains 
than it was in the lowlands. In the mid-1950s there were no labour recruiters working 
directly in Mokhotlong district and presumably Basotho migrants would have first had 
to go to the major lowland towns to negotiate contracts 21 Nevertheless most of the men 
I interviewed in Mokhotlong ward reported that they had been on at least two or three 
mining contracts, the exceptions being members of the local petty bourgeoisie.22
In good rainfall years wheat grows well on the dark basaltic soils of the mountain zone. 
In the 1940s summer wheat from the mountain zone was the country’s most important 
agricultural export. From the early 1930s onwards Lesotho was consistently a net 
importer of maize23 but during the 1940s and 1950s the country continued to be a net 
exporter of wheat in good rainfall years.24 I have no data on the distribution of this
18 See chapter 9.
1° Oral informant 3 (Table 9.1) reported that when he was a young man there used to a be a number o f  
smaller hamlets further up the Mabunyanneng valley. In 1995 his hut was the highest permanently 
occupied hut in the valley. Oral informant 13 used to live in a hamlet further up the Sakeng Valley 
but sometime during the 1950s, whilst he was in Johannesburg on a mining contract, the hamlet 
was destroyed and his family were allocated a new residential plot and fields lower-down the 
valley.
20 Oral informant 1 reported that many families ordered to leave their cattle-posts by the chiefs in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s quietly returned to the cattle-posts a few years later.
21 Interview with Sir James Hennessy, Cambridge, 12 November 1996. Hennessy recalled that when 
he had been an A.D.C. in Teyateyaneng he spent a large part of his time signing passes for people 
to go on labour contracts and that this had not been a significant element of his work in 
Mokhtolong.
22 See Table 9.1.
23 See Figure 1 in Murray, C. ‘From Granary to Labour Reserve: An Economic History of Lesotho’, 
South African Labour Bulletin, 6 ,4 , 1980, pp. 3-20.
24 in 1957 the country exported 101,077 bags (2001b) and imported 32,316 bags of wheat, Great 
Britain Colonial Annual Report: Basutoland 1957 (London, 1958), p. 42.
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yield amongst the farmers of the mountain zone so it is impossible to say if it came 
from a few successful commercial operations or from a wider range of small producers.
Figure 1.3 Absentees as percent de jure population, 1956.25
+20%
10- 20%
0- 10%
Livestock populations figures for individual districts were not produced between 1937 
and 1965, but these two figures do produce a rough guide to the total livestock 
population of the districts in the period under investigation (Table 1.2).
The livestock figures from Mokhotlong translate into just under three livestock units 
(lu)26 per person in 1937, compared to a national figure of just over 1 lu per person.27 
It is possible to derive some indication of the average size of sheep flocks in 
Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek compared to national figures from data from government
25 Map reproduced from Smit, Lesotho, p. 20. Data from 1956 Census.
2b Through-out the thesis I use the calculation that 1 head of cattle, horse, donkey or mule and 5 head
of sheep or goat equals 1 lu. This was the rule-of-thumb calculation used by the colonial
authorities, though there are more complex and accurate ways of calculating lu on the basis of the
weight of the beast, the age profile of the herd etc.
27 Calculated from the 1936 census figures reproduced in Smit, Lesotho, and from Basutoland, 
Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1936.
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wool sheds. In 1939, the last year data was broken down by district, the average flock 
shorn at government wool sheds comprised 142 sheep in Mokhotlong and 120 sheep in 
Qacha’s Nek, compared to a national average of 94 sheep per flock.28 Oral informants 
reported that when they were young men and women their fathers all had fairly large 
herds, with one informant claiming his father had well over 2,000 sheep in the 1940s.29 
These figures indicate that livestock played a more important role in the economy of the 
mountain sector than they did in the lowlands. All of the territory’s main agricultural 
export products (summer wheat, wool and mohair) were strongly associated with the 
mountain economy.
Table 1.2 Official livestock populations of Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek, 1937 
and 1965.
Mokhotlong
1937 1965
Qacha’s Nek
1937 1965
sheep 258,173 313,347 255,699 191,265
goats 42,047 120,899 71,254 77,234
cattle 29,622 29,354 41, 325 120,899
equines 13,222 17,824 12,582 13,574
As with the figures on wheat production there are no specific data on the distribution of 
livestock amongst households on a district or local level during this period. Vernon 
Sheddick did, however, produce figures from a nation-wide survey in the late 1940s 
(Table 1.3).
This national data clearly indicates the highly skewed distribution of livestock in 
Lesotho. 50 percent of households survey owned less than ten head of cattle and a 
similar proportion owned less than nine head of smallstock. At the other end of the 
scale over 23 percent of the total smallstock population and over 15 percent of the total 
cattle population were held30 by just nine households.31
28 Calculated from Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1939.
29 Informant 9 (Table 9.1), though I was slightly suspicious about the validity of his testimony. Other 
informants (11,13) also reported that their fathers had over 1,000 head of smallstock. Most 
informants gave precise figures for cattle and equines and more general descriptions of the size of 
the smallstock population.
30 Because of mafisa (loaning out) arrangements it is necessary to make a distinction between 
holdings and ownership.
31 It is not possible to tell from the data whether or not these are the same households.
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Table 1.3 Distribution of herd size from nation-wide survey c. 194932
smallstock
size of holding frequency
less than S 216
5-9 24
10-4 19
15-9 16
20-4 10
25-9 13
30-4 12
35-9 8
40-4 8
45-9 7
50-4 11
55-9 2
60-4 3
65-9 3
70-4 3
75-9 9
80-4 5
85-9 7
90-4 0
95-9 7
100-49 35
150-99 19
200-49 8
250-99 4
300-49 7
350-99 3
400-49 4
450-99 5
500-49 3
550-99 1
others
650 1
688 1
804 1
850 1
863 1
900 1
1100 1
1452 1
cattle
size of holding frequency
0 60
l 15
2 17
3 19
4 20
5 24
6 23
7 19
8 23
9 11
10 19
11 16
12 12
13 7
14 12
15 11
16 10
17 6
18 14
19 5
20-9 71
30-9 32
40-9 14
50-9 5
60-9 4
70-9 2
80-9 3
90-9
others
2
100 1
105 1
144 1
230 1
This heavily skewed distribution suggests that the variation in herd size is not simply a 
function of household development cycles. The large number of chiefs at the upper - 
end of this distribution suggests, rather, that it was a function of economic 
differentiation. There were a few large commercial livestock owners in the mountain 
zone who received a significant return on their herds, especially in years of high wool 
or mohair prices.
In summary, during the period in question the mountain zone of Lesotho had a small 
population concentrated in villages and hamlets along the lower altitude valleys. The 
domestic agricultural and pastoral economy remained important to livelihoods and the
32 Based on survey of 480 households, Sheddick, Land Tenure, p. 99-100.
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reliance upon migrant remittances was probably lower than in the lowlands. A number 
of individuals ran large commercial flocks of livestock on the communal lands , selling 
wool and mohair to the South African market at the coast. Summer wheat was grown 
on a commercial basis by at least some households and in good rainfall years the 
mountain valleys could produce a good yield. Nevertheless the area was intimately 
involved in the migrant labour system and most young men went for at least one 
contract at the South African mines.
1.3. The historiography of colonial conservation and development
Conservation and development projects and policies in colonial Africa have received 
widespread attention in a number of different areas of academic inquiry in recent years. 
Much of the initial interest arose out of the often violent resistance to some of these 
policies especially during the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s when this resistance was linked 
to national anti-colonial movements. The increased interest in local social history 
during the early 1980s led to more detailed analyses of some of these incidents of rural 
resistance and revealed a greater complexity in the response of rural communities to 
development projects.
Interest in colonial conservation and development policies has also come from the field 
of environmental history. Using an environmental history approach some scholars have 
considered not just the political economy of colonial interventions but also their impact 
on the environment. This field has begun to play a increasingly important role in 
African historiography in recent years, though its intellectual roots run fairly deep. 
There have also been a number of important studies examining the rise of 
environmentalist ideologies in the colonial setting. A third approach to environmental 
history, one which examines the influence of the (changing) natural environment on 
society, has made less of an impact in African studies.33
Some of the earliest academic literature to consider colonial conservation and 
development policies was interested in how resistance to schemes introduced in the 
decades following the Second World War fed into nationalist politics. Much of this 
literature was based on the premise that rural protest was simply a forerunner of more
33 The exception to this is Illife, J. Africans: History o f a Continent (Cambridge, 1995), which uses 
the adaptation of people to a hostile environment and demography as the lens through which to 
view African society. Given the radical nature of Iliffe’s thesis it is surprising that the book has not 
received more attention. See also Guy, J. ‘Ecological Factors in the Rise o f Shaka and the Zulu 
Kingdom.’ in Marks, S. and Atmore, A. (eds.) Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, 
(London, 1980), pp. 102-119.
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organised nationalist politics and tended to treat the peasantry as an undifferentiated 
mass waiting to be organised by the nationalist political elites.34 Major research linking 
nationalism and resistance to colonial interventions was carried out in Tanganyika35 and 
Kenya, where the work of John Lonsdale is a notable exception to the general criticism 
expressed above.36 This interest in the links between agrarian protest and nationalist 
politics was not apparent in the South African literature, where literature on national 
politics concentrated almost exclusively on the urban setting.37
The structuralist literature that dominated African historiography during the 1970s
tended to see colonial interventions in African rural life either as part of a deliberate
attempt to undermine independent African peasant production and force labour into the
wage economy or as belated attempts to put the genie back in the bottle and bolster
production in the reserves in order to ensure the continuation of the migrant labour
system. In southern African historiography, Colin Bundy’s seminal work, based on
underdevelopment theory, tracing the rise and fall of the South African peasantry
spawned a number of studies concentrating on the success of African peasant farmers in
the late nineteenth century and their decline during the first half of the twentieth.38 The
environmental decline in the African reserves reported in official documents from the
first decades of the twentieth century onwards were seen both as the outcome of a
deliberate policy of undermining African agriculture and a cause of its continued
decline. In her concluding chapter to the influential collection Roots o f Rural Poverty
Ann Seidman argues:
As a result of systematic policy decisions... Africans in many areas were given 
little opportunity to earn cash except by joining the vast migratory wage-labour 
force... The women, children and older men who stayed at home had difficulty in 
maintaining the levels of agricultural productivity previously attained. As
34 See for example Tickner, V. ‘Class struggle and the food supply sector in Zimbabwe’ (unpublished 
paper presented a Leeds Conference on Zimbabwe, 1980) cited by Ranger, T. Peasant 
Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe (London, 1985) p. 19-20.
35 Cliffe, L. ‘Nationalism and the Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change in Tanganyika during the 
Colonial Period’ in Cliffe, L. and Saul, J. (eds.) Socialism in Tanganyika (vol. 1) (Nairobi, 1973), 
pp. 17-24; Maguire, G.A. Towards Uhuru in Tanzania: the politics o f  participation (London, 1969).
36 Lonsdale, J. ‘Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa’, Journal o f African History, 9 ,1 ,1968 , 
pp.l 19-146. Frank Furedi’s research also avoided the tendency of the era to lump together peasants 
into a undifferentiated mass though it does not explicitly examine colonial interventions into 
African agriculture, Furedi, F. ‘The Social Composition o f the Mau Mau Movement in the White 
Highlands’, Journal o f Peasant Studies, 1 ,4 ,1974 , pp. 486-505.
37 Mbeki, G. The Peasant’s revolt (London, 1984 [1964]) being a notable exception.
3  ^ Bundy’s work was not published as a monograph until 1979, but his thesis was well known through
two articles and numerous seminar papers; Bundy, C. ‘The Emergence and Decline of a South 
African Peasantry’, African Affairs, 71,1972, pp. 369-388; Bundy, C. ‘The Transkei Peasantry, c. 
1890-1914: “Passing through a period of Stress’” in Palmer, R. and Parsons, N. (eds.) The Roots o f  
Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa (Berkeley, 1977), pp, 201-220; and Bundy, C. The 
Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (London, 1979).
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traditional irrigation and cultivation practices fell into disuse and the soils became 
increasingly eroded, the vast majority of the young men growing up in rural areas 
were even more narrowly restricted to seeking jobs on the large mines or 
plantations.39
Allen Isaacman argues that the work based on what he labels the ‘strangulation thesis’ 
tended to simplify complex processes of rural transformation into a single trajectory 
which was simply the product of ‘exogenous historical forces’.40 He contrasts this 
body of work with the ‘mode of production theorists’ who focused on the articulation of 
capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production.41 In South African historiography 
Harold Wolpe was highly influential in the literature on the articulation of modes of 
production. His widely cited article in Economy and Society set-out his basic thesis 
and included a important argument about how to understand the conservation and 
development policies enacted in the South African reserves from the 1930s onwards. 
According to Wolpe the migrant labour system meant that capital did not have to ensure 
the reproduction of labour as this was ensured through agricultural production in the 
African reserves. By the 1930s, however, the ability of this reserve economy to provide 
the conditions for reproduction of labour was rapidly disintegrating, not least because of 
an environmental collapse. Conservation and development schemes in the reserves can, 
therefore, be understood as an attempt to ensure that reproduction of labour continued 
by bolstering the faltering agricultural economy.42 Despite the fact that Wolpe’s thesis 
was, in part, an assertion of South African exceptionalism his arguments have surfaced 
in literature about colonial environment and development policies in other countries of 
east and southern Africa.
Both ‘structuralist’ and the ‘nationalist’ approaches to colonial development policies 
were primarily interested in the relationship between the policies and the national 
political economy. During the early 1980s a number of scholars began to view these
39 Seidman, A. ‘Postscript: the economics of eliminating rural poverty’ in Palmer and Parsons The 
Roots o f Rural Poverty, pp. 410-421, p. 414.
411 Isaacman, A. ‘Peasants and Rural Social Protest in Africa’, African Studies Review, 33 ,2 ,1990, pp. 
1-120, p. 9.
41 Issacman’s dichotomy is somewhat forced; underdevelopment theory itself was premised on the 
notion that underdevelopment was the result of capitalist penetration into pre-capitalist structures 
(as opposed to the transformation of the mode of production from pre-capitalist to capitalist).
Bundy attempted to use the concept of the articulation of modes of production in the Rise and Fall, 
though, as he admits himself, he was not altogether successful. In the preface to the 2nd edition of 
Rise and Fall he argues that the major weakness of the book is its failure to identify the production 
relations and internal dynamics of pre-capitalist African society and this ‘inevitably weakens any 
attempt to theorise its articulation with capitalist colonial society’; Preface to Second edition 
(London, 1988), no page number.
4^ Wolpe, H. ‘Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa; from segregation to apartheid’, 
Economy and Society, 1 ,4 ,1972, pp. 425-456.
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policies through a more focused lens. Often this narrower focus was in response to a 
feeling that the social history of rural areas had been sidelined by the structuralist 
models that dominated in the 1970s.43 For those interested in ‘history from below’ or 
‘subaltern studies’, rural struggles were obvious areas of investigation. The influential 
work of James Scott, working in South East Asia,44 and others45 encouraged Africanist 
historians to move beyond the more spectacular cases of violent confrontation46 and 
look for ‘hidden’ or ‘everyday forms of resistance’ to the state.
In South Africa much of the literature concentrated on the social history of the ‘white’ 
farming districts where a focus on the dynamics of class relations and how they were 
transformed at a local level was seen as an important palliative to the rather sterile 
debate about the exact nature of the transition to capitalist agriculture.47 There was, 
however, also a significant growth in the literature on resistance in the African reserves 
and how this intersected with national political movements. In contrast to the earlier 
‘nationalist’ approaches towards similar subjects in the rest of Africa this literature was 
strongly grounded in local social and political history and the links to national 
movements were explored from the perspective of the rural population.48
43 Isaacman ‘Peasants and Rural Social Protest’; Beinart and Bundy Hidden Struggles in Rural South 
Africa, p. 2. There has been a similar burgeoning of ‘subaltern studies’ in Asian and Latin 
American historiography, for a critique see Mallon, F.E. ‘The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern 
Studies: Perspectives from Latin American History’, American Historical Review, 99,1994, pp. 
1491-1515; Mukheijee, M. ‘Peasant Resistance and Peasant Consciousness in Colonial India: 
Subalterns and beyond’, Economic and Political Weekly, 8 October 1988, pp. 2109-2120 and 15 
October, 1988, pp. 2174-2185; Brass, T. ‘Moral Economists, Subalterns, New Social Movements 
and the (Re)emergence of a (Post) modernised (Middle) Peasant’, Journal o f  Peasant Studies, 18, 2, 
1991, pp. 173-205.
44 Scott, Weapons o f the Weak.
45 Also often drawing on an older literature on resistance to slavery in the Americas, for example 
Mullin, G.W. Flight and Rebellion: Slave Resistance in Eighteenth Century Virginia (New York, 
1972); Genovese, E.D. Roll, Jordon Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York, 1974).
^  Such as that in Witzieshoek discussed by Hirson, B. ‘Rural Revolt in South Africa’, The Societies 
of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Collected 
Seminar Papers), 8,22,1976.
47 See for example Keegan, T. ‘The sharecropping economy, African class formation and the 1913
Native’s Land Act in the high veld maize belt’ in Marks, S. and Rathbone, R. (eds) Industrialisation 
and Social Change in South Africa: African class formation, culture and consciousness, 1870-1930 
(London, 1982), pp. 195-211 and various papers in Beinart, W. Delius, P. and Trapido, S. (eds.) 
Putting a Plough to the Ground, (Johannesburg, 1986). Bradford, H. ‘Highways, by-ways and cul- 
de-sacs: the transition to capitalism in South African historiography’, Radical History Review, 46, 
1990, pp. 59-88, provides a useful review and critique of the South African rural historiography.
See also the more recent work by Nancy Jacobs, which places access to resources centre stage in 
the discussion about class formation and race in the South African countryside: Jacobs^. ‘The 
Flowing Eye: Water Management in the Upper Kuruman Valley, South Africa, c. 1800-1962.’ 
Journal o f  African History, 37,1996, pp. 237-260.
4  ^ See for example Beinart and Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa', Bundy, C. ‘Land and 
Liberation: popular rural protest and the national liberation movements in South Africa, 1920-1960’ 
in Marks, S. and Trapido, S. (eds.) The Politics o f Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth
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These shifts in South Africa historiography mirrored similar shifts elsewhere in 
Africa.49 The work of Terence Ranger on Zimbabwe is particularly notable in this 
respect His early work viewed rural protests as a pre-cursor to later nationalism, but did 
not address the question of how peasant consciousness was transformed through the 
colonial period and how it interacted with nationalism.50 A new perspective was 
revealed in a 1978 review article entitled ‘Growing from the Roots* (a reference to 
Palmer and Parson’s edited collection The Roots o f Rural Poverty). One of the 
comments Ranger made about the body of work represented by The Roots o f Rural 
Poverty was that it had very little to say about peasant consciousness.51 Ranger’s 
subsequent work concentrated on this very topic, drawing largely on detailed fieldwork 
in the Makoni district of Zimbabwe.52
In his 1978 review article Ranger also criticised much of the existing agrarian 
historiography for taking official reports of economic or ecological decline at face 
value. The ‘social history’ approach to rural economy and society consciously 
questioned this archival data, especially in connection to discussion about resistance 
and class relations. Clandestine resistance only appears in the written record when it is 
discovered and other forms of ‘everyday resistance’, such as sabotage, feigning illness 
and deliberate misunderstanding of instructions from landlords or colonial officials 
tended to be reported as just another indication of the ‘lazy and uneconomical nature of 
the African’ 53 Many historians, therefore, turned to oral history in order to circumvent 
the problems associated with a reliance upon archival sources.54 The use of oral history
Century South Africa (London, 1987), pp. 254-285; Beinart, W. and Bundy. C. ‘State intervention 
and rural resistance in the Transkei 1900-65’ in Klein, M. (ed.) Peasants in Africa: contemporary 
and historical perspectives (Beverley Hills, 1980)pp. 271-315; Delius, P. ‘Sebatakgomo: Migrant 
organisations, the ANC and the Sekhukhuneland revolt’, Journal o f Southern African Studies, 15, 3, 
1989, pp. 581-615; Delius, P. A Lion Amongst the Cattle: reconstruction and resistance in 
Northern Transvaal (Oxford, 1996); Mager, A. ‘The People Get Fenced: Gender, Rehabilitation 
and African Nationalism in the Ciskei and Border Region, 1945-1955’, Journal o f  Southern African 
Studies, 18,4,1992, pp. 761 - 782; Marks, S. Reluctant Rebellion: the 1906-08 disturbances in 
Natal (Oxford, 1970).
49 For example Throup, D.W. The Economic and Social Origins ofMau-Mau, 1945-1953 (London, 
1988).
50 Ranger, T. ‘Connections between “Primary Resistance” Movements and Modem Mass Nationalism 
in East and Central Africa’, Journal o f African History, 9 ,3,1968, pp. 437-454.
51 Ranger, T. ‘Growing from the Roots: reflections on peasant research in Central and Southern 
Africa’, Journal o f Southern African Studies, 5 ,1 ,1978 , pp. 99-133.
52 Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War.
55 Issacman, A., Stephen, M., Adam, Y., Joro Homen, M, Macamo, E. and Augustinho, P. ‘Cotton as
the motor of poverty: peasant resistance to forced cotton production in Mozambique, 1938-1961’, 
The International Journal o f African Historical Studies, 13,1980, pp. 581-615.
54 For example Keegan, T. Facing the Storm: Portraits o f Black Lives in Rural South Africa (Athens,
Ohio, 1988); Van Onselen, C. ‘The Reconstruction of a Rural Life from Oral Testimony: Critical
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helped historians develop a much more nuanced and complicated picture of rural 
society but few ‘social’ historians developed their analysis further to consider the 
relationship between that society and its environment.55
In the African context there is a fairly long tradition of literature that concentrates on 
the impact of colonialism and capitalism on the African environment. Much of the 
academic literature has concentrated on the impact of colonial hunting on African 
animal populations56 or on the relationship between colonialism and the spread of 
disease, in particular tryanosomiasis or ‘sleeping sickness’. A pioneering study by an 
ex-colonial official, John Ford, on the ecology of the tsetse fly, encouraged historians to 
consider the ramifications of the disease in discussion about the impact of colonialism 
on pre-colonial societies. Colonial officials tended to ascribe the spread of tsetse fly to 
the increased mobility and livestock population growth that has resulted from the 
establishment of Pax Britannica. Ford dismissed this claim and argued that the early 
years of colonial rule resulted in unprecedented disruption to African ecological 
management systems and it was this that had resulted in the spread of tsetse fly.57
Helge Kjekshus incorporated Ford's work into his thesis about the impact of 
colonialism on the African environment. Kjekshus argued that pre-colonial African 
societies had developed effective and equitable resource management and ecological 
control mechanisms which were smashed apart by the advent of colonialism, leading to 
serious over-exploitation and environmental decline.58 Kjekshus model has been 
critiqued in a number of subsequent studies, most notably by John McCracken. 
McCracken argues against the simple model that colonialism led to a spread of tsetse
Notes on the Methodology in the Study of a Black South African Sharecropper’, The Journal o f  
Peasant Studies, 20 ,3 ,1993, pp. 494-519; Van Onselen, C. The Seed is Mine: the Life ofK as 
Maine, a South African sharecropper, 1894-1985 (London, 1996).
55 Though there is good reason to be highly cautious about using oral history to re-construct a picture 
of past environmental conditions and change, see Lindblade, K. ‘Discrepancies in understanding 
historical land use changes in Uganda’ PLA Notes, 28, February 1997, pp. 59-63.
56 MacKenzie, J. ‘Chivalry, Social Darwinism and Ritualised Killing.’ in Anderson, D. and Grove, R. 
(eds.) Conservation in Africa: People, Policies and Practice (Cambridge 1987), pp. 41-62; 
MacKenzie, J. The Empire o f Nature: Hunting, Conservation and British Imperialism (Manchester, 
1988); MacKenzie, J. ‘The Natural World and Popular Consciousness in Southern Africa: the 
European appropriation of Nature’ in Kaarsholm, P. (ed.) Cultural Struggle and Development in 
Southern Africa (Harare/London, 1991), pp. 13-31; Steinhart, E.I. ‘Hunters, poachers and game 
keepers: towards a social history of hunting in colonial Kenya’, Journal o f African History, 30, 
1989, pp. 247-264; Wagner, R. ‘Zoutpansberg: the dynamics of a hunting frontier, 1848-67’ in 
Marks, S. and Atmore, A. (eds.) Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa (London, 
1980), pp. 313-349.
57 Ford, J. The Role ofTryanosomiases in African ecology: A study o f the tsetse f ly  problem (Oxford, 
1971).
Kjekshus, H. Ecological Control and Economic Development in East African History: The Case of  
Tanganyika: 1850-1950 (Berkeley, 1977).
27
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
fly and shows a far more complicated process of advance and retreat of the tsetse belt 
through-out the colonial period.59
McCracken was also one of the first historians of colonial development and 
conservation policies to stress the importance of the individual agricultural officer’s 
understanding of the issues.60 This is a theme that has been taken up in a number of 
other studies and there now exists a wide-ranging literature on the development of 
colonial ideas about conservation and development.61 In southern African 
historiography probably the most influential contribution has been William Beinart’s 
1984 paper in the Journal o f Southern African Studies. In contrast to his earlier work 
on Pondoland and his collaborative work with Colin Bundy, Beinart explicitly set-out to 
‘journey through the labyrinths of official minds’ and examine how colonial ideas about 
African society and environment fed into policy making.62 Beinart’s survey of colonial 
attitudes in southern Africa has since been widely cited in the literature, though some 
have been critical of his stress on a common colonial discourse and have emphasised 
the specific local issues driving policy.63 David Anderson’s 1984 paper in African 
Affairs on colonial soil conservation in East Africa has also been widely cited in 
subsequent literature.64
Beinart and Anderson (in conjunction with Richard Grove) both followed up these 
studies with editorial efforts to bring together a wide range of different scholars 
working on issues related to conservation and development in Africa.65 Both these 
collections were important in helping open out two new avenues of inquiry in African 
historiography. Firstly they brought a dominant theme within American environmental
5° McCracken, J. ‘Colonialism, Capitalism and Ecological Crisis in Malawi: a re-assessment’ in
Anderson and Grove Conservation in Africa, pp. 63-78. See also Vail, L. ‘Ecology and History: the 
example of Eastern Zambia’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 1977,3, pp. 129-155; Giblin, J. 
The Politics o f Environmental Control in North-eastern Tanzania, 1840 -1940 (Philadelphia,1992); 
Maddox, G., Giblin, J and Kimambo, I.N. (eds) Custodians o f the land: ecology and culture in the 
history o f Tanzania (London,1996); Birley, M. ‘Resource Management in Sukumaland, Tanzania’, 
Africa, 52,1982, pp. 1-30; Richards, P. Indigenous Agricultural Revolution, (London, 1985).
60 McCracken, J. ‘Experts and Expertise in Colonial Malawi’, African Affairs, 81,1982, pp. 101-116.
61 See also John McKenzie’s work on hunting referred to above.
Beinart, W. ‘Soil Erosion, Conservation and Ideas about Development: a Southern African 
Exploration, 1900-1960’, Journal o f Southern African Studies, 11,1,1984, pp. 52-83.
63 Phimister, I. ‘Discourse and the discipline of historical context: conservationism and ideas about 
development in southern Rhodesia, 1930-1950’, Journal o f Southern African Studies, 12,2,1986, 
pp. 263-275.
64 Anderson, D. ‘Depression, dust bowl, demography and drought: the colonial state and soil 
conservation in East Africa during the 1930s’, African Affairs, 83, 332,1984, pp. 321-343.
6^ Beinart, W. (ed.) ‘Special Issue: The Politics o f Colonial Conservation’, Journal o f Southern 
African Studies, 15,2,1989; Anderson and Grove, The Politics o f Colonial Conservation.
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history, tracing the roots of modem environmental thinking,66 to the notice of Africanist 
historians, especially through the work of Richard Grove. Grove argues that the 
American literature on the ‘roots of environmentalism’ ignored the importance of ideas 
developed within the British colonial empire, especially on the small island way- 
stations along important shipping routes.67 His work on the Cape in the nineteenth 
century revealed some early conservation ideologies, often associated with Scottish 
colonial officials and missionaries, and the growth of a dessicationist ideology that tied 
de-forestation to declining rainfall.68
While Grove’s work has been widely cited it has not been criticized in the literature on 
the growth of ideas about conservation in southern Africa. Most of the small number of 
academic studies in this field have, rather, concentrated on de-bunking the romantic and 
whiggish popular histories of game preservation.69 There have been a couple of studies 
following the American tradition of biography as environmental history, tracing the 
development of one individual's ideas about conservation and how these influenced 
others.70 There have also been a number of texts glorifying pre-colonial 
conservationist ideologies and to calling for a return to these ‘traditional values’, though 
these tend not to be particularly scholarly in nature.71 Many themes within the history
66 The classic work in this field is Worster, D. Nature’s Economy: A History o f  Ecological Ideas (2nd 
edition, Cambridge, 1994).
67 Grove, R. Green Imperialism: Science, Colonial Expansion and the Emergence o f Global 
Environmentalism, 1660-1860 (Cambridge, 1994); Grove, R. ‘The Origins of environmentalism’, 
Nature, 345,3 May 1990, pp. 11-14.
68 Grove, R. ‘Early themes in African conservation: the Cape in the nineteenth century’ in Anderson 
and Grove Conservation in Africa, pp. 21-40; Grove, R. ‘Scottish Missionaries, evangelical 
discourses and the origins of conservation thinking in southern Africa 1820-1900’, Journal o f  
Southern African Studies, 15, 2,1989, pp. 163-87; Grove, R. ‘Scotland in South Africa; John 
Crombie Brown and the roots of settler environmentalism’ in Griffiths, T. and Robin, L. (eds.) 
Ecology and Empire: The Environmental History of Settler Societies (Edinburgh, 1997), pp. 139- 
153.
69 See Carruthers, J. ‘Creating a National Park, 1910-1926’, Journal o f Southern African Studies, 15,
2,1988, pp. 188-216; Carruthers, J. ‘The Dongola Wildlife Sanctuary: ‘psychological blunder, 
economic folly and political monstrosity’ or ‘more valuable than rubies and gold’, Kleio, 24,1992, 
pp. 82-100; Carruthers, J. ‘Nationhood and National Parks: Comparative Examples from a Post- 
Imperial Experience’, in Griffiths, T. and Robin, L. (eds.) Ecology and Empire: The Environmental 
History o f Settler Societies (Edinburgh, 1997), pp. 125-138; Khan, F. ‘Re-writing South Africa’s 
Conservation History: The Role of the Native Farmers Association’, Journal o f Southern African 
Studies, 20,4,1994, pp. 499-516.
7® Grove, ‘Scotland in South Africa’; Beinart, W. ‘Vets, Viruses and Environmentalism: The Cape in 
the 1870s and 1880s’ in Griffiths and Robin Ecology and Empire, pp. 87-101; Carruthers, J. 
‘Lessons from South Africa: War and Wildlife Protection in the Southern Sudan, 1917-1921’ 
(unpublished paper presented to ASA-UK Biennial Conference, University o f Lancaster, September
1994). Timm Hoffman, an ecologist, is working on the biography of John Acocks, pers. cors. 23 
October 1996.
7 1 See for example Kasere, S. ‘Campfire: Zimbabwe’s Tradition of Caring’ in United Nations Non- 
Governmental Liaison Service Sustainable Development (Voices from Africa, No. 6, Geneva:
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of environmental ideas remain unexamined, however, especially topics such as the 
development of environmental science and connections between environmental 
ideologies and racist ideologies.
The second area of research that the editorial efforts of Beinart and Anderson and 
Grove helped foster was investigations of the impact of colonial and post-colonial 
development projects on the environment. Both these collections included papers by 
scholars with backgrounds in the social and natural sciences carrying-out applied 
research into conservation and development issues.72 These contributors tended to be 
more interested in the environmental impact of projects rather than the political context 
in which they were enacted. This cross disciplinary interaction made historians 
increasingly aware of research findings that questioned the uni-lineal view of 
environmental destruction.
Some of the most influential research in this area came out of a new paradigm of range 
ecology that developed during the 1980s. The work of range management specialists 
such as Ian Scoones in Zimbabwe and Nick Able and Yvan Biot in Botswana 
challenged prior ecological theories that linked livestock populations in excess of 
carrying capacity to range degradation. Instead they emphasised the concepts of 
variability and disequilibrium, and argued that semi-arid rangelands have to be 
considered ‘event-driven’ environments. Extreme events, specifically droughts, are the 
primary agents forcing changes in the vegetational pattern of these environments rather 
than the pressure of grazing per se.73
This new ecological approach helped foster a cross-disciplinary re-evaluation of ‘the 
assumptions, theories and technologies which have underpinned interventions’ into the 
African environment.74 Many non-historians took an increasingly historical approach
1996), pp. 33-40. Khan identifies a lack of research on pre-colonial African ideas about the 
environment as one of the key lacunas in the current literature; Khan ‘Re-writing South Africa’s 
Conservation History’.
72 See for example Wilson, K. ‘Trees in fields in Southern Zimbabwe’, Journal o f  Southern African 
Studies, 15, 2,1989, pp. 369-383; Nyamapfene, K. ‘Adaptation to Marginal Land Amongst the 
Peasant Farmers of Zimbabwe’, Journal o f Southern African Studies, 15 ,2 ,1989, pp. 384-389; 
Hughes, F. ‘Conflicting Uses for Forest Resources in the Lower Tana River Basin in Kenya’ in 
Anderson and Grove, Conservation in Africa, pp. 211 - 228; Lindsay, W. K. ‘Integrating Parks and 
Pastoralists: some lessons from Amboseli’ in Anderson and Grove, Conservation in Africa, pp. 149 
-167.
73 Research by these three and others are included in the collection Behnke, R.H., Scones, I. and 
Kerven, C. (eds) Range Ecology at Disequilibrium: New Models o f Natural Variability and 
Pastoral Adaptation in African Savannas (London, 1993).
74 McGregor, J. ‘Review Article: Environmental Knowledge Under Scrutiny’, Journal o f Southern 
African Studies, 1994,20,2, pp. 317-324.
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to environmental issues across sub-Saharan Africa. Research in this field has been 
particularly vibrant in Zimbabwe where the work of Ian Scoones, Ken Wilson, JoAnne 
McGregor, Michael Drinkwater and Jocelyn Alexander all stressed the continuity 
between colonial and post-colonial environment and development policies in the 
communal areas.75 Within development studies there has also been an increased 
awareness of the fact that development policy did not suddenly start at independence 
and there have been a number of studies tracing the history of development discourse to 
its roots in the nineteenth or eighteenth century (there are differences in emphasis 
between different researchers).76
Perhaps the most striking challenge to the assumption that degradation has been a one 
way affair came from an Overseas Development Institute (ODI) study into Machakos 
District in Kenya. Archival and photographic evidence from the colonial era showed 
that this was an area thought to be suffering an environmental crisis and development 
interventions were enacted as a result. During the colonial era these interventions were 
resisted by the communities living in Machakos District. Since then, however, many of 
the policies advocated by the colonial authorities, such as the terracing of fields and 
planting of trees, have taken place without any direct government involvement. The 
ODI team argue that the primary reason for this turn-around has been population 
increase, which has forced people to use the land more productively and to invest in 
environmental improvements. This strong challenge to the dominant Malthusian 
assumptions about population and environmental degradation has received a great deal 
of attention from both environmental historians and people interested in contemporary
75 Alexander, J. H. ‘The State, Agrarian Policy and Rural Politics in Zimbabwe: case studies of Insiza 
and Chimanimani Districts, 1940-1990’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Oxford University, 1993); 
Drinkwater, M. The state and agrarian change in Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas, (London, 1991); 
Drinkwater, M. ‘Cows eat grass, don’t they? Evaluating Conflict over Pastoral Management in 
Zimbabwe’ in Croll, E. and Parkin, D. (eds.) Bush Base: Forest Farm (London, 1992), pp. 169-186; 
McGregor, J. ‘Woodland Resources: Ecology, Policy and Ideology: An Historical Case Study of 
Woodland Use in Shurugwi Communal Area, Zimbabwe’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Loughborough, 1991); Scoones, I. ‘Livestock Populations and the Household Economy: A Case 
Study from Southern Zimbabwe’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1990); Scoones,
I. ‘Politics, Polemics and Pastures: Range Management Science and Policy in Southern Africa’ in 
Leach, M. and Meams, R. (eds) Lie o f the Land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the African 
Environment (London, 1996), pp.34-53; Scoones, I. and Wilson, K. ‘Households, Lineage Groups 
and Ecological Dynamics’ in Cousins, B., Jackson, C. and Scoones, I. (eds) Socio-economic 
Dimensions o f Livestock Production in the Communal Lands o f Zimbabwe (Harare, 1988); Wilson, 
K. ‘Trees in fields in southern Zimbabwe’.
76 Cowen, M.P. and Shenton, R.W. Doctrines o f Development (London, 1996); Cowen, M.P. and 
Shenton, R.W ‘The Invention of Development’ in Crush, J. (ed.) Power o f Development (London,
1995), pp. 27-43; Watts, M. ‘A New Deal in Emotions: Theory and Practice and the Crisis of 
Development’ in Crush Power o f Development, pp. 44-62; Porter, D.J. ‘Scenes from Childhood:
The Homesickness of Development Discourse’ in Crush, Power o f Development, pp. 63-86.
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Figure 1.4 Vegetational change in southern Machakos district, Kenya according 
to an ActionAid Participatory Rural Appraisal project and according 
to an Overseas Development Institute project team77
Q.
V  ..
O o
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
1952 High level of deforestation due to increase in population accompanied with settlement and fanning 
(shifting cultivation). 1965 Introduction of exotic trees in the area. 1974 Charcoal burning started. 1985 
Ceasing of charcoal burning due to lack of trees. 1986-1988 Nurseries started by community groups.
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Ground cover percentages derived from black and white aerial photographs 
and from field inventory in 1990.
The ActionAid PRA indicates people believe that tree 
cover has significantly decreased since the 1950s. 
Evidence from aerial photography indicates that the 
opposite is actually the case and the area covered by 
trees has increased.
environmental issues.78 Figure 1.4 indicates how the findings reported by the ODI 
team contradict prior descriptions of the direction of environmental degradation in the
77 ActionAid, Lifestyle Overload ?: Population and Environment in the Balance. A Report o f the 
ActionAid Seminar held at Commonwealth House, London, on 20 November 1991, (edited by 
Johnson, V. ActionAid Development Report No. 5, London, n.d. [c.1991]), p. 7; Tiffin, Mortimore 
and Gichuki, More People, Less Erosion, (Table 8.1).
7  ^ Tiffen, M., Mortimore, M. and Gichuki, F. More People, Less Erosion: Environmental Recovery in 
Kenya (London, 1994); Tiffen, M. and Mortimore, M. Environment, Population Growth and 
Productivity in Kenya: A Case Study o f Machakos District (International Institute of Environment 
and Development Drylands Network Programme Issue Paper, No. 47, London, 1994).
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area. Figure 1.4 also highlights a potential problem in using oral history to reconstruct 
past environmental change. Recent research from Uganda supports both the conclusion 
that increased population does not necessarily mean more environmental degradation 
and the problems associated with oral history as a way of re-constructing environmental 
change.79
This work on environmental change complements research on American environmental 
history which stresses transformations rather than degradation.80 Beinart has again 
been at the forefront in introducing this literature to an Africanist audience, most 
notably through his monograph with Peter Coates comparing South African and United 
States environmental history (concentrating on the period between the mid-19th and 
20th centuries).81 The idea of transformation rather than destruction has also informed 
his recent research into the pastures of the Karoo region of South Africa. This work 
provides a good example of the possibilities of cross-fertilisation between the work of 
ecologists and other natural scientists and environmental historians.82 His research on 
the Karoo is included in a collection of papers, cleverly entitled The Lie o f the Land, 
from across the continent which argue against a uni-linear view of environmental 
destruction.83 The publication of this collection arguably marks the firm entrenchment 
of this new perspective on African environmental change, at least within academic 
circles.
1.3.1.Secondary literature on Lesotho
Given Lesotho’s long-standing reputation as a country suffering from both acute soil 
erosion and low agricultural productivity there has been surprisingly little attention paid 
to colonial conservation and development policies. The major texts on the economic
70 Lindblade, K., Tumuhairwe, J.K., Carswell, G., Nkwiine, C. and Bwamiki, D. ‘More People, More 
Fallow: The Myth of Over-cultivation in Kabale District, Uganda’ (unpublished paper, 1996).
80 Worster, D. ‘Seeing Beyond Culture’, Journal o f American History (Roundtable: Environmental 
History), 76,1990, pp. 1078-1106; Cronin, W. Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists and the 
Ecology o f New England (New York, 1983).
81 Beinart, W. and Coates, P. Environment and History: The Taming o f Nature in the USA and South 
Africa (London, 1995).
82 Beinart, W. ‘Environmental Destruction in Southern Africa: Soil Erosion, Animals and Pastures 
Over The Longer Term’ in Driver, T. and Chapman, G. (eds.) Time-scales and Environmental 
Change (London, 1996), pp. 149-168. In this paper Beinart makes good use of ecological research 
by Timm Hoffman and R. Cowling which argues against the widely held belief that semi-arid 
Karoo vegetation is spreading into wetter areas (often couched in terms of a ‘desert on the march’); 
Hoffman, T. and Cowling, R. ‘Vegetation Change In The Semi-Arid Eastern Karoo Over The Last 
200 Years: An Expanding Karoo - Fact or Fiction?’, South African Journal o f Science, 86,1990, 
pp. 286-294.
83 Beinart, W. ‘Environmental Destruction in Southern Africa: Soil Erosion, Animals and Pastures 
Over The Longer Term’ in Leach and Meams The Lie o f the Land, pp. 54-72.
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history of Lesotho have tended to concentrate on the period between c. 1830s and 
c. 1930s and on the growth and subsequent decline of the Basotho peasant agricultural 
sector.84 The migrant labour system has dominated the historiography of Lesotho both 
as subject of inquiry itself and as the chief explanatory factor in its economic history.85 
The relationship between chiefs, commoners and the colonial state has also been well 
covered, though this has tended to be in relation to studies of the growth of organised 
political movements.86
The lack of interest in late colonial development policy is surprising compared to the 
huge interest in Lesotho as a recipient of development aid during the 1970s and 1980s 
and the underlying continuity in development policy. One of the results of this huge 
interest in post-colonial Lesotho amongst development organisations was the Lesotho
84 Eldredge, E. A South African Kingdom: the Pursuit o f Security in Nineteenth Century Lesotho, 
(Cambridge, 1993); Kimble, J. ‘Clinging to the Chiefs: Some Contradictions of Colonial Rule in 
Basutoland, c.1890-1930’ in Bernstein, H. and Campbell, B. K. (eds) Contradictions o f 
Accumulation in Africa: Studies in Economy and State (London, 1985), pp. 25-69; Kimble, J. 
’Labour Migration in Basutoland, 1870-1885’ in Marks, S. and Rathbone, R. (eds.) 
Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa: African Class Formation, Culture and 
Consciousness, 1870-1930 (London, 1982), pp. 119-141; Kimble, J. ‘Towards an Understanding of 
the Political Economy of Lesotho: the Origins of Commodity Production and Migrant Labour, 
1830-C.1885’ (unpublished Masters thesis, National University of Lesotho, 1978).
85 Bonner, P. ‘“Desirable or Undesirable Basotho Women?” Liquor, Prostitution and the Migration of 
Basotho Women to the Rand, 1920-1945’ in Walker, C. (ed.) Women and Gender in Southern 
Africa to 1945 (Cape Town, 1990), pp. 221-250; Guy, J. and Thabane, M. ‘Technology, Ethnicity 
and Ideology: Basotho Miners and Shaft-Sinking on the South African Gold Mines’, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 14, 2,1988, pp. 257-278; Guy, J. and Thabane, M. ‘Basotho Miners, Oral 
History and Workers Strategies’ in Kaarsholm Cultural Struggle and Development, pp. 239-258; 
Maloka, T. ‘Basotho and the Mines: Towards a History of Labour Migrancy, c. 1890-1940’ 
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 1995); Maloka, T. ‘All Chiefs are Shepherds: 
Populism and Labour Migration in Colonial Lesotho, 1886-1940’ (unpublished paper presented at 
Societies of Southern Africa Seminar Series, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of 
London, 21 October 1995); Maloka, T. ‘Khomo Lia Oela: Canteens, Brothels and Labour Migrancy 
in Colonial Lesotho, 1900-40’, Journal o f African History, 38,1997, pp. 101-122; Murray, ‘From 
Granary to Labour Reserve’.
8b Coplan, D. and Quinlan, T. ‘A Chief By the People: Nation versus State in Lesotho’, Africa, 67,1, 
1997, pp. 25-59; Edgar, R. Prophets with Honour - a Documentary History ofLekotla la Bafo 
(Johannesburg, 1990); Machobane, L. B. B. J. The Political Dilemma o f  Chieftaincy in Colonial 
Lesotho with Reference to the Administration and Court Reforms o f 1938 (Institute of Southern 
African Studies, National University of Lesotho, Occasional Paper, No. 1, Roma,1986); 
Machobane, L. B. B. J. Government and Change in Lesotho, 1800-1966: A Study of Political 
Institutions (Basingstoke, 1990); Neocosmos, M. ‘Towards a History of Nationalities in Southern 
Africa’ (unpublished paper presented at Dimensions of Economic and Political Reform in 
Contemporary Africa conference, Kampala, 8 April 1994); Rugege, S. ‘The Chieftainship and 
Society in Lesotho: a study in the political economy of the Basotho chieftancy from pre-colonial 
times to the present’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Oxford, 1993); Weisfelder, R. F. 
Defining National Purpose in Lesotho (Papers in International Studies, Africa Series No. 3, Athens, 
Ohio, 1969); Weisfelder, R. F. The Basotho Monachy: A Spent Force or a Dynamic Political 
Factor? (Papers in International Studies, Africa Series No. 16, Athens, Ohio, 1972); Weisfelder, R.
F. ‘Early Voices of Protest in Basutoland: The Progressive Association and Lekotla la Bafo’, 
African Studies Review 17,1974, pp. 397-409.
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Agricultural Sector Analysis (LASA) project. The project aimed to collect the data 
necessary for more planned interventions into the rural economy of Lesotho and 
included a study of past soil and water conservation projects.87 The analysis of colonial 
projects was confined almost entirely to describing what had taken place according to 
official reports, though the authors did note an apparent shift in policy away from 
physical engineering approaches during the 1950s, despite the reports that these had 
been a success.88 An annotated bibliography on water and soil conservation by 
Qalabane Chakela also made the point that the reports of success in official documents 
did not tally with the fact that they were suddenly dropped with no further comment.89
Both Nobe and Seckler’s and Chakela’s work was primarily concerned with the 
technical side of soil and water conservation and development and how past 
experiences could feed into contemporary initiatives. Chakela undertook a more in- 
depth study of soil and conservation policies and projects in his chapter on Lesotho in a 
general SADC history of soil and water conservation.90 Discussion of colonial projects 
is dominated by the massive programme of contour bank construction initiated in the 
1930s. Chakela’s analysis is still largely concerned with the technical aspects of the 
projects, rather than their political and economic context and consequences, though his 
work supports Showers's analysis of the contour bank building programme.
Kate Showers has studied the impact of these policies on the physical environment and, 
with Gwendolen Malahleha, on the attitude of people whose land was 
‘protected’towards the contour banks.91 They argue that the policies often had a 
negative effect on rates of erosion, and were resented and frequently resisted by the 
local populations. In line with much of the contemporary literature in development 
studies, and in the tradition of authors such as Kjekshus, Showers sees pre-colonial 
techniques of resource management as being environmentally sound. In contrast to 
much of the literature on the livestock sector (discussed below) she views increased soil 
erosion on lowland arable lands as being the direct result of ill conceived colonial anti-
87 Nobe K.C. and Seckler, D. W. An Economic and Policy Analysis o f Soil Water Problems and 
Conservation Programmes in the Kingdom of Lesotho (LASA Research Report No. 3., Maseru, 
1979).
88 Nobe and Seckler, An Economic and Policy Analysis o f Soil Water Problems, p. 59.
89 Chakela, Q.K. Review and Bibliography: Water and Soil Resources o f Lesotho, 1935-1970 
(Uppsala, 1973), p.13.
90 S ADC-ELMS, History o f Soil Conservation in the SADC region: a collection o f  eight national 
studies and a summary report (Maseru, 1987).
91 Showers, K. ‘Soil Erosion in the Kingdom of Lesotho: Origins and Colonial Response, 1830- 
1950s’, Journal o f Southern African Studies, 15,2,1989, pp. 263-286; Showers K. and Malahleha,
G. M. ‘Oral Evidence in Historical Environmental Impact Assessment: Soil Conservation in 
Lesotho in the 1930s and 1940s’, Journal o f Southern African Studies, 18,2,1992, pp. 276-296.
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erosion policy.92 Showers, therefore, dates the on-set of accelerated environmental 
degradation to the late 1930s, when the anti-soil erosion programme got underway.
She uses oral history to show that there was little evidence of degradation in the 1930s, 
though there are reasons to be cautious about these findings. Evidence from elsewhere 
indicates that oral history may be a particularly unreliable way of re-constructing a 
picture of past environmental conditions (see Figure 1.4).93
James McCann has recently used a number of additional sources to re-examine Showers 
research. While he agrees with her general ‘disturbance’ thesis he traces its roots to an 
earlier period and to changes in agricultural techniques. McCann particularly 
emphasises the impact of deep ploughing introduced during the nineteenth century and 
Basotho farmers responses to new market opportunities. He also emphasises the point 
that there are particular physical characteristics of the duplex, sodic soils of the 
lowlands that make them especially susceptible to erosion.94
McCann’s point about the physical properties of the lowland soils is supported by 
recent research by Meena Singh, a physical geographer. Singh examines the 
phenomenon of soil erosion in the Lesotho lowlands on a number of different time- 
scales. She argues that the geological history of the highly eroded lowland soils 
indicates that they were formed by soil erosion in the past, under a different 
hydrological regime. The dongas that scar the lowlands of Lesotho are a result of the 
continued re-working of these deposits and human impact is ‘more an acceleration of a 
pseudo-cyclic natural process, than an initiation of a new process regime’.95
Colonial conservation and development projects other than the physical anti-erosion 
works have received little attention. Sandra Wallman’s Take Out Hunger, published in 
1969, remains the only monograph specifically to analyse colonial development 
projects. Wallman carried out applied anthropological research into one of the two case 
studies she presents, the Farmech Mechanisation Scheme, and analysed the second, the 
Taung Reclamation Scheme, using secondary materials and project documents.96
92 Showers ‘Soil Erosion in the Kingdom of Lesotho’.
93 See also Linblade, ‘Discrepancies in understanding historical land use changes’.
94 McCann, J. Green Land, Brown Land, Black Land: An Environmental History o f Africa, 1800-1996 
(in press), chapter 7.
95 Singh, ‘Geological, Historical and Present-day Erosion and Colluvation in Lesotho’.
96 Wallman, S. Take Out Hunger: Two Case Studies o f Rural Development in Basutoland (London,
1969).
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Her detailed descriptions of the projects and the reasons for their failure have not been 
followed-up in subsequent research. This may be because the more theoretical articles 
she published on the basis of her fieldwork emphasised individual psychological factors 
to explain Lesotho’s ‘non-development’ and have, therefore, been associated with a 
liberal historiography emphasising economic dualism.97 While Colin Murray’s 
characterisation of Wallman’s theoretical arguments as ‘reductionist and ahistoric’98 is 
valid, there is much excellent primary research in Take Out Hunger that could be built 
on in further studies of colonial development policies. The ‘Farmech’ project was in 
progress at the time of Wallman’s fieldwork, and one obvious research project would be 
to see how the project fared in subsequent years and assess its long-term impact on the 
lowland regions of Mafeteng district.
Another fascinating area of research is suggested by A.F. Robertson in an article on the 
career of James Jacob Machobane. During the 1950s Machobane established a 
remarkable organisation in Lesotho designed to increase agricultural production rapidly, 
mainly through inter-cropping, and thus to ‘banish hunger’ from the country. Though a 
number of colonial officials gave the ‘Machobane system’ a degree of support many in 
the Department of Agriculture (both before and after Independence) regarded it as a 
threat and Machobane argues his movement was deliberately undermined and 
eventually destroyed.99 Robertson’s article is based almost entirely on an interview 
with Machobane and a few official published sources: archival information on the 
colonial officials attitudes and actions towards Machobane and his organisation are 
available in the Lesotho National Archives (LNA) and the relationship could prove to 
be a fascinating, and important, research topic.100
There is a fairly extensive literature on rangeland degradation and grazing regimes in 
the mountains,101 though little of this considers the issues for the colonial period. Tim
07 Wallman, S. ‘Conditions of Non-development: The Case of Lesotho’, Journal o f  Development
Studies, 8 ,2 ,1972 , pp. 251-262; Wallman, S. ‘The modernisation of dependence: a further note on 
Lesotho’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 3 ,1 ,1976, pp. 102-108.
Murray, C. ‘From Granary to Labour Reserve’ p.4.
99 Robertson, A..F. ‘Popular Scientist: James Jacob Machobane and Mantsa Tala', African Affairs, 93, 
1994, pp. 99-121.
100 LNA B3597/11, J.J. Machobane’s Agricutlural System, 1958.
101 Dobb, A. J. ‘The Organization of Range Use in Lesotho, Southern Africa: A Review of Attempted 
Modifications and Case Study’ (unpublished Masters dissertation, Washington State University, 
1985); Government of Lesotho, Ministry of Agriculture and Marketing, Seminar on the 
Productivity o f Mountain Livestock, Mazenod, Lesotho, 16 July 1984 (Maseru, n.d. [c. 1984]); 
Swallow, B. M., Mokitimi, N. and Brokken, R.F. Cattle Marketing in Lesotho (Research Division 
Bulletin RD-B-49/ISAS Research Report No. 13, Maseru, 1986); Swallow, B. M., Motsamai, *M., 
Sopeng, L., Brokken, R. F. and Storey, G.G. A Survey of the Production, Utilisation and Marketing 
of Livestock Products in Lesotho (Research Division Report RD-R-81/ISAS Research Report No.
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Quinlan discusses colonial livestock development policies in his article in Journal o f 
Southern African Studies , but his purpose is essentially to contrast these with post­
colonial policies in the livestock sector.102 Some of his arguments will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 2. D.S. Uys put together a useful factual account of the history of 
the mohair industry in Lesotho, though for the colonial period it is based more or less 
entirely on official documents.103 Some of the most detailed descriptions of colonial 
policies in the livestock sector are given by Daniel Phororo in his official report on the 
livestock sector written in the late 1970s.104 Surprisingly Phororo makes no mention of 
the 1947 closure policy in Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek in his report and told me in an 
interview in 1995 that he had never even heard of the closure policy.105 The closure 
policy is only mentioned briefly in a couple of studies on the livestock sector in Lesotho 
either quoting the Department of Agriculture Annual Reports or Patrick Duncan’s 1960 
textbook Sotho Law and Custom.106
17, Maseru, 1987); Ivy, D. and Turner, S. ‘Range Management Areas and Grazing Associations - 
experience at Sehlabathebe, Lesotho’ in Centre for Development Co-operation Services (eds) 
Successful Natural Resource Management in Southern Africa, (Windhoek, 1996), pp. 117-146; 
Klosterman, E.W. Livestock Production in Siloe, Nyakosoba andMolumong Areas (Agricultural 
Research Technical Bulletin, RD-B-11, Maseru, 1983); Lawry, S. Livestock and Range 
Management in Sehlabathebe (Land Conservation and Range Development Project (USAID), 
Range Management Division, Ministry of Agriculture, Maseru, 1986); Lawry S. ‘Communal 
Grazing and Range Management: the Case of Grazing Associations in Lesotho’ in African 
Livestock Policy Analysis Network (International Livestock Centre for Africa, No. 13, Addis 
Ababa, 1987); Limbach, ‘Current State of Range Management and Development in Lesotho’.
*92 Quinlan, T. ‘Grassland Degradation and Livestock Rearing in Lesotho’, Journal o f Southern 
African Studies, 21, 3,1995, pp.491-507.
103 uys, D. S. The Lesotho Mohair Industry: History and Evaluation, 1970 and 5 more years (Maseru, 
1971).
104 phororo, D. R. Livestock Farming in Lesotho and Pasture Utilisation: Analysis and Suggested 
National Policy (No. 4 in Series, The Anatomy of Lesotho's Agricultural Development Section, 
Maseru, 1979). Phororo worked in the Ministry of Agriculture both before and after Independence, 
eventually becoming the Permanent Secretary in the 1970s. The report cited above was written 
specifically because it was feared his departure from the Ministry in 1979, to take up a post with 
the FAO, would mean the government was no longer able to access his personal knowledge and 
expertise. In 1986 he become the de facto Minister of Agriculture in the military government of 
Major General Lekhanya, though his position with the FAO officially barred him from political 
office. He left the government in 1990 and set-up a veterinary practice on the outskirts of Maseru.
!95 Interview with Daniel Phororo, 25 April 1995, Maseru.
196 Duncan, P. Sotho Laws and Customs: A handbook based on decided cases in Basutoland together 
with the Laws ofLerotholi (Cape Town, 1960), p. 78; Quinlan, T. The Livestock Economy in the 
Mountain Zone o f Lesotho (Socio-economic Project Report of the Maluti/Drakensberg Catchment 
Conservation Programme, May 1989), p. 30; Swallow, B. M., Motsamai, 'M., Sopeng, L. and 
Storey. G.G. Livestock Development and Range Utilisation In Lesotho (Research Division Report 
RD-R-82/ISAS Research Report No. 18, Maseru, 1987) p. 23; Lawry, S. ‘Private Herds and 
Common Lands: Issues in the Management of Communal Land in Lesotho’ (unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1988), p. 107-108.
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Most of the literature on current grazing regimes and development policy refer to the
past simply to provide a benchmark against which present degradation can me
measured. Raymond Staples and W.K. Hudson’s 1938 Ecological Survey is widely
cited in this literature as an example of both the long-standing nature of range
degradation and an indication of how the solutions to the problem are well known but
have never been implemented.107 In contrast to much of the colonial discourse on
Basotho livestock management, and in line with most contemporary development
studies literature, the modem reports on livestock development in Lesotho tend to argue
that elements of the pre-colonial grazing strategies were environmentally sensitive.
This literature tends to regard the colonial period as a time when many of the current
problems with the grazing regime were initiated. Colonialism introduced ‘external
markets and entrepreneurship’ which ‘undermined the local institutions’ and led to
people acting in their own economic self-interest rather than in the interests of the
community.108 The colonial government did try to institute sensible grazing
management policies, but these lacked any popular support:
However well conceived, these laws proved to be ineffective; perhaps they were 
perceived by the Basotho people as an imposition of expatriate (colonial) 
values.109
1.3.2. Where this thesis fits into the secondary literature
This thesis is the first to deal specifically with the history of colonial livestock 
development policies in Lesotho. The 1947 closure policy briefly mentioned elsewhere 
forms the central point around which this thesis is built.
While the thesis falls within the broad category of environmental history it does not set- 
out to trace the way in which the mountain environment was been transformed over the 
colonial period. Nor does it attempt to trace the impact of the closure policy on the 
environment. Indeed it argues that the policy had no direct impact on the environment 
as it was never implemented. Nevertheless I have been heavily influenced by the 
growing literature challenging the view of uni-linear environmental degradation and I 
reject the notion that the pastures of the mountain area of Lesotho have shown 
continuous degradation in response to increased population pressures. In chapter 5 1 
marshal some of the new ecological thinking on African rangelands in support of my 
argument that any observations of changing conditions in the rangeland in the period
107 See for example Limbach ‘Current State of Range Management’, p. 73.
108 Swallow et.al Livestock Development and Range Utilisation, p. 22.
109 Limbach ‘Current State of Range Management’, p. 74.
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mid-1940s to mid-1950s had nothing to do with the implementation of the closure 
policy. It is also used to provide an alternative ‘reading’ of the environmental 
conditions which colonial officials and others believed indicated range degradation.
The emphasis on the political and socio-economic causes and consequences of the 
policy in the mountain zone, and the short-time frame, make the thesis akin to the rural 
social history that has concentrated on resistance to the colonial state and on rural class 
formation. Indeed, as I suggested at the start of this chapter, that is where my primary 
early influences lay. Like much of the social history the thesis uses oral history as a 
way of avoiding the biases and assumptions of the archival record. Unlike most cases 
where oral history is used, however, it does not provide a more nuanced version of 
events and trends reported in the written record: rather the oral history flatly contradicts 
the official history. Though oral evidence on the state of the pastures during the period 
in question was also collected whilst in the field I have tended to avoid using it to re­
construct a picture of past environmental conditions partially for reasons outlined above 
but also as none of the oral testimonies provided me with a firm picture of 
environmental change in the decade following the ‘war with Hitler’.110
Another field of environmental history, tracing the development of ideas about the 
environment, is well represented in the thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 clearly build on the 
work of academics such as Grove, Beinart, Anderson and McCracken. The emphasis is 
perhaps more on the history of science that the existing literature in this vein, an area I 
would identify as being under-represented. I also place emphasis on the role ideas 
about post-war re-construction played in the accelerated intervention in the second half 
of the 1940s, unlike the previous literature which has tended to see the war as simply an 
intermission in the growing concerns sparked off primarily by the global depression in 
the early 1930s.
My stress on the importance of colonial ideologies of environment and development to 
the increased intervention in the African environment does not mean that I totally reject 
structuralist explanations. Clearly colonial development policy in Lesotho has to 
understood in connection with the migrant labour system and capitalist growth in South 
Africa. Nevertheless it is not adequate to explain all the actions of the colonial state in 
Lesotho as primarily concerned with ensuring that the territory continued to subsidise 
the costs of reproduction of the migrant labour force. Indeed I would argue that a 
primary motivation of the colonial state, especially in the post-war period, was to 
ensure its own reproduction and to prevent the transfer of administration to the Union
HO See chapter 9 for details of how I carried-out the oral hisory for this thesis.
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government. The transfer issue is central to the history of livestock development in 
Lesotho.
Most literature on the economic history of Lesotho has been based on South African 
historiography. In this thesis, especially in chapter 7 ,1 tend to stress the differences 
between Lesotho and the South African reserves. In sections of the thesis dealing with 
the relationship between chiefs and the colonial state I have tried to introduce literature 
from the indirect rule colonies to the north of the Limpopo, especially in connection 
with the politics of land allocation. I have also attempted to incorporate some of the 
recent literature on the history of development, much of which has come from people 
working outside of the discipline of history. It is to this literature that I turn in the next 
chapter.
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2. Conservation, development and order
Development and conservation and are often seen as being two opposing ideas: the 
former aimed at transforming both society and the physical environment and the later 
aimed at protecting the physical environment from being transformed by society. In the 
1980s and 1990s efforts to marry the two concepts (Integrated Conservation and 
Development Projects, Sustainable Development) have been thought of as new, 
challenging and a departure from previous orthodoxy. The growing literature on 
colonial African rural development projects clearly shows, however, that the linking of 
conservation and development has a far longer history. In this chapter I will explore the 
history of development as an entry point into a discussion of the major arguments 
underlying my thinking about colonial development policies in the mountain areas of 
Lesotho.
In an article in the Journal o f Southern African Studies Tim Quinlan argues that
colonial and post-colonial interventions in the livestock sector of Lesotho have been
marked by an intrinsic ambiguity:
On the one hand, the projects implicitly disavow the notion of natural ecological 
limits, asserting that creative intervention will protect the grassland, and allow 
more (improved) stock on the land. On the other hand, a premise of the projects 
is that livestock have overgrazed the grassland, and thus they implicitly blame 
stock-owners for having transgressed natural limits. This judgement is expressed 
in the restrictions which the projects impose on use of the grassland, and which 
are reminiscent of the preservationist ideology of conservation.1
During the colonial period, Quinlan argues, it was the first side of this dichotomous
equation that held sway. In the post-colonial period grassland conservation issues
have come to the fore:
A discernible difference between colonial and post-colonial lies in the role 
attributed to stock-owners. Colonial projects emphasised livestock as the critical 
resource and, wittingly and unwittingly, allowed Basotho to manage the 
grassland. Post-colonial interventions have begun to emphasise grassland as the 
critical resource, in terms of its bio-physical capacity to support other economic 
activities.2
Evidence presented in this thesis will clearly show that when Quinlan states that ‘little 
attention was paid to the conservation of grazing land [during the colonial era]’3 he is 
simply mistaken. Ironically, however, I accept Quinlan’s implicit argument that 
colonial interventions in the livestock sector could be characterised as developmentalist. 
They were also , however, conservationist.
1 Quinlan, ‘Grassland Degradation’, p. 491.
2 Quinlan, ‘Grassland Degradation’, p. 496.
3 Quinlan, ‘Grassland Degradation’, p. 494.
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Implicit to Quinlan’s analysis are orthodox ‘development studies’ definitions of 
development and conservation. Development is conceived of as simply a process of 
improvement, essentially measured through an increase in output (though the use of 
quote marks indicates some scepticism about these claims on the part of development). 
Conservation, on the other hand, relates simply to the ‘bio-physical’ realm and can be 
measured by the proximity of the environment to its natural state. These definitions are 
then read back to the colonial period and government actions are labelled according to 
their fit to the modem definition.
Historians of colonial interventions into African rural society and the African 
environment have, by contrast, used the terms conservation and development almost 
interchangeably. Beinart’s seminal 1984 article used the terms conservation and 
development in its title but the text spoke mainly of conservation, conservationism and 
conservationist ideologies, while the term development tended to be reserved for post- 
1960 state interventions; again with quote marks implying that these interventions were 
somehow not authentic development4
Similarly Anderson, in his article in African Affairs, tends to refer to interventions in the 
1930s as conservationist, but in the conclusion to the article he implies that the 
interventions marked the ‘beginnings of “development”’.5 Neither Anderson nor 
Beinart examine the meaning of these two terms. It is clear that their understanding of 
the term conservation is closely tied to the productive capacity of land, rather than its 
proximity to a ‘natural state’, and the concept is, therefore, more easily reconcilable 
with the concept of development. Quote marks around the word development also 
suggest a divergence between the outcome of these interventions and the outcome of 
authentic development: i.e. these interventions did not lead to a widespread 
improvement in the human condition of the population of these areas.
While I would argue that Anderson is correct to describe these early interventions as 
‘development’ (though for reasons that I hope will become apparent I would leave out 
the quote marks) the potential for confusion caused by competing definitions of the 
term means that it is necessary to explore the history of the concept explicitly.
4 Beinart, ‘Soil Erosion, Conservation and Ideas about Development’.
5 Anderson, ‘Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography and Drought’, p. 343. Again note the quote 
marks around development
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2.1. History of development
2.1.1. Development, progress and modernity
Despite the impression created by the many development studies text books that assume 
development has its roots in the years immediately following the Second World War,6 
development has a long and complex history. The texts that do consider the history of 
development often look for its roots in the late eighteenth century Enlightenment and 
the ‘epoch of modernity’.7 Michael Watts argues that shortly after the word 
development entered the English language in the eighteenth century it attracted to itself 
a powerful metaphorical association with ideas about biological growth. It also bore a 
close affinity to teleological views of history, science and progress.8 The rise of a 
teleological view of history is frequently associated with Adam Smith and the Scottish 
Enlightenment. In many of the texts that do consider the pre-1945 history of the 
concept, Smith is cited as the forefather of development because of his belief that 
human society passed through a series of stages, from hunting and fishing, through 
pastoralism and settled agriculture to commerce and manufacture.9 Furthermore 
Smith’s concentration on the desire of the individual to pursue pleasure placed wealth, 
value and accumulation at the centre of economic theory; the concepts that still 
dominate most development discourses in the late twentieth century.10
Others, such as Kate Manzo, look back beyond Smith to Thomas Hobbes and to John
Locke. Manzo cites Hobbes because of the binary distinctions he makes between
science and superstition, man and beast, man and child, order and anarchy, sanity and
madness, sense and nonsense and reason and passion. The creation of an ‘Other’ is
central to Hobbes scheme and
Although Hobbes did not speak in terms of underdevelopment, the logic of 
Leviathan provides an exemplary illustration of modem understandings of that 
term. To be underdeveloped was to exist in a condition of unreason, marked by 
the absence of industry, culture, navigation, trade, comfort, knowledge of the 
earth, time, art, letters and society. For Hobbes, this mode of living in continual 
fear and danger was exemplified by children and ‘savages’ and attributable either
6 Some texts pinpoint an exact date: 20 January 1949; the day of Harry Truman’s inaugural address
as US President when he declared: ‘We must embark on a bold new program for making the
benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas’; quoted by Porter, D. ‘The Homesickness of Development 
Discourses’, p. 66.
7 Manzo, K. ‘Black Consciousness and the Quest for a Counter-Modernist Development’ in Crush, 
Power o f Development, p. 228-252.
8 Watts, ‘A New Deal in Emotions’.
9 Cowen and Shenton, Doctrines o f Development.
10 Lasch, C. The True and Only Heaven, (New York, 1991), p. 52, quoted in Watts, ‘A New Deal in 
Emotions’, p. 48.
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to the absence of science ('ignorance’) or to the presence of superstition and its 
reliance upon ‘false rules’. 11
Manzo also marshals John Locke into the proto-development fold, arguing that his
Second Treatise o f Government was also reliant upon a spatial and temporal distancing
of ‘us’ from ‘them’. Rational man had created human comfort and progress through the
application of labour to land. Those, such as the native inhabitants of the Americas,
who had not improved their land through labour (described by Locke as being in ‘an
imperfect state of Childhood’) needed the guardianship of rational civilised man to be
brought to reason.12
The linking of development and modernity, and the incantation of Hobbes, Locke and 
Smith as the forefathers of development discourse, ironically relies upon many of the 
internally contradictory aspects of the word that these explorations seek to explain. 
Manzo’s linking of the ‘Othering’ of Hobbes and Locke to development is only 
possible by blurring the distinction between development as a state and development as 
a process. Watts’s concentration on the connection between development and 
Enlightenment views of progress similarly blurs the distinction between development as 
an innate process and an intentional project. In general the linking of development and 
modernity would seem to have little to offer as a tool for sharpening the focus on either 
of these two complex, diffuse and contested terms.
2.1.2. Development and positivism
Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton’s recent research tracing the history of 
development discourse appears to have much more to offer.13 They identify the roots 
of what they label development doctrine in early nineteenth century European reactions 
to the socially disruptive outcomes of rapid industrialisation and capitalist growth. 
Central to the elaboration of development doctrine were the ideas of the French 
positivists, especially Henri de Saint Simon and Auguste Comte, often described as the 
founder of the discipline of sociology.
Saint Simon and his followers, living through the era of the French Revolution and the 
rise of industrial capitalism, addressed the problem of creating order in a society 
undergoing rapid transformation. The Saint Simonians argued that the thinkers of the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution had succeeded in destroying the old basis of
11 Manzo ‘Black Consciousness and the Quest for a Counter-Modernist Development’, p. 233; citing 
Campbell, D. Writing Security: US Foreign Policy and the Politics o f Identity, (Minneapolis, 1992).
12 Manzo ‘Black Consciousness and the Quest for a Counter-Modernist Development’, p. 235.
13 Cowen and Shenton, Doctrines o f Development and Cowen and Shenton ‘The Invention of 
Development’. The following paragraphs are closely based on these two sources.
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political and economic order. This had been necessary; but they had been unable to 
create a new theory and practice upon which to build a new era of order and stability. 
Most importantly of all, the growth of capitalism had created the spectre of 
unemployment and a relative surplus population. By putting a premium upon the self- 
interested action of the rational individual the Enlightenment thinkers had compounded 
the problem of social disorder. The Saint Simonians argued that the present epoch of 
disorder had to be transformed through active purpose by those who were entrusted 
with the future of society.
While Comte agreed with much from his Saint Simonian predecessors he argued that 
their project of reconciling order and progress was premature and it was first necessary 
to create a new science of history, or sociology. Crucially Comte argued that there 
needed to be a reformulation of the concept of order in line with natural laws. In the 
natural world progress was orderly and in keeping with these universal laws but in the 
human realm progress was restless and inconsistent. It was development that would 
bring order to progress. Knowledge was the pre-requisite for this reconciliation 
between order and progress: for ordered progress to be continuously reproduced it was 
necessary simply to develop the encyclopaedias of knowledge and then to apply their 
wisdom.
Positivist knowledge was restricted to the few (‘the high priests of positivism’14) but 
altruism, a primary principal of Comte’s positivism, meant that ordered progress would 
lead to the collective good. Comte argued, however, that care should be taken in 
transferring the ‘ideas customs and institutions’ of civilised men ‘indiscriminately and... 
indiscreetly’ to the ‘less civilised’ as such action would likely lead to the ‘gravest 
political unrest’.15 The positivist ideas first needed to be explored and tested amongst 
society’s elite before being transferred to the rest of humanity.
I have gone into some detail on nineteenth-century positivist thought because out of 
these ideas it is possible to distil three essential features of development that have 
implications for this study. First, development was conceptualised as a way of 
ameliorating or controlling the negative or destructive elements of progress, especially 
relative surplus population, and creating order out of disorder. Secondly, it involved an 
active transformation or an intention to develop. Thirdly, development was to be
14 Cowen and Shenton ‘The Invention of Development’, p. 35.
15 Andreski, S. (ed.) The Essential Comte: selected from the Cours de Philo sophie Positive (London, 
1974), p. 200-1, quoted in Cowen and Shenton, Doctrines o f  Development, p. 35
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entrusted to individuals who possess the necessary skills or knowledge to see through 
the intention to develop, what Cowen and Shenton label as trusteeship.
2.1.3. From French positivism to British colonial development policy
Cowen and Shenton argue that there is a direct genealogical lineage between 
nineteenth-century French positivist thinking and twentieth-century development 
doctrines in British colonial Africa. Ironically it was one of the foremost theorists of 
liberal democracy, James Stuart Mill, who arguably did most to introduce positivism 
into British political and economic theory.
Mill was heavily influenced by French positivist thinking and his analysis of the crisis 
of mid-century British industrial society echoed many of their theories. He broke with 
the positivist thinkers, however, over their solution for a swift transformation of society 
from its present disordered state through the direction of a few individuals of genius. 
Rather, Mill argued, there needed to be widespread education and the development of 
human minds. This development of minds could only take place under conditions of 
liberty where individuals had freedom of choice. Where these conditions did not exist 
they had to be created through trusteeship. Mill was an employee of the East India 
Company and used India as an example of a place that needed to be governed by an 
Imperial cadre:
India ... needed to be governed despotically through the exercise of trusteeship in 
order to create the conditions under which ‘education’, ‘choice’, ‘individuality’ - 
in a word ‘development’ - might occur. For Mill, wittingly, as for unwitting 
modem theorists, development could only occur where the conditions of 
development were already present. Societies in which the conditions were not 
present had to guided by those from societies in which such conditions were 
already extant J 6
Like Comte, Mill opposed the transfer of the institutions of the ‘civilised’ world to the 
‘uncivilised’. Indeed he even opposed the transfer of administration of India from the 
East Indies Company to the British Crown on the grounds that the rule of India would 
be corrupted by British democracy. Despite the fact that this transfer did occur Mill 
took comfort in the fact that the ‘principles of trusteeship would underpin the new 
administration’.17
16 Cowen and Shenton, Doctrines o f Development, p. 41.
17 Cowen and Shenton ‘The Invention of Development’, p. 41, citing Mill, J.S. ‘Writings on India’ in 
Robson, J.N., Moir, M. and Moir, Z. (eds) Collected Works o f John Stuart Mill (vol. 30, Toronto, 
1990).
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One of the things that Mill argued effective trusteeship in India should guard against 
was the transfer of resources from India to Britain. Development would act against this 
draining of resources, but it had to be a specific form of development sited within rural 
village communities. It was only in village communities, Mill argued, that the space 
could be found to create an autonomous democratic form of development: an alternative 
to the corrupting force of British democracy. In this argument Mill was essentially 
following the lead of numerous other thinkers who had sort to protect Indian village 
communities from the destructive power of capitalist growth and align state 
development or trusteeship to the development of community.
These ideas, evolving out of positivism, had a powerful influence on British Fabians 
and Radical Liberals later on. Mill’s arguments about the need to site development in 
‘uncivilised countries’ within village communities was echoed in the concerns of many 
early African colonial administrators to protect ‘natural African communities’ from the 
ravages of industrial capitalism. British Neo-Hegelian ideologies, especially those 
associated with T.H. Green were also influential, especially in respect to communal 
land tenure. Following the ideas of Green, Viscount Haldane of Cloan, the Chief 
Justice of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, made a precedent setting 
judgement in 1921 on a Lagos land dispute. His judgement was premised on the idea 
that African society could only develop out of its own laws and customs and, therefore, 
that land disputes had to be judged on the basis of African ‘customary’ law. Under 
African customary law, Haldane believed, all land belonged to the community, under 
the trusteeship of a chief.18
By the late 1930s, however, Cowen and Shenton argue that a new colonial 
development policy began to be formulated, associated around the role of the state and 
constructive development rather than the community. This constructive state 
development policy was largely the result of a reaction against the idea of community 
which had become associated with the laissez-faire economic policies which were 
blamed for causing widespread unemployment. Immediately after the war the colonial 
state in Africa, under the influence of a Labour administration in London, became 
involved in development policies aimed at production and trade.19 Though this
See Cowen, M.P. and Shenton, R.W. ‘British Neo-Hegelian Idealism and Official Colonial Policy 
in Africa: the Oluwa Land Case of 1921’, Journal o f Imperial and Commonwealth History, 22,2, 
1994, pp. 217-250.
19 Cowen and Shenton trace a continuity in these ideas about state-led development from nineteenth 
century positivism, through the theories of Frederic List and into British thought via Joseph 
Chamberlain.
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involvement was fleeting it left a lasting impact on policy and a legacy of state directed 
development.
Their emphasis on state development of production and trade and on doctrine means 
that Cowen and Shenton miss the shift in colonial policy that occurred earlier in the 
1930s and resulted in (state led) projects to protect the African environment. The 
context of this shift in policy was precisely the growth of a relative surplus population 
but it was not bom out of a reaction to the perceived failures of the idea of community 
but to the devastating effects of the global depression. While these interventions have 
tended to be characterised as conservationist I would argue that they closely resemble 
the development doctrine of nineteenth century positivism. They involved an active 
intention to ameliorate the impact of capitalists growth, which was displaying its 
destructive potential on the face of the land and creating a relative surplus population in 
the rural areas. Furthermore the interventions were aimed at creating an ordered 
environment and an orderly population.
2.2. Population and rural development
The conservation or development schemes undertaken in East and southern Africa from 
the 1930s onwards are often explained in terms of the need to ameliorate the effects of 
population growth.20 Fears about the effects of population growth were most acute in 
the settler states where the African population found itself crowded into the reserves, 
but total population figures were increasing in every colony.21 It was not, however, the 
absolute growth of population that was important in driving development or 
conservation policies but rather the spectre of rapid rural to urban migration in response 
to decreasing opportunities in the countryside. The counter to the threat of the growth 
of an urban proletariat was rural development to maintain the rural population in its 
rural home and conservation to break the perceived vicious cycle of soil erosion and 
increasing population density.
Cowen and Shenton note that development policies, both in colonial Africa and in other 
times and places, were primarily concerned with controlling the movement of 
population:
From the threat of emigration from Quebec or Victoria in the mid-nineteenth
century to that of de-industrialisation in late-century Britain or rural
20 Anderson, ‘Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography and Drought’, and Iliffe, Africans, p. 250.
21 Though there were also fears, in various places and at various times, about ‘disappearing tribes’ and 
population decline in specific rural areas.
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unemployment in Kenya a century later, the focus [of development] is on the 
disordered movement of population.22
In colonial and post-colonial Africa the emphasis has been on controlling rural to urban
migration and preventing the growth of a large relative ‘surplus population’ in cities
and towns. This does not mean that the colonial state wanted to prevent rural to urban
migration, but rather that they wanted to maintain control over it. In southern Africa
the specific concern was to maintain control over the migrant labour system.
Harold Wolpe’s now classic thesis explaining the shift from segregation to apartheid 
postulates that an ecological crisis in the reserves during the 1930s and 1940s, the 
result of population growth in on a restricted land area, contributed to a crisis of social 
reproduction. The more draconian legislation of apartheid was implemented as a 
means of controlling this crisis and ensuring the continuation of the migrant labour 
system. Policies designed to protect the reserve’s environment were an integral part 
of this process. Concern about the environment of the South Africa’s reserves was 
therefore directly linked to their ability to provide for the reproduction of the labour 
force in the reserves.23
Wolpe’s structuralist arguments say little about conditions in the reserves or the
policies enacted to confront the supposed ecological crisis. Subsequent research on
these issues has shown a more complex interplay of economic, political and
ideological motivations. Nevertheless most research on conservation and development
in South Africa does indicate that interventions in African rural environment, society
and economy were essentially linked to the aims of segregation and, later, apartheid.
In the words of Beinart:
The discourse and justification of conservation in the African areas became bound 
up with the political imperatives of segregation: stemming African urbanisation, 
maintaining the migrant labour system and ‘developing’ Africans within their 
‘own’ areas. In the words of the influential Native Economic Commission report 
of 1932: ‘the fundamental problem lies in the reserves’. The situation in the 
reserves of South Africa (and Rhodesia) was diagnosed as bordering on 
ecological disaster. This was inimical to agricultural development and it also 
posed a threat to the direction of ‘native policy’.24
22 Cowen and Shenton, Doctrines o f Development, p. 476.
23 Wolpe, ‘Capitalism and Cheap Labour-power in South Africa’.
24 Beinart, W. ‘Introduction: The Politics o f Colonial Conservation’, Journal o f Southern African 
Studies, 15,2,1989, pp. 143-162, p. 153.
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2.2.1.Population, conservation and development in colonial Lesotho
Much of the structuralist literature on Lesotho’s economy has assumed that the 
colonial state simply acted in the interests of international capital invested in South 
Africa25 and any policy shift in South Africa could, therefore, be expected to have its 
counterpart in Lesotho. Despite the fact that this line of reasoning simplifies the 
complex and often contradictory motivations of the Basutoland government, Wolpe’s 
theoretical model of the transformation of the reserves’ political economy fits Lesotho 
well. Colonial conservation/development policies were first put forward at a time 
when it looked as though the colonial authorities might lose control over the migrant 
labour system. After decades of stimulating the outflow of labour from Lesotho the 
colonial authorities began to be increasingly concerned about keeping the lid on the 
system, and especially to maintain control over the migration of women.
The population of Lesotho has grown steadily over the past century. Given the 
dependence of the country on migrant remittances and the large numbers of men (and 
some women) migrating to Johannesburg or the Free State farms and gold fields it is 
necessary, however, to disaggregate the de facto population from the de jure 
population (see Figure 2.1). During the heyday of colonial conservationist 
interventions, from the mid-1930s through to the mid-1950s the de facto population of 
Lesotho grew only very slowly, only rising again once the apartheid state started to 
apply influx control with renewed vigour.
25 Chapter 1 of Rugege, ‘Chieftaincy and Society in Lesotho’, surveys the literature on this issue.
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Figure 2.1. De facto and de jure population for Lesotho during the colonial period.
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The global depression of the early 1930s hit Lesotho hard:
The bottom fell out of wool prices as a result of the massive recession in world 
trade which followed the 1929 slump. The coincidence of acute economic 
depression with an exceptional drought in 1932-3 led to a loss of perhaps half the 
country’s livestock. Wheat production survived and recovered but maize did not: 
in 1933 more than 350,00 bags of maize had to be imported... At the same time a 
resurgence in the price of gold stimulated the expansion of mining production and 
enormously increased the demand for labour on the gold mines. In the following 
decade a vast flow of emigration from Basutoland took place which, offsetting 
natural increase, explains the virtually static population recorded between the 
censuses of 1936 and 1946.26
The Basutoland authorities were faced not just by increasing unemployment at home,
but also pressure from South Africa to stem the flow of migrants, especially of
women. The answer to this uncontrolled out-migration was rural development.
Colonial interventions into the rural economy of Lesotho were not motivated by 
simple demographic pressure, but by the increase in the gap between the de facto and 
de jure population. I am in no way suggesting that the colonial authorities wanted to 
bring the migrant labour system to an end. The colonial state wanted to ensure the 
continuation of an ordered and controlled system of oscillating migration, rather than 
the wholesale emigration of men and, crucially, women to South Africa’s urban 
centres.27 Nor am I suggesting that the interventions by the colonial state were in any 
way successful in stabilising the migrant labour system. The primary reason for the 
narrowing of the gap between de facto and de jure population figures after the late 
1950s was the draconian influx control regulations employed by the apartheid state 
and the forcible expulsion of many Basotho living in South Africa.28
Maintaining control over the migrant labour system was in the interests of not just the 
colonial state but also of the chiefs. In the Sesotho praxis, a chief is a ‘chief by the 
people’ and in the nineteenth century one of the controls on a chiefs actions was the 
threat that his followers might shift allegiance to a new chief.29 On the other hand, a
26 Murray, ‘From Granary to Labour Reserve’, p. 9-10.
27 When Anthony Sillery became the Resident Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, in 
1947, he claims he was given one single instruction by the Dominions Office: keep up the labour 
supply to the Witwatersrand; Sillery, A., Unpublished memoirs, Rhodes House, Oxford; cited by 
Parsons, N. on H-SAfrica electronic mail discussion list (27 November 1997).
28 After Independence, development discourse in Lesotho shifted to an emphasis on changing the 
pattern of a labour exporting economy, and encouraging self-sufficiency and self help. Nevertheless 
the government of Lesotho remained fearful of any moves by the South African government to 
restrict the migrant labour system. In June 1996, for example, officials from Lesotho were vocal in 
their opposition to plans to give 90,000 long-term Basotho migrants permanent South African 
residency rights because of the potentially devastating impact on the Lesotho Bank (which receives 
direct transfers of a portion of migrants wages) and on the overall economy; Coplan and Quinlan,
‘A Chief by the People’, p. 50.
29 Coplan and Quinlan, ‘A Chief by the People’, p. 35.
53
CHAPTER TWO: CONSERVATION, DEVELOPMENT, ORDER
chiefs personal aggrandisement was often tied up with encouraging the out-flow of 
migrant labour, not least because of the payments made by labour recruiters to senior 
chiefs. In short it was in the political and material interests of chiefs to encourage the 
continuation of an ordered and stable migrant labour system, in which Basotho did 
not permanently leave for South Africa.
Maloka’s research shows some of the ways in which an alliance between the chiefs 
and the colonial state (and the missionaries) maintained control of the migrant labour 
system. He notes that the 1920s and 1930s marked a crisis period for the chiefs and 
their control of the migrant labour system. The growth of a civil society in the 1920s 
threatened their national political position whilst the massive movement of labour to 
South Africa after the early 1930s drought and depression meant that many chiefs 
were concerned about losing their followers.30 For both ideological and political 
reasons it was in the interests of the chiefs to support colonial calls for rural 
development.
2.3. Agrarian ideologies and trusteeship
In the mid-twentieth century anti-urban ideologies were widespread in southern
Africa. Amongst settlers, an anti-urban ideology was strengthened by the linking
together of ideas about urbanisation, environment, health, cleanliness and morality.31
Environmental decline in the countryside was seen as the root cause of an urban drift
that was leading to the degeneration of both European (the ‘poor white’ problem) and
African (‘detribalisation’) society. In 1938 one of the foremost conservationists in
South Africa noted that:
All will agree that the greatest social problem confronting South Africa to-day is 
the drift of both European and Native populations from the country to the towns. 
The further complications that must inevitably arise as a result of this competitive 
association of races in the struggle for existence do not concern me here, but my 
present interest lies in the root cause of this country-to-town exodus. The root 
cause is not far to seek. The condition of the people tells its own tale and the state 
of the country speaks for itself. Poverty and hunger are indelibly written on 
both.... Land that formerly produced virile whites and healthy and contented 
natives no longer continues to do so. The original valuable vegetal cover has been 
removed, the soil has lost its fertility, and much of the precious land has been
30 Maloka, ‘All Chiefs are Shepherds’.
31 Dubow, S. ‘Race, Civilisation and Culture: the Elaboration of Segregationist Discourse in the Inter- 
war Years’ in Marks, S. and Trapido, S. (eds) The Politics o f Race, Class and Nationalism in 
Twentieth Century South Africa (London, 1987), pp. 71-94, p. 75. See also Jochelson, K. ‘Moral 
Tribes and corrupting Cities: Explanations of African Susceptibility to VD’ paper presented to 
Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries seminar series, Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 25 October 1991.
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washed away. Man has misused the land that formerly gave him health and 
wealth.32
Cowen and Shenton look to the metropolitan Fabian colonial nexus for the source of 
ideas about the need to preserve African (rural) communities but there was also a 
longer standing romantic agrarian ideology in southern Africa. A romantic 
agrarianism can be found particularly in nineteenth-century missionary ideologies 
and the celebration of a settled yeoman peasantry. John and Jean Comaroff trace the 
roots of this missionary ideology to the same experiences in early 19th century 
Europe that influenced French positivism, specifically the social disruption caused by 
rapid industrialisation. They note that many early members of the influential London 
Missionary Society (LMS) and the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society were 
originally from the parts of Britain which were undergoing industrialisation.33
Through-out the colonial period there were a number of influential administrators in 
the High Commission Territories descended from these early missionaries, especially 
from the LMS aligned Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS) whose activities 
were based in Lesotho. Other locally recruited officials were also descended from a 
missionary background. Neil Parsons’s has argued that these mission-connected 
administrators, recruited to the Union Native Affairs Department and the High 
Commission Territories, established a local southern African variant of trusteeship.34
Mahmood Mamdani has noted that a shift in local to metropolitan recruitment to the
colonial service took place in the early decades of this century as the practice of
administration by indirect rule spread across Africa:
Both Britain and France ended the local recruitment of colonial administrators 
between 1890 and 1914 and reorganised the colonial administration into a formal 
service along lines of the upper echelon of the metropolitan bureaucracy. The 
corollary of district-level decentralisation was that the agents of district 
administration were recruited, trained and placed from the centre. This was not 
simply a territorial shift, from local to metropolitan recruitment, but also a change 
in social emphasis. During the 1920s, the Colonial Office began to recruit 
administrators chiefly from Oxbridge.35
32 CAD, Havenga papers, A38/29, Memorandum by I.B. Pole Evans, ‘The Needs of the Land and its 
People’, 31 December 1938, quoted in Dobson, B. and Goudie, S.C. ‘Environment, ideology and 
politics: soil conservation in South Africa 1910-1948’ unpublished paper, Department of 
Environmental and Geographical Science, University of Cape Town, 1996.
33 Comaroff, J. and Comaroff, J. Ethnography and the Historical Imagination (Boulder, 1992), 
p. 196.
34 Parsons, N. ‘Colonel Rey and the Colonial Rulers of Botswana: mercenary and missionary 
traditions in administration, 1884-1955’ in Ade Ajayi, J.F.and Peel, J.D.Y. (eds.) People and 
empires in African history: essays in memory o f Michael Crowther, (London, 1992), pp. 197-216.
35 Mamdani, M. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy o f Late Colonialism 
(London, 1996), p. 77.
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While a similar (though much later) trend towards metropolitan recruitment can be 
detected in the High Commission Territories many of those recruited through the 
British graduate recruitment programme had southern African roots not dissimilar to 
those of the local recruits. One early Oxford graduate recruit to the Basutoland service, 
Patrick Duncan, was the son of the first South African appointed to the post of 
Governor General.36 Another recruit from Britain reported that the staff recruited 
directly from South Africa were not (except on the odd occasion) the ‘brutal Afrikaner 
types... Mostly they were a good bunch from mission stock’.37
There were other strands to anti-urban ideologies in Southern Africa, including one 
linked specifically to Afrikaner nationalism. While it is not possible to fully 
disaggregate these diverse strands it is clear that the concern amongst Basutoland 
administrators to stabilise the rural population was not simply a reflection of the 
economic demands of the South African mines but also reflected of some deep-seated 
ideological beliefs.
2.3.1. Russell Thonton and development in the High Commission Territories
One noteworthy South African recruit to the High Commission Territories who was 
especially concerned with stabilising the African rural population was Russell 
Thornton, previously the Director of Agriculture in the Native Affairs Department.
Thornton had been one of the first senior officials in the Native Affaris Department to 
call for the economic development of the South African reserves. Visits to the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate and Lesotho in the early 1930s were important in 
convincing Thornton that Betterment policies did not go far enough and there was a 
need for both general economic development and territorial expansion of the areas 
occupied by Africans in order to support populations that were in excess of the 
agricultural carrying capacity.38 In his report on Lesotho in 1931 Thornton’s first 
recommendation was that the territory of the country should be expanded (something he 
admitted was not likely!), or else a significant number of Basotho should be resettled in 
the Bechuanaland Protectorate (which he believed could carry a higher population if
36 See Driver, C J. Patrick Duncan: South African and Pan-African (London, 1980), p. 35-36.
37 Transcript of a Tape Recording by Sir Robert Latimer, CBE (dated 3 May 1972), interviewed by 
Dr. A. Sillery, Rhodes House, Oxford, Mss.Afr.s.1444, p. 27.
38 Thornton, R.W. ‘Bechuanaland Protectorate: Report on Investigations’ Feb 1951, NTS 1034/46/419 
quoted by Rich, P. State Power and Black Politics in South Africa 1912-51 (London, 1996), p. 132.
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economic development took place).39 He was prevented from publicising similar views 
about the South African reserves by more senior officials in the NAD because of fears 
that any call for the increase in their area would be used by opponents of the ‘native 
bills’ being debated at that time in a parliamentary select committee.40 His decision to 
move to the High Commissioner’s office was largely a result of his unhappiness with 
the piecemeal way economic development policies were carried out in the reserves 41
Thornton was central in the growth of a development ideology in colonial Lesotho
and the conceptual link between the labour migration system and rural development.
In a letter to the Principal Agricultural Officer in the Basutoland administration in
1931 Thornton wrote:
With a drop in the value of agricultural products more and more labour is 
becoming available, which labour it will be extremely difficult to absorb. At the 
present time... there is a big surplus of Native labour and, as it is only by going 
out to work that the people are able to exist, it becomes imperative... to find 
wages and means to enable people to live in times like the present. When a 
sufficient number of Natives can go out to work on the mines, on industries and in 
other industrial centres, and amongst European farmers, they are able, through the 
wages secured, to maintain themselves and pay their taxes. When this source of 
labour for securing money fails, this position becomes acute... As far as one can 
see, there is only one way of overcoming this ever increasing difficulty and that is 
by improving methods of stock raising and agriculture.42
Thornton argued that Lesotho’s ‘bleak economic position’ was not the result of over­
population per se but rather because of bad agricultural and pastoral practices. 
Environmental decline, especially pasture deterioration and soil erosion, was the 
result of these bad practices and it also made solutions to them more difficult. To 
return to Quinlan’s original dichotomy between conservation and development it is 
noticeable that Thornton’s recommendations to the Basutoland authorities included 
both development (increasing the output from agriculture) and conservation policies 
(such as the fencing-in of denuded grazing areas).43 For Thornton, and for all the 
colonial administration, there was no contradiction between conservation and 
development.
39 LNA 212, Thornton, R. W. ‘Report on Pastoral and Agricultural Conditions in Basutoland, c. June 
1931’.
40 Lucas, F.A.W. to Herbst, J.F., 8 January 1932 and Herbst, J.F. to Lucas, F.A.W., 11 January 1932, 
NTS 1769, quoted by Rich State Power and Black Politics, p. 132.
41 Milton, S. ‘The Apocalypse Cow’.
42 LNA 212, Thornton to Wacher, 28 March 1931. In the original document the last sentence of this 
passage was underlined in red; it is not clear by whom.
4^ LNA 212, Thornton, R., Report on Pastoral and Agricultural Conditions in Basutoland, July 1931. 
In the livestock sector the emphasis was on increasing the output per beast and decreasing the total 
number of livestock.
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The Basutoland authorities tended to label projects designed to prevent soil erosion, 
such as the massive contour bank building programme, as development projects. The 
Basutoland section of an article on ‘economic development* by Evelyn Baring, the 
High Commissioner between 1944 and 1951, concentrated almost entirely on the 
contour bank building programme in the lowlands. The policy to close huge swathes 
of mountain grazing land to all livestock was also briefly described in the article (in 
keeping with many of his statements, Baring gave an exaggerated version of the 
policy and described grand future plans for its extension).44
Recognising that development doctrine was concerned with ameliorating the negative 
impacts of capitalism means that the apparent contradiction between development and 
conservation simply disappears. As we will see in chapter 3, environmental decline 
was seen as one of the external indicators of the negative impacts of capitalist 
accumulation. Rural development and conserving the rural environment (in particular 
its soils) were regarded as part and parcel of the same development project. There 
was a strong connection between the aim of stabilising the rural population and 
stabilising the rural environment.
2.4. Colonialism, development and order
In most Africa colonies, including the High Commission Territories, the colonial state 
looked to indirect rule to create social stability. The political aim of indirect rule was to 
create effective hierarchical ‘native’ administrative structures ruling over clearly 
bounded and essentially homogeneous communities (usual defined as tribes). There is 
an extensive literature on the way in which early British colonial officials attempted to 
re-order African society to produce clearly hierarchical bounded communities.45 A 
1929 statement by the Secretary for Native Affairs in Northern Rhodesia is frequently 
cited in this literature. He noted that in 1924 when the Colonial Office took over
44 Baring, E. ‘Economic Developments under the High Commission in South Africa’, African Affairs, 
51,204,1952, pp. 222-230. In this article Baring wrote that the migrant labour system was ‘far 
from favourable to the happy growth of contented African farmers permanently resident on their 
holdings’. Contrary to my arguments above this statement might be seen as an indication that 
Baring was opposed to the migrant labour system. It is important, however, to note the audience 
the 1952 paper was written for. As the article was based on an address to the Royal African Society 
Baring was probably concerned to create a favourable impression amongst the London Africanist 
circles who were, on the whole, anti-South Africa and pro-indirect rule.
4  ^ Berry, S. ‘Hegemony on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to Agricultural Land’, Africa, 62,
3,1992, pp. 327-355, provides a useful review of this literature.
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administration from the British South Africa Company ‘the tribes were in a very 
disorganised state’, but since then tribal organisation had been ‘created’.46
Mamdani argues that the main technique used by the British colonial authorities to 
create ordered communities was to identify and establish suitable leaders. Aware of the 
power this new position gave them the chiefs would ensure that the rest fell into 
place.47 In line with ‘invention of tradition’ arguments, Mamdani stresses the fixed 
structure of African society created through colonialism and downplays the 
contradictions and ambiguities created through this process and the role of a continuing 
struggle over the form of African society and the meaning of African customary law. 
While I would reject Mamdani’s characterisation of a successful and relatively 
uncontested re-ordering of African society through colonialism, his concentration on 
the possibilities for control that colonial ideas about African society presented for 
chiefly authorities is pertinent.
In Lesotho members of the senior Koena lineage were able to take advantage of the
colonial state’s desire to ensure a hierarchical structure of authority with the Paramount
Chief at the pinnacle.48 The colonial state also held out development policies as a
mechanism for chiefs to maintain control. One of the earliest references to the threat of
pasture degradation in Lesotho, the report of a conversation between the Assistant
Resident Magistrate and a group of senior chiefs, makes the connection between
conservation and political control explicit:
Assistant Resident Magistrate, Thaba Bosiu [Rolland]... I foresee considerable 
inconvenience will arise from the rapidly increasing wealth and population.
People who have been absent for many years are coming back with the wealth 
they have acquired and if you chiefs do not observe some arrangements in 
preventing the formation of new villages, and in setting the arable lands apart 
leaving enough room for pasturage, the country will not support either people or 
stock.
Moketse for Chief Moletsane ... I agree with Mr Rolland and others who say that 
the villages are too small and too much scattered about the country; they should 
be larger so as to have fewer of them, and thus bring the arable lands more with 
compass and make the pasture land more open and available.
Chief Tlalele.... but you are spoiling and wasting it (the land) by making separate 
villages; I say have large villages and when you move the presently widely 
scattered huts, plant pumpkins where your gardens (i.e. fields) and pasture land
46 Quoted in Chanock, M. Law, Custom and Social Order, (Cambridge, 1985), p. 112.; also in Berry, 
‘Hegemony on a Shoestring’, p. 332; and Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p. 81.
47 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p. 81.
48 Moshoeshoe I was of the Koena lineage or clan. Ian Hamnett notes that according to a 1956 survey 
‘not more than about 30 per cent of the population are Koena, [but] the bulk of the chieftainship are 
Koena chiefs’; Hamnett, I. ‘Koena Chieftainship Seniority in Basutoland’, Africa, 35, 3,1965, pp. 
241-251.
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ought to be. Every man that asks the chief for leave to form a village gets it at 
once and places it in the middle of what ought to be reserved for pastures.49
In the 1940s and 1950s the Ward Chiefs of Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek both enforced
villagisation programmes. This process was justified on the grounds of
development/conservation but I would argue had as much to do with the Chiefs
concerns about maintaining control over far-flung mountain villages.50 Certainly one
of the aims of the programme was to break-up communities labelled as being the home
of stock thieves.51
While colonial authorities in Africa modelled themselves as the trustees of African
society, they, in turn, ascribed to chiefly authorities the role of trustees of customary
law and communal land. Rural (community) development interventions were logically
channelled through the trustees of community resources. In 1951 Basil Davidson
interviewed L.H. Collett, the Basutoland Agricultural Officer in charge of the massive
lowland contour bank building programme. In response to a question about how they
had managed to implement the scheme successfully, Collett replied:
The tribal system. We can’t do anything without that. We explain the methods to 
the chiefs, and the chiefs pass down our orders to the villages and see that the 
orders are carried out52
As custodians of customary law, chiefs were able to claim new legislation introduced 
in the name of conservation or development as customary matters to be tried in their 
courts. Colonial conservation regulations were enforced not through the colonial civil 
legal system but through the customary courts. In 1932,776 people were convicted in 
customary courts in Malawi for offences against the Forest Laws, 387 for violating 
Township Regulations and 227 for breaches of the tobacco and cotton uprooting rules.53 
In Lesotho, Baring argued that the myriad minor offences that would cumulatively 
cause an environmental disaster would go unpunished if the authorities had to try the
49 Extract from the Minutes of a Public Meeting held at Maseru, 2 October 1874, Cape o f Good 
Hope, Blue Book (Native Affairs, 1875, G21), quoted by Sheddick, Land Tenure, p. 66-67.
50 This contrasts with the situation in Northern Rhodesia where Bemba Chiefs were not generally 
amenable to the colonial state’s attempts to enforce a minimum size to villages: ‘When admonished 
that their authority would dwindle if they permitted their “subjects” to scatter, Bemba chiefs 
blandly countered that “the greater the number of villages, the greater the prestige of the chief’.’ 
Berry, ‘Hegemony on a Shoestring’, p. 340, citing Ranger, T. The Agricultural History o f  Zambia 
(Historical Association of Zambia Pamphlet 1, Lusaka, 1971).
51 In 1952 Bowmaker reported that a village established near the Koakoatsi Pass was known to be ‘a 
haunt of stock theives’. He continued: ‘This no doubt will be seen to by Chief Matlere when a 
village re-grouping scheme is effected’. LNA 2476/11, Bowmaker, ‘A report on a visit to 
Mokhotlong from 6 - 2 8  March 1952’.
52 Collett in Davidson, B. ‘Crisis in the Protectorates’, New Statesman and Nation, 25 August 1951.
53 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p. 123.
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cases ‘in due form before a major court’. Offences needed to be dealt with quickly, 
‘near the scene’ and in ‘accordance with native law and custom’.54
As I will discuss in more detail in chapter 7, the Paramount Chief of Lesotho was given 
the power to make rules and order for the ‘peace, good order and welfare of his 
people’.55 Many of the areas in which the Paramount Chief could issue Orders related 
to agricultural development or conservation policies including the right to issue Orders 
to ‘regulate grazing’ and ‘prevent soil erosion*.56 This Proclamation appears to be a 
more or less exact repetition of 1927 Native Authorities Ordinance enacted in 
Tanganyika. As in Lesotho, the initiative for these new orders came from the colonial 
state but they were reported as being locally formulated and imposed by the relevant 
‘Native Authorities’ in response to local conditions and needs. 57
Conservation and development interventions were enacted through customary law in 
chiefly courts, but colonial administrators, in particular District Commissioners, 
supervised their activities and tried to act as arbitrators in disputes over the meaning of 
customary regulations. When the Paramount Chief in Lesotho instructed Ward and 
Principal Chief that they must implement grazing control policies in the areas under 
their jurisdiction, it was the District Commissioners who pressurised individual chiefs 
to enact the new ‘customary’ regulations.58
2.5. Decentralisation and The Anti-Politics Machine
Mamdani argues that through indirect rule, and the role of District Commissioners in 
arbitrating or creating customary law, the colonial state was able to extend its control of 
the African population. A policy that ostensibly decentralising power to chiefs in 
reality lead to the triumph of ‘techno-administration’ and rule by ‘legal 
administration’.59
Mamdani’s version of indirect rule looks very similar to James Fergusons’s ‘anti­
politics machine’. Ferguson’s detailed ‘anthropology of a development project’ 
examines the working of one development project in the mountain areas of Lesotho.
54 Baring, ‘Economic Developments’, p. 229-230.
55 Proclamation 61/1938 (Chieftainship Powers Proclamation) in Basutoland, Laws o f Basutoland, 
1960 (Cape Town, 1961), pp. 156-62.
56 Section 8, Proclamation 61/1938.
57 Quoted in Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, p. 124.
58 See chapter 7.
59 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject.
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Like most development projects in Lesotho the, Thaba Tseka area based project failed 
to meet its stated objectives. Indeed, as its objectives were essentially based on a totally 
false premise that the country was poor because its ‘traditional’ economy was ‘virtually 
untouched by modem economic development’ and needed to be brought into the 
twentieth century, failure to meet them was only to be expected.60
Ferguson points out, however, that this ‘failure’ does not mean that the project had no 
impact on the local political economy. The most obvious impact of the project was the 
extension of ‘bureaucratic state power’ into the previously politically (though not 
economically) isolated central mountain zone. This extension of bureaucratic power 
took place within a development framework that denied that its role was in any sense 
political.
By making the intentional blue-prints for ‘development’ so highly visible, a 
‘development’ project can end up performing extremely sensitive political 
operations involving the entrenchment and expansion of institutional state power 
almost invisibly, under the cover of a neutral, technical mission to which no one 
can object... If the ‘instrument-effects’ of a development project end up forming 
any kind of strategically coherent or intelligible whole, this is it: the anti-politics 
machine.61
In order to write an anthropology of a development project Ferguson emphasises the
need for a ‘decentered’ analysis which locates ‘the intelligibility of a series of events
and transformations not in the intentions guiding the actions of one or more animated
subjects, but in the systematic nature of the social reality which results from these
actions’.62 Ferguson’s thesis is theoretically grounded in the writing of Michel
Foucault, in particular his ‘genealogy’ of the prison.63 Foucault’s work shows how
planned social interventions can result in powerful constellations of control that were
never intended. In Discipline and Punishment Foucault argues that it is not enough to
simply look at how the prison has failed, but to ask what it has succeeded in doing:
For the observation that prison fails to eliminate crime, one should perhaps 
substitute the hypothesis that prison has succeeded extremely well in producing 
delinquency, a specific type, a politically or economically less dangerous - and, 
on occasion, usable - form of illegality... The success of the prison, in struggles 
around the law and illegalities, has been to specify a ‘deliquency’.64
From this theoretical point of departure Ferguson argues that an anthropology of a
development project should not attempt to measure to what extent the development
60 See World Bank, Lesotho a Development Challenge (Washington, 1975).
61 Ferguson, J. The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development’, De-politicisation and Bureaucratic Power 
in Lesotho (Cambridge, 1990), p. 256.
6^ Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine, p. 18.
63 Foucault, M. Discipline and Punishment :The Birth o f the Prison (translated by Sheridan, A. 1977, 
Harmondsworth, 1991).
64 Foucault, Discipline and Punishment, p. 277.
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agencies stated objectives have been meet, or not meet, but instead examine what the 
project has actually done.
In this analysis the discourse of development is not simply a smoke-screen behind
which other actors conspire to achieve their unstated objectives. Rather the discourse of
development is itself a instrument through which power acts in a particular way:
One must entertain the possibility that the ‘development’ apparatus in Lesotho 
may do what it does, not at the bidding of some knowing and powerful subjects 
who is making it all happen, but behind the backs of or against the wills of even 
the most powerful actors. But this is not to say that such institutions do not 
represent an exercise of power; only that power is not to be embodied in the 
person of a ‘powerful’ subject. A ‘development’ project may very well serve 
power, but in a different way than any of the ‘powerful’ actors imagined: it may 
only wind up, in the end, ‘turning out’ to serve power.65
This is where Mamdani’s analysis of indirect rule and the extension of administrative 
control differs from Ferguson’s analysis of a development project and the extension of 
bureaucratic control. For Mamdani the discourse of indirect rule is no more than 
rhetoric behind which imperial interests extended their power. Indirect rule becomes a 
monolithic model that has shaped all African society in an image that benefited the 
colonial powers. The failure of post-colonial states in Africa has essentially been an 
inability to break-down these inherited structures.66
Following Terence Ranger and Eric Hobsbawn,67 Mamdani regards communal land 
tenure, and other ‘customary’ legal practices, as invented or constructed.68 The 
invented nature of customary law points to an analysis that emphasises the cleavage 
between a fluid pre-colonial and a rigid colonial system of customary law.69 This 
sharp disjuncture between colonial and pre-colonial customary law has been 
challenged in some of the recent literature.70 The emphasis has shifted to identifying 
the continued conflicts over the definitions of customary law into the colonial period 
and the way in which these conflicts feed into contradictory understandings of the 
customary. Berry notes that:
65 Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine, p. 18-19.
66 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject.
67 Ranger, T. and Hobsbawn, E. (eds) The Invention o f Tradition (Cambridge, 1983).
68 Gocking, R. ‘Colonial Rule and the ‘Legal Factor’ in Ghana and Lesotho’, Africa, 67 ,1 ,1997 , pp. 
61-85, p. 61.
6° See for exmaple, Franklin, A. Land Law in Lesotho: The Politics o f the 1979 Land Act (Aldershot, 
1995), p. 47-49.
70 Ranger has shifted his position in response to this new research, talking now of ‘contested
imaginings’ of tradition, Ranger, T. ‘The Invention of Tradition Revisited: the case of Colonial 
Africa’ in Ranger, T. and Vaughan, O. (eds) Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth Century Africa: 
essays in honour o f A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (London, 1993), pp. 62-111.
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In general, the effect of indirect rule was neither to freeze African societies in 
precolonial moulds, nor to restructure them in accordance with British inventions 
of African tradition, but to generate unresolved debates over the interpretation of 
tradition and its meaning for colonial governance and economic activity. In 
seeking to maintain social and administrative stability by building on tradition, 
officials wove instability - in the form of changing relations of authority and 
conflicting interpretations of rules- into the fabric of colonial administration.71
One of the arenas where there were competing and shifting understandings of 
customary law was over resource-use rights. Competition for the use of natural 
resources tended to be fought in terms of competing understandings of the meaning of 
customary laws.72 Colonial officials were keen to restructure African rights to natural 
resources but when they intervened in usefuctory rights they became embroiled in 
intractable political battles. Colonial officials wanted to order African space to suit 
their purposes and ideologies but more often than not they simply became embroiled in 
political debates about the very nature of that space. If, in the end, things turn out to 
their advantage this was rarely via the intended route.
2.6. Order and the environment
In his introduction to the collection Power o f Development Jonathan Crush quotes
extensively from an 1895 address by Sir Harry Johnston, the Commissioner in British
Central Africa, to the Royal Geographical Society in which he describes how British
colonialism would transform African society and the African environment:
Johnston’s was a highly stylised rendering of the reordering of space: the 
civilised, ordered white, male, English landscape erases its unordered, savage, 
chaotic, dangerous African predecessor. For Johnston, colonialism was about 
gaining control of disorderly territory and setting loose the redemptive power of 
development. The African landscape is rewritten, figuratively and literally, to 
reflect the substitution of one reality by another.73
The ordering of a chaotic African space is a constant theme in colonial development 
discourses. Colonial ideas drawn from an industrialised and capitalist Europe, laid far 
more stress on rigid spatial division between land set aside for different purposes. At 
the national level this resulted in reserves for exclusive functions like forestry, or 
game reserves, or farming, while multi-purpose common land greatly diminished.74
71 Berry, ‘Hegemony on a Shoestring’, p. 336.
72 Peters, P. ‘Manoeuvres and debates in the interpretation of land rights in Botswana’ Africa, 3 ,62,
1992, pp. 413-434.
73 Crush, J. ‘Introduction: Imagining development’ in Crush, Power o f Development, pp. 1 - 23,
p. 2.
74 Beinart, ‘Introduction, The Politics of Colonial Conservation’, p. 158.
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In Southern Rhodesia the 1939 Mclllwaine Report noted that ‘for the regeneration of 
the reserves there are two essentials: organisation and control’ and advocated the 
establishment of fenced paddocks on communal rangeland.75 E.D. Alvord, the 
Agriculturist in the Rhodesian Native Affairs Department, commented that after the 
implementation of centralisation policies the homesteads in Gwelo were ‘all in lines 
and look very nice’.76 In Transkei officials borrowed military terminology and 
described re-organised model villages with homesteads arranged in a grid as being 
‘dressed’.77 It is not too far-fetched to suggest that part of the attraction of contour 
banks for the administration of Lesotho was they created a more orderly looking 
landscape.
These concerns about creating an ordered environment were obviously connected to 
policies of social control. The laying out of villages in straight lines aided 
administrative surveillance of the population and allowed more effective tax 
collection. The connection between an ordered landscape and an orderly society go 
beyond simple administrative demands, however, and it is also important to consider 
ideological connections between space and society. In recent years the interplay 
between ideas about society and ideas about nature has been a dominant theme in 
sociology, anthropology and the history of science.78
Ideas and theories about society and the natural world have often converged in the 
production of knowledge about the environment.79 The limited basis of scientific 
knowledge about the African environment meant that it was theoretical ideas, often 
related to understandings of social processes, that drove colonial thinking on the 
environment. In line with much of the recent literature on the history of science 
Michael Thompson disputes the notion that there is one ‘answer’ to areas of dispute 
within environmental sciences. He argues that perceptions of environmental 
problems are reliant upon the ‘world view’ of the person analysing the issue. Using 
the debate about environmental degradation in the Himalayas he shows how each
75 Southern Rhodesia, Report on the Commission to enquire into the preservation o f the natural 
resources o f the colony (Salisbury, 1939), p. 49 and 57, quoted in Scoones, I. ‘Politics, Polemics 
and Pastures’, p. 44.
76 Quoted in Beinart, ‘Soil Erosion, Conservation and Ideas about Development’, p. 77.
77 Beinart, ‘Soil Erosion, Conservation and Ideas about Development’, p. 77.
78 A particularly strong theme tracing the gendered nature of scientific thinking has come from
feminist scholarship, see Haraway, D.J. Primate Visions: Gender, Race and Nature in the World o f  
Modem Science (London, 1989); Haraway, DJ. Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Re-invention o f  
Nature (London, 1991).
79 Though it is an area that has received little research attention there was a clear exchange of ideas 
between ecology and political philosophy in early twentieth century South Africa; see Smuts, J.C. 
Holism and Evolution , (London, 1926); and Bews, J .Life as a Whole, (London, 1937).
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point of view - each certainty - is largely a result of the assumptions held by the 
proponents of each competing approach.80
As we will see in chapter 5, the facts to support a claim that Lesotho’s mountain 
environment was being degraded were simply not available to sustain the argument 
during the 1940s and 50s. Nevertheless colonial officials and visiting range 
management experts were able to assemble the facts that were available in such a way 
that allowed them to be certain that environmental destruction was occurring. 
Following Thompson, I would argue that the way these facts were assembled was 
reliant upon the assumptions that they brought to the issue: and central to these 
assumptions was the view that nature acted through laws and created stability. Ideas 
about order and stability not only drove the process of policy-making, they also 
underlay the analysis of the ‘problem’.
80 Schwarz, M. and Thompson, M. Divided we Stand: Re-defining Politics, Technology and Social 
Change (New York, 1990) and Thompson, M. ‘Policy Making in the Face of Uncertainty: the 
Himalayans as Unknowns’ in Chapman, G.P and Thompson, M. (eds) Water and the Quest for  
Sustainable Development in the Ganges Valley (London, 1995).
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3. The history of environmentalism in colonial Lesotho1
Fears about environmental decline have existed in Lesotho since the mid-nineteenth 
century. Despite the continuity in the overarching concerns there have been important 
shifts in the environmentalist ideologies that have informed these fears and 
corresponding changes in the specific sources of physical evidence cited and policies 
advocated to solve the problems. Developing ideas about environmental problems in 
the mountain areas of Lesotho followed a similar trajectory to the development of 
environmentalist ideologies in South Africa and beyond. Of particular interest to this 
thesis is the shift from fears about lack of tree cover to fears about soil erosion that 
occurred in the early decades of this century. This also needs to be understood in its 
specific local context and in particular the context of fears about the impact of 
drastically falling agricultural output on the ability of Lesotho to maintain its labour 
reserve economy.2 Nevertheless the dramatic rise in environmental concern in Lesotho 
immediatly after the Second World War was also heavily influenced by the growth of a 
South African environmental movement concerned about the impact of soil erosion on 
the sustainability of ‘white civilisation’.
3.1. Deforestation and desiccation
Fears about the impact of deforestation on hydrology were widespread in southern 
Africa from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, particularly amongst Cape colonial 
officials, and have been well documented by Grove.3 Nineteenth century scientific 
analysis of the inter-relationships between forest, climate and hydrology had resulted 
in a strong adherence to a desiccation theory, which linked deforestation to drought. 
Grove argues that the roots of this belief (and indeed of modem environmentalism) 
can be found in the colonial encounter with the fragile environments of a number of 
small island such as St. Helena and Mauritius which were strategically placed along 
the major shipping routes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Colonial
1 In this chapter I have not discussed the development of environmentalist ideologies amongst 
Basotho. Robertson’s article on James Jacob Machobane indicates that environmental concerns did 
exist amongst Basotho by the 1950s, but there is no literature on earlier concerns (Robertson, 
‘Popular Scientist; James Jacob Machobane’). Khan’s work on African attitudes to environmental 
issues across the Calendon in South Africa indicates that there is more research to be done in this 
field (Khan, ‘Re-writing South Africa’s Conservation History’). However, as the purpose of 
discussing the rise of environmentalism here is to explain its influence on colonial policy, that 
research is beyond the scope of this thesis.
2 See Phimister, ‘Discourse and the discipline of historical context’, for a critique of studies that 
emphasise general colonial discourse rather than the local historical context.
3 Grove, ‘Early themes in African Conservation’, and Grove, ‘Scottish Missionaries, Evangelical 
Discourses and the Origins of Conservation Thinking’.
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administrators quickly encountered the limits of these small islands to meet the 
demands placed on them for food, water and wood and resulted in some of the 
world’s earliest conservation legislation. These early environmental fears were given 
added impetus during the mid-nineteenth as British officials in India and elsewhere 
came to believe that deforestation was leading to the drying-out and heating-up of the 
climate. These beliefs were backed by scientific evidence and became widely 
accepted by colonial officials.4
The Cape Colonial Botanist during the 1860s, John Crombie Brown, wrote 
extensively on the issue of desiccation, and proposed a number of radical solutions.5 
His criticisms of the ecological impact of colonialism eventually led to his being 
sacked by the Cape government, though he continued to publish widely on the South 
African situation, including a monograph (published in 1875) entitled Hydrology o f 
South Africa.6 The book quoted extensively from a report on a paper presented to the 
Royal Geographical Society by James Fox Wilson. The paper described a severe 
drought, in 1862, affecting the broad maize-growing belt of lowland Lesotho (much 
of which later become the Conquered Territories within the Orange Free State). 
Wilson ascribed this drought largely to the impact of grass-burning and tree cutting by 
the African population of the interior.
Dessicationist ideologies also arrived in South Africa via British officials trained in 
the Indian Forestry Service, such as F.E. Kanthack who moved from India to the Cape 
in 1907 to take charge of irrigation affairs.7 Kanthack was a strong adherent of the 
idea that deforestation of mountain slopes lead not only to increased rates of erosion 
and consequently to siltation of irrigation works but also to climatic changes. In an 
address to the South African Association for the Advancement of Science in July 
1908, Kanthack explained that research findings from around the world indicated that 
temperatures inside forested areas tended to be significantly cooler than in deforested 
areas. This meant that condensation was more likely to take place above forests and 
hence precipitation would be higher. It therefore followed that if forests were cleared 
rainfall would decrease and the environment would become increasingly desiccated.8
4 Grove, Green Imperialism.
5 See Grove, R. ‘Preacher of a Green Gospel’.
6 Brown, J.C. Hydrology o f South Africa: or Details o f the Former Hydrological Condition o f  the 
Cape o f Good Hope, and o f Causes of its Present Aridity (Edinburgh, 1875).
7 Beinart and Coates, Environment and History, p.43.
8 Kanthack, F.E. ‘The Destruction of Mountain Vegetation: its Effects upon the Agricultural 
Conditions in the Valleys’, Agricultural Journal o f the Cape o f Good Hope, 33 ,2 ,1908 , pp. 194- 
204.
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There was, however, a problem in applying these theories to southern Africa. Unlike 
the Himalayan foothills, where Kanthack had undertaken his previous work, or the 
European and North American mountains, where the scientific research he cited had 
been carried out, most of southern Africa’s mountain environments did not support 
large areas of forest Nevertheless, Kanthack argued that the beneficial effects of 
trees also held for other forms of vegetation and that efforts should be made to ensure 
as lush a vegetational covering of mountain slopes as possible. Where forests could 
be established they should be, but the main emphasis should be on protecting the 
vegetation of mountain slopes from burning and grazing. Kantack argued that this 
work should fall to the Forestry Department, whose role should be significantly 
expanded:
We must learn to clothe the word ‘Forest’ with a far wider meaning than is 
customary. It should stand for the veld in general and the mountain or forest-clad 
veld in particular. Its chief aim should be die restoration and conservation of the 
natural growth of vegetation on the mountain slopes or other places liable to 
erosion and denudation. Briefly the Department should have control of the land 
wherever the physical conditions are such that the removal of the protection 
afforded by vegetation must result after a longer or shorter period in the 
destruction or deterioration of agricultural conditions.9
In the same year as Kantack arrived in the Cape the Basutoland authorities invited 
A.W. Hey wood, the Conservator of Forests, Kingwilliamstown, to write a report on 
forestry in Lesotho. The Basutoland authorities were initially interested in the 
commercial possibilities of forestry but Heywood’s report emphasised the ability of 
forests to ‘regulate and restrain the flow of water’ (though he did not comment on the 
impact of forests on climate). Heywood admitted that, with the exception of some 
kloofs in the foothills, Lesotho was a tree-less environment Nevertheless he argued 
that forestry was possible, at least below about 6,000 feet, and that the colonial 
authorities should embark on a programme of tree planting as well as ensuring the 
control of grass burning.10
K. A. Carlson, the Conservator of Forests in the Orange Free State, also argued that 
efforts should be made to plant a large number of trees in the Lesotho mountains. In a 
paper presented at the 1913 South African Irrigation Congress, Carlson argued that 
this forest planting scheme should be undertaken by the South African government, as 
the forests would act as a huge reservoir for the Orange river. Not only would the 
forest hold water and reduce evaporation; it would also increase the rates of 
precipitation, at least on a local scale. Although there were no indigenous trees which 
could survive the harsh climate, exotics introduced from elsewhere would be able to
9 Kanthack ‘The Destruction of Mountain Vegetation’, p. 196.
10 SAB FOR/158/A217/1. Heywood, A.W., Report on Forestry in Basutoland, 11 May 1908.
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cope. Carlson simply brushed aside the thought that the local population might not
agree to the project, arguing that the area was uninhabited:
Here is an area of about 3 million acres of uninhabited country in a neighbouring 
state, the afforestation of which, wholly or in part, is as much in the interest of 
that State as in ours. To expect a small native community to undertake a task of 
such magnitude is out of the question, but... not so for the Union of South 
Africa.11
While his arguments concerning the positive impact that afforestation could have for 
South African irrigation schemes along the Orange were accepted by the other 
delegates, his proposals were treated with scepticism. There were a number of 
comments suggesting he was more concerned with enhancing his department’s 
influence than anything else.
Carlson essentially conceived this afforestation programme as an improvement to the 
natural environment rather than as a programme to conserve or restore what was 
already there. Basotho livestock owners were blamed for starting veld fires and for 
overgrazing, but their role as agents of environmental destruction received 
significantly less emphasis than in subsequent publications. Though tree planting has 
regularly been advocated since these two reports this type of massive state sponsored 
afforestation was not suggested subsequently as a solution to hydrological problems. 
Subsequent afforestation policies have rather stressed small-scale village woodlots as 
sources of fuel, therefore encouraging people not to bum dung needed as fertiliser.12
Kanthack, Heywood and Carlson all made good use of the forestry discourse that 
dominated international environmental concerns during the period in question. They 
used this discourse to discuss not simply forestry but also other environmental issues
11 Carlson, K. A. ‘Forestry in Relation to Irrigation in South Africa’, Agricultural Journal o f the Union 
of South Africa, 5 ,2 ,1913, pp. 219-234, p. 227. The obvious implications of this proposal for the 
transfer issue were made explicit in a 1933 comment by Jan Smuts: ‘It is desirable in the interest of 
the Union, as well as Basutoland itself, that steps are taken on an extensive scale along the 
headwaters of several important rivers which arise in Basutoland and flow through the Union, to 
prevent, by means of afforestation and other methods, the erosion which is causing so much 
damage in the mountain parts of the country. These steps might have to be taken on both sides of 
the border and could be carried out satisfactorily only by the Union Government.’ Memorandum on 
the Proposed Incorporation of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland in the Union o f South 
Africa, submitted to Mr Thomas, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on 28th July 1933 by 
General Smuts, Annex 13 of Union of South Africa (White Paper), Negotiations Regarding the 
Transfer to the Union o f South Africa o f the Government o f Basutoland, Bechuanaland 
Protectorate and Swaziland, 1910-1939 (Pretoria, 1952), p. 35. See chapter 6 for further details. 
Aforestation for this purpose was first undertaken on a national scale during the Second World War 
in an effort to increase agricultural yields. See Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual 
Reports, 1941 and 1942. Between then and the end of the colonial period something in the order of 
40 million trees were planted. Very few of these were still alive in the early 1970s when a new 
project, the Lesotho Wood-lot Project, was initiated; Food and Agriculture Organisation,
Advancing Forestry in Lesotho (FAO Forestry Project Profile, Rome, n.d. [c. 1986]).
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with little or nothing to do with forestry. While the reports and articles cited above 
were written by foresters and are full of references to trees, the environmentally 
destructive activities given most weight, over-grazing and veld-burning, were 
identical to the concerns raised in later reports which never mention forestry.
Grove records that the concentration on a forest and desiccation discourse within the 
Cape waned during the first few decades of the twentieth century and was replaced by 
more explicit concerns about over-grazing and soil erosion.13 He does not, however, 
explain why this shift occurred and, as Beinart notes, ‘a detailed history of the shifting 
emphasis in the debate has yet to be constructed’.14
One of the reasons the shift in the South African debate occurred at this time was 
probably related to the rapid expansion of the arable farming frontier into the dry 
Great Plains regions of the south western United States. The infamous sodbusters of 
the American west, heeding the slogan ‘Rain follows the plow’, turned thousands of 
acres of grassland into arable fields during the 1880s and 1890s. As early as 1894 this 
expansion brought dust storms to many areas and, combined with the 1890s economic 
crisis, led to the abandonment of huge swathes of farm land.15 In the wake of these 
environmental problems the US Department of Agriculture began a programme of 
research into soil conservation and published numerous pamphlets about the dangers 
of soil erosion. Many of these found their way to South Africa and fuelled pre­
existing fears about environmental degradation. Despite the fact that the soil 
conservation movement in the USA lost ground during the agricultural boom of 1910s 
and 1920s, the new discourse of soil conservation had taken root and displaced the 
dominant desiccation and deforestation discourse that had previously dominated 
South African concerns.16
Another cause of this shift in discourse can be traced to the expansion of the British 
empire into the semi-arid regions of central and east Africa. There were numerous 
links between the officials in South Africa and their colleagues to the north, and fears 
about soil erosion were reinforced by case studies from different areas. Links of 
kinship and camaraderie drew the settler societies of East and southern Africa closer 
together and examples from one country were readily applied to the others.17 While 
late nineteenth-century Cape officials had to look to the woodier environments of
13 Grove, ‘Early themes in African conservation’.
14 Beinart, ‘Environmental Destruction in Southern Africa’.
15 Worster, Nature’s Economy, p. 229.
Beinart, ‘Soil erosion, conservation and ideas about development’; Worster, Nature’s Economy.
17 Anderson, ‘Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography and Drought’.
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India, Europe and the eastern North America for their comparative examples, those in 
early twentieth century Southern Rhodesia could point to the semi-arid zones of South 
Africa.18
The shift from a discourse dominated by trees and climate to one dominated by 
grasses and soil did not mean, however, that the link between climate change and 
vegetational change no longer existed in popular environmentalism. This issue was 
discussed in the early 1920s in South Africa by a Drought Investigation Commission 
but no evidence was found to support the dessicationist hypothesis. Despite these 
findings the perception that there must be a link between vegetation and climate 
persisted in South Africa, and the 1951 Desert Encroachment Committee specifically 
aimed to examine whether ‘man-made desiccation had altered the natural conditions 
of the veld to such an extent that the climate itself had in turn been affected’.19 As in 
the 1920s no evidence was found to suggest that rainfall figures showed a longer-term 
downward trend.
Both the Desert Encroachment Committee and the earlier Drought Investigation 
Commission were primarily concerned with environmental degradation in the ‘white’ 
farming areas of South Africa’s interior. Despite the impression created by some of the 
literature that ‘the environmentally destructive activities of European farmers were 
virtually ignored’20 in reality the initial emphasis of environmental concerns were the 
extensive settler farming regions. Anxiety over ecological decay on the settler farms of 
South Africa co-existed, however, with similar fears about the African-occupied 
reserves. Beinart argues that by the time of the 1932 Native Economic Commission 
‘the basic points about environmental decline in the reserves were firmly entrenched 
and have permeated a great deal of literature since’.21
18 See for example Watt, W. M. ‘The Dangers and Prevention of Soil Erosion’, Rhodesia Agricultural 
Journal, 10, 5,1913, cited in Beinart ‘Soil erosion, conservation and ideas about development’, p. 
56.
19 Union of South Africa, Report o f the Desert Encroachment Committee, UG 59, (Pretoria, 1951), p. 
2, quoted by Beinart, ‘Environmental Destruction in Southern Africa’, p. 155.
20 Mackenzie, F. ‘Selective Silence: a Feminist Encounter with Environmental Discourse in Colonial 
Africa’ in Crush, Power o f Development, pp. 100-114, p. 102.
21 Beinart, ‘Environmental Destruction in Southern Africa’, p. 155.
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3.2. Dongas and falling agricultural output
The idea of environmental degradation was also firmly entrenched in Lesotho by the 
early 1930s. The concerns expressed by foresters and others associated with the 
(international) dessicationist ideologies need to be articulated with specific local 
concerns about gully (donga) erosion and falling output. Though the fears of donga 
erosion only really held in some very specific environments (the highly erodable 
duplex soils around the base of steep-sided kopies along the foothill-lowland 
boundary) their visually alarming presence helped create a general association 
between the words Basutoland and erosion.
The earliest recorded local concerns about the spread of dongas date from the 1870s 
and 1880s, specifically from a number of long-term missionaries who had observed 
their measurable spread during their lifetime.22 These fears about donga erosion were 
given added impetus and official recognition with the visit in 1901 of an irrigation 
engineer with long experience in India and Egypt, invited by Lord Milner to write a 
report on the possibilities and potentials of irrigation in the Cape, Transvaal and 
Orange Free State.23 In a small departure from his brief the engineer, W. Wilcocks, 
also went to Lesotho. He reported that irrigation had little potential in the colony, but 
detailed his concerns about the rate of soil erosion on arable land.
Wilcocks’s report suggested that the major cause of soil erosion was the intense
cultivation of cereal crops that had occurred since the advent of British Protection.
The root cause of soil erosion was a desire for peasant accumulation amongst a
Basotho population not well versed in sound agricultural techniques. The implication
was that the Basotho had experienced short-term gains but in the long-term their
production techniques were unsustainable. The primary way to prevent soil erosion,
according to Wilcocks, was, therefore, the establishment of ‘small model farms’
where manuring, rotation and the use of legumes would increase output:
If obviously satisfactory results were obtained, a people so intelligent as the 
Basutos would certainly imitate them.34
Wilcocks also suggested a number of physical anti-erosion works, including the 
planting of trees and the damming of dongas.
22 Showers, ‘Soil Erosion in the Kingdom of Lesotho’.
23 Wilcocks, W. Report on Irrigation in South Africa (London, 1901), Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office Library, South African Pamphlets, Vol. 2.
24 Wilcocks, Report on Irrigation in South Africa, p. 32, emphasis in original.
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Given that the stated policy of the Basutoland authorities at this time was ‘to induce 
labour [for South African farms and mines] by all reasonable means’25 it is not 
surprising that Wilcocks recommendations to improve peasant cultivation were not 
acted upon. District Commissioners were charged with responsibility for tree 
planting and the construction of weirs in ravines, but the extent that these 
interventions were carried out largely depended on the actions of individual officers26 
and, as they were performed by matsema (‘tribute’) labour, the support of the local 
chief.
Wilcocks’s assumption that intensive cereal cultivation had only begun with the 
advent of colonialism is far from the truth. Despite the persistent threats from the 
neighbouring Boer republics and frequent insecurity Basotho farmers managed to 
produce significant yields of maize and other cereals from the 1840s onwards.27 
Nevertheless, Wilcocks was right in his identification of the 1870s as a boom time 
for Basotho agriculture, as farmers responded to the new opportunities brought about 
in the wake of diamond discoveries at Kimberley. This boom was accompanied by 
the widespread adoption of new techniques, especially deep ploughing. Indeed the 
increase in labour migration, especially to the mines at Kimberley, during this period 
has often been linked with attempts to raise capital to buy new ploughs and cattle to 
pull them (as well as guns and other manufactured articles).28 During the 1880s and 
1890s the fortunes of Basotho agriculturalists fluctuated, but in years with good 
rainfall and encouraging market conditions the territory continued to export large 
quantities of grain.
The period 1900 to 1930 saw agricultural output in Lesotho continue to fluctuate. The 
years 1908 and 1909 saw disastrous harvests as a result of pests and drought but the 
First World War brought about increased world prices and record-breaking 
production. This led one official to comment that ‘the theory which is sometimes 
propounded that the wheat lands of Basutoland are “worked-ouf ” had been 
disproved.29 Nevertheless the overall trend in production was downwards and the 
international depression of the early 1930s put the final nail in the coffin of Lesotho’s 
once vibrant maize-exporting economy. Wheat production, mainly on the fertile 
basalt soils of the mountain valleys, did recover as prices gradually rose in the late
25 Lagden, G. Friend o f the Free State, 25 November 1898, quoted in Maloka, ‘All Chiefs are 
Shepherds’, p. 7.
26 Showers, ‘Soil Erosion in the Kingdom of Lesotho’, p. 278.
27 Eldredge, A South African Kingdom.
28 Murray, ‘From Granary to Labour Reserve’.
29 Great Britain, Colonial Annual Report: Basutoland 1919/20, quoted by Murray, ‘From Granary to 
Labour Reserve’, p. 9 and by Showers, ‘Soil Erosion in the Kingdom of Lesotho’, p. 269.
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1930s but by then the economy had essentially undergone its transformation from 
‘granary to labour reserve’.30
It is unclear to what extent this downward trend was the result of environmental 
decline. James McCann’s recent work suggests that the agricultural boom in the last 
three decades of the nineteenth century may well have led to increased soil erosion, 
especially on the easily eroded lowland duplex, sodic soils. The introduction of new 
techniques, in particular deep ploughing, was probably largely responsible for the 
acceleration of soil erosion and the growth of the visually alarming dongas.31 It is 
impossible, however, to distinguish the result of environmental decline from the 
general transformation of the structural economy of Lesotho: the impact of South 
Africa import restrictions, competition from cheap grain production in the United 
States and Australia, the imposition of colonial taxes, demand for manufactured 
products, labour constraints due to absence of young men at the mines and relatively 
higher transport costs due to lack of rail access all played their part in the decline of 
Basotho agriculture and sucked Basotho labour into the migrant labour system.
Whatever the exact contribution of environmental decline to falling agricultural 
output what is clear is that by the early 1930s the Basutoland authorities were 
becoming increasingly concerned about the impact of soil erosion on the territory’s 
economy. Despite the impression created in some of the literature these fears pre­
dated the 1935 Pirn Commission. Tsidiso Maloka has argued that the decline in 
agricultural production was actually the deliberate policy of the colonial 
administration, citing the increased hut tax just after a drought in 1898 and a severely 
constrained budget for public works.32 While the policy in 1898 may well have been 
to undermine agriculture, and force Basotho onto the labour market, it is not enough 
to simply extrapolate forward from there and argue that the British were happy to see 
agriculture decline until ‘an outcry was raised by the [1935] Pirn report’.33
While the Basutoland colonial authorities were in general sympathetic to South 
African calls for increased outflows of labour from Lesotho, and did everything they 
could to facilitate labour recruitment, a number of officials were also concerned about 
the implications of the collapse in the agricultural sector that occurred during the first 
three decades of the 20th century. These fears about falling agricultural output were 
often expressed in terms of the impact of environmental degradation. The concerns
30 Murray, ‘From Granary to Labour Reserve’.
31 McCann, Green Land, Brown Land, Black Land, Chapter 7.
32 Maloka, “All Chiefs are Shepherds”, p.7.
33 Maloka, “All Chiefs are Shepherds”, p.7.
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about soil erosion expressed by the Pim Commission were actually largely based on 
the answers to pre-survey questionnaire sent to the Department of Agriculture in 
August 1934.34 As we saw in chapter 2 Russell Thornton, the Basutoland Director of 
Agriculture from 1934 to 1942, was especially concerned that environmental 
degradation meant that the land would no longer be able to support a rural population 
and the urban labour market would be unable to absorb the surplus population.
Showers argues that accelerated soil erosion was not widespread in the 1930s. Using 
evidence contained in the Pim Commission and from oral history35 she argues that 
accelerated gully erosion was confined to a few specific locations around the main 
government camps, along roads (both areas in the full view of colonial officials) and 
below the escarpment dividing foothills from the lowlands. Using this evidence 
Showers dates the on-set of widespread accelerated environmental degradation to the 
late 1930s, when the anti-soil erosion programme got underway. While Showers may 
be right to say that colonial reports of soil erosion exaggerated the picture there were 
undoubtedly some cases of fairly severe soil erosion on a local scale.
Unlike the concerns expressed by those following a dessicationist ideology these fears
were primarily about erosion of arable land. There were, however, a number of
expressions of concern about grazing land as well. In 1931 Thornton was invited to
examine the mountain grazing areas specifically because it was feared that the
pastures were deteriorating and leading to increased soil erosion. The Resident
Commissioner commented that:
The question of preservation of pastures is an all important one as far as 
Basutoland is concerned, and any steps which could usefully be taken to further 
this object would be most valuable.3®
Thornton’s report on the state of the mountain grazing sparked off a brief flurry of 
interest in the state of the mountain environment in 1931-32. This interest quickly 
waned, however, mainly because the rapid decrease in livestock populations in response 
to drought led most officials to conclude that the country was no longer overstocked. 
Thornton’s report is discussed in more detail in the chapter 4.
34 PRO DOl 19/1051, Answer to Questionnaire sent by Sir Alan Pim in Preparation for Commission, 
31 August 1934 and A Note on the Problem of Erosion, Showing Areas Affected and the Extent of 
Inquiry to the Cultivable and Grazing Areas.
35 Showers and Malahleha, ‘Oral Evidence in Historical Environmental Impact Assessment’.
36 LNA 212, Sturrock to Tweedie, 31 March 1931.
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By the time the Pim Commission arrived in the territory in 1935 the emphasis was
firmly back on the cultivated lands in the lowlands. The Department of Agriculture’s
submission to the Pim Commission stated that:
We are fortunate... in that there is very little of this serious menace [soil erosion] 
in the mountain areas, due to the very favourable conditions of soil and climate.37
Nevertheless the Pim Commission did express fear about the possibility of soil erosion
in the mountains and advised that the services of an ecologist be sought in order to write
a fuller report on environmental conditions in the mountains.38 An ecological survey of
the mountains was indeed carried out and, again, it is discussed in more detail in
chapter 4.
Whatever the true extent of soil erosion in the early 1930s what is clear is that the 
colonial authorities were concerned about the impact of dongas and tended to express 
their concerns about falling output in environmental terms. Conversely, at the points 
during the 1910s and 1920s when exports of grain were healthy, they made a number 
of more positive reports on environmental conditions.39 To understand why fears 
about falling output were primarily expressed in a discourse of environment decline it 
is necessary to return to the wider international environmental debates.
3.3. Dust bowl
In the 1930s soil erosion became an international concern; Anderson describes it as 
the ‘first global environmental problem’.40 A major reason for this international 
concern were the alarming images of dust storms blowing away huge amounts of top 
soil from the ploughed fields of the south-western states of the USA. As I have noted 
above, these areas had experienced dust storms in previous decades, especially in the 
depressed 1890s, but nothing prepared people for what was to occur in the 1930s. 
Rapidly expanding agriculture in the dry Great Plains met its limit as drought struck 
and the top soil simply blew away in the area’s ever-present high winds. The winds 
deposited dust blown from the Great Plains as far east as Chicago, Washington D.C. 
and even on ships out in the Atlantic.41
37 PRO DOl 19/1051, A Note on the Problem of Erosion, Showing Areas Affected and the Extent of 
Inquiry to the Cultivable and Grazing Areas.
38 Pim, A.W. Financial and Economic Position o f Basutoland: Report o f the Commission Appointed 
by the Secretary o f State fo r  Dominion Affairs (Cmd. 4907, London, 1935), p. 142.
39 Compare statements from colonial officials cited in Showers ‘Soil Erosion in the Kingdom of 
Lesotho’, p. 269 with reports of fluctuating exports in Murray, ‘From Granary to Labour Reserve’, 
p. 9.
40 Anderson, ‘Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography and Drought’, p. 327.
41 The dust bowl is discussed in numerous American environmental history texts; Worster, D. Dust 
Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s, (New York, 1979) is widely regarded as the classic text on 
the subject.
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The alarming images of the dust bowl quickly found their way into the British 
imperial arena, especially through the copious literature emanating from the US 
Department of Agriculture’s Soil Conservation Service.42 To many writers at the time 
these events on the Great Plains appeared like the inevitable culmination of 
unsustainable agricultural practices. Reports on the problems were doom laden and a 
number of authors, most notably Paul Sears and G.V. Jacks and R.O. Whyte, set-out 
to determine where the plague of soil erosion was going to hit next.43 Southern Africa 
received widespread attention in the work of both Sears and of Jacks and Whyte. In 
the Rape o f the Earth, Jacks and Whyte pointed to South Africa (including the three 
High Commission Territories) as the place in the world where a catastrophe due to 
soil erosion was most imminent.44
International fears about soil erosion during and after the US dust bowl did much to
fuel concerns in British colonial Africa. Anderson’s statement about the spread of
concern about erosion in East Africa is equally true for southern Africa:
In a sense it became fashionable to be aware of soil erosion, and the zeal with 
which many young officers pursued the problem is testimony to the fact that the 
acquisition of a Diploma in Agriculture came to have a knowledge of this aspect 
of agricultural science as one of its essential requirements. Armed with their new 
perceptions, this small cadre of Agricultural Officers quickly identified the danger 
areas.45
In southern Africa one of the danger areas was clearly Lesotho where the pre-existing
fears about donga erosion were given added impetus by the images of the US dust
bowl. As in the US a series of drought years in the early 1930s did much to
concentrate colonial officials minds on soil erosion. These drought years were a
significant turning point in the country’s economic history and left a great impression
on the population. One oral informant told Singh that:
So impressed on people minds were the drought years of the 1930s that people 
would name their birthdays as before or after the drought.46
The images of the American dust bowl must have echoed especially strongly when
compared with Lesotho’s own dust storms of the early 1930s. Singh reports that
another oral informant told her that:
In 1932[3] there was a terrible dust storm... Blacked out the whole country - 
South Africa and here - it came across from the Kalahari.47
42 Anderson, ‘Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography and Drought’, p. 326.
43 Sears, P. Deserts on the March (London, 1949, [1935]); Jacks, G.V. and Whyte, R.O. The Rape o f  
the Earth: A World Survey o f Soil Erosion (London, 1939).
44 Jacks and Whyte, Rape o f the Earthy p. 264.
45 Anderson, ‘Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography and Drought’, p.327.
46 Oral informant (Rev. Ruch) quoted in Singh, ‘Geological, Historical and Present-day Erosion*, p. 
243.
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Though these dust storms in Lesotho took place in the year before the worst storms 
began in the US, when stories of the American events arrived in the territory they 
must have resonated with pre-existing images in Lesotho. A report on soil erosion in 
Lesotho written five years later opened with a report on the ‘Great Dust’ that had 
‘darkened the sun’ in 1933.48
Through-out the 1930s British colonial concerns about soil erosion increased. The
Colonial Office in London began to take an increasingly proactive role in discussion
about soil erosion and it was an issue that was extensively discussed in influential
forums like the Royal Africa Society and the Royal Geographical Society. In 1937
the Council of the Royal African Society passed a resolution declaring:
That this Council views with the gravest concern the widespread destruction of 
the African soil by erosion consequent on wasteful methods of husbandry which 
strike at the basis of rural economy and native welfare, and is of the opinion that 
immediate steps should be taken for the application of a common policy and of 
energetic measures through-out British Africa in order to put an effective check 
upon this growing menace to the fertility of the land and to the health of its 
inhabitants.49
Frank Stockdale played a crucial role in increasing interest in the issue of soil erosion 
in the British Empire, using his position as Agricultural Advisor in the Colonial 
Office to make soil conservation policies an Empire-wide policy.50
Stockdale and others at the Colonial Office were careful to ensure that the three High 
Commission Territories, administered by the Dominions Office, were not left out of 
the equation. They were included in a general instruction to furnish the Colonial 
Office with annual reports on soil conservation measures and were invited to 
conferences of the Colonial Directors of Agriculture.51 Off-prints of articles on soil 
erosion sent by the Colonial Office to colonial territories were also forwarded to the 
three High Commission Territories. In March 1938, for example, 59 copies of two 
articles by E.P. Stebbing were sent to the High Commission Territories.52 Given the 
tiny size of the administrations in the territories, 59 copies would have received a very 
wide distribution.
47 Oral Informant (Mr Thom) in Singh, ‘Geological, Historical and Present-day Erosion’, p. 282. 
Archival evidence suggests that this was actually in 1933.
48 PRO DO35/940/Y600/146, Resident Commissioner, Basutoland, First Annual Report on Soil 
Erosion, October 1936-September 1937, submitted to Dominions Office, 21 June 1938.
49 PRO D035/934/Y556/9, Resolution Passed by the Council of the Royal African Society, 20 
October 1937.
50 Anderson, ‘Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography and Drought’, p. 341.
51 PRO CO 323/1641, Conference of Colonial Directors of Agriculture, July 1938.
52 PRO CO322/1620/7, the articles were ‘Erosion and Drought in Africa’, Journal o f the Royal Africa 
Society, January 1938 and ‘The Man Made Desert in Africa’, Journal o f  the Royal Africa Society, 
January 1938.
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By the late 1930s reports on environmental conditions in Lesotho by the Pim 
Commission and publications such as Jakes and Whyte’s Rape o f the Earth had made 
the name Basutoland synonymous with soil erosion within British African colonial 
circles. However, it was also held up as an example of how serious problems of 
erosion could be tackled. The programme of contour bank construction begun in the 
lowlands, under the auspices of Thornton, was seen as a model programme that could 
be emulated elsewhere. Before establishing a Soil Conservation Service in Kenya, for 
example, it was suggested that an Agricultural Officer should be sent to investigate 
the works carried out by the Basutoland administration.53
By 1939 Thornton and his small but growing staff in the Basutoland Department of 
Agriculture were poised to expand their soil conservation programme, specifically by 
beginning to implement some of the findings of the ecological survey into the 
mountain zone. They were delayed, however, by the onset of war in Europe and the 
general instructions that for the duration of the war anti-erosion work be concentrated 
in areas where a start had already been made.54 The Second World War was to have 
implications, especially in the South African context, beyond simply delaying the 
imposition of new policies.
3.4. Soil erosion and civilisation
One of the most persistent themes in colonial and wider international discussions of soil
erosion was the connection between accelerated soil erosion and the decline of ancient
civilisations. Many of the books and articles written in response to the dust bowl in the
USA opened with surveys of soil erosion in past civilisations and how this had
contributed to the decline of once great civilisations. The obvious implication was that
if current generations were not careful Western Civilisation would go down the same
path as the Romans, Egyptians, Greeks and Chinese. A 1946 South African children’s
textbook, written by two leading lights of the South African anti-soil erosion
movement, reproduced the standard arguments:
History shows that great civilisations have flourished and disappeared again. It is 
certain that some, at least, of these great empires fell not only before the march of 
conquering armies, but because men did not understand that Nature would cast 
them off if they did not obey her rules. Ruins of great cities that lie in the deserts
53 Anderson, ‘Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography and Drought’, p.340. In early 1938 three officials 
from Kenya did tour both Lesotho and South Africa; see Gurney, H.L.G., Edwards, D.C. and 
Barnes, R.O. ‘Notes on a visit to the Union of South Africa and Basutoland, March - April 1938.’ 
unpublished report in the Papers of R.O. Barnes, Rhodes House, Oxford, MSS Brit. Emp. t l( l) .
54 PRO DO35/940/Y600/146, Sir Arthur Hill, Observations on Summary Reports on Soil Erosion in 
the Colonial Empire for 1939.
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of the world were once, records tell us, surrounded by fertile soil, forest and broad 
lands. Men by ill treating the soil destroyed their plant and water supplies and so 
in the end destroyed themselves, for no one can live without food. This happened 
in China, Persia, North Africa and many parts of the world. It is happening to a 
certain degree to-day in the Middle and Far East, in the United States, in Russia, 
in Canada, Australia and New Zealand and in our own country.55
The discourse of soil conservation policy was primarily concerned with how to mediate
between civilisation and nature: if it was to survive civilisation had to find a way of
living within the limits of nature.
The connection between civilisation and soil erosion had particular resonance in South
Africa. Jacks and Whyte commented:
Given a stable and productive soil, Europeans should at least be able to hold their 
own in competition with the natives; without soil stability they are doomed to 
occupy at best a subordinate place in South Africa’s economy. A clearer 
illustration cannot be found of the dependence of a civilised society on securing 
and maintaining absolute control of the soil.56
The issue was not just the soil itself but also its connection to the issue of water
resources and irrigation. According to S.J. Tighy, MP for Johannesburg West:
If we do not solve our water problem, it will not be necessary for us to worry over 
the colour problem. Then we will not have a non-European problem but a 
European problem, because if we do not find a solution, South Africa will no 
longer be a habitable country for Europeans and only the Kaffirs will be able to 
live here.57
As we saw in chapter 2 soil erosion on the plaatland was seen as a direct cause of the 
‘poor white problem’ and there were, therefore, implications that in South Africa white 
society was already tottering on the edge of a descent from civilisation.
The Second World War in Europe introduced a new factor to the soil erosion and 
civilisation discourse in South Africa. The War had shaken civilisation to its roots in 
Europe and the white population of South Africa, therefore, had a particular duty to 
ensure its preservation. Early editions of the Veld Trust News contrasted pictures of 
‘healthy natives’ in South Africa with emaciated, starving white children in war-torn 
Europe. The language of national defence and of a war against the ‘evil of soil erosion’
55 Van Rensburg, C JJ . and Palmer, E.M. New World to Win (Bloemfontein, 1946), p. 36.
56 Jacks and Whyte, Rape o f the Earth, p. 265. Interestingly they suggested that the threat of soil 
erosion made racial segregation impossible as the African population was unable to support itself 
on the congested reserves. As many white farmers had also proved themselves poor farmers the 
only solution was a system of feudalism where all land would be owned by the ‘class(of the 
dominant race) which shows itself capable or organising for the perpetuation of conservative land 
utilisation, and of appreciating that its individual and class interests are bound up with the future 
security of the soil... The South African native faces a period of serfdom as the price he must pay 
for his share in the benefits of a distant civilisation.’ (p. 279-280). To Jacks and Whyte this severe 
form of ‘trusteeship’ was the only way that ‘Nature’s harsh harmony’ could be restored (p. 280).
57 Tighy, S.J., Union of South Africa, Debates of the House o f Assembly, 3rd Session, 10th 
Parliament, 1950, p. 2112.
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came to dominate the debate: an early edition of Veld Trust News was entitled ‘A 
Nation Imperilled’. 58
The upsurge in public concern about soil erosion amongst white South Africans, 
culminating in the 1946 Soil Conservation Act, also had an influence on the Basutoland 
service. Many members of the Basutoland service were white South Africans and the 
social world most officials moved in was essentially the same as that of most South 
African government officers in the reserves.
One young Basutoland civil servant heavily influenced by the then-fashionable concern 
about soil erosion was Patrick Duncan, son of the Union Governor General and later on 
a committed anti-apartheid activist.59 As a young man in the Basutoland service during 
the War, Duncan was, like many of his colleagues, extremely concerned about the 
country’s apparent soil erosion. His contribution to the struggle against erosion was a 
short pamphlet, entitled The Enemy.
As with many of the publications of the time the pamphlet started with a description of
the world as it had been before the advent of civilisation and a description of how
nature had kept human populations in balance. The rise of civilisation, on the back of
agriculture, meant that ‘man had learnt to upset the balance in his favour’. The early
civilisations, China, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece and Rome, had all failed, because of
soil erosion and European civilisation was only able to survive because it exported its
soil depleting activities to the New Worlds. This meant that the crisis was now global.
The pamphlet finished with a call to action in military terms suitable for the era:
When Germany and Japan are beaten we must not cease to fight. We must 
realise, all of us, that there is another Enemy, whose attacks on Man are deadlier 
even than those if Hitler. We must go forward to this new war... with the same 
united purpose.60
Though Duncan thought his colleagues, with the exception of Thornton and one or two 
others in the Department of Agriculture, were unconcerned about the issue of soil
58 Veld Trust News, 1, 2,1944. Under the banner headline was a photograph of Hugh Bennett, the 
visiting head of the US Soil Conservation Service, sitting in a field chair and surrounded by Dr. 
P.R. Viljoen (Secretary for Agriculture), Dr J.C. Ross (chief of the Division o f Soil and Water 
Conservation), and C J J. van Rensburg (the officer in charge of the Rust-der-Winter Pasture 
Research Station) crowded around him anxiously showing him their plans: a scene reminiscent of a 
general and his staff planning an invasion.
59 Driver, Patrick Duncan.
60 Melanchthon [Duncan, P.] The Enemy, (Morija, 1943). The pseudonym ‘Melanchthon’ means 
black earth in Greek. In all 250 copies of the pamphlet were printed and mostly brought by or given 
to his colleagues in the Basutoland service; Driver, Patrick Duncan, p. 47 - 48.
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erosion his views were probably similar to those of most Basutoland officers at the 
time.61
3.5. International discourse and local concerns
It may seem a bit far fetched to talk of an ‘environmentalist ideology’ amongst the tiny 
Basutoland civil service. Yet by the mid-1940s a clear concern about environmental 
decline infused every part of the administration and ‘saving the soil’ was seen as one of 
their essential jobs. The development of these environmental concerns can in part be 
explained by the international growth in concern but specific local factors also need to 
be taken into account. These include environmental factors, (such as the susceptibility 
of the lowland sandstone soils to gully erosion), political factors (such as the Union 
calls for transfer) and economic factors (such as the impact of the 1930s depression of 
Basotho agriculture). Furthermore the small size of the service meant that one 
individual, such as Thornton, could make a large difference to the way environmental 
concerns were understood.
Nevertheless the international discourse was important in driving the nature of the 
concerns about the environment in Lesotho. In the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries dessicationist ideas were applied to Lesotho and there were calls for 
afforestation schemes to ensure a steady supply of water to the South Africa river 
systems. The early interest in the environment of the Lesotho mountains, especially the 
article from Carlson, had little to do with the actual state of the mountain grasslands but 
rather involved the application of international models of environmental change. The 
shift from concerns about vegetation to concerns about soil mirrored shifts in the 
international discourse, from the early 1930s driven mainly by the images of the US 
dust bowl. Colonial officials in the Basutoland service were heavily influenced by the 
general growth in environmentalism amongst white South Africans in the years 
immediately following the Second World War.
With the exception of the period immediately following Thornton’s visit in 1931 fear of 
soil erosion in the 1930s was mainly confined to the lowlands. Nevertheless the growth 
in environmental concerns in the lowlands, and the fact that Basutoland became 
synonymous with soil erosion in British African circles, meant that when post-War
61 Driver, Patrick Duncan, p. 47.
83
CHAPTER THREE: HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTALISM
attention turned to the mountains the Basutoland administration, and their masters in 
London, were already convinced of the gravity of soil erosion.
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4. A history of rangeland ecology and rangeland management in
southern Africa
In order to understand why colonial officials in Lesotho became concerned about the 
country’s mountain pastures it is necessary to understand not just the rise of fears about 
environmental destruction but also the science that informed these fears. A very 
specific ecological model, that of plant succession and climax community, was integral 
to the discursive structures conditioning the way in which the landscape was ‘read’1 by 
colonial officials and other individuals concerned about the state of the mountain 
environment.
This theory of ecology is strongly associated with the work of the American ecologist 
Frederic Clements, who has been described as ‘the greatest individual creator of the 
modem science of vegetation*2 and the chapter will start with an examination of his 
work and the concept of a climax community and plant succession. Clements was also 
strongly associated with the idea of ‘complex organisms’ which will be examined in 
connection with the work of John Phillips, probably the foremost South African 
ecologist in the early 20th century. The chapter then turns to the key concepts of 
carrying capacity and of indicator species before considering how these various ideas 
were spread around the British colonial empire. The final section looks at how these 
ideas were used in Lesotho and how they helped shape fears about environmental 
degradation and drove policy formulation.
4.1. Climax Community, plant succession and complex organisms
Frederic Clements early work in the 1890s, mapping the vegetation of his native 
Nebraska,3 lead him towards the theme that was to dominate his writing: that vegetation 
was dynamic and underwent a process of change. This process of change, however, 
had a direction: over time vegetation would tend towards a state of equilibrium to form 
what Clements called a climax community. He argued that in any given habit 
vegetation will pass through a series of clearly distinguishable progressions (‘seres’). A 
piece of land cleared of all vegetation would be initially colonised by pioneer species, 
which would in turn be replaced by new invaders, until eventually the climax
1 Fairhead, J. and Leach, M. Misreading the African Landscape: Society and Ecology in a Forest- 
savanna Mosaic (Cambridge, 1996).
2 Tansley, A.G. ‘Frederic Edward Clements’, Journal o f Ecology, 34,1946, pp.194-196, quoted in 
Worster, D. Nature’s Economy: a History o f Ecological Ideas, (New York, 1994, 2nd edition) p. 
209.
3 Clements, F. and Pound, R. The Phytogeography o f Nebraska (Lincoln, 1898).
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community was reached. An outside intervention, such as the impact of man, could 
alter the climax community but once the outside influence ceased nature would run its 
course and the system would return to its climax. Though Clements did allow for the 
influence of variable factors like soil type it was essentially climate that dictated the 
form of the final climax community, hence the terminology climatic climax.4
The influence of ideas emanating out of Darwin and Wallaces’s theory of evolution are 
clear in Clements belief that vegetational communities began with simple forms and 
over time became increasing complex: contained within his ecological theory is the idea 
that time has a direction, unlike in theories of the physical world derived from 
Newtonian physics.5 Equally important for Clements was another ideology that arose 
in response to the theory of evolution: that of ‘organismic philosophy’ as expressed by 
the English nineteenth-century thinker, Herbert Spencer (perhaps best known for 
coining the phrase ‘the survival of the fittest’ and for being the foremost early Social 
Darwinist). Spencer likened society to one huge organism and saw the process of 
history leading towards progressively more advanced and complex organisms.
Clements was much taken by Spencer’s analogy and underlying his whole theory of 
climax communities was the belief that the development of vegetation must resemble 
the growth process of an individual plant.6
Clements’s ideas about plant succession and climax communities have been hugely 
influential in twentieth-century ecology. From the early years of the century through to 
the 1970s his ideas have dominated ecology in southern Africa, even though individual 
scientists may have disagreed with specific aspects of his theories. One important 
ecologist who disagreed with very little of Clements’s theories was the South African, 
John Phillips.
4.2. John Phillips, complex organisms, and organismic 
philosophy
It was through John Phillips that the most direct African link to Frederic Clements 
existed. Phillips had been introduced to the work of Clements whilst an undergraduate 
in Edinburgh University and he was so impressed by Plant Succession that in 1920 he
4 Clements’s theory of plant succession was most comprehensively outlined in his book Plant 
Succession: Analysis o f the Development o f Vegetation (Washington, 1916). For a detailed 
description of Clements theories and his wide ranging influence in Anglo-American ecology see 
Worster, Nature’s Economy, chapter 1 1 -1 2 , p. 205-253.
5 Chapman, G. and Driver, T. ‘Time, Mankind and the Earth’ in Driver, T. and Chapman, G., (eds) 
Time-scales and Environmental Change (London, 1996), pp. 1-24, p. 12.
6 Worster, Nature’s Economy, p.211.
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wrote to Clements and initiated a correspondence that was to last from then until 
Clements death in 1954. In 1922 Phillips returned to South Africa to take up an 
appointment in the Forestry Department, where he carried out ecological research in the 
sub-tropical evergreen forests of Knysa. In 1927 he was appointed to the post of 
Ecologist in the Tanganyika Department of Tsetse Research before returning to South 
Africa, in 1931, as Professor of Botany at the University of Witswatersrand. In 1948 he 
returned to Tanganyika as an adviser to the East African Groundnuts Scheme and in the 
early 1950s carried out a number of consultancies in Asia and Central America and 
helped establish the Faculty of Agriculture at the new Gold Coast University.7
From his position in the University of Witswatersrand Phillips was able to influence a 
whole generation of both theoretical and applied ecologists in South Africa and beyond. 
In 1933 he initiated a programme of ecological research at the Frankenwald Research 
Station and many figures who were later to make their mark in various colonial 
departments of agriculture studied there.8 His earlier professional experiences, in both 
South Africa and Tanganyika, had also given him scope to influence the work of his 
colleagues. In the early 1920s he had numerous discussion with J.W. Bews9 who was 
already applying some Clementsian principals to his study of grasslands and forests in 
Natal, though he had more reservations about the utility of the theory.10 In Tanganyika 
his work on tsetse fly brought him into contact with a both colonial administrators and 
animal ecologists,11 and made Phillips increasingly convinced of the need to consider 
both animals and vegetation as part of the same biotic community.12
From the mid-1930s onwards Phillips became increasingly interested in applied 
ecology, and in particular grazing management and pasture deterioration. In 1938 he 
published an influential article on the ‘deterioration in the vegetation of the Union of 
South Africa’ and made a call for a united ‘national fight’ against the three foes of 
‘Deterioration, Ignorance and Procrastination’.13 Following the Second World War he
7 Phillips, J. ‘A Tribute to Frederic E. Clements and his Concepts in Ecology’, Ecology, 35,1954, pp. 
114-115, and Du Plessis, E. ‘Obituary: John Frederick Vicars Phillips (1899-1987)’, Bothalia, 17, 
1987, pp. 267-8.
8 Scoones, ‘Politics, Polemics and Pastures’, p. 37.
9 Phillips, ‘A Tribute to Frederic E. Clements’.
10 Bews, J.W. Plant forms and their evolution in South Africa (London, 1925).
11 For details of this research programme see Swynnerton, C. F. M. ‘The entomological aspects of an 
outbreak of sleeping sickness near Mwanza, Tanganyika Territory’, Bulletin of Entomological 
Research, 13,1922, pp. 317-370; Swynnerton, C. F. M. ‘An experiment in control of Tsetse flies in 
Shinyanga, Tanganyika Territory’, Bulletin o f Entomological Research, 15,1924, pp. 313-337; 
Swynnerton, C. F. M. ‘The tsetse-fly problem in the Nzega sub-district Tanganyika Territory’, 
Bulletin o f Entomological Research, 16,1925, pp. 99-109.
12 Phillips, J. ‘The Biotic Community’, Journal o f Ecology, 19,1931, pp. 1- 24.
13 Phillips, J. ‘Deterioration in the vegetation of the Union of South Africa’, South African Journal of
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established an applied BSc course in Soil Conservation which became the training 
ground for several hundred men ‘who spread the conservation message to several parts 
of Africa and overseas’.14 His move towards more applied ecology mirrored that of his 
mentor Frederic Clements, who had become increasingly involved in American national 
debates, particularly those concerning the dust bowl, after his move to the Carnegie 
Institute in Washington D.C. in 1927.15
Through-out his career Phillips associated himself wholehearted with Clements and he 
was internationally recognised as one of Clements’s staunchest supporters. The leading 
light of early twentieth-century British ecology, A.G. Tansley, commented that Phillips 
was apt to simply accept any argument put forward by Clements16 and in his respected 
series of articles in the Journal o f Ecology, Phillips certainly had a tendency to dismiss 
the work of other ecologists simply by referring to Clements.17
It was perhaps for his unstinting support of one of Clements’s more contentious ideas, 
that a biotic community was analogous to an organism, that Phillips received most note 
and criticism from fellow ecologists. One of Phillips’s major critics was Tansley. 
Tansley was willing to accept that a biotic community was in some senses like an 
organism;18 indeed in 1899 he had helped Spencer extend his theory of evolutionary 
organicism from the human to the ecological realm.19 He was, however, highly critical 
of Clements’s and Phillips’s view that a biotic community was a complex organism.20
Though he based his idea that a biotic community was a complex organism on 
Spencer’s organismic philosophy, Clements did not believe that ‘developed’21 societies 
could be part of the biotic community. He did consider the Native American population 
of the central plains to be part of the biome, but, as Worster has argued, ‘it was clear to
Science, 35,1938, pp. 476-484; also quoted in Scoones, ‘Politics, Polemics and Pastures’, p. 37.
14 Scoones, ‘Politics, Polemics and Pastures’, p. 38, quoting Du Plessis, ‘Obituary: John Frederick 
Vicars Phillips’.
15 Worster, Nature’s Economy, p. 235.
16 Tansley, A.G. ‘The Uses and Abuses of Vegetational Concepts and Terms’, Ecology, 16,1935, pp. 
284-307.
17 Phillips, J. ‘Succession, development, the climax and the complex organism: an analysis o f 
concepts’, Journal o f Ecology, Part 1 ,1934,22, pp. 554-571, Part II, 1935,23, pp. 210-246, Part III, 
1935, 23, pp. 488-508.
18 Tansley described a biotic community as a quasi-organism, Tansley, A.G. ‘The classification of 
vegetation and the concept of development’, Journal o f Ecology, 8 ,2 ,1920 , pp. 118-144.
19 Worster, Nature’s Economy, p.213.
20 Tansley, ‘The Uses and Abuses of Vegetational Concepts and Terms’.
21 Clements substituted the word ‘development’ for Spencer’s term ‘organisation’. The word 
development was used by Clements and his followers in ecology to mean an inevitable process to a 
higher form, see Phillips, ‘Succession, development, the climax and complex communities: Part II.’ 
p. 210-216.
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Clements...that the white was not part of it: he came as disrupter, an alien, an 
exploiter’.22
Phillips’s position was more unclear. In his 1931 article in The Journal o f Ecology 
Phillips argued that man should be included in the concept of biotic community. He 
went on to say:
My inclusion of man doubtless will call for much criticism - so to anticipate such 
I would remind you that despite the ability of man to upset temporarily, to hold in 
check to some degree, and to accelerate to greater or lesser extent the responses, 
the reactions, the co-actions and the development of a community, it is more than 
he can do to alter fundamentally the trend of these. To him certain - and not all - 
things are possible.23
In his 1934-5 series of articles, however, he retreated from this position and emphasised 
‘the need for restriction of the term biotic community to naturally associated 
organisms’.24 For Phillips, as for Clements, however the line between man and nature 
was somewhat unclear: he stated that herding or farming societies could not be part and 
parcel of a biotic community but significantly remained silent on hunting and gathering 
societies.25
Clements’s and Phillips’s view that ‘modem man’ had somehow stepped outside nature 
had been prevalent in much European ecological thinking since the eighteenth century 
and earlier. The idea is often traced back to the English politician Francis Bacon (1561- 
1626) and the view that society can and should use the technology at its disposal to 
achieve mastery or dominance over nature so as to satisfy human needs or wants.26 Of 
course, intricately associated with ‘domination over nature’ are ideas about other axis of 
domination based on class, race and gender.27 In early twentieth century European 
thinking on the relationship between people and nature in the African context there 
existed a clear hierarchy of societies, from hunter-gather societies which were regarded 
as being part and parcel of nature, through African farming and herding societies, 
regarded as being close to nature but nevertheless having the ability to adapt, and 
disrupt, the environment, and finally, ‘developed’ European society which had stepped 
outside of nature. During the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth
22 Worster, Nature’s Economy, p.217.
23 Phillips, ‘The Biotic Community’, p. 19.
24 Phillips, ‘Succession, development, the climax and complex communities: Part IIP, p. 500.
25 Phillips, ‘Succession, development, the climax and complex communities: Part IIP, p. 502.
26 Leach, M. and Meams, R. ‘Environmental change and policy: challenging received wisdom in 
Africa.’ in Leach and Meams, The Lie o f the Land, pp. 1-33, p. 11. See also Glacken, C. Traces on 
the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought from ancient times to the end o f  the 
eighteenth century (Berkely, 1967).
27 See Merchant, C. The Death o f Nature: Women Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (San 
Francisco, 1980) and Leiss, W. The Domination o f Nature (New York, 1972).
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century environmental destruction in southern Africa was blamed primarily on the 
activities of European settlers.28
There was, therefore, a hugely ironic contradiction in the supposedly unifying theories 
of climax community, complex organisms and evolutionary organismics. The 
‘developed’ human societies, seen as being analogous with the climatic climax, were 
the very ones doing most to destroy those climaxes (or in the words of Clements and 
Phillips, to retard the succession and deflect it to sub or pro-climax community).29 
African society was at the early stages of an inevitable evolutionary transformation 
(development in Clementsian terminology) and therefore akin to a subclimax biotic 
community, but was, nevertheless, less likely, or less able, to deflect the African 
climatic climax to a pro- or sub-climax biotic community.
In the African context this tension was manifested in a contradictory attitude to the 
relationship between the development of African societies and the African environment. 
Colonial attitudes towards the impact of African society on the environment tended to 
vacillate between arguing that it was developing away from an environmentally benign 
‘tradition’ and that at the same time Africans must rapidly adopt European economic 
and socio-cultural practices in order to conserve their environment.30
I am not arguing here that these contradictory views were solely a result of Clementsian 
theories of complex organisms. To a large extent this contradictory impulse arises from 
the ever present tension in ecology between the two major traditions within the 
discipline; what Worster, in Nature's Economy, labels as the arcadian (or romantic) and 
imperial traditions. In the arcadian tradition, growing out of the work of thinkers such 
as Rousseau and Thoreau, the underlying belief is that human suffering is largely the 
result of mankind breaking its ties with nature. The imperial tradition, associated with 
writers such as Bacon and Linneaus, was premised upon the belief that human 
happiness could only result from our mastery of nature.31 Nevertheless the ecological
28 See page72
29 Phillips did argue, however, that the activities o f humans, for example through the use of fire, could 
on occasions accelerate succession towards the climax; Phillips, J. ‘Fire: its influence on biotic 
communities and physical factors in South and East Africa’, South African Journal o f Science, 27, 
1930, pp. 352-367.
30 This contradictory attitude is still prevalent in late twentieth-century thinking on the African 
environment. On the one hand there are ideas about ‘poverty being the greatest polluter’ and on the 
other there is the ‘limits the growth’ approach which teaches that rapid economic growth is at the 
root of environmental problems. To an extent this contradiction is resolved by blaming local 
environmental problems on poverty and global environmental problems on economic growth. Note 
that here I am using ‘development’ in it’s ecological sense; cf. with discussion in chapter 2.
31 In modem environmentalism this tension is still prevalent and reflected in the distinction between 
eco-centric and antropo-centric environmentalism.
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theories of Clements (and Phillips) have been, and continue to be, extremely influential 
in shaping the way ecologists, agronomists and policy makers thought (and think) about 
relationships between human society and the environment.32
While John Phillips may have only been only one small player in the development of 
ideas about society and environment in southern Africa in the early twentieth century he 
was a key figure in the development of both theoretical and applied ecology in the 
region. Phillips’s view that the health of a particular environment could be measured 
by the extent to which it diverged from the climatic climax has dominated twentieth 
century southern African ecology. Within the field of range science this idea was 
crucial and it became the basis upon which ecologists and range managers judged the 
deterioration of African pastures. The mere presence of species associated with 
‘invader’ seres was enough to indicate that an environment was suffering from 
degradation.
Phillips’s other crucial role in the development of range science in southern Africa was 
his insistence, following Clements’s lead, that habitats grazed by domestic animals 
could not be considered biotic communities.33 It was Phillips’s and Clements’s 
perspective, rather than that of another South African ecologists J.W. Rowland, that 
dominated southern African range science and domesticated animals were always 
considered as an external influence on the ‘natural environment’.34 I will return to both 
of these themes and their relevance to livestock policy in Lesotho later in this chapter, 
but first I examine the crucial concept of carrying capacity.
4.3. Carrying capacity
Range science was dominated by studies carried out in the United States of America 
and many of the assumptions about range management practices were based on 
American ranching experiences. This had important implications for the way in which 
range science theory and the range management practices based on the theory evolved. 
This is particularly apparent in the way in which the concept of carrying capacity came 
to be used.
32 One clear area in which Clementsian ecological theories influenced wider political theory is 
through Jan Christian Smuts and in particular his influential book Evolution and Holism; Smuts,
J.C. Holism and Evolution (London, 1926).
33 Phillips, ‘Succession, Development, the climax and complex communities: Part n r , p. 502.
34 Rowland, J. ‘Notes on the study of plant succession in relation to grazing’, South African Journal of  
Science, 30,1933, pp.307-316.
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While the concept of carrying capacity was developed in range science during the early 
years of this century35 it obviously owes a great deal to the influential work of Thomas 
Malthus, whose calculations concerning an exponentially growing population versus an 
arithmetically growing resource base have underlain much of modem ecological 
thought.36 Malthus’s thesis was used by P.F. Verhulst, a 19th century theoretical 
ecologist, and resulted in an equation giving the upper limit of population size based on 
fixed resources.37 At this point, usually designated as K in modem ecological 
literature, the population will cease to grow because of limited food resources.
The concept of carrying capacity as used in range science is, however, somewhat more 
complex than an absolute limit on population growth. Within range science, carrying 
capacity does not refer to the absolute maximum number of animals a given habitat can 
support but to the density of population at which output can be maximised without 
causing environmental degradation. There is, therefore, a difference between an 
ecological carrying capacity (K) and an economic carrying capacity. The relationship 
between ecological and economic carrying capacity is represented in Figure 4.1.
With a very low animal density (y axis of Figure 4.1) there will be a high density of 
plants (x axis on Figure 4.1) but as the number of animals increases the density of 
plants decreases. Eventually a point (K) is reached where the animal population can 
grow no further as all plant growth is consumed (this does not mean there is no more 
vegetation, just that it is consumed at the same rate it grows). When the animal 
population is zero there is obviously no output from the livestock population. As the 
population grows it is possible to extract a greater number of animals as offtake. There 
comes a point, however, when because of limitations in food supply this figure begins 
to decrease: the population growth rate slows down meaning less animals available for 
slaughter and animals of poorer quality. The point at which the possible offtake is 
greatest (maximum sustained yield) corresponds to the economic carrying capacity.
35 For example Cotton J.S. ‘Range Management’ in United States, Department of Agriculture, 
Yearbook o f the Department o f Agriculture (Washington, 1906), pp.225-238.
36 Malthus, T. An Essay on the Principle o f Population (Harmondsworth, 1986 [1798]).
37 Bartels, G.B., Norton, B.E. and Perrier, G.K. ‘An examination of the carry capacity concept’ in 
Behnke, R.H., Scoones, I. and Kerven, C. Range Ecology at Disequilibrium: New Models o f  
Natural Variability and Pastoral Adaptation in African Savannas (London, 1993), pp. 89-103.
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Figure 4.1 The relationship between plant and animal populations in a 
grazing system.38
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This model bases the idea of an economic carrying capacity on the maximum offtake, 
where a herd of livestock is being managed primarily for slaughter. If the management 
objectives of the herd are not, however, simply the off-take the carrying capacity could 
be at a different point along the curve. In a game park, for example, where the primary 
management objective is to have as many animals as possible in order to facilitate game 
viewing it would make sense to aim for an animal population closer to the ecological 
carrying capacity; while in a biological reserve, where the aim is to preserve certain 
plant species, it would make more sense to have a smaller animal population.
As noted above the concept of carrying capacity was primarily developed in the 
ranching regions of the South West of the United States. The first federal range 
management research station were established in these areas around the turn of the
38 Based on Figure 1.2 in Behnke, R. and Scoones, I. ‘Rethinking Range Ecology: Implications for 
Rangeland Management in Africa’ in Behnke, Scoones and Kerven, Range Ecology at 
Disequalibrium, pp. 1-30.
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century. All the research emphasised the commercial production of beef and the 
calculations of carrying capacity reflected this emphasis.
The concept of carrying capacity developed in the United States also included the idea
of maintaining the output at a constant level over the years. The number of livestock on
the range was to be be managed to allow the vegetation to rejuvenate the following
growing season. In 1923 A.W. Sampson, an influential American range scientist,
defined carrying capacity as:
the number of stock... which an areas will support in good condition during the 
time that the forage is palatable and accessible without decreasing the forage 
production for subsequent seasons.39
Here the theory of climax communities came into play: evidence of a decrease in forage
production could be judged from the presence of species from a seres lower in the
succession. As already noted range scientists used this theory to develop management
systems where they looked for the presence of certain indicator species as a way of
judging if the condition of the rangeland was deteriorating. If these species were
present the obvious management solution was to reduce grazing pressure and allow the
pasture to develop back towards its climax.
One way of reducing grazing pressure was to rotate the livestock between different 
paddocks. The basic idea behind this system was that it would allow each area a period 
in which it could recover (revert to its climax) before it was grazed again. A huge 
number of different types of rotational or deferred grazing systems were experimented 
with in both the USA and southern Africa. Different regimes were advocated for 
different areas and at different times but the basic principals remained more or less 
constant. The emphasis on fencing in areas of communal grazing land was largely a 
response to the belief in rotational grazing as a management strategy.
4.4. The spreading Karoo
US ideas about carrying capacity and indicator species were extremely influential in 
southern Africa. Colonial officials trained in range science were exposed to a large 
body of US literature during their academic and professional development.
Furthermore a number of influential South African soil erosion experts undertook 
periods of training in the United States. Two members of the influential South African 
Drought Commission, the chairman H.S.D. du Toit and RJ. van Reenen, both studied 
in the USA while exiled during the South African War.40
39 Sampson, Range and Pasture Management, p. 328, quoted in Bartels, Norton and Perrier, ‘An 
examination of the carrying capacity concept’, p. 101
40 Beinart and Coates, Environment and History.
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The 1922-3 Drought Commission also borrowed terminology from the USA. The
Drought Commission argued that over-grazing on settler stock farms was leading to the
development of a ‘great South African desert’: a term taken from the Great American
Desert marked on early 19th century maps as the region between the 98th meridian and
the Rockies.41 The Drought Commission, and fears about vegetational change in the
semi-arid interior of the Cape generally, proved to be highly influential far beyond the
settler stock areas of the Cape interior. As William Beinart has noted:
The state of the settler stock farms and semi-arid areas more generally has been 
the trigger for broader debates and discourses about ecological decay in the 
region.42
Observations about changing southern African rangeland vegetation patterns did not, 
however, only appear after the development of American-inspired range science. A 
third influential South African who studied in the USA, T.D. Hall, was the first person 
to attempt to trace the development of concerns about vegetation change in southern 
Africa systematically. He identified the earliest fears about pasture deterioration as far 
back as the mid-18th century and quoted officials of the Board of Heemraden, 
Stellenbosh and Drakenstein mentioning the ‘disappearance of grass’ in the older 
settled districts ‘and the springing up of small bushy plants in their stead’.43 The ‘small 
bushy shrubs’ presumably referred to Karroid vegetation types, the same indicator of 
pasture deterioration used in the Lesotho mountains some two hundred years later. In 
1775, Andrew Sparrman, a Swedish traveller noted an increase in inedible vegetation 
types. He blamed this on an increase in cattle numbers and their preference for grazing 
certain grasses, thus preventing them from ‘thriving and taking root’, while they ‘pass 
by and leave untouched’ the unpalatable species which ‘take root free and unmolested 
and encroach on the place of others’.44
A century later John Shaw gave an address to the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science which highlighted one of the key ideas behind South African 
ecological thinking over the following century: that vegetation associated with the 
Karoo was expanding northwards and eastwards.45 Under the influence of Clementsian 
ideas about succession, carrying capacity and overgrazing, these observations about 
changes in vegetation took on a new, and more potent, meaning. Overgrazing was
41 Beinart and Coates, Environment and History, p.51.
42 Beinart, ‘Environmental Destruction in Southern Africa’, p. 150.
43 Hall, T.D. ‘South African Pastures: Retrospective and Prospective’, South African Journal of  
Science, 31,1934, pp. 59-97, p. 66; also quoted in Beinart, ‘Environmental Destruction’, p.153.
44 Sparrman, A. A Voyage to the Cape o f Good Hope 1785, quoted in Hall, ‘South African Pastures’, 
p. 66-67, also quoted in Beinart, ‘Environmental Destruction’, p. 153.
45 Beinart, ‘Environmental Destruction’, p.153-4.
95
CHAPTER FOUR: RANGELAND ECOLOGY
pushing vegetation back down an ecological succession and encouraging the spread of 
Karoo type vegetation out of its semi-arid heartland and into the wetter ‘sweetveld’ 
areas with higher productivity.
From the mid-1930s the bare bones of this ecological theory were filled out by an 
extremely influential ecologist, John Acocks, employed by the Department of 
Agriculture. Acocks’s fieldwork in and around the Karoo was highly influential in 
determining the findings of the 1951 Desert Encroachment Commission, on which he 
served. The report of the Commission and Acocks’s own Veld Types o f South Africa 
both proved to be highly influential in setting the terms of subsequent debate in South 
Africa, and southern Africa more generally.46
Acocks expressed particular concerns over the replacement of sweet rooigras species 
(especially Themeda triandra) with Karoo vegetation types: a derived climax 
community he labelled as False Upper Karoo.47 This concern mirrored exactly the 
prime ecological theory used to explain pasture deterioration in Lesotho. Before 
specifically examining the development of ideas about range ecology and range 
management in Lesotho, however, I will briefly explore the nature of links between 
different pasture and soil erosion experts in the British Empire and beyond, and the 
manner in which ideas were circulated and reinforced.
4.5, The network of range specialists in the British Empire and 
beyond
As I have already suggested American influences in the development of range science 
were extremely strong. At the foremost British colonial agricultural training institute, 
the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture (ICTA) in Trinidad, the literature on range 
management was dominated by research carried out in the USA, as Figure 4.2 indicates
46 Beinart, ‘Environmental Destruction’. One example o f this influence is the oft quoted figure that 
the Karoo is expanding at a rate of 2.4 km per annum. This statistic is derived from a (highly 
suspect) re-working of Acocks figures by B.H. Downing, a botanist at Fort Hare, in 1978; 
Downing, B.H. ‘Environmental Consequences of Agricultural Expansion in South Africa Since 
1850’, South African Journal o f Science, 1A, November 1978, pp. 420-422. See Driver, T.S. 
‘Political Ecology’, Southern Africa Review o f Books, 33,1994, pp. 12-13 for a discussion of the 
use of this statistic in recent environmental literature.
47 Acocks, J.P.H. Veld Types o f South Africa (Pretoria, 1953). Also published as Memoirs o f the 
Botanical Survey o f South Africa, No. 40 (Pretoria, 1975).
96
CHAPTER FOUR: RANGELAND ECOLOGY
Figure 4.2 Geographical origin of research reports in the Imperial College of 
Tropical Agriculure catalogue in the Pasture and Grasslands 
category (A.30) (divided by sub-category)
□  USA E3 Australia
E3 South Africa ■  New Zealand
II] Rhodesia and Nyasaland D  Canada
|  UK §  other
Pastures, mountain pasture, range and veld
(n=213)
Fertilizers, irrigation and seeds
(n=127)
Pests, diseases and weeds
(n=70)
Economics, grazing and forest grazing
(n=48)
Two of the most important colonial officials in the Basutoland Department of 
Agriculture, P.A.O. Bowmaker and J.G.M. King, both undertook the rigorous ICTA 
training course before embarking on careers in the colonial service.48 After his training 
at ICTA Bowmaker worked at the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation Experimental
48 Bowmaker was at ICTA from 1926-1927 and King from 1930-31, Complete ICTA Register, 
Records Management Centre, University of the West Indies.
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Station, in Natal, South Africa before moving to Swaziland for a brief period and then 
to the Basutoland Department of Agriculture from 1946-1957, first as Principal 
Agricultural Officer and then as Director of Agriculture. He was the officer in charge 
of the grazing closure policy in Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek between 1947 and 1956. 
King’s first post after the ICTA was as a District Officer and then Senior Agricultural 
Officer in Tanganyika, before he was seconded as a lecturer in tropical agriculture to 
Cambridge University just after the Second World War. He became Director of 
Agriculture in Lesotho in 1948, then transferred to Uganda in 1954 and eventually 
ended up in Swaziland in the early 1960s. Though both King’s and Bowmaker*s early 
interests were primarily in cash crops they presumably would have been exposed of the 
US literature on range science and American ideas about carrying capacity.49
Nevertheless it is probably a mistake to see the development of range science in British 
East and southern Africa as simply the wholesale application of models developed in 
the USA. As concerns about vegetational change in the Cape interior indicated, 
Clementsian ideas about succession complicated, reinforced and provided scientific 
validity for pre-existing beliefs rather than creating wholly new ones. Perhaps the 
greatest significance of the new range science emanating from the United States was 
that it provided a new language and a scientific justification for the pre-existing fears 
over deterioration. Writing in the Rhodesia Agricultural Journal in 1932 Illytd Pole 
Evans argued:
Uniform grazing of the veld should be aimed at. This can only be obtained by a 
complete system of camping... In the US, an ingenious system, known as 
‘deferred grazing’ has been worked out and practised, with highly satisfactory 
results. There is no reason whatsoever why the same system should not be 
appointed in the Union.50
It is noticeable that Pole Evans pointed to the US for inspiration and not to domestic
South African schemes based on the same principals (even if precise details were
different). As early as 1802 General J.A. de Mist (after whom the town of Uitenhage
was named) commented that:
By allowing cattle to graze only in small paddocks of ground, moving them from 
one field to the next in rotation, the veld itself will gradually improve and in time 
the stock will be in better condition.51
49 Bowmaker, P.A. ‘An experiment designed to determine the optimum date to sow cotton’ 
(unpublished AICTA thesis, 1927); King, J.G.M. ‘The diversification of cocoa’ (unpublished 
AICTA thesis, 1931), both in University of West Indies Library, St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad 
and Tobago. Biographical details from Kirk Greene, A.H.M. A Biographical Dictionary o f  the 
British Colonial Service, 1939-1966 (London, 1991).
50 Pole Evans, I.B. ‘Pastures and their Management’, Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, 29,1932, pp. 
912-920, p. 917 quoted by Scoones, ‘Politics, Polemics and Pasture’, p. 36.
51 Hall, ‘South African pastures’, p.69
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For twentieth century proponents of grazing control, however, it seemed to make more 
sense to associate their ideas with the projects taking place in the USA, projects which 
were written up in suitable scientific and technically language.
Within the region people such as Pole Evans, who frequently visited Rhodesia, Kenya 
and other colonies, were extremely important in spreading ideas about carrying 
capacity, plant succession and climax communities. There was a high degree of 
movement between the different colonies on official visits, research trips and through 
job mobility. Most of these links were concentrated within southern and East Africa 
but both the United States and the United Kingdom were also important. There 
appeared to be few obvious links between the southern and eastern African pasture and 
soil specialists and their colleagues in West Africa. Figure 4.3 indicates just some of 
these links amongst pasture and soil erosion experts mentioned in this thesis.
As we have already seen the South African Department of Agriculture and its related 
institutions, such as the Rust-der-Winter Pasture Research Station, provided one 
important sphere in which ideas about vegetation change were developed, especially for 
semi-arid environments. There were, however, other equally as important nodes in this 
network.
One interesting sphere is Tanganyika in the 1930s. Here C.F.M Swynnerton, who had 
also had a farm in Rhodesia,52 played a significant role in gathering together various 
plant and animal ecologists to investigate ways of controlling tsetse fly and provided an 
important link between southern and East Africa. His son, R.J.M. Swynnerton, was 
later to find fame as the author of the Plan to Intensify the Development o f African 
Agriculture in Kenya.53 Under the influence of Swynnerton senior the Tanganyika 
Department of Agriculture and the Tsetse Research Division provided important links 
between more theoretically minded ecologists, such as John Phillips, and more 
practically minded individuals such as Raymond Staples (later to become the Chief 
Pasture Officer in Rhodesia). Swynnerton himself had earlier expressed views in line 
with Clementsian ideas of complex organisms54 and he and John Phillips must have 
found each other stimulating colleagues.
52 Anon. ‘Obituary: C.F.M. Swynnerton.’ Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, 35 ,8 ,1938 , pp. 611-616.
53 Swynnerton, R J.M. A Plan to Intensify the Development o f African Agriculture in Kenya (Nairobi, 
1954). Thanks to Luise S. White and Ralph Austin for confirming the relationship between the two 
Swynnertons in response my query on the H-Africa electronic mail discussion list (21 April 1997).
54 Swynnerton, C.F.M. ‘Nature Notes: Adaptation’, Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, 14, 3,1917, pp. 
339-356.
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Figure 4.3 The network of soil conservation and livestock management 
experts mentioned in the thesis.
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Though they do not appear on Figure 4.3 the Dominion/ Commonwealth Relations and 
Colonial Offices in London also provided an important link. Reports from one colony 
tended to be circulated to other colonies for their information. A report from L.H. 
Collett, the Basutoland civil servant with prime responsibility for the massive contour 
bank building programme, written after he had returned from an investigation of anti­
erosion measures in the US in 1938 was later circulated to all the East and southern 
African territories.55 Frank Stockdale, the Agricultural Adviser to the Colonial Office, 
had circulated a copy of his own notes on soil conservation in the USA some months 
earlier.56
The importance of the US influence does not mean that research from the imperial 
metropole was not also highly significant. During the 1920s research on beef 
production and pastures expanded rapidly in the United Kingdom. The work of 
Woodham and co-workers appearing in a series of articles in the Journal of 
Agricultural Science from 1926 to 1930, were often referred to in southern African 
publications, for example.57 Journals produced by the various Imperial research 
institutions were also circulated to the colonial Departments of Agriculture. In the late 
1930s the Director of Agriculture in Maseru received quarterly publications of the 
Review o f Applied Entomology, Plant Breeding Abstracts, Animal Breeding Abstracts, 
Field Crop Abstracts, Herbage Abstracts, Herbage Reviews, (the latter two published 
by the Imperial Bureau of Pastures and Forage Crops in Aberystwyth) and a 
bibliography from the Imperial Bureau of Soil Science in Harpenden.58
Colonial civil servants also met up at various conferences59 and after 1952 at the annual 
Southern African Regional Committee for Conservation and Utilisation of the Soil.60 
Given these myriad links it is hardly surprising that many of the same ideas about 
overgrazing, plant succession and soil erosion would arise in all the British colonial 
territories in the region.
55 Unfortunately it was not returned to the correct Dominions Office file (PRO D035/936/Y579/12) 
and I have not ben able to locate a copy of the report elsewhere.
56 PRO DO35/940/Y600/146, Notes prepared by Sir Frank Stockdale on Soil Conservation in 
America, sent to the High Commissioner’s Office, South Africa, 7 February 1938.
57 Scoones, ‘Politics, Polemics and Pasture’, p. 39.
58 PRO C0323/1619/1, Distribution of Journals issued by Imperial Agricultural Bureau, November 
1938.
59 See for example PRO C0323/1621 & DO 35/930/Y526/7 on the 1938 Conference of the Colonial 
Directors of Agriculture, 1938.
60 The first S ARCCUS meeting was held from 20 - 23 August 1952 in Pretoria. The Director of 
Agriculture, J.F.M. King and Collett represented the Basutoland government, LNA 361.
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4.6. The ‘Cattle Complex’ and overgrazing
One of the ideas that was shared through-out the region was that Africans had 
uneconomic socio-religious attachments to cattle and managed their herds to ensure 
maximum herd size rather than maximum output. This belief has proved to be 
especially robust, despite numerous attempts to disprove its validity, and can still be 
found in many policy documents on the post-colonial African livestock sector.
Perhaps part of the reason the belief has proved to be so robust is that it based its 
validity on the existence of widely recognised pre-colonial institutions. In many 
southern and East African pre-colonial societies political power was based on the ability 
to accumulate cattle. Once herds had been built up cattle could be loaned out under 
systems like the Basotho’s mafisa arrangements in order to attract new followers to a 
particular patron or political leader.61 Associated with this political and material 
significance was a symbolic significance.62
Observations of this pre-colonial phenomena fed directly into the idea of a ‘cattle 
complex’ amongst African livestock owners.63 An influential 1926 article by Melville 
Herskovits was the first to introduce the idea of a ‘cattle complex’.64 Herskovits used 
the term complex in the sense of a unifying set of cultural traits in a given area but the 
physcological undertones of the term complex (in the sense of an obsession) soon 
attached themselves to the phrase.65 The label ‘cattle complex’ was subsequently used 
by both anthropologists and colonial administrators to describe African attitudes to 
livestock.66 Colonial rangeland experts used these ideas as a way of explaining high
61 On the political importance of mafisa arrangements in 19th century Lesotho see Sanders, P.B. 
‘Sekonyela and Moshweshwe: Failure and Success in the Aftermath o f the Difaqane’, Journal o f  
African History, 10,1969, pp. 439-455 and Eldredge, A South African Kingdom, p. 34.
62 See Comaroff and Comaroff, Ethnography and the Historical Imagination, chapter 5 for a 
discussion of the relationship between symbolic and material significance of cattle amongst the 
Tshidi and how this altered with the arrival o f colonialism and capitalism.
63 Parsons and Palmer, ‘Introduction’, p. 7.
64 Herskovits, M. J. ‘The Cattle Complex in East Africa’, American Anthropologist, 28,1926, pp. 
230-272, 361-388,494-528,633-664.
65 Mair, L. ‘Correspondence: The Cattle Complex’, Man, (n.s.) 20,1985, p. 743
66 For example Vernon Sheddick (using the term as Herskovits intended) recorded that ‘the people of 
Basutoland are sometimes regarded as being within the “cattle complex” cultural area of Africa’; 
Sheddick, V. The Southern Sotho, (International African Institute, Ethnographic Survey o f Africa, 
Southern Africa, Part II, London, 1953), p.21. The existence of a ‘cattle complex’ was also used 
by some Africans to argue against colonial de-stocking measures: in an article on the Witzieshoek 
uprising in November 1950 the Sesotho/English newspaper Mochochono (9 December 1950) 
argued that ‘the Bantu through-out Southern Africa have cattle complex founded on hundreds of 
years of a closely integrated pastoral economy, in which cattle held a paramount place’.
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levels of overgrazing. Africans had uneconomic attitudes towards cattle and their prime 
concern was to have as many animals as possible.
Through-out Africa colonial rangeland experts encountered livestock densities that 
appeared to be in excess of their calculations of carrying capacity. In the late 19th and 
early 20th century rinderpest and East Coast fever had decimated African livestock 
population but during the 1910s and 1920s they tended to rise rapidly, as Figure 4.4 and 
Table 4.1 indicate for South Africa and southern Zimbabwe respectively.
Figure 4.4 Cattle and small-stock numbers in South Africa.67
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67 Based on Beinart, ‘Environmental Destruction’, Figure 8.1. Note on original graph: The figure
must be seen as representing approximate stock numbers. It attempts to include all the stock in 
South Africa, whether owned by black or white. The original figures in various censuses and 
agricultural censuses are somewhat suspect and numbers are especially weak since the 1970s as 
statistics for the black homelands are decreasingly reported in the national figures. For example 
there has probably been a significant increase in goat numbers in the homelands which is not fully 
reflected in available figures. An attempt has been made to present total figures rather than to 
segregate out those for whites only, for three reasons [the paper is primarily concerned with 
environmental change on white farms]. First, at least till the 1950s, many of the stock on white- 
owned farms belonged to black tenants and workers. Second, totals also allow for local boundary 
changes: the reserve or homeland areas have approximately doubled in size since the early 
twentieth century and the white owned farmlands have declined in extent Third, environmental 
impacts, while they can be localised, often spill over political boundaries.
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Table 4.1 Cattle population change in southern Zimbabwe68
pre-1896 Before the rinderpest pandemic of 1896, cattle populations in the area were
probably high, competing with extensive wildlife populations. Records 
indicate that Ndebele herders were utilising much of the area as extensive 
grazing grounds for large herds.
1896 Rinderpest devastated cattle populations across the country, reducing
populations to a fraction of their previous size. The removal of power from 
the Ndebele state and the seizure of cattle by settlers also reduced cattle 
populations in the area.
1896-1945 This period showed a marked recovery of cattle populations to densities of
0.23-0.3 animals/ha in the study areas. Average growth rates between 1923 
and 1935 ranged from 5-20% per annum in different areas. The 
establishment of dipping facilities from the early 1920s also reduced disease 
related mortalities.
1945-1960 The destocking policy, instituted by the colonial government in all the study
areas, saw a major reduction in cattle populations. In some areas densities 
were reduced to 0.15 animals/ha, little more than the population density 
recorded in the early 1920s.
1961-1975 The abandonment of destocking allowed populations to recover again. The
high rainfall levels of the 1970s provided plentiful fodder, and cattle 
populations recovered to levels not seen since the 1930s. In some areas 
populations increased even more. Average growth rates between 1961 and 
1978 were 3-7% per annum in different study areas.
Initially estimates of carry capacities were often based on US experience but as the 
regional research establishment developed more calculations were generated locally. 
Through-out southern and East Africa rangeland experts calculated that both African 
and white livestock owners had far too many cattle. While estimates of carrying 
capacity obviously varied with soil fertility and rainfall the basic method of calculation 
was universal. Areas of rangeland were fenced off and different stocking rates and 
different management strategies (especially rotation) were attempted. The presence of 
sub-climax indicator species was taken as evidence of a stocking rate in excess of the 
carrying capacity which could, therefore, be arrived at through a process of trial and 
error.
4.7. Range science and management in Lesotho
Following the lead of other southern and East African territories the Basutoland 
authorities were keen to establish their own pasture research station where experiments 
to establish the country’s carrying capacity and suitable management strategies could be
68 Based on Table 4.1 in Scoones, I. ‘Why Are There So Many Animals: Cattle Population Dynamics 
in the Communal Areas of Zimbabwe’ in Behnke, Scoones, and Kerven, Range Ecology at 
Disequalibrium, pp. 62-76.
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determined. In early 1931 they invited Russell Thornton to visit the country and advise 
them on the establishment of a pasture research station.
4.7.1. Thornton’s Report on Pastoral and Agricultural Conditions in 
Basutoland
As we saw in chapter 2 and 3 Thornton’s association with range management in 
Lesotho was to continue long after this initial trip and he proved to be extremely 
influential character in setting the agenda for pasture control in the country. Three 
years after his initial visit Thornton became the Director of Agriculture in the 
Basutoland administration. His responsibilities also extended to the other two High 
Commission Territories via his role as the Agricultural Adviser to the High 
Commissioner. Between 1934 and his retirement 1942 he presided over a period of 
rapid expansion in all three Departments from admittedly exceedingly humble 
beginnings.
Thornton had studied agriculture at Guelph, Canada, before he returned to his native 
South Africa and became, in 1911, the first principal of the Grootfontein School of 
Agriculture. After a spell as Chief of the Division of Field and Animal Husbandry in 
the Department of Agriculture, where he was primarily responsible for promoting the 
settler beef industry, he moved, in 1929, to the Native Affairs Department.69 His 
primary personal interest was in livestock, especially cattle and horses,70 but he also 
played an important role in developing the technique of building contour banks as a 
attempt to controlling storm water run-off and preventing sheet erosion.71 Thornton 
was, in short, a central character in the development of ideas about environmental 
decline in both the reserves and on the ‘white’ farms of South Africa, as well as in the 
three High Commission Territories.72
The report that Thornton wrote in 1931 after visiting the mountain areas of Lesotho 
went far beyond his brief of investigating the feasibility of establishing a pasture
69 Anon. ‘Farming Personalities: Mr R.W. Thornton’, Farmers Weekly, 27 May 1936, p. 839.
70 See Thornton, R. W. and Leckie, W. G. The African and his Livestock (African Welfare Series, 
Cape Town, 1944); and Thornton, R.W. The Basuto Pony, (Morija, 1938). Thornton vehemently 
disliked goats, see page 201.
71 Thornton, R. W. ‘Anti-erosion measures and reclamation of eroded land’, Proceedings o f  the South 
African Society o f Civil Engineers, 40,1942, pp. 79-104.
72 See Rich, P. ‘The Origins of Apartheid Ideology: the case of Earnest Stubbs and the Transvaal 
Native Administration, c. 1902-1932’ African Affairs, 79, 315,1980, pp. 171 -194; Milton, S. ‘The 
Apocalypse Cow: Russell Thornton and State Policy towards African Cattle Husbandry in the 
Union of South Africa, 1929-39’, unpublished paper presented to African History Seminar, School 
of Oriental and African Studies, 30 November 1994; Beinart, ‘Soil Erosion, Conservation and Ideas 
about Development’; Beinart, ‘Introduction: the politics of colonial conservation’.
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research station. His basic ecological arguments have been repeated, with some 
modifications, in just about every report on Lesotho’s rangelands right through to the 
present-day. The first published source to use the same arguments, Staples and 
Hudson’s 1938 Ecological Survey,73 has frequently been cited in literature on Lesotho’s 
rangelands but the link back to Thornton in 1931 is not recognised.74
Thornton’s basic argument was that some of the best sheep pasture in southern Africa 
was being senselessly destroyed by ‘wanton vandalism’. He believed that high 
stocking rates were leading to the area’s climax community of ‘wonderful rooigras’ 
(dominated by Themeda triandra) being overgrazed. This was allowing the invasion by 
the inedible plant succession of ‘bitter karoo bush’ (Chrvsocoma tennifolia) and a 
significant decrease in the nutritional value of the pasture. Furthermore the ‘bitter 
karoo bush’ did not provide good ground coverage and was therefore accelerating the 
process of soil erosion.75
Thornton’s understanding of the ecology of the mountain rangelands of Lesotho was 
clearly based on Clementsian ideas about climax communities and plant succession. He 
described the climax community of the mountain zone as being rooigras, a sweetveld 
recognised as being one of the most productive in southern Africa. This climax was, 
however, subject to an increased domestic livestock population; a factor external to the 
area's climax biome. Overgrazing was pushing the vegetation back down its 
succession and the ‘bitter karoo bush’ represented a lower seres.
The sub-climax seres was less productive than the climax and this further reduced the 
carrying capacity of the country. Thornton estimated that a shift in vegetation away 
from rooigras towards ‘bitter karoo bush’ represented a loss of something in the order 
of 50,000 acres of grazing land. The implications, Thornton argued, were grave and 
something needed to be done quickly if the pastures were not to deteriorate further; ‘a 
pasture station alone will not save the country’. The theory of plant succession also 
suggested the solution that the Basutoland authorities should enact:
73 Staples, R.R. and Hudson, W.K. An Ecological Survey o f the Mountain Areas o f  Basutoland 
(Letchworth, 1938).
74 See for example Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1949, p. 27-33; Sheddick, 
Land Tenure in Basutoland, p. 48; Smit, Lesotho, p. 6-9; FAO and World Bank, Draft Report o f  
the Lesotho First Phase Mountain Development Project Preparation Mission (Report No. 11/75, 
LES 1, Rome, 1975), p. 5-6; Swallow, Brokken, Motsamai, Sopeng and Storey, Livestock 
Development and Range Utilisation, p. 20.
75 LNA 212, Thornton, R.W., Report on Pastoral and Agricultural Conditions in Basutoland, n.d. [c. 
July 1931].
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If the area affected is protected from stock, the plant succession will be reversed 
and the natural grasses of the area, when allowed to seed and reproduce 
themselves, will oust this intruder.76
Thornton’s assessments of the ecological changes taking place on the mountains were 
based solely on observations made on a trek from Maseru to the Maletsunyane Falls. 
His understanding of the ecology was, therefore, based mainly on an application of 
models of vegetation constructed elsewhere. The expansion of the Karoo was 
represented by conversions of rooigras sweetvelds into woodier Karoo type vegetation. 
When Thornton observed patches of Karoo type vegetation and rooigras species 
intermingled in Lesotho’s mountain environment the obvious explanation was that the 
rooigras species were the climax and Karoo type vegetation represented a sub-climax 
(invader) seres.77
4.7.2.Staples and Hudson’s Ecological Survey
Staples and Hudson ecological survey, begun in 1936, involved significantly more 
fieldwork and the collection of a much greater quantity of data. Between October 1936 
and January 1937 Staples, at that time the Botanist to the Tanganyika administration,78 
and W.K. Hudson, of the Basutoland Public Works Department, travelled the bridle­
paths of the mountain area on horseback along with a party of six (unnamed) Basotho 
assistants, a police guide and 13 pack horses. Hudson’s primary role was both to act as 
a surveyor for the ecological survey and to draw up a separate report on the state of the 
mountain bridle-paths.79 It is safe to assume that Staples was primarily responsible for 
the ecological findings in the final report.
Staples and his assistants collected over three hundred different botanical specimens 
and mapped out the incidence of different communities of vegetation. Like Thornton,
76 LNA 212, Thornton, R.W., Report on Pastoral and Agricultural Conditions in Basutoland, n.d. [c. 
July 1931].
77 The term invader species, and Thornton’s reference to an ‘intruder’, should not imply that the 
climax community was altering because of internal ecological dynamics: it should be remembered 
that the basis of Clements’s theory was that climax communities could only be altered by external 
influences, such as the impact of domestic livestock. The term ‘invader’ refers to the fact that 
under a succession model certain species (invaders) would move onto a piece of land vegetated 
only by pioneer species. Over time invader species would, in turn, be replaced by species of the 
climax community.
78 After studying agriculture at Cambridge University, Staples became, in 1922, a botanist in the 
South African Department of Agriculture. In 1929 he moved to Tanganyika, first as an Agricultural 
Economist, then a Research Officer on pastures and finally as Botanist. Later on he transferred to 
Southern Rhodesia as the Chief Pasture Officer; Kirk Greene, A Biographical Dictionary o f the 
British Colonial Service.
79 Staples and Hudson, Ecological Survey, p. 2.
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Staples identified the sweetveld rooigras species as forming one distinct climax 
community. He also, however, identified a second climax community, this time 
consisting of sourveld species such as Festuca caprina- In line with Clementsian 
ecology Staples argued that these variations in vegetation were primarily due to climatic 
variability caused by aspect and relief. Staples did admit that edaphic variability, 
especially the transition from basalt to sandstone, could affect the frequency of 
dominant species within the two climax communities but the effect was not marked 
enough to produce a shift from one climax to another.
Staples identified these two separate climaxes using Sesotho terminology. The 
sweetveld rooigrass communities he named seboku. the Sesotho name for the species 
Themeda triandra. This was the dominant climax community in the mountain zone, 
but also the one that had suffered most from overgrazing or conversion into farm land.
It was found up to an altitude of 7,500 feet on slopes with a southerly aspect and high 
as 9,000 feet on slopes with a northerly aspect.
On the best soils seboku grasses were dominated by a rich sward of Themeda triandra 
but on poorer soils other species could be important. Thinner stony soils with a 
northerly aspect often had stands of mohlomo thatching grass (sp. Hvparrhenia hirta) 
while on ‘immature’ soils the biotic community could include significant numbers of 
serai species (i.e. lower down the succession), such as the unpalatable Aristida 
Braedii. Staples described the rich swards of Themeda triandra growing on the rich 
black loamy soils of the mountain basalt as ‘some of the finest, if not the best, sheep 
pasture in South Africa’.80 The similarity between this statement and one from 
Thornton’s 1931 report suggest that Staples was highly influenced by the earlier 
work.81
The second climax community, Staples labelled as letsiri. the Sesotho word used to 
describe the two dominant species Festuca caprina and Festuca rubra. This sourveld 
climax community was to be found above 7,000 feet on slopes with a southerly aspect 
and above 9,000 feet on slopes with a northerly aspect. Though grasses in this 
community were generally less palatable than the seboku grasses they did provide 
adequate pasture during the summer months.
80 Staples and Hudson, Ecological Survey, p. 16.
81 LNA 212, Thornton, R.W., Report on Pastoral and Agricultural Conditions in Basutoland, n.d. [c. 
July 1931]. Thornton described Lesotho’s mountain Themeda triandra stands as ‘the best sheep 
pasture in South Africa’.
108
CHAPTER FOUR: RANGELAND ECOLOGY
Both of these climax communities had suffered from overgrazing. Staples agreed 
with Thornton’s assessment that the major result of overgrazing was the increase in 
the area occupied by ‘bitter karoo bush’ (Chrvsocoma tenuifoliaV Again Staples 
labelled the vegetation according to its Sesotho name, sehalahala (meaning simply 
small bush). Sehalahala was to be found mainly on slopes with a northern aspect at 
altitudes between 7,000 and 9,500 feet. In some areas it formed a more or less pure 
stand, whilst in others it was mixed with seboku or letsi species. It was found to be 
more prevalent on the drier southern and central mountain ranges than in the wetter 
northern regions.
As sehalahala was not a naturally occurring serai species in Lesotho, coming from the 
more arid mixed grassland Karoo bush areas of the Cape Province, Staples did not 
consider it a sub-climax but rather a dis-climax. Continuous close grazing reduced 
competition from grass species and allowed the unpalatable sehalahala to establish 
itself. Furthermore a decrease in the incidence of fire, itself related to an increase in 
grazing (resulting in less flammable biomass), also favoured sehalahala. Staples argued 
that reducing grazing pressure and the regular burning of areas covered by sehalahala 
would rapidly lead to the re-establishment of seboku or letsi climax communities. He 
recommended that the nascent experimental programme begun in 1933 be expanded as 
soon as possible to examine the stocking rates and burning regimes that would allow the 
climax to be re-established (the experimental programme is examined in more detail in 
chapter 8).
While Staples and his assistants carried out a much more detailed survey than Thornton 
in 1931 it should be recognised that their basic research methodology was similar. 
Staples and Hudson noted that their job of mapping the vegetation pattern was made 
easier by the fact that ‘almost at the start of the Fieldwork ... it became apparent that, 
from the pasture viewpoint, there were three main types of vegetation only’.82 From 
then on their task became simply to allocate every area to one of the three categories 
and map the distribution. This was done simply by observation.
While some efforts were made to investigate vegetation changes over time (mainly 
questioning Basotho informants) the data simply did not exist for Staples to generate 
the model of ecological change which he produced. This model was principally the 
result of placing observations from the field into a framework provided by both 
Clementsian ecological theory and pre-existing southern African concerns over an 
expanding Karoo. Staples ‘reading’ of the mountain environment was structured by the
82 Staples and Hudson, Ecological Survey, p. 12.
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accepted ecological theories of the time. Both Staples and Thornton took a spatial 
pattern of vegetation, a mix of three veld types, and ‘read* a process (pasture 
degradation) from the pattern.
In in the past two to three decades range ecology has shifted away from Clementsian 
ideas quite dramatically. These new approaches of African rangelands could offer 
significantly different ‘readings’ of Lesotho’s mountain environment. In chapter 5 I 
will try to explore some of the implications of these different ‘readings’ of the 
environment and suggest that they indicate the colonial fears about one-way pasture 
deterioration may have been misguided.
4.7.3. Carrying capacity and livestock populations
Both Thornton and Staples concluded that the only way of restoring the climax 
community was to reduce the grazing pressure. When Thornton visited Lesotho in 
1931 the livestock population of the area was at a peak. As in South Africa the 1920s 
had been a period of growing smallstock populations in response to generally good 
rainfall and high prices for wool and mohair. The early 1930s saw a precipitous decline 
in the livestock population with a succession of drought years and a huge fall in the 
price of mohair and wool. Through-out the rest of the colonial period livestock 
populations remained at levels significantly lower than those achieved in the late 1920s. 
Smallstock figures have never again approached those high levels and largestock 
figures have only climbed back towards that level in recent years.
In 1931 Thornton did not suggest a specific livestock population for the country’s 
carrying capacity. He calculated that the country’s average stocking rate was 
something in the order of four and a half acres per livestock unit and that this was ‘far 
more than the country can carry’. He recommended that the smallstock should be 
reduced by about 50 per cent.83 This suggests he was thinking of a carrying capacity 
somewhere in the region of 7 or 8 acres per livestock unit.
83 LNA 212, Thornton, R.W., Report on Pastoral and Agricultural Conditions in Basutoland, n.d. [c. 
July 1931].
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Figure 4.5 Livestock populations in Lesotho, 1912-199284
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In their 1938 Ecological Survey Staples and Hudson gave some more precise figures for 
suggested carry capacities on different types of grasslands. They admitted, given the 
total lack of experimental data, that these figures were no more than estimates. On 
rangelands above 8,500 feet (where pastures were mainly letsi) they recommended 400 
smallstock units per sq. mile, between 6,500 and 8,500 feet (where pastures were 
mainly seboku) they recommended 500 smallstock units per sq. mile and below 6,500 
feet (dominated by serai communities of the seboku climax) they recommended 300 
smallstock units per sq. mile. These carry capacities convert to 8.0 acres per livestock 
unit above 8,500 feet, 6.4 acres per livestock unit between 6,500 and 8,500 feet and 
10.7 acres per livestock unit below 6,500 feet.85 It is unclear how they arrived at these 
figures, although my assumption is that they were probably derived from data from 
research plots in other colonial territories.
84 Figures derived from a variety of official sources. As in Figure 4.4 the numbers needed to be 
treated with extreme caution . Many statistics were generated by adding estimated birth rates and 
imports and subtracting death rates and exports from previous years figures. As livestock censuses 
were sometimes not carried out for 5 or 6 years there was obviously considerable scope for error to 
compound upon error. Note that (unlike in Figure 4.4) I have given the smallstock population in 
livestock units using the calculation of five heads of smallstock to one livestock unit.
85 Staples and Hudson, Ecological Survey, p. 26.
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These figures give carrying capacity figures more or less in line with those estimated by 
Thornton in 1931. Given the huge decrease in both small and large stock populations in 
the first half of the 1930s (see Figure 4.5) Staples and Hudson calculated that the 
territory's total livestock population could actually increase by 1,034,000 head of 
smallstock from its 1936 figure of 4,290,000 smallstock units without causing 
overgrazing, so long as it was properly distributed between the different climax 
communities at the correct stocking rates. Furthermore if deferred and rotational 
grazing systems were introduced the livestock population could increase even further, 
by 2,365,000 smallstock units.86
Staples and Hudson recommended a series of experimental plots be set-up to investigate 
the effects of different grazing and burning regimes on the carrying capacity and on 
sehalahala. These plans were never put into action, but, as I show in chapter 8, the 
experimental programme begun at Thaba Putsoa and Thaba Tsoeu in 1933 was later 
expanded in an attempt to collect data on carrying capacity.
The research programme carried out at Thaba Putsoa between 1945 and 1947 indicated 
that the correct carrying capacity for seboku grasslands at 8,500 feet was somewhere in 
the region of 1 livestock unit per 3 acres if the area was only grazed in the summer 
months (see Table 8.1). A rotational grazing experiment at Thaba Tsoeu also on seboku 
grassland had originally been stocked at a rate of one livestock unit per 10 acres, but 
this was subsequently reduced to one livestock unit per 5 acres when it was found that 
the pasture was becoming ‘rank’ (clogged up with dead and rotting vegetation).87
During the 1940s and early 50s the figure of one livestock unit per 8 acres was used as 
rule of thumb measurement of carrying capacity. At this stocking rate, the Department 
of Agriculture argued, sehalahala would be replaced by the climax community. Once 
this had occurred the carrying capacity could be increased to approximately one 
livestock unit per 6 acres, or even higher if grazing was rotated.88 There were, however, 
other calculations made during this period which produced starkly different figures.
The most notable of these were the figures given by Pole Evans after his visit to 
investigate the Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek closure schemes in February 1950.
Unlike Staples and Thornton, Pole Evans did not admire Lesotho’s mountain Themeda 
triandra pastures. He argued that even where there was the short dense sward of
86 Staples and Hudson, Ecological Survey, p. 27.
87 See page 213.
88 LNA 2476/n, P.A.O. Bowmaker’s Comments on I.B. Pole Evans Report, May 1950.
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Themeda triandra it was an unproductive species and easily damaged by heavy grazing. 
As it was susceptible to invasion by sehalahala it had to be considered ‘the weakest spot 
in the mountain pasture’. In line with this belief Pole Evans recommended an 
extremely light grazing regime of 1 livestock unit per 25 acres.89
Not surprisingly the Basutoland Department of Agriculture dismissed Pole Evans
recommendations. Bowmaker commented:
A stocking rate of 25 acres to a beast means that the Territory can only carry say 
100,000 head of large stock and 700,000 head of smallstock, as compared with 
the present 580,000 large and 2,170,000 smallstock. Such a reduction is an 
absolutely unpractical [sic.] suggestion, and is unnecessary in view of our 
experimental results.... My impression of Dr Pole Evans, which is backed up by 
his report, is that he is so much a lover of nature and pure botanist that he does not 
really grasp the practical side of getting things put right.90
These hugely different estimates are a good example of how different objectives need 
to be taken into account in order to understand the concept of a carrying capacity. As 
Figure 4.1 indicates the concept of carrying capacity as usually used in range science 
does not represent an absolute limit on the number animals (the ecological carrying 
capacity). Thornton, Staples and Bowmaker all stressed that the carrying capacity they 
advocated was designed to maximise output of beef, wool and mohair; in his 1931 
report Thornton argued that a 50 percent decrease in the smallstock population would 
result in a five fold increase in output of wool and mohair.91 Pole Evans, on the other 
hand, was primarily interested in maintaining as great a diversity of grass species as 
possible in Lesotho’s mountain areas.
Pole Evans’s primary interest was in the native vegetation of southern Africa; he 
consistently argued that a full understanding of the country’s vegetation, especially the 
grass species, was essential to agricultural development. His lobbying led to the 
establishment, in 1918, of a Botanical Survey of South Africa and the setting aside of 
various botanical reserves in vegetatively representative parts of the country.92 In 1950 
Pole Evans was excited to find a number of species thriving in Lesotho’s grasslands
89 LNA 2476/11, Pole Evans, I., Visit to Basutoland in February, 1950,23 March 1950.
90 LNA 2476/n, Bowmaker’s Comments on Pole Evans Report, May 1950. J.C. Ross, the Chief of 
the Division o f Soil and Veld Conservation in the Union of Agriculture, had made a similar 
comment a few years previously when discussing the Department's research programme under Pole 
Evans: ‘A good deal of criticism was directed at these [research] stations in the ground that their 
policy was to exalt grass for its own sake, without reference to the practical issues of farming’; J.C. 
Ross to L. Esselen, 18 September 1942, A6.14, J.C. Smuts Papers, University of Cape Town.
91 LNA 212, Thornton, R.W., Report on Pastoral and Agricultural Conditions in Basutoland, n.d. [c. 
July 1931].
92 Carruthers, ‘The Dongola Wildlife Sanctuary’. For details on Pole Evans career see also Scoones 
‘Politics, Polemics and Pastures’; and Gunn, M.D. ‘Illytd Buller Pole Evans (1879-1968)’,
Bothalia, 10,1968, pp. 131-5.
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not found in abundance elsewhere. He recommended that a pasture research officer be 
appointed to fully investigate the grasses of the area and to carry out trials with exotics. 
He felt that these species could only be fully investigated in an environment with an 
extremely light stocking rate, or better still in a totally de-stocked area.
4.8. Conclusion
It is clear from Pole Evans report that he saw domestic livestock as an external factor 
that could only serve to disrupt the area’s natural climax community. This view was 
shared by just about every range and soil erosion expert who commented on the area. 
This view was reinforced by a belief that it had only recently been occupied by African 
agro-pastoralists.
Staples and Hudson’s Ecological Survey reported that the first agro-pastoralists to settle 
in the mountain areas of Lesotho were a group of ‘Zulus of the Matooane tribe’ in the 
early nineteenth century. They had left the area during ‘the wars of Chaka’s time’ and 
from then until the 1880s the area was ‘occupied solely by the Bushman and the game 
on which they preyed’.93 It was only with the arrival of the Batloka94 that domestic 
livestock were re-introduced into the area. Increasing population in the lowlands, 
especially with the influx of people from the Free State in the aftermath of the South 
African 1912 Land A ct, had resulted in the internal migration of people to the 
mountain valleys and the rapid increase in the livestock populations of the mountain 
pastures. This history of occupation was accepted as a matter of course by the 
Basutoland administration and they believed that it largely accounted for the recent 
environmental degradation.
Phillips’s and Clements’s arguments that hunter-gatherers could be considered part of a 
biome but agro-pastoralists were not was reflected in the colonial attitudes expressed 
towards the Basotho population of the mountain zone. They were recent arrivals, 
disrupters and destroyers.95 Despite Staples and Hudson’s use of Sesotho terminology 
for rangeland types the general assumption was that the Basotho had few pre-existing
93 Staples and Hudson, Ecological Survey, p. 19. This section of the report was based on information 
from R.C. Germond. The archaeologist Mitchelll agrees that agropastoralist settlement of the 
highlands was a nineteenth century phenomenon, Mitchell, P. J. ‘Archaeological research in 
Lesotho: a review of 120 years’, African Archaeological Review , 10,1992, pp 3-34, p. 27.
94 See chapter 9.
95 This argument seemed to mesh with more general ideas about the recent arrival of ‘Bantu-speakers’ 
in southern Africa. In June 1938 the Resident Commissioner, Sturrock commented: ‘The Bantu as 
an agricultural race are comparatively inexperienced and the Native methods of cultivation and 
pasture management are often destructive’; DO35/940/Y600/146, Report on Soil Erosion submitted 
by Resident Commissioner, Basutoland, 21 June 1938.
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systems for managing grazing systems. Indeed Hugh Ashton, who wrote a standard 
colonial ethnography on the Basotho, argued they had little interest in the country’s 
rangelands:
Though they may notice that the pastures are being destroyed through over- 
grazing and soil erosion, they do nothing to remedy this condition and stubbornly 
resist Government proposals for reduction of stock or temporary closure of 
affected areas. They have responded slowly, suspiciously and apathetically to the 
various experiments which are being conducted by the Government and to efforts 
being made to introduce better methods.96
Social Darwinism was hugely influential in creating Clementsian ecology, which in turn
regulated the way in which colonial range experts ‘read’ the African environment.
Social Darwinism also taught, however, that the solution to the environmental
deterioration they perceived could only be found through the ‘trusteeship’ of European
colonialism.
Although I have attached great significance to the intellectual framework used by range 
specialists in southern Africa, an analysis that attempted to explain livestock 
development policies in Lesotho simply via the history of ideas would be very flawed. 
Policy arose in response to specific political events, and the form policy took was 
largely due to the nature of the colonial state in Lesotho. These two issues will be 
addressed in the chapters 6 and 7, but first I examine the evidence for environmental 
change in the mountain zone during the colonial era.
96 Ashton, The Basuto, p. 139.
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5. Environmental Change in the Mountain Zone
In the chapters 1 and 4 ,1 suggested that recent shifts in range ecology have led a 
number of ecologists to reject the view that African grasslands have undergone a uni­
linear process of environmental decline. In the following chapter I examine some of 
these ideas in more detail and suggest some of the ways that they could be used to 
suggest an alternative analysis of the mountain environment. I have not, however, 
drawn any firm conclusions about environmental change in the mountain areas of 
Lesotho in the period in question. This is because the data simply does not exist to 
indicate any significant trends in the period in question, at least not in a form usable to 
someone trained in the social sciences and the humanities. My purpose here is 
essentially to show how the belief that the mountain grasslands were being overgrazed 
was based more on theory than on empirical evidence. The facts that colonial officials, 
and people such as Pole Evans, assembled to support their claim that the mountain 
environment was being degraded could be re-assembled to provide a different ‘reading’ 
of the environment.
5.1. Indicator species
The primary fact used to determine whether the mountain grazing areas were being 
degraded was the presence of indicator species in the veld. The most important 
indicator species was Chrvsocoma tennifolia (also known as ‘bitter Karoo bush’ and 
sehalahala) but other were mentioned as well. These species were thought to be 
indicative of a sub-climax seres for Lesotho’s mountain environment and, therefore, an 
indicator that over-grazing was taking place. The presence of indicator species was 
always described as a recent occurrence and the outcome of increasing livestock 
populations during the colonial period.
There is some evidence to suggest, however, that these indicator species had been 
present prior to the advent of colonialism and the movement of Basotho and their 
livestock into the mountain zone. Chrvsocoma tennifolia was always described as a 
recent arrival in the mountain zone. The evidence for its recent arrival was based on 
oral testimony from Basotho informants. In 1932, for example, Chief Tebesi responded 
to a question from Sturrock about ‘bitter Karoo bush’ by reporting that they ‘began to 
see it in the days of Lerotholi’ (1891-1905).1 Staples and Hudson reported that oral
1 LNA 212, Notes of an interview with representatives of the Paramount Chief, 24 Febrary 1932.
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informants indicated that the species had first been seen around the turn of the century 
and had become widespread during the 1920s.2
There is, however, evidence that Chrvsocoma tennifolia as present prior even to the 
advent of the British Protectorate in Lesotho. In 1840 Thomas Arbousset, of the Paris 
Evangelical Missionary Society, accompanied Moshoeshoe and a group of his followers 
on a trek from Thaba-Bosiu to the headwaters of the Malibamatso River (in the 
highland area of present day Butha-Buthe District). In the foothills of the Maluti, 
Arbousset noted:
Here goats and sheep can nibble at a host of little bushes or fragrant plants, rather 
than the tall bitter and scarcely nourishing kind of grass.... The soil is fertile 
everywhere and is much blacker here than in the lowland plain, because of the 
shrubs I have just mentioned.3
In his annotations to Arbousset’s text David Ambrose has interpreted this to refer to a
contrast between sweetveld (seboku) grasses in the foothills and sourveld pastures in
the northern lowlands. According to Staples and Hudson, however, the dominant
species in Lesotho’s seboku pastures was the grass Themedra triandra and there were
few non-grasses in the vegetational type. It is possible that Arbousset was referring to
the cheche bush fLeucosidea sericeal that Staples and Hudson report in the valley areas
of the foothills. They also note that areas of these bushes tended to be reserved as
lehoella for fuel-wood and building materials, and therefore unlikely to be grazed by
sheep and goat.4 I would suggest that a more likely explanation is that the small bushes
Arbousset mentions were Chrvsocoma tennifolia. especially as the Sesotho name for the
species is sehalahala. meaning ‘little bush’.
More precise reports of the widespread presence of Chrvsocoma tennifolia date from 
1893. The Colonial Annual Report for the year mentions the intrusion of ‘bitter Karoo 
bush’ and burrweed into the country’s pastures as a problem.5 Presumably if the 
amount of Chrvsocoma tennifolia and burrweed growing in the country was sufficient 
for it to be seen as a problem it was already fairly widespread.
Other species used by Staples and Hudson as indicators of pasture degradation also 
appear to have had a longer history. They reported that a species of ragwort poisonous 
to horses (Senecio spp.) had invaded the seboku pastures during the past quarter of a
Staples and Hudson, Ecological Survey, p. 28.
Arbousset, T. Missionary excursion into the Blue Mountains: being an account o f King 
Moshoeshoe's expedition from Thaba-Bosiu to the sources o f  the Malibamatso River in the year 
1840, edited and translated by Ambrose, D. and Brutsch, A. (Morija, 1991), p. 58.
See also Sheddick, Land Tenure, p. 124.
Quoted by Singh, ‘Geological, Historical and Present-Day Erosion’, p. 15.
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century. Though it was a naturally occurring species in the seboku grasslands it was 
very rare in the past and had increased rapidly under heavy grazing pressure. 
Archaeological evidence, however, suggests that the prevalence of the species may not 
have been related to increased grazing by domestic livestock: pollen from Senecio spp. 
is dominant in assemblages of charcoal deposits dated to the Last Glacial Maximum 
(15-20,000 cl.yr BP).6
5.2. Longer-term anthropogenic impacts
The presence of these species from periods prior to the advent of British colonialism 
could indicate that a negative impact of humans on the mountain environment had a 
much longer history. Most colonial officials assumed that the pre-colonial San 
population of the mountain zone had no or little impact on the environment. This belief 
reflected the arguments of ecologists such as Clement and Philips who saw agro- 
pastoralists but not hunter-gatherers as being able to alter (i.e. destroy) their 
environment. Mike Meadows has argued, however, that San hunter-gatherers often set 
fire to the mountain slopes to encourage new grass growth to attract wildlife as well as 
to aid in hunting.7 Fire was an ecological factor that the colonial officials tended to 
ignore, yet recent research as indicated that both natural and anthropogenic fire has 
played a significant role in the formation of southern African mountain eco-systems.8
Most reports on the ecology of Chrvsocoma tennifolia during the colonial era indicated 
that burning of the veld decreased its prevalence. This was reported by Chief Tebesi in 
19329 and Staples in Hudson in 1938.10 Despite the possibility that annual burning led 
to an increase in sweetveld grasses at the expense of Chrvsocoma tennifolia (and other 
shrubs and trees) the colonial authorities were more or less consistently opposed to veld 
burning. Under the Laws of Lerotholi grass burning was outlawed and any area burned 
was supposed to be declared as leboella for 12 months.11 An exception was made, 
however, for burning with the aim of destroying Chrvsocoma tennifolia.12 Increased
6 Mitchell, P. ‘Revisiting the Robberg: new results and a revision of old ideas at Sehonghong Rock 
Shelter, Lesotho’, South African Archaeobgical Bulletin, L, 161,1995, pp. 28-38, p. 35; cl.yr BP is 
short for calibrated years before present.
7 Meadows, M. ‘Vegetational Changes in the Afro-Montane Regions of Southern Africa’ paper 
presented to seminar in Department of Botany, University of Cambridge, 1993, quoted by Singh, 
‘Geological, Historical and Present-Day Erosion’, p. 164.
8 Meadows, M.and Linder, H.P. ‘A Palaecological Perspective on the Origin of the Afromontane 
Grasslands’, Journal o f Biogeography, 20,1993, pp. 345-355.
9 LNA 212, Notes of an interview with representatives of the Paramount Chief, 24 Febrary 1932.
Staples and Hudson, Ecological Survey, p. 30.
11 Rule 32, Part II, Laws of Lerotholi, quoted by Duncan, Sotho Laws and Customs, p. 74
12 Rule 32 (2a), Part II, Laws of Lerotholi, in Basutoland, Laws o f Basutoland, 1960 (Cape Town,
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levels of grazing probably had a negative impact on rates of burning: closer grazing 
resulting in less dried bio-mass available for burning. Climate change also plays a role 
in the incidence of burning. Long dry spells obviously increase the risk of fire, though 
lightening strikes are also a significant factor in starting natural grass fires.
These factors indicate the need to take longer-term changes in the mountain 
environment into account. The assumption that the human impact on the mountain 
environment dates only from the last decades of the nineteenth century ignores the 
longer-term anthropogenic impact over time-scales of thousands of years. Longer-term 
environmental fluctuations probably also played a role: the Last Glacial Maximum 
corresponded with a period of cooler and drier weather across much of southern Africa, 
a situation which, according to Meadows and Linder, would have promoted fire and 
favoured grasslands.13 This last point suggests the need to take account of the 
possibility of environmental change (on a variety of time-scales) which is unrelated to 
humans.14
5.3. Dis-equilibrium and uncertainty
The presence of Chrvsocoma tennifolia and other indicator species was seen as
important by ecologists in the colonial era because they indicated the presence of a sub-
or dis-climax seres. Recent ecological explanations of African grasslands have,
however, tended to reject the whole concept of climax communities and stress rather the
dis-equilibrium of the grassland ecosystem:
Equilibrium models - and succession theory in particular - fail to explain some 
situations. Arid and semi-arid rangelands - that cover most of South Africa - 
display large spatial-temporal switches in herbaceous species composition and 
production that are not consistent with simple successional pathways. The 
fluctuations are associated with episodic events (such as rainfall, herbivory and 
fire) which themselves vary greatly in space and time.15
External ‘disturbances’ to the ecosystem do not just push the ecosystem back down a
linear progression, rather they often deflect the ecosystem onto an entirely different
trajectory. The interplay between climatic variability, grazing, fire, soil behaviour and
plant behaviour, all acting along different time-scales, adds up to an extremely complex
system. Different patches of vegetation in a landscape also needs to be taken into
1961), p. 14.
13 Meadows and Linder, ‘A Palaecological Perspective’, p.353.
14 See Tyson, P.D. and Lindsay, J.A. ‘The Climate of the Last 2000 Years in Southern Africa’, The 
Holocene, 2, 3,1992, pp. 271-278. During the ‘Little Ice Age’ (c. 1300-1850) summer rainfall 
regions of southern Africa were probably drier (and cooler) than at present
15 Mentis, M.T., Grossman, D., Hardy, M. B., O’Connor, T.G. and O’Reagain, PJ. ‘Paradigm Shifts 
in South African Range Science, Management and Administration’, South African Journal o f  
Science, 85,1989, pp. 684-687, p. 684.
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account, as different vegetational patches will interact in different ways with 
neighbouring patches, for example through the rate of surface flow of water or 
sediments.16
Recent ecological research has identified drought as the primary cause of complex
dynamics in semi-arid and arid African grasslands:
Severe droughts devastate plant communities and decimate animal populations. 
Where droughts are frequent, population fluctuations prevent plants and 
herbivores from developing closely coupled interactions, ecosystem development 
and succession are abbreviated or non-existent and ecosystems seldom reach a 
climatically determined equilibrium point. Uncertainty abounds.17
The very complexity of these systems makes it very difficult to determine if dis­
equilibrium dynamics are acting on a particular ecosystem. Detailed analysis of the 
pattern of drought, the patterns of reaction of the important plant species to drought and 
the impact of changing vegetation on the herbivores all need to be taken into account. 
Research of this nature simply has not been done in the mountain environment of 
Lesotho, making it difficult to determine if the grassland ecosystem falls within the 
realm of dis-equilibrium.
Ecologists have, however, found that there is a rule-of-thumb threshold based on 
rainfall variability that is a good indicator of ecosystems at equilibrium or dis­
equilibrium. Environments with inter-annual co-efficients of variability (CV) for 
precipitation of over 30 percent are thought to be at dis-equilibrium, where the system 
is dominated by variability rather than average conditions. They also suggest that 
environments with CV of less than 20 percent are at equilibrium, where animal 
populations will remain relatively stable and strong feedbacks will develop between 
herbivores and plants.18 In general the lower the total annual rainfall the higher the CV.
The rainfall records from stations in mountain zone of Lesotho indicate CV’s in the 
region of 20 percent to 30 percent (see Table l .l) .19 These figures indicate that the 
mountain grasslands are neither entirely at dis-equlibrium nor at equilibrium. Under 
similar climatic conditions in the southern Ethiopian highlands Layne Coppock has
Stafford Smith, M. and Pickup, G. ‘Out of Africa, Looking In: Understanding Vegetational Change’ 
in Behnke, Scoones and Kerven, Range Ecology at Disequilibrium, pp. 196-226.
17 Ellis, J. ‘Climate Variability and Complex Ecosystem Dynamics: Implications for Pastoral 
Development’ in Scoones, I. (ed.) Living with Uncertainty: New Directions in Pastoral 
Development in Africa, (London, 1995), pp. 37-46, p. 38.
18 Ellis, ‘Climate Variability and Complex Ecosystem Dynamics’.
19 Contary to expectations the higher rainfall areas, along the eastern escarpment, have a higher CV 
than the drier stations in the valley. This is probably not just a function of the shorter-runs o f data 
used to calculate the CV for these stations: for the period 1935-1955 the percipitation figures for 
Mokhotlong Camp still produce a CV of 21%.
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argued that ample time exists between drought events for Borana livestock populations 
to build up to levels which negatively affect vegetation. Coppock therefore postulates 
an ecosystem in which equilibrium dynamics among vegetation and herbivores exist 
between dis-equilibrium periods when external forcing influences vegetation change.20
The paucity of data on either livestock populations at a district level or on patterns of 
vegetation change make it difficult to draw any conclusion about the nature of 
ecosystem dynamics in the mountain zone of Lesotho. CVs between 20-30 percent 
suggest that dis-equilibrium dynamics hold at least periodically, especially as other 
unpredictable factors external to the system, notably the occurrence of frost, might also 
play a role.21
Rainfall data from Mokhotlong Camp indicates that the period from 1930 to 1955 was 
unusually dry (see Figure 5.1). Contrary to the widely accepted model of the southern 
African climatic system of switches between runs of wet and dry years every nine years 
or so,22 during this period years of above average rainfall tended to be followed by an 
immediate return to drought.
As in the rest of the country (see Figure 4.5) livestock populations drastically declined 
in Mokhotlong district during the drought in the early 1930s. It is important to note, 
however, that this rapid decrease in the sheep and goat population was not simply the
20 Coppock, D.L. ‘Vegetation and Pastrol Dynamics in the Southern Ethiopian Rangelands: 
Implications for Theory and Management’ in Behnke, Scoones and Kerven, Range Ecology at 
Disequilibrium, pp. 42-61.
21 Scoones notes that mountain environments often display disequilibrium ecosystem dynamics, 
Scoones, I., pers. cors., 11 September 1997.
22 Tyson, P.D. Climate Change and Variability in Southern Africa (Cape Town, 1986).
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Figure 5.1 Percentage deviation from long-term mean for precipitation at 
Mokhotlong Camp, 1930-1994
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result of increased mortality created by lack of forage. Rather, Basotho livestock 
owners responded to the spectacular decrease in wool and mohair prices by selling off 
their flocks or slaughtering them for consumption. In 1933 over 40,000 head of cattle 
were exported from Lesotho (compared to figures of 8-14,000 in previous years), as 
Basotho livestock owners took advantage of encouraging market conditions in the 
Union.23
The 1931 livestock census recorded 477,921 sheep in Mokhotlong district, by 1936 it 
had dropped to nearly half that population (254, 684). The drop in the goat population 
was proportionally even greater, from 103,719 head in 1931 to 43,458 in 1936.24
Figures from 1937 indicate that the downward trend in Mokhotlong’s livestock 
population had ceased, but as no district level figures were produced from then until 
1965, it is impossible to determine exactly what happened to livestock populations at a 
district level. In 1965 Mokhotlong district sheep populations had risen back up to 
313,347, while goat populations had risen beyond the 1931 figure to 120, 899.2s
With low livestock densities and frequent droughts, the 1940s were probably a period in 
which ecological factors which did not depend on density were important in any 
changes in the pattern of vegetation and species composition. Evidence about 
vegetation change in the mountain area between 1930 and 1955 is sparse. Staples and 
Hudson reported that the area covered with sehalahala had decreased since 1931, in 
response to lighter grazing pressure and ‘a few seasons of exceptionally good rains’.26 
The two areas where the decline in sehalahala was most marked were the western 
ridges of the Maluti, around the watershed of the Senqunyane river, and in the area 
around Qacha’s Nek and Sehlabathebe, along the border with East Griqualand.
Rainfall data from Sehlabathebe indicate that the mid 1930s did see good rainfall 
figures (Figure 5.2). During Staples and Hudson’s survey (October 1936-January 1937) 
the Sehlabathebe rainfall station received 975mm of precipitation compared to a mean 
of 736mm. This contrasts with the rainfall data from Mokhotlong Camp (Figure 5.1), 
where the mid-1930s saw rainfall figures at or below the longer-term mean. As the
23 Figures from PRO DOl 19/1051, Answers to a Questionnaire sent by Sir Alan Pim in Preperation 
for Commission, 31 August 1934. See Milton, S. ‘“To make the crooked straight”: settler 
colonialism, imperial decline and the South African beef industry, c. 1902-42’ (unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of London, 1996).
24 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1936.
25 Lesotho, Ministry of Agriculture, Statistical Bulletin, 1967.
26 Staples and Hudson, Ecological Survey, p.29.
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mid-1930s saw low livestock population densities through-out the country the different 
rate of sehalahala decline in the mountain zone probably had more to do with this 
variable rainfall pattern than with a decrease in grazing pressure.
Figure 5.2 Percentage deviation from long-term mean for precipitation at 
Sehlabathebe, 1912-1956.
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Figure 5.3 Percentage deviation from long-term mean for precipitation at 
Mashai, 1932-1967
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Other conclusions about vegetation change can be drawn from comparisons between 
observations made by Pole Evans and Bowmaker27 and the vegetation map produced by 
Staples and Hudson.28 The most obvious point is that Pole Evans and Bowmaker both 
described the area around Mashai and Sehonghong as suffering from the most serious
27 See chapter 9.
28 Though the map produced by Staples and Hudson was based on Dobson's 1911 survey which, as I 
show in chapter 9, was extremely inaccurate.
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pasture degradation and intrusion of sehalahala.29 Staples and Hudson’s map indicates, 
however, that the area was largely covered by seboku grasses in the late 1930s.
As livestock populations remained low it seems unlikely that the intrusion of sehalahala 
was simply the result of grazing pressure. Rainfall data from Mashai (Figure 5.3) 
indicate that the period from the mid-1940s to mid-1950s saw generally low 
precipitation, with 1948-9 recording figures some 40 percent below average.
On his 1952 trek Bowmaker described the area around the source of the Qaqa stream 
(which was officially open to grazing) as being in good condition and able to 
accommodate greater livestock densities. Yet Staples and Hudson’s map indicates 
significant areas of sehalahala along the small tributaries to the east of the stream. By 
contrast Bowmaker reported overstocking and sehalahala encroachment in the eastern 
tributaries of the Matsoku river while Staples and Hudson’s map records a mixture of 
seboku and letsiri veld types.30 The pattern of vegetation change was clearly not uni­
linear between the late 1930s and late 1940s, and strongly suggests that factors other 
than simple grazing pressure account for the changing pattern in vegetation.
Some observations on the condition of vegetation can quite clearly be linked to specific 
short-term local factors. The National Veld Trust party who visited the mountain areas 
in March/April 1945 observed low bio-mass production and high rates of surface flows 
of water, especially in the northern areas.31 These observations are consistent with the 
pattern of rainfall recorded at Mokhotlong Camp for the period in question. The main 
rainfall months had seen figures below monthly averages but towards the end of the 
rainy season there was heavy rain, producing figures for the month of March far in 
excess of average (see Figure 5.4). Low rainfall in the peak months would result in low 
levels of bio-mass production and an unhealthy looking veld. This in turn would have 
decreased the infiltration rate for the late burst in rainfall and led to higher than normal 
surface flows of water. The pattern of degradation noted by the National Veld Trust 
party was probably more to do with factors specific to the time of their visit than a long­
term process of degradation.32
29 LNA 2476/n, Pole Evans, ‘Visit to Basutoland in February, 1950’; LNA 2476/11, Bowmaker, Cattle 
Post Trek, 14 - 26 November 1949.
30 LNA 2476/E, Bowmaker, ‘A Report on a Visit to Mokhotlong from 6- 28  March 1952’.
31 E.M.P. [Palmer, E.M.] ‘Basutoland-Heart of the Union’, Veld Trust News, 1, 2,1945, pp. 3-17. See 
chapter 6 for a discussion of the importance of this visit.
32 Note that the emphasis on the high plateau as the worst area for pasture degradation conflicts with 
reports from Staples, Baring and Bowmaker that drove the policy of closing valley grazing and 
moving livestock to the high peaks.
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Figure 5.4 Recorded and average monthly precipitation for Mokhotlong 
Camp, 1942 -1946 (mm).
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The data on vegetational change I have presented here do not conclusively disprove the 
hypothesis that changes in the species composition of the mountain zone were 
dependent largely on the density of livestock populations. Nevertheless they do suggest 
a more complex situation in which non-density dependent factors played at least some 
role. I would, therefore, suggest that the process of environmental change ‘read’ into 
the spatial pattern of vegetation by people such as Thornton, Staples and Pole Evans 
was based largely upon theory and not empirical evidence.
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5.4. The uncertainty of environmental change
The process of pasture degradation indicated by these early ecological investigations
has been repeated in most of the subsequent literature on Lesotho’s mountain
rangelands. The pattern of vegetation has constantly been seen as an indicator of
degradation. The very length of these claims of environmental decline provides some
opportunity to assess their validity. As D. Tapson points out for a similar history of
reported decline in KwaZulu:
Had they been true over all or even part of this time, the decline in primary 
productivity, as a consequence of the collapse over time of the basic resource, 
would have resulted in a decline in stock numbers.33
After the precipitous plummet of the early 1930s the livestock population has fluctuated 
but the country continues to support livestock populations in excess of most estimates 
of carry capacity.
Despite the lack of evidence about the process of ecological change, studies of the 
range management industry in Lesotho turn out precise figures for the rate, and 
seriousness, of pasture degradation. One study, produced by a team of range 
management experts, gives a precise figure of the increase in the area covered by 
Chrvsocoma tennifolia between 1938 and 1986. This was calculated by comparing 
Staples and Hudson’s estimate of the area covered by Chrvsocoma tennifolia to a 1986 
survey by the Land Conservation and Range Development Project. In 1938, 13 percent 
of the mountain area was reported covered bv Chrvsocoma tennifolia. while in 1986 
12.4 percent of the entire country was covered by Chrvsocoma tennifolia. Making the 
highly dubious (un-stated) assumption that there was no Chrvsocoma tennifolia in the 
lowlands at the time of the 1938 survey, they calculate that the area covered by 
Chrvsocoma tennifolia had increased by ‘approximately 4.3 percent of the total area of 
the country’.34
Even setting aside the dubious nature of this calculation, it is clear that the data simply 
can not generate such a precise number. Staples and Hudson’s estimate of 13 percent 
was no more than a guess and was based on a mapping exercise using the extremely 
inaccurate 1911 map. Even the figures from the Land Conservation and Range 
Development Project indicate a 3.2 percent error between the sum of their survey and 
the total area of Lesotho. Yet Swallow et.al. give a precise figure down to one decimal 
place.
33 Tapson, D. ‘Biologial Sustainability in Pastoral Systems: The Kwazulu Case.’ in Behnke, Scoones
and Kerven, Range Ecology at Disequilibrium, pp. 118-135, p. 122-123.
34 Swallow, Brokken, Motsamai, Sopeng and Storey, Livestock Development, p. 20-21.
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The precision of the figure for expansion of Chrvsocoma tennifolia creates an 
impression of knowledge about the mountain environment and certainty about the 
processes at work. Colonial officials also attempted to create an impression of certainty 
about both their knowledge of the mountain environment and the implementation of 
development projects. As we will see in subsequent chapters, however, the colonial 
state appeared to rarely know what was actually going on in the Lesotho mountains
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6. South Africa, Britain and the Senqu/Orange River
The blue mountain ranges of Basutoland, towering upwards fold upon fold hold 
the key to South Africa: the abundant waters that make her greatest and many of 
her lesser rivers and give life to plants, animals and humans.1
6.1. Introduction
Somewhere in the first couple of paragraphs of just about every development studies 
text on Lesotho there is a statment something along the lines of ‘Lesotho is a small-land 
locked country completely surrounded by South Africa’.2 Unfortunatley almost all of 
these texts then ignore this fact in their anaylsis of Lesotho’s ‘development problems’ 
or whatever it is they are discussing.3 Lesotho’s geopolitics are, however, crucial to 
any understanding of the country’s society, economy or political system. One crucial 
element in the country’s geopolitics is the fact that the majority of South Africa’s major 
rivers have their headwaters in Lesotho.
Commercial agriculture in the dry interior of South African is heavily reliant upon 
irrigation water from the Orange river (known as the Senqu in Lesotho). Most of this 
vital water does not fall as rain on South African soil but as rain and snow in the 
mountains of Lesotho. South Africa’s biggest river, the Senqu/Orange river receives 
the majority of its flow from headwaters and tributaries in the Lesotho mountains.4 At 
various times over the past century fears have been expressed over the impact of soil 
erosion in the mountain areas of Lesotho on South African water resources. These fears 
have, on occasion, been translated into political pressure on Lesotho to implement anti­
erosion policies in the mountain areas. In this chapter I will argue that the enactment of 
policy designed to control soil erosion in the years 1947 - 1956 had little, or nothing, to 
do with the reality of environmental conditions in the mountains and everything to do 
with the changing attitudes towards African occupied land amongst white South 
African politicians.
International disputes over water resources are commonplace and have received much 
attention from politicians, academics and the media. In the Middle East, for example,
1 EMP[almer], ‘Basutoland - Heart of the Union.’, p.3.
2 See for example Food and Agriculture Organisation, Advancing Forestry in Lesotho.
3 Crush ‘Introduction: Imagining development’, p. 15.
4 Lesotho contributes a Mean Annual Run-off of 4,750 million metres3 to the flow of the Orange
River compared with 2,240 million metres3 from South Africa, Conley, A.H. ‘A synoptic view of 
water resources in southern Africa.’ unpublished paper presented to SAFER Symposium, 
Zimbabwe, 16 November 1995.
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many commentators have made alarmist predictions pointing to water disputes as the 
most likely cause of future conflict in the region5, while in South Asia there is a long 
running debate about the impact of soil erosion in the Himalayas on the hydrology of 
the Ganges Valley.6 South African-Lesotho water relations have received surprising 
little attention, even with the current construction of the massive Highlands Water 
Project One reason for this has obviously been that South Africa’s ability to influence 
Lesotho’s politics has been so overwhelming that dispute seems impossible. Indeed it 
seems that some commentators on water resources get around the issue by simply 
pretending Lesotho does not exist: there are numerous maps of ‘South Africa water 
resources’, for example, which neglect to show the international border of Lesotho.7
The evidence to suggest that high stocking rates in the mountain areas of Lesotho have 
caused problems for South African water management on the Senqu/Orange river is at 
best shaky. The necessary long-term detailed hydrological data on the Senqu/Orange 
river within Lesotho does not exist even today and certainly did not exist in the 1940s 
and 50s. Two officially sanctioned surveys of siltation in the Senqu/Orange river 
inside Lesotho were carried out in the 1950s but the techniques used for determining the 
rate of siltation appear to have been confined merely to observation.8 Furthermore 
neither survey involved the sort of long term data collection necessary to determine the 
impact of grazing on the levels of silt in the river (i.e data covering a number of seasons 
and over a number of years).
5 See Beschomer, N. Water and Instability in the Middle East (ESS Adelphi paper 273, Winter 
1992/3), for a realistic assessment of the strategic risk of conflict over water resources in the Middle 
East.
6 See Chapman, G. and Thompson, M. (eds) Water and the Quest o f  Sustainable Development in the 
Ganges Basin (London, 1995); Haigh, M J. ‘Deforestation in the Himalaya* in Roberts N. (ed.)
The Changing Global Environment (Oxford, 1994); Ives, J.D. and Messerli, B. The Himalayan 
Dilemma: Reconciling Development and Conservation (London/New York, 1989).
7 See for example Readers Digest, Atlas o f South Africa (Pretoria, 1984), pp. 20-21 ( ‘Water in a dry 
land’), which includes six water resource maps, four of which include both Lesotho and Swaziland 
within the Republic and one which includes Swaziland but excludes Lesotho. The only map to 
show the correct international boundaries is the ‘% of farmland under irrigation’ map. See also a 
map entitled ‘South Africa’s main rivers’ (p. 131), which shows no international boundaries and a 
number of rivers that are certainly not ‘South Africa’s’ in Coetzee, H. and Cooper, D. ‘Wasting 
Water: Squandering a Precious Resource’ in Cock, J and Koch, E. Going Green: People Politics 
and the Environment in South Africa (Oxford, 1991), pp. 129-138.
8 In 1949/50 Green and Germond, of Hawkins, Jeffares and Green Civil Engineers, Johannesburg, 
carried out a survey, funded by the CD&W, of possible sites to build a dam in the lower reaches of 
the Senqu/Orange River inside Lesotho; PRO DO35/4061, Jeffares and Green, ‘Water Resource 
Survey of Basutoland.’ January 1951. N. Shand did a further survey of water resources in Lesotho 
in 1956, Shand, N. ‘Report on the Regional Development of the Water Resources of Basutoland.’ 
(unpublished, Feb. 1956).
131
CHAPTER SIX: SOUTH AFRICA, BRITAIN AND THE LESOTHO MOUNTAINS
Nevertheless, international disputes, or indeed agreements, over the causes of 
environmental problems are not dependent upon good evidence. The limited factual 
basis to knowledge of most environmental issues and the enormous scope for collision 
between conflicting value or knowledge systems means that it is often not the issue 
itself which steers the debate but the preconceptions that different proponents bring to it 
(see chapter 2).9 In order to understand why the colonial authorities in Lesotho came 
under pressure from the South African state to institute anti-erosion policies it is 
important to not only understand the political dynamics of the relationship but also to 
place the events within the context of colonial ideas about the African environment It 
is important to trace the way in which these ideas intersected with wider views about 
African society and how they developed over time; crucial to this story about the rise 
and fall of one environmental policy were the changing ideas about African occupation 
of land that went hand-in-hand with the rise of an apartheid ideology.
6.2. Early South African fears of the impact of soil erosion
As we saw in chapter 3, fears about the impact of deforestation on hydrology were
widespread in South Africa from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. It was not,
however, until 1933 that the issue of soil erosion was specifically linked to the transfer
debate. In that year Smuts specifically mentioned the need for aforestation in the
mountains of Lesotho when calling for the transfer of administration of the country
from Britain to South Africa:
It is desirable in the interest of the Union, as well as Basutoland itself, that steps 
are taken on an extensive scale along the headwaters of several important rivers 
which arise in Basutoland and flow through the Union, to prevent, by means of 
afforestation and other methods, the erosion which is causing so much damage in 
the mountain parts of the country. These steps might have to be taken on both 
sides of the border and could be carried out satisfactorily only by the Union 
Government10
The Pim Commission, published in the following year, also emphasised the impact of 
soil erosion on hydrology, arguing that the development of dongas would speed-up run 
off and therefore reduce infiltration rates, lower water tables and result in greater 
seasonality of river and stream flows.11 The Commission concentrated, however, on
9 Chapman, G. ‘Environmental Myth as International Politics: the Problems of the Bengal Delta’ in 
Mukheijee, A. and Agnihotri, V.K. (eds) Environment and development: views form the East and 
West (New Delhi, 1994), pp. 223-256, p 225.
10 Memorandum on the Proposed Incorporation of Basutoland, Bachuanaland and Swaziland in the 
Union of South Africa, submitted to Mr Thomas, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on 28th 
July 1933 by General Smuts, Annex 13 of Union of South Africa (White Paper) Negotiations 
Regarding the Transfer to the Union o f  South Africa o f the Government o f  Basutoland, 
Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, 1910-1939, (Pretoria, 1952) p. 35.
11 Pim, Financial and Economic Position, pl35.
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the lowland arable areas where mass aforestation was obviously not an option. Instead 
the report advocated a programme of physical anti-erosion works to protect arable land. 
Nevertheless their report still emphasised the importance of Lesotho’s water resources 
for South Africa:
The conservation of the rainfall in the soil is of importance not only locally but 
also to the countryside lying across its borders to the south and west, because it 
affects the flow of the two main rivers, the Orange and its tributary, the 
Caledon.12
Both London and Maseru took note of Smuts's linking of the issues of soil erosion and
transfer. The anti-erosion works in the lowlands were used by the British as an
important element in the propoganda battle over transfer. In 1938 at the invitation of
the Union government a party of chiefs from Lesotho and Swaziland, accompanied by
Charles Arden Clarke, then Resident Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate
(later of Basutoland), Douglas Smit, the South African Secretary for Native Affairs, and
a number of other High Commission officials' visited the Transkei and Ciskei. The
South African government’s idea seems to have been to so impress the chiefs by
development schemes in these areas that they would be immediately converted to the
cause of transfer of the High Commission Territories. According to Arden Clarke:
Smit started the tour with the idea in his mind that he had only to show the 
development work that is being carried on in the native areas of the Union to win 
over the Basutoland and Swaziland Chiefs...and that the transfer of the Territories 
was a matter of months, not years, a view which appears to be prevalent in Union 
government circles in Pretoria. As the tour progressed and Smit saw the reactions 
of the Basutoland Chiefs, and as a result of conversations he had with Bruton and 
myself, he began to take a realistic view of the situation. After he had 
seen...something of what was being done in the way of anti-erosion and 
development work in Basutoland he became somewhat depressed.13
When the South African government suggested, in 1953, that chiefs from Transkei 
should undertake a reciprocal visit, the Basutoland government organised a tour for 
them that mainly consisted of visiting anti-erosion works. The reaction of the 
Transkeian chiefs is not recorded but the Basutoland officials clearly felt they had 
organised a successful public relations exercise.14 Basutoland officials were always 
confident about receiving a positive reaction to the lowland anti-erosion works and 
encouraged visitors to the country to view them.15 In this respect, if no other, the 
massive lowland anti-erosion works begun in the mid-1930s could be considered a great 
success.
12 Pim, Financial and Economic Position, p.134.
13 Botswana National Archives (BNA) S337/16, Arden Clarke to Huggard, 8 May 1938. The Swazi 
and Basotho chiefs were also not impressed by the refusal of white Union officials to shake their 
hands, see LNA 153/46, Visit of Union Officials to Basutoland, 1953.
14 LNA 153/46.
15 For example see LNA 153/56, Mrs Bertha Solomon, MP: Visit to Basutoland, 1954.
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6.3. Post-war South African fears and the British response
Since the late nineteenth century the importance of Lesotho’s mountains for South 
African water resources had been recognised by all commentators on the mountain 
environment. In 1933 the issue had been raised by Smuts during discussion about 
transfer and the 1935 Pim Commission reiterated the economic and hence political 
importance of these water resources. Nevertheless before the war the issue did not 
seem to raise much interest on either side. South African press response to the anti­
erosion works in the lowlands during the late 1930s and early 1940s were, on the 
whole, complimentary. The Johannesburg Star, for example, twice reported on the 
success of Lesotho’s anti-erosion works, stating that they could provide a model for 
South Africa.16
As we saw in chapter 3 in the mid-1940s South Africa experienced a huge increase in 
fears about the impact of soil erosion. The 1944 tour of Dr H.H. Bennett, head of the 
U.S.A. Soil Conservation Service, did much to raise South African (white) public 
interest in the issue and the newly formed National Veld Trust gave itself the mission of 
taking his message to the country.
During his tour of South Africa, Bennett also paid a visit to Lesotho to investigate the 
anti-erosion works begun in the 1930s. To the great pleasure of the Basutoland 
administration Bennett was very complimentary about their work, and in an article in 
Veld Trust News suggested that South Africa should follow their example.17 The 
Basutoland authorities made much of this ringing endorsement from the man one 
official described as ‘the greatest soil conservationist of all’18 and quoted his words in 
the Agriculture Department’s Annual Report.19
Just over a year later, however, they received a much less flattering assessment in 
another article in the Veld Trust News, written after a trip through Lesotho by a party of 
Veld Trust officials.20 While the piece again praised the anti-erosion work carried out 
in the lowlands, it expressed grave concern that the issue of soil erosion in Lesotho's
16 16 and 23 November 1944, cuttings in PRO D035/1180/Y950/3.
17 Quoted in Anon. ‘A Nation Imperiled - Dr Bennett Views South Africa’, Veld Trust News, 1, 2,
1944, p. 3.
18 Duncan to Roberts, 2 October 1944, Patrick Duncan Papers, University of York, DU5-81/10.
19 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1945, p.2.
20 EMP[almer], ‘Basutoland - Heart of the Union.’ The other important member of the party was
C.J.J. Van Rensburg, a figure credited by many South African politicians in the 1940s as being the 
main impetus behind the rise in public interest in soil erosion (see chapter 3). Sections of the 1945 
article were reproduced in a joint book by Van Rensburg and Palmer, New World to Win, p. 61.
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mountains was not being addressed. They argued that soil erosion there, caused mainly 
by over-grazing, could have disastrous consequences for the flow of the many South 
African rivers that had their head-waters in the Lesotho mountains.
The mountain areas were described as the ‘sponge of South Africa’, collecting and
slowly releasing water, but the effects of rapid soil erosion meant that ‘the sponge...
[was] slowly being squeezed dry’.21 They expressed particular concern for the high
mountain area of the North West that forms the watershed of the Tugela and
Senqu/Orange river valleys. Here they observed:
mountain sides with great patches of bare rock glittering in the sun where chunks 
and layers of the mountain had slipped away and were reminded that an eroded 
mountain loses in time, along with its soil and vegetation, the power to attract 
and hold water.22
The article argued that the mountain areas were until recently uninhabited and that the 
deterioration had been rapid, largely taking place since about 1915; and that the only 
solution was the ‘most prompt, widespread and drastic limitation of stock and 
agriculture in the mountains’.23 There was a clear implication (though not explicitly 
stated) that the human population of the area also needed to be removed.
Shortly after the article first appeared in Veld Trust News Tom Fraser, a Basutoland
Assistant District Commissioner, sent a letter to William Ormsby-Gore (Lord Harlech),
who had retired as High Commissioner the previous year (Fraser had been his private
secretary). In his letter Fraser, who seemed to have been generally dissatisfied with the
Basutoland government, declared that he was delighted by the article as it would force
the government into action.24 He agreed with its arguments and explicitly stated that
‘the inescapable conclusion [is] that depopulation is really the only solution’.25
Ormsby-Gore later circulated the letter to Dominions Office officials.
The criticisms expressed in the article and in Fraser’s letter were treated very seriously
by the Dominions Office, and it was felt that:
a great deal of difficulty seems to have been caused in the Union especially by 
exaggerated or misleading statements in the article.26
21 E.M.P. ‘Basutoland - Heart of the Union’.
22 E.M.P. ‘Basutoland - Heart of the Union’, p.5.
23 E.M.P. ‘Basutoland - Heart of the Union’, p. 17.
24 See Ormsby-Gore to Emry-Evans, 8 October 1944, Correspondence between William G.A. 
Ormsby-Gore (Lord Harlech), High Commissioner, Cape Town/Pretoria, 1942-45 and Paul V. 
Emry-Evans, M.P., Under Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1942-45, P.V. Emrys-Evans 
Papers, British Library Add.Mss.58244, p 103.
25 PRO D035/1180/Y950/3, Fraser to Harlech, 28 July 1945.
26 PRO DO35/1180/Y950/3, file note [by Roddan?], 14 March 1946.
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Dominions Office concerns about the implications of the criticisms were essentially two 
fold. Firstly they felt that the criticisms made it more difficult for them to go to the 
Treasury for further CD&W Funds for anti-erosion work in the three High Commission 
Territories begun before the war. Secondly, and most importantly, they were concerned 
that the South African government, or more probably the Nationalist opposition, might 
use the alleged impact of soil erosion in Lesotho on the flow of South African rivers as 
a bargaining chip to pressurize the British into transfering the administration of the 
High Commission Territories to Union control.
In March 1945 the Basutoland administration had applied for a free grant from CD&W 
in order to continue the anti-erosion work it had started in the lowland areas during the 
1930s.27 In the climate of post war austerity the Dominions Office was cautious about 
applying to the Treasury for further funds for development projects that could come in 
for criticism. Though there were no adverse public criticisms of the lowland contour 
bank schemes, and indeed most reports were highly complimentary, the Dominions 
Office did received a critical briefing from G.R.B. Brown, a district officer from 
Machakos, Kenya, who had been sent to investigate the scheme in February 1945. The 
file minutes on the briefing record that Brown was ‘clearly not in the least impressed by 
what he saw in Basutoland’ and that ‘he appeared to think that Basutoland was looking 
on the provision of contour bunds as an end in itself.28 With the addition of public 
concerns about erosion in the mountains the Dominions Office decided to delay the 
application for further CD&W funds.29
In response to the article and Fraser’s letter the Dominions Office requested that W.G. 
Leakie, the Basutoland Director of Agriculture, write a report on soil erosion. The 
report, sent to the Dominions Office in August 1945, lends support to Brown’s criticism 
that the Basutoland authorities were looking on the provision of contour bunds as an 
end in itself. The Dominions Office’s request had clearly been in response to Palmer’s 
fears about soil erosion in the mountains but the subsequent report by Leakie was 
exclusively about physical anti-erosion works in the lowlands. The report 
acknowledged a number of problems, in particular with a lack of maintenance, but 
argued that these problems could be ‘overcome by perseverance’.30 Not surprisingly 
Leakie’s report failed to allay the Dominions Office’s fears about soil erosion in the
27 PRO D 035/1187/Y1136/23, Applications for Colonial Development and Welfare Funds.
28 PRO DO35/1180/Y950/4, Minute from Roddan on discussion with G. Brown. See also Marcant, 
W.S., Lambert, R.T., and Brown, G.R.B. ‘Notes on a visit to the Union and Basutoland, February - 
March 1945’, unpublished, Rhodes House, Oxford, Mss Afr.s.397(9).
29 See file notes on PRO D 035/1180/Y950/3 & 4.
30 PRO D 035/1180/Y950/3, Leakie, ‘Report on Soil Erosion Work in Basutoland’, August 1945.
136
CHAPTER SIX: SOUTH AFRICA, BRITAIN AND THE LESOTHO MOUNTAINS
mountains and they decided to delay the application for further funds until they were 
satisfied that the Basutoland government was taking some form of action.
It is unclear whether the Basutoland government were completely aware of the reason 
for the Dominions Office delaying the application. A telegram was drafted explaining 
to the High Commissioner the reason for the delay, but before it could be sent out the 
Dominions Office had reversed its decision. In correspondence from the Basutoland 
Deaprtment of Agriculture and in a meeting with Arden Clarke, the retiring Resident 
Commissioner, at the Dominions Office in September 1945 the situation in the 
mountain areas was increasingly emphasised.31 It seems highly likely that the 
Basutoland government became aware of the need to be seen to institute some sort of 
anti-erosion work in the mountains if they were going to ensure further funds.
The meetings with Arden Clarke and correspondence from the Basutoland Department 
of Agriculture reassured the Dominions Office that the Basutoland authorities were 
aware of the sensitive nature of the issue of soil erosion in the mountains. Evelyn 
Baring, the newly appointed High Commissioner, supported the Basutoland authorities, 
telling the Dominions Office that ‘the authorities are fully alive to the seriousness of 
erosion in the mountain areas’.32
In late 1945 the Dominions Office agreed to recommend the application for further 
CD&W funds to the Treasury, but the implication was that the Basutoland authorities 
had to implement some sort of soil conservation scheme in the mountain cattle post 
areas.
The question of transfering the three High Commission Territories to Union control had 
not been explicitly on the political agenda since 1939. At that date a decision had been 
taken to delay the publication of a memorandum on the terms for transfer and the 
publication of report of the Joint Advisory Conference.33 Nevertheless transfer was a 
constant factor in British-South African relations. Indeed in 1946 the British half 
expected South Africa to renew its formal application for transfer and the Dominions 
Office prepared a draft White paper for this eventuality.34 The issue was brought even
31 PRO D 035/1180/Y950/3, Minutes on a meeting between Arden-Clarke and C.W. Lawrence at the 
Dominions Office, 13 September 1945.
32 PRO D 035/1180/Y950/3, Baring’s comments on a letter from the Acting Resident Commissioner 
to High Commissioner, circulated to the Dominions Office, 8 September 1945.
33 Spence, J.E. ‘British Policy Towards the High Commission Territories’, Journal o f  Modem  
African Studies, 2 ,2 ,1964 , pp. 221-46.
34 PRO DO 35/1172/Y/766/13, Draft White paper on Transfer.
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closer to the political agenda when South Africa applied to the United Nations for the 
full incorporation of Namibia into the Union.
As with many South African issues the British attitude towards the incorporation of 
Namibia was ambiguous. The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs was minded to 
support the South African application but under pressure from Creech-Jones, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Cabinet agreed on a more circumspect approach. 
Creech-Jones was concerned about the possible public reaction in other British colonial 
possessions and, crucially, the reaction of the Indian government to their support for 
South Africa’s incorporation of Namibia.35 The British Cabinet faced a dilemma: if 
they did support South Africa’s application they would encounter opposition both at 
home and abroad (including from the USA) but if they spoke out against incorporation 
they could potentially weaken the strong alliance with South Africa. In the context of 
the developing Cold War and European economic reconstruction this alliance was seen 
as a primary aim of British foreign policy for political (anti-Communist), strategic (gold 
and uranian deposits, Simonstown naval base) and economic reasons (South Africa lent 
Britain £80 million in 1946).
British policies towards South Africa in the immediate post war era always had half an 
eye on their impact on domestic South African politics and great trouble was taken to 
avoid giving the National party any political capital to use against Smuts’s United 
Party. Smuts was viewed as the supreme statesman and held in exceptionally high 
regard, bordering on hero worship, and the British were extraordinarily keen to 
maintain good relations with him. The political relationship with Smuts was reinforced 
by the close personal friendship between Smuts and the British High Commissioner, 
Evelyn Baring.36 The British Labour government attempted to keep issues where 
public opinion opposed to Smuts’s policies off the political agenda. One such issue was 
the incorporation of the three High Commission Territories into South Africa.
Tshekedi Khama’s public pronouncement of his intention to challenge any South 
African application for the incorporation of Namibia, on the grounds it could set a 
precedent for the High Commission Territories, was a clear indication of the strength of 
feeling and the sort of opposition that could be expected to any moves to transfer their 
administration. In this context the British interest was best served by keeping the High 
Commission Territories off the political agenda.
35 PRO CAB 128/5, CM 45(46)8, South West Africa: Cabinet Conclusions on South Africa’s 
proposed incorporation in the Union, 13 May 1946 and PRO CAB 128/6, CM 88(46), South West 
Africa, Cabinet conclusions on UK attitude to proposed incorporation, 18 October 1946.
36 Douglas-Home, C. Evelyn Baring: The Last Proconsul (London, 1978).
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Unfortunately for the British the Veld Trust News article sparked off a great deal of 
interest in Lesotho’s mountain environment in South Africa. This was not simply 
confined to water and soil experts. During debates about the new South African Soil 
Conservation Bill in early 1946 the issue of soil erosion in Lesotho was raised on a 
number of occasions. H.H. Johnson, the MP for Port-Elizabeth-North, for example, 
told the House:
I have been given to understand by people who know something about it that in 
the Basutoland mountains there are sources of supply which feed the streams and 
rivers of the Union of South Africa... I would like to know how the Minister and 
his department propose to deal with those sources, because... it is no good playing 
with soil erosion. It is no good restoring a patch here and a patch there, unless we 
restore the streams that provide the necessary water that is going to make things 
grow in this country.37
A Nationalist MP, J.N. le Roux, speaking in the same debate, specifically chastised the
British government for not preventing soil erosion in the mountains.38
While Smuts appeared to be happy to leave the issue of transferring the administration 
of the High Commission Territories in abeyance for the time being he was also aware 
that success on the issue would be popular with the white South African electorate.39 
On the other hand he was keen not to alienate the British, especially as he was looking 
for their support over the incorporation of Namibia. He raised the issue of soil erosion 
in the mountains of Lesotho in private with Baring on a couple of occasions,40 but did 
not do so publicly (in contrast to his statement in 1933). This suggests that his concerns 
was probably to remove possible political advantage from the Nationalists rather than to 
pressurize London for transfer per se.
The potential political capital to be made by South Africa through its claims of neglect 
underscored all the discussions between Basutoland officials in Maseru, the High 
Commissioners office in Pretoria/Cape Town and the Dominions Office in London. 
Transfer was to the forefront of all British official’s minds when issues such as soil 
erosion in Lesotho were being discussed. When Arden Clarke meet with Dominions 
Office officials in 1945, the relationship between the mountain soil erosion issue and 
the question of transfer was discussed. The minutes of the meeting record that Arden 
Clarke:
37 Johnson, H.H., Union of South Africa, Debates o f the House o f  Assembly, 3rd Session, 9th 
Parliament, 1946-1947, Vol. 58, p. 8309.
38 LeRoux, J.N., Union of South Africa, Debates o f the House o f Assembly, 3rd Session, 9th 
Parliament, 1946-1947, Vol. 58, p.8330.
39 Baring wrote a long memorandum to Addison, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, on 13 
April 1946 dealing with the fact that Smuts was coming under pressure from the nationalists over 
the issue, PRO DO35/1172/Y/706/11.
40 PRO D 035/1180/Y950/5, Baring to Machtig, 25 February 1946.
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wondered whether, even if Basutoland were transferred to the Union, the Union 
Government would in fact do any more than has been and is being done in 
Basutoland under the present administration.41
All were agreed that the best way to counter South African claims over the damage
caused by soil erosion in the mountains was for the Basutoland authorities to do more to
combat the perceived threat
During 1946 the Basutoland authorities began to formulate a policy designed to reduce 
soil erosion on the mountain rangelands. However, as the Veld Trust News article had 
acknowledge, their resources to do this were very limited. Early in the year Baring 
retraced the steps of Palmer and Van Rensburg’s 1945 trek in order to comment on their 
article and made some initial policy recommendations. A keen amateur naturalist,42 he 
made extensive use of Staples and Hudson’s 1938 Ecological Survey in his report on 
the mountain areas. In contrast with Palmer (and in line with Staples and Hudson) he 
reported that the worst examples of overgrazing were not on the high mountain tops but 
on north facing valley sides where rooigras species where being replaced by ‘bitter 
karoo scrub’.
During this tour Baring held initial discussion with Matlere Lerotholi and Theko 
Makhaola, the chiefs of the two main mountain wards of Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek, 
but no firm policy was decided upon.43 Early the following year P.A. Bowmaker, one 
of the Basutoland Deparment of Agriculture’s two Principal Agricultural Officers, was 
sent on another trek to the mountain wards to devise a suitable policy.44
As we will see in chapter 7 and 9, the two ward chiefs agreed to implement a policy to 
close all valley cattle post grazing areas below the 9,000 foot contour line and to order 
all livestock herds to be moved to the higher pastures. This policy was officially 
implemented in April 1947 and reported as a great success in subsequent Department of 
Agriculture Annual Reports. It was designed to remove all grazing pressure from the 
rooigras areas and to allow the grassy species to re-establish themselves over the 
‘bitter karoo shrub’. Initially it as felt that this would take only a few years but, in fact, 
the closure policy officially stayed in place for almost a decade.
41 PRO D035/1180/Y950/3, Minutes of meeting between Arden Clarke and Lawrence at the 
Dominions Office on 13 September 1945.
42 His notebook on the trek is full of details on different plants and flowers. Unfortunatley the notes 
are incoherent and say little about the general ecological conditions, Notebook 3, Evelyn Baring 
Papers, University of Durham.
43 PRO DO35/1180/Y950/5, Baring to Machtig, 25 February 1946.
44 I have been unable to trace Bowmaker’s report on this trek in either the LNA or PRO, it is, 
however, refered to subsequent files such as LNA 2476/11.
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The Basutoland authorities, the High Commissioner and the Commonwealth Relations 
Office45 were all pleased with the closure policy and felt it would silence any South 
African criticism. Indeed it received a number of press reports that compared the policy 
favourably with what was taking place in South Africa. The Friend, for example, 
reported that:
In the highlands where the Orange rises no less than 1,400 square miles - an 
eighth of all Basutoland - have been totally closed to grazing till the Red Grass 
(themeda) carpets them again... The Basuto custom of tribal veld-sparing has been 
immensely extended by progressive chiefs on technical advice. I have seen 
mountain sides dangerously eroded and covered only by the bitter Karoo-bush 
after many years misuse growing golden red with red grass again after only two 
years of enforced rest from stocking. I have also flown across Cathkin Peak into 
Natal and seen exactly the same problems on the native lands on the Ladysmith 
side of the border with one depressing difference: there was practically no 
reclamation work in sight.46
The Basutoland authorities must have been particularly heartened by a positive report in
the VeldTrust47 magazine:
With the support of progressive chiefs, who enforce the system in their own 
courts and receive the proceeds of the fines, Mr P.A. Bowmaker...is carrying 
through a programme designed to stabilise all the mountain slopes of Basutoland 
by 1956. More than 1,400 square miles - about an eighth of the territory - have 
been already removed from grazing, so that the rooigras may grow again and oust 
the bitter Karoo.48
Nobody, not even the Veld Trust, commented on the fact that the closure policy 
involved moving all the livestock out of the valleys onto the watershed areas that 
Palmer had identified as having the worst soil erosion problems and being the greatest 
risk to the free flow of South African rivers.
45 The Dominions Office changed name, to the Commonwealth Relations Office, in July 1947.
46 The Friend, 27 March 1950.
47 Formerly the Veld Trust News.
48 Bond, J. ‘The Basuto fight to save a mountain jewel’, VeldTrust, April 1951, pp. 22-23,30 & 32. 
Sections of the article were repeated in the August 1954 VeldTrust article ‘Basutos Avert Disaster: 
Fight to save cradle of the Orange river’, p. 25.
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6.4. The National Party and renewed pressure
Despite the positive press reports the Commonwealth Relations Office did not feel 
complacent about the issue for long. Their fears were renewed with the victory of the 
Nationalists in the 1948 South African election and Malan's demand that the British 
address the issue of transfer. The Labour government could no longer simply avoid the 
problem and try to keep it off the political agenda. The victory of the Nationalists also 
hardened opposition to plans for transfer in both the High Commission Territories and 
Britain. Groups such as the Anti-Slavery Society, the Fabian Colonial Bureau and the 
Society of Friends actively lobbied the Commonwealth Relations Office to prevent any 
moves towards transfer.49
In mid 1949 the High Commissioner’s office began to warn the Commonwealth
Relations Office that Malan was likely to formally request transfer in the very near
future and soil erosion in the mountains of Lesotho would be one of the central issues.
In August Baring reported a converstaion with Forsyth, an official in the Union
Department of External Affairs:
Forsyth has told me that the Union Government definitely intend to demand the 
transfer of the High Commission Territories in the near future...[He] said that a 
particular point would be made of the condition of the catchment area of the 
Orange River.50
In response to this possibility the Commonwealth Relations Office asked the High 
Commissioner office to compiled a briefing on various issues likely to arise in 
connection with the transfer issue. Much of the section on Lesotho was taken up by a 
discussion of soil erosion; the policy of closing areas of grazing was reported to be a 
success but the need for further action was stressed.51 In subsequent years three basic 
approaches to dealing with potential criticism were attempted: firstly to obtain 
independent support for the closure policy; secondly to introduce policies to reduce the 
total livestock populations; and thirdly to explore the possibility of technical solutions 
to prevent siltation.
49 See for example Submission from a Deputation on the High Commission Territories to the
Commonwealth Relations Office, 14 November 1949, Patrick Duncan Papers, University of York, 
Basutoland Miscellany, DU 7.3.
PRO DOl 19/1442, Baring to Syers, 26 August 1949.
51 PRO DO 35/4330, A collection of notes on various aspects of the administration o f the High 
Commission Territories likely to arise in connection with transfer, prepared by the High 
Commissioners Office, Pretoria, 7 December 1949,
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6.4.1. Livestock culling
Stock limitation was seen as being a crucial element of the battle against negative South
African publicity about the environmental condition of all three High Commission
Territories. In October 1949 Baring informed the Resident Commissioners that:
I think it is particularly important for all three High Commission Territories to 
emphasise the measures we are taking to enforce in the future the limitation of 
stock. My impression from conversations with the Union authorities and from 
visiting Betterment areas in the Transkei is that i) they lay more emphasis on the 
limitation of stock and the improvement of pasture than they do on the protection 
of arable land and ii) they believe that without compulsory limitation no measures 
to save the soil are of any use.52
During the 1949 Basutoland National Council the colonial authorities placed great
pressure on the Basuto chiefs to implement livestock culling policies.53 While
members of the National Council rarely expressed any opposition to grazing control
policies,54 there was almost unanimous opposition to compulsory culling, even from
chiefs such as Theko Makhaola who claimed to support the closure policy. Given that
many members of the council were themselves large livestock owners this was hardly
surprising. However, the fear of discussing any issue connected to the transfer question
may well have acted as a check on opposition to anti-erosion policies.55 A petition
delivered to the British Prime Minister and signed by many influential chiefs in
Lesotho, complained that the Resident Commissioner had threatened that a failure to
check erosion would lead to increased pressure from South Africa for transfer.56
After pressure from the Resident Commissioner the 1949 Council did agree to 
recommend the introduction of a scheme to reduce the goat population by 25 percent 
over a five year period. Goats were regarded by the British as ‘public enemy number 
one’57 and the administration made much of the National Council's acceptance of the 
proposal. The scheme was exceptionally liberal when compared with culling schemes 
in South Africa or Southern Rhodesia, and was essentially voluntary. The Basutoland 
administration had recognised for many years that it had little chance of imposing a 
compulsory culling scheme:
52 PRO DOl 19/1422, Baring to Forsyth-Thompson, 11 October 1949.
53 Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f the 45th Session, 1949, p. 166-168.
54 The main complaint in this area was that white traders were not made to abide by the grazing 
regulations.
55 Edgar argues in the introduction to Prophets with Honour that the fear of incorporation into the 
Union was a check on militant protest by the opposition movement, Lekhotla la Bafo.
56 PRO D035/4159, Petition of the Basotho tribe.
57 Howard, J ‘Notes on a visit to Transkei, Ciskei and Basutoland, January 1950.’ unpublished, 
Rhodes House, Oxford, MSS Afr. s.787. For the opposite view see Mathe, B.M. letters page of 
Mochochonono, 15 September 1945.
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The unrest and ill feeling which such a course would cause would prejudice the 
success of all other progressive measures which the Government may intend to 
introduce during the next few years.58
Any ideas for a compulsory plan were surely shelved in the aftermath of the 1950
Witzieshoek uprising just across the northern border of Lesotho. Police reports from
the uprising described trails of blood leading into the Lesotho mountains,59 and it is
most likely that many Basotho heard first hand accounts of the culling policy and
resistance to it.
Even the limited culling scheme agreed to by the National Council was, however, more 
than the Basutoland authorities could really manage and no attempt at implementation 
was ever made.60
6.4.2. Pole Evans’s Report
As well as the plans for a goat-culling programme the Basutoland authorities decided 
that they needed some independent support for their closure policy. In December 1949 
they commissioned Illtyd Pole Evans to investigate the two main mountain districts of 
Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek. As we saw in chapter 4, Pole Evans was a central figure 
in African colonial ecology and was well connected with high level South African 
figures. Like Evelyn Baring he was a keen friend of Smuts and all three of them used 
to spend holidays at the Dongola Game Reserve run by Pole Evans.61 The Basutoland 
authorities approached Pole Evans expressly because they hoped he would support their 
policies and, Bowmaker, who was responsible for administering the closure plan 
wondered whether:
Dr Pole Evans might be informed confidentially that the object of his invitation is 
to provide the Basutoland Government with an ‘outside’ report which can be used 
to refute statements which appear in the press from time to time about the state of 
the cover in the Basutoland mountains, as compared perhaps with what is 
happening in the native reserves in the Union.^
Pole Evans’s reputation and connection with Baring may have made him an obvious 
choice but, if the Basutoland authorities were keen to impress the Nationalist 
government, he was not the best man for the job. During 1949 Pole Evans suffered
5% LNA 2526, District Commissioner, Butha Buthe to Government Secretary, Maseru, 15 September 
1947.
59 Rand Daily Mail, 29 November 1950, quoted by Moroney, S. ‘1950 Witzieshoek rebellion’, Africa 
Perspective, 3,1976, pp.1-15. Also see Hirson, B. ‘Rural revolts in South Africa’.
60 It is discussed in more detail in chapter 7.
61 Douglas-Home, Evelyn Baring: The Last Proconsul and Carruthers, ‘The Dongola Wildlife 
Sanctuary’.
62 LNA 2476/n, Bowmaker to King, 28 December 1949.
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frequent personal criticisms in the South African parliament over his running of the 
Dongola Game Reserve. J.G. Strijdom, then Minister of Irrigation and Lands, wanted 
to break up Dongola (on the outskirts of his Waterberg constituency) and open it to new 
settler farmers but Pole Evans fought hard to resist.63 Though Smuts spoke up in Pole 
Evans’s defence, classing him ‘with the very highest and most able public servants we 
have had in this country’,64 the Basutoland authorities had choosen a man with much 
reduced influence vis-a-vis the South African government.
Furthermore, despite their best efforts to fix the result, Pole Evans's report contained,
amongst the general praise, a number of potentially damaging criticisms of the
Basutoland authorities. Most importantly Pole Evans reported that the closure policy
was not a solution to the problem in itself:
The question ... arises - Is the work now being done enough? Does it provide a 
permanent solution? The answer is ‘No’. Something more than reclamation of the 
natural pasture by resting is required.65
The Basutoland Department of Agriculture were concemend about these criticisms and,
despite the fact Pole Evans complimentary comments were used in the 1950 Annual
R e p o r t  it was not circulated to other members of the administration.67 The
Basutoland authorities seemed to be somewhat dissatisfied with the results of the
report68 and Bowmaker complained that:
My impression of Dr Pole Evans, which is backed up by his report, is that he is so 
much of a lover of nature and pure botanist that he does not really grasp the 
practical side or means of getting things put right.69
To make things worse they also felt that Pole Evans’s ‘did not let us of lightly over his 
fee’.70
6.4.3 . Damming the Senqu/Orange River
With increasing South African pressure over transfer, the failure of the goat reduction 
policy and only mixed support from Pole Evans, the British turned to more technical 
solutions to the problem of siltation caused by erosion in the mountains: the 
construction of water storage systems within Lesotho. For the British these plans had
63 Union of South Africa, Debates o f  the House o f Assembly, 3rd Session, 10th Parliament, 1949, vol. 
67, pp. 3371
64 Smuts, J., Union of South Africa, Debates o f the House o f  Assembly, 3rd Session, 10th Parliament, 
1949, vol. 67, pp. 3765.
65 LNA 2476/n, I.B. Pole-Evans: Visit to Basutoland in February 1950.
66 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1950, stated that Pole Evans ‘expressed the 
opinion that the work in progress was satisfactory’, (p.9).
67 LNA 2476/n, file notes from King and Forsyth-Thompson, c.May 1950.
68 Baring reported that Pole Evans was ‘inclined to antagonise Agricultural Officers’, PRO 
D035/4010, Baring toLiesching, 20 July 1951.
69 LNA 2476/11, P.A. Bowmaker’s comments on Pole-Evans report, June 1950.
70 LNA 2476/n, Forsyth-Thompson to Baring, 24 June 1950.
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two major advantages; firstly they were a clear counter to the accusations that they were 
doing nothing to develop the resources of the country and secondly a series of dams 
would capture any siltation and result in a clearer flow of water into the Union.
The possibility of large scale water development schemes on the Orange river had been 
discussed for many years in South Africa. But a perennial problem was the large silt 
content of the river which would significantly reduce the life-span of any dam. The 
finger of blame for the silt content was pointed at the Basotho and the British 
administration, the obvious implication being that the Imperial government was holding 
back South African economic development. Some within the Basutoland 
administration began to discuss the possibility of large scale water development of their 
own as a way of countering these South African complaints. In April 1947, Gideon 
Pott, the District Commissioner of Teyateyaneng, wrote a long letter to the Government 
Secretary in Maseru detailing proposals for a large dam in Quthing district. While Pott 
outlined some economic advantages of the dam he essentially saw it as having a 
political role:
Politically I am of the opinion that it would do Basutoland a lot of good in its 
relations with the Union. It would show them we are willing to co-operate and 
assist them to combat erosion and to help them irrigate needy Union areas, and 
thus forestall them in the same way as we have done with anti-erosion work.
There would be less talk about incorporation in the Union as we would no longer 
be a stumbling block to some of their more progressive and very necessary 
schemes.71
Pott’s proposal received a warm welcome from other members of the administration but 
no action was taken until late 1949 when Jeffares and Green, a Johannesburg based 
civil engineering firm were contracted to write a preliminary report on the practicality 
of constructing a large dam. Their initial assessment, handed to the Resident 
Commissioner after a visit to the area in November 1949, included both good and bad 
news for the Basutoland administration: they believed that there was too much silt in 
the Senqu/Orange where it flowed through Quting for a dam to be sustainable but they 
also argued that most of this silt came from the lower Senqu/Orange valley below the 
divide between the basalt and sandstone based soils (see chapter 1). They argued that 
water development schemes would be possible in the upper reaches of the 
Senqu/Orange and its tributaries, especially the Malibamatso, but any developments on 
the lower reaches of the river should be delayed ‘until such a time as the silt problem 
has found a solution’.72 Obviously the ‘solution’ to siltation was to be an extended 
anti-erosion campaign:
71 LNA 335/1, DC, Teyateyaneng to Government Secretary, Maseru, 14 April 1947.
72 LNA 335/1, Germond, R.C. ‘Report on Preliminary Reconnaissance on the Orange River in 
Basutoland, 14th - 17th November 1949’.
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All cultivation of steep slopes would have to be stopped and grazing would have 
to be strictly controlled and probably stopped altogether for a few years.73
Given the positive reports about low levels of siltation from the northern mountains the
Basutoland administration were keen to have Jeffares and Green write a full report on
the proposals and the High Commissioner applied to the Commonwealth Relations
Office for £2,500 from the CD&W Fund.74 With the Union parliament frequently
debating the possibility of water development schemes on the Orange within South
Africa during February and March 1950, the Basutoland administration and the High
Commissioner felt an even greater need for new ammunition. Their fears appeared to
have been vindicated when Strijdom, the Minister for Irrigation, deflected demands for
new projects by pointing towards Lesotho:
The water of the Orange River, coming from Basutoland, where there is a 
tremendous amount of soil erosion and from other places, contains so much silt 
that if one were to construct a catchment dam on the river, such a dam would 
eventually meet the same fate as the dams in the Fish River valley, and for 
practical purposes it would also silt up and we would find ourselves in a worse 
position than we are in today.75
In May 1950 the High Commissioner pressurised the Commonwealth Relations Office
into releasing funding for the survey. In a telegram to Patrick Gordon-Walker, the
Secretary of State, he pointed out that the survey in itself would help counter South
African criticisms even if the project was never constructed. He was particularly keen
for the survey to take place at the same time the Directorate of Colonial Surveys were
also involved in mapping the country:
The High Commissioner is particularly anxious that [the] survey should start 
without delay, both for intrinsic advantage and to anticipate criticism from [the] 
Union Government who, in supporting [the] case for transfer of [the] territories, 
are likely to allege that [the] catchment area of Orange river which is of major 
importance to the Union has deteriorated through neglect, and that we do not even 
possess accurate information about the area or its potential. [The] Colonial Survey 
Unit is currently engaged in photography of [the] Territory, preliminary to 
accurate mapping. If [a] hydrographic survey was also begun now we should be 
in a good position later this year to demonstrate that we are energetically 
accumulating data which will enable us to preserve and use [the] natural resources 
of Basutoland to common advantage. In short a scheme or schemes may result 
but politically we must have information.76
The political necessity of the survey was also made explicit in the application for 
CD&W funds:
This survey is required to ... obtain the necessary data to anticipate criticism from 
the Union government, who in support of their case for the transfer of the High
73 LNA 335/1, Green, H.H. ‘Notes on Basutoland, 5 December 1949’. The phrases ‘strictly 
controlled’ and ‘stopped altogether’ were underlined by somebody within the Basutoland 
administration (probably the Resident Commissioner) with a large ‘yes’ in the margin.
74 PRO DO35/4061, Application for CD&W Funds, 1 May 1950.
75 Strijdom, J.G., Union of South Africa, Debates of the House o f Assembly, 3rd Session, 10th 
Parliament, 1950, Vol. 70, p. 3362.
76 LNA 335/1, Baring to Baxter, 1 May 1950.
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Commission Territories are likely to allege that the catchment area of the Orange 
River...has deteriorated through neglect."
In November 1950 CD&W released the funds and Jeffares and Green began a more
comprehensive survey. The High Commissioner and the Commonwealth Relations
Office were encouraged by the report, delivered to them in December 1950, and Baring
advised that ‘there is a very real possibility of the development of a big combined
scheme of water storage’.78 As in the preliminary assessment the report argued that
there was little silt from the upper mountain valleys:
The igneous Drakensberg beds and solid cave sandstone of the Highlands produce 
only a fraction of the silt that the lowlands produce from the very erodable purple 
red and blue shale and mudstone, red standstone and grits.79
Armed with this report the Commonwealth Relations Office felt much more
comfortable about Gordon Walker’s forthcoming meetings with Union officials during
his tour of southern African in early 1951. In his briefing before the trip the political
importance of the storage scheme as way of deflecting any criticism was made clear: 
With storage in the mountains of Basutoland the flow [of the Senqu/Orange river] 
would become even, the conditions for irrigation in the Union would improve and 
the edge would be taken off the comments on erosion in the Basutoland 
mountains.80
When Gordon Walker met with Strijdom in February 1951, as expected Strijdom 
‘complained of the extent of erosion in the Basutoland mountains and the quantity of 
silt in the waters of the Orange River’. In reply Gordon Walker mentioned the plans of 
the construction of a large dam on the Senqu/Orange.81 During the first half of 1951 
Baring discussed the details of the plans, mentioned by Gordon Walker, with Strijdom 
and Union officials.
The Commonwealth Relations Office, however, were wary of releasing too many 
details about the scheme. By keeping plans vague they probably hoped that they could 
avoid difficult questions, especially as there was a major problem that needed to be 
overcome if the calculations of profitability were going to make any sense at all. The 
only way that the dam could possibly make any return on the investment was by selling 
electricity or water for irrigation direct to South Africa. Without a South African 
commitment to buy the electricity the necessary funds could not be approved by the
77 LNA 335/1 and PRO DO35/4061, Application for a Grant from the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Fund of £2,500 for a survey of the Orange River in order to investigate its hydro-electric
and irrigation possibilities, 1 May 1950.
78 PRO DO 35/4061, Baring to Baxter, 2 December 1950.
79 PRO DO 35/4061, Report from Jeffares and Green, ‘Basutoland: Orange River Hydro-electric and
Irrigation Project’ 1 December 1950.
80 PRO DO35/4061, Note for discussion with Secretary of State, 1-2 January 1951.
81 PRO DO 35/4061, Baring to Baxter, 19 February 1951.
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Treasury. The High Commissioner’s office, therefore, remained deliberatley vague 
about details, but let it be generally known they were planning a major project
The Commonwealth Relations Office must have felt satisfied with their approach when 
the plans for the scheme were raised in the Union Parliament in March 1951. J.A. Cull, 
the MP for Port Elizabeth North, mentioned the British survey whilst supporting a 
motion to establish a commission to investigate the watershed areas of the 
Senqu/Orange river. He went on to report that ‘they are going to turn the upper portion 
of the Orange River into another Tennessee Valley’.82
Over the next few months the issue was raised in the Union parliament on a number of
occasions. In June 1951 Cull again mentioned the British survey in greatly exaggerated
terms. Baring’s assessment in May 1950 that the technical survey of the Senqu/Orange
river and the Colonial Survey Unit’s activities would be seen as part of the same
process seems to have been accurate:
We..know that the British Government sent out quite a large number of experts to 
survey the Basutoland area, the sources of the Orange River. I understand that 
there were 70 experts and that they spent the best part of a year there. They 
surveyed all the potentialities and possibilities of the Orange River in respect of 
irrigation, cultivation of land, conserving of water, and the production of 
electricity by hydro-electric means... I would like to know from the Hon.
Minister whether he or his Department has been approached to give advice or 
assistance, and if not, whether he or his department will take steps to find out 
what the plans of the British government are in regard to the scheme.83
In his reply to Cull, Strijdom simply lied, saying until the British government saw ‘fit to 
discuss the matter with us, it would not be right for us to discuss the matter’.84 C.R. 
Swart, the Minister of Justice, had similarly denied any discussions with the British 
over the issue in response to a question by K. Ueckermann in April 1951.85
In January of 1952 Bowker, Cull, Ueckermann, E.J.W. Henderson (Parktown) and 
G.F.H. Bekker (Craddock) all raised the issue of co-operation with Britain over the 
development of the Senqu/Orange river, while government ministers denied any
82 Cull, J.A., Union of South Africa, Debates o f the House o f Assembly, 4th Session, 10th Parliament, 
1951, p.2438, seconding a motion by Bowker, T.B. (p.2432).
83 Cull, J. A., Union of South Africa, Debates o f the House o f Assembly, 4th Session, 10th Parliament, 
1951, p.8606.
84 Stijdom, J.G., Union of South Africa, Debates o f the House o f  Assembly, 4th Session, 10th 
Parliament, 1951, p. 8629.
85 Ueckermann, K., Union of South Africa, Debates o f the House o f Assembly, 4th Session, 10th 
Parliament, 1951, p. 5609.
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discussion had taken place.86 Yet at one point Strijdom indicated that perhaps he knew
slightly more about the schemes than he was letting on:
If those dams in the upper reaches of the Orange river and various streams in 
Basutoland which he has in mind were to be constructed they would conserve 
only 750,000 morgen feet whereas the total average annual flow of the Orange 
River near Hopetown is 2,750,000 morgan feet.87
Reports had also appeared in the press that negotiations were taking place and that a 
deal could be struck. The Star, for example, reported in December 1951 that Strijdom 
had hinted they might do a deal with Britain over storage dams in Lesotho. Negotiations 
about the scheme were difficult, however, and in many ways neither side had much to 
gain from the development schemes. The British could not call on the large amounts of 
capital needed for the project and, as mentioned above, needed the South African 
market for irrigation water and electricity to get any return on their investment.
There were also obvious reasons why the South Africans would want to avoid going 
into major joint development projects with the British colonial authorities, not least 
because it would be a de facto recognition of their sovereignty over the territory.88 A 
private correspondent of Baring reported that Strydom had ‘given orders that his 
Department should treat [the plans for a hydro-electric scheme] as a highly secret 
document until he was prepared to deal with it’.89 By the middle of 1952 the scheme 
was more or less shelved.90
Nevertheless the survey and proposals had essentially fulfilled their function of 
deflecting criticism of the Basutoland authorities. The Commonwealth Relations Office 
were confident about the political implications of the soil conservation work carried out 
in Lesotho and could blame the lack of progress on the Senqu/Orange river scheme on 
the Union:
In the past there was..some validity in the arguement that development of the 
Territories resources was neglected. But this is no longer true today... In 
Basutoland we can claim to have arrested erosion and to have done conservation 
work that has been described as ‘the best in Africa’. It is only the unwillingness
86 Ueckermann, (22 January 1952, p. 24); Henderson, (25 January 1952, p.208); Bowker, (29 January 
1952, p.356); Cull, (29 January 1952, p. 362); Bekker, (1 February 1952, p.540) all in Union of 
South Africa, Debates of the House of Assembly, 5 th Session, 10th Parliament, 1952.
87 Strijdom, J.G., Union of South Africa, Debates o f the House o f  Assembly, 5th Session, 10th 
Parliament, 1952, p.371.
88 PRO DO35/4011, High Commisioner, Visit to UK, Note for Discussion with Secretary of State, 
Januray 1950.
89 Roland D[illegible] to Baring, 1 October 1951, Semi-Official Correspondence, 1944-1949, Evelyn 
Baring Papers, University of Durham.
90 PRO DO 35/4061.
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of the Union Government to co-operate that holds up progress with the Orange 
River Power Development Scheme.91
6.5. Changing preconceptions of African occupation of land
The Nationalist government’s criticism of the Basutoland government reflected the
belief that the mountains were only recently populated and that this was the root of the
problem. Most reports stated that the mountains were not populated prior to the settling
of Batloka people in the 1870s - the deliberate destruction of the San population by the
early British and Cape colonial governments was totally ignored. A number of
commentators, including both Pole Evans and Palmer, argued that the area was not
actually suited to any human habitation. Many of the complaints coming from South
Africa during the 1940s and early 1950s argued that soil erosion could not be prevented
without massive, or even total, depopulation of the mountain area. This fitted in with
more widespread calls for the removal of African population from watersheds
frequently made in South Africa during the late 1940s and early 1950s. In May 1951
S.P. LeRoux, Minister for Agriculture, for example, told Parliament:
One would like to see the Native population removed from the mountainous 
areas, from the catchment areas of rivers, to more flat country92
Yet during the mid-1950s these calls for the removal of the Basotho population from 
the mountain area declined and eventually disappeared. In order to understand why it is 
necessary to trace changing attitudes towards African occupation of land within the 
Union, and its relationship to an apartheid ideology, and how this influenced attitudes 
towards the three High Commission Territories.
The historiography of the genesis of apartheid has shifted significantly since the mid- 
1980s. The work of Deborah Posel, in particular, has shown that the Nationalists came 
to power in 1948 with no ‘grand plan’ for apartheid. Posel argues that there were 
essentially two distinct apartheid ideologies amongst Nationalists in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s; one she characterises as the ‘total segregation’ school and the other as the 
‘practical’ school.93
91 PRO D 035/ 4316, The Transfer Question; additional file note (anon.), 4 June 1953.
92 LeRoux, S.P. (Minister of Agriculture), Union o f South Africa, Debates o f the House o f Assembly, 
4th Session, 10th Parliament, 1952, p.7318. Similar statements in Parliament were also made by 
Abrahamson, Union of South Africa, Debates o f the House o f Assembly, 1st Session, 10th 
Parliament, 1948, p.1767, Mitchell, D.E., Union of South Africa, Debates o f the House o f  
Assembly, 1st Session, 10th Parliament, 1948, p.2108 and Hen wood, Union of South Africa, 
Debates of the House of Assembly, 2nd Session, 10th Parliament, 1949, p.6120.
93 Posel, D. The Making of Apartheid 1948-61: Conflict and Compromise (Oxford, 1991), pp. 49-60.
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South African white commercial farmers had always looked to those small areas of the 
Union reserved for African occupation with envy, not just because of the land resources 
but, more importantly, because they saw within them a rich source of labour. Labour 
shortages in the commercial agricultural sector were endemic during the first half of 
this century, but became even worse during the Second World War with the flight of 
many farm workers to the towns and cities to take advantage of the new opportunities 
presented by the rapid growth of secondary industry. This perennial problem for white 
farmers underscored their attitude to most political and economic issues: though the 
ability and techniques used to gain labour varied greatly over time and between well 
capitalised large scale commercial farmers (the ‘mealie kings’) and poorer white 
farmers.94 Generally larger farmers were able to fulfill their labour needs with state 
support and this meant that they were willing to accept the division of the African 
labour force into different economic sectors. This lay behind the support for policies to 
create a permanent urban labour force by the the South African Agricultural Union’s 
(SAAU), the main vehicle for commercial farming interests. Nevertheless all farmers, 
large or small, were opposed to any land segregation policies that had a negative effect 
on them in practice. For example, farmers in areas near existing reserves vehemently 
opposed the extension to the reserves under the 1936 Land Act and, at a local level, 
often managed to delay or even prevent the purchase of scheduled land under the Act’s 
provisions.
Posel argues that the SAAU was one of the prime forces behind the ‘practical’ 
conception of apartheid in the late 1940s.95 Their primary concern, and hence their 
conception of what apartheid meant, was finding a solution to their chronic labour 
shortage problems. Posel’s research concentrates on the allocation of labour between 
different sectors of the economy and hence her interest is in the SAAU’s attitude to 
influx control and not the organisations' attitude towards the reserves. Nevertheless it is 
clear that even in 1948 many commercial farmers wanted to see not just a suspension of 
the scheduled area policy but the breaking up of the whole reserve system.
While the ‘total segregation’ conception of apartheid is often identified in popular 
histories as a uniquely Afrikaner ideology almost all professional historians accept that 
the earliest segregationists were English-speaking liberals.96 These liberals were
94 Bradford, H. ‘Getting away With Murder: “Mealie Kings”, the State and Foreigners in the Eastern 
Transvaal, C.1918-1950’ in Bonner, P., Delius P. and Posel, D. (eds.) Apartheid's Genesis 1935- 
1962 (Braamfontein, 1993), pp. 96-125.
95 Posel, The Making o f Apartheid, p. 54.
96 Dubow, S. Racial segregation and the origins o f apartheid in South Africa, 1919-36 (Basingstoke, 
1989).
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concerned about the impact of African urbanisation and were anxious to find ways to 
keep African populations in the reserves. As we saw in chapter 2, by the early 1930s it 
was clear that conditions in the reserves were very poor and if their African population 
was to remain in these areas some sort of development policy was needed: the Native 
Affairs Department, therefore, began to implement Betterment policies designed to 
increase agricultural productivity.
The rapid rate of African urbanisation during the 1930s and more especially during the 
war years brought increased interest in the ‘native question’ amongst Afrikaner 
Nationalists. Accelerated rates of female migration, especially from Lesotho,97 into 
Johanesburg and other Rand towns added to white fears of a permanently settled urban 
population politically able to challenge white supremacy: the increasingly vocal African 
opposition during the war years inevitably fuelled these fears. A number of Afrikaner 
Nationalists (often described as the ‘visionaries’), especially within the South African 
Bureau of Racial Affairs (S ABRA), began to advocate an ideology of ‘total 
segregation’ as a solution to these concerns. The ‘visionaries’ believed that in order to 
protect white supremacy there had to be be the complete ‘separation of White and 
native into separate and self-sufficient socio-economic units’.98 Given the heavy 
dependence of capital on African labour the ‘visionaries’ recognised there would need 
to be a significant economic sacrifice to enact this programme. For white workers too 
there was an obvious attraction to ‘total segregation’ as it would remove cheap African 
competition for jobs.
When the Nationalists came to power in 1948 there were, therefore, two distinct views 
about African occupation of land within the Apartheid fold: a ‘practical’ view that 
would happily alienate any African land where it suited white economic or political 
interests, and a ‘visionary’ view that looked to increase the size of the reserves and 
economic opportunities within them as a step towards ‘total segregation’. These 
contradictory and competing views of Apartheid both had their own constituencies 
within the National Party: the ‘practical’ view was generally espoused by both farming 
and large capitalist interests and ‘visionary’ view by workers and intellectuals.
Calls for the de-population of the Lesotho mountains seem to fit clearly within the 
‘practical’ conception of Apartheid: the mountain population was causing siltation and 
problems for irrigated farming and should, therefore, be removed. In much of the
97 Bonner, “‘Desirable or Undesirable Sotho Women?”.
98 Eiselen, W.M. ‘The Meaning of Apartheid’, Race Relations, 15, 3,1948, p. 80, quoted by Posel,
The Meaning o f  Apartheid, p. 51.
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literature on the rise of Apartheid the interests of white farmers are seen to be 
paramount. Dan O’Meara, in particular, sees agricultural capital as being the driving 
force, arguing that ‘apartheid sought primarily to secure a stable labour supply for 
agriculture’.99 While Posel lays more emphasis on conflicting conceptions of what 
apartheid meant to farmers, industrialists, workers or intellectuals she agrees that 
addressing the needs of white commercial agriculture was central to the design of 
apartheid.100
Strijdom, who represented a farming constituency and was a long term advocate of 
irrigation farming,101 was the most vehement critic of British policy towards the 
environment in the three High Commission Territories. Baring records that during a 
meeting in March 1951 to discuss the proposals for the Senqu/Orange river dam 
Strijdom:
made it clear that his own belief is that in order to save the waters of the most 
important river in southern Africa it will one day be necessary to remove Natives 
not only from the mountains of Basutoland but also apparently from the lowlands. 
When pressed by me he admitted that much could be done to reduce soil erosion 
but he did not believe that it could be eliminated as long as there was a large 
Native population in Basutoland. I have often felt that this was the view of the 
Nationalist leaders.102
There were, however, Nationalist MPs who were arguing for the opposite; ie. that
Lesotho should support a greater population. Despite the ‘practical’/ ’visionary’
dichotomy outlined above one of these MPs was a representative of farming interests:
J.N. le Roux the MP for Ladybrand and the Chairman of the Orange Free State
Agricultural Union. In a speech in Parliament in 1946 Le Roux complained about
British policy in Lesotho:
I also want to make an appeal to the Minister to get in touch with the Imperial 
Government in regard to the Protectorates. We have nothing to do with them 
today, but indirectly we have. I mention Basutoland here and I must say that the 
soil erosion in that Protectorate is a disgrace. It makes your heart sore when you 
see in Basutoland how the fine rich soil is being washed away and how it is 
ignored. Indirectly we shall pay for that, because the natives will be squeezed 
out, owing to not being able to make a living on the lands, and they will come to 
the Union in the near future, we shall again have to provide them with land and a 
place to settle. Therefore I would appeal to the Minister that as we have now 
become erosion conscious the Protectorates must fall into line and recover their 
land as well so that they can carry a greater population than is the case at 
present.103
99 O’Meara, D. Volkskapiyalisme: Class Capital and ideology in the development o f Afrikaner 
nationalism, 1934-1948 (Cambridge, 1983), p.177.
100 Posel, The Making o f Apartheid, p.7.
101 His maiden speech in Parliament (29th July 1929) was about the need for a coordinated national 
irrigation scheme.
102 PRO DO35/4061, Baring to Baxter, 16 March 1951.
103 LeRoux, J.N., Union of South Africa, Debates o f the House o f Assembly, 3rd Session, 9th
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Nevertheless in the late 1940s and early 1950s the majority opinion within the National 
Party was that the mountain areas of Lesotho should be de-populated. This was 
certainly the assessment made by the Chief Secretary to the High Commissioners Office 
in February 1952 when he reported that the general ‘opinion in the Union holds that 
these mountains... should be evacuated’.10*
Over the next few years there was a major shift in attitude on the issue of African 
occupation of Lesotho, mirroring the development of a more concise conception of 
apartheid within the National Party. H.F. Verwoerd, the Party’s chief spokesman on 
‘Native affairs’ and the leading policy maker, played a key role in the development of 
this strategy in the early years of apartheid. In 1948 Verwoerd was closely aligned with 
the SABRA ‘visionaries’ and through-out his career he continued to use their language 
and call for ‘total segregation’ as an ultimate ideal. He was, however, always careful to 
allay the fears of industrialists and farmers reliant upon African labour.105
Verwoerd’s way around these contradictory ideologies was to state that they were being 
practical in the short term but were moving in the long-term situation where ‘total 
segregation’. The ideology was internally contradictory as the ‘practical’ policies 
would take the country along a different route from that leading to the purported ideal 
of ‘total segregation.’106 Nevertheless Verwoerd’s ideology of apartheid was more than 
just ‘practical’ apartheid dressed up in ‘visionary’ language. Significantly for the 
debate here Verwoerd accepted the ‘visionary’ calls for the reserves to be developed 
economically (though he wanted to also use white capital) but he rejected calls for their 
territorial expansion.
The Tomlinson report107 originally commissioned in 1950 but not finally published 
until 1956 was a key area of contest between Verwoerd and the ‘visionaries'.108 
Verwoerd announced that he accepted the report in principal though there were some 
details with which he disagreed. In practice few of the recommendation were ever 
enacted. Nevertheless the Tomlinson Report is relevant in respect to the issue because 
of what it said about the High Commission Territories.
Parliament, 1946, Vol. 56, p.8330.
104 PRO DO35/4014, Notes on visit by Turnbull to Basutoland, February 1952.
105 Lazar, J. ‘“Verwoed versus the “Visionaries”: The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs and 
Apartheid, 1948-1961’ in Bonner, Delius and Posel, Apartheid’s Genesis, pp. 362-392, p.371.
106 Posel, The Making o f Apartheid, (chapter 3).
107 Tomlinson, F.R. Summary o f the Report o f the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of 
the Bantu areas within the Union o f South Africa, (Pretoria, 1955), p.181.
108 Lazar, ‘Verwoed versus the “Visionaries’” .
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This report envisaged that Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland would form three of the 
‘cultural-historical cores’ of South Africa’s African population. The incorporation of 
the three High Commission Territories was seen as essential to the success of the policy 
of ‘total separation’. And by including their land areas in the calculations, the division 
of land between the African and European populations south of the Limpopo looked 
much more even, jumping from 13 percent to 47 percent .109
Obviously if the ‘visionaries’ had had their way the population of Lesotho would have 
increased and, therefore, allegations of overcrowding in Lesotho would be 
incompatable. Verwoerd’s rejection of Tomlinson’s calls for the establishment of 
freehold tenure are also relevant in this respect. He stressed the importance of 
maintaining ‘traditional’ African communal land tenure - the very practice that was 
(and is still) so often blamed for causing poor farming techniques and overgrazing.
South Africa remained keen to get its hands on Lesotho in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, but now in order to fully incorporate it into the ‘total’ apartheid system. When 
Strijdom visited London in 1956 he expressed very different views to those reported by 
Baring in 1951. Rather than calling for the removal of the African population from 
Lesotho he complained that the British policy of allowing white settlement in the three 
High Commission Territories did ‘ not fit into the Union pattern’.110
While pressure for transfer of the High Commission Territories did not stop in 1954, 
complaints about soil erosion in official correspondence between London and Pretoria 
did suddenly disappear. The erosion and siltation issue is not mentioned once in lengthy 
correspondence between 1955 and 1960 over the feasibility of another reservoir scheme 
in the upper reaches of the Senqu/Orange river.111 Similarly, press reports about 
proposed schemes on the South African stretches of the Orange river no longer pointed 
the finger of blame for the high silt content of the river at either the Basotho or the
109 Tomlinson Summary o f the Report o f the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development o f the 
Bantu areas, p. 183. This figure was based on a calculation including all o f Swaziland, not just the 
‘native areas’.
110 PRO D035/4329, Note of conversation between Strijdom, Prime Minister of the Union of South 
Africa, and Louw, Minister of Finance and External Affairs, and Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister 
of the United Kingdom, and the Earl of Home, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, at 
10 Downing Street on 19th June 1956. The Natal Agricultural Union (NAU) continued to call for 
the ‘depopulation’ of watershed areas in the province into the 1960s, arguing that African 
agriculural practices were ruining the some of the most fertiles areas. These complaints were 
clearly linked to NAU opposition to plans to consolidate the ‘homelands’, see Naunlu, July 1967, 
quoted in Greenberg, S. Race and State in Capitalist Development (New York, 1980), pl03.
111 D035/7256, Regional water supplies in Basutoland: Ox-Bow Lake Scheme.
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British.112 With South African pressure off the need for anti-erosion policies in the 
mountains of Lesotho was no longer had of political importance and the 
Commonwealth Relation Office’s interest in the issue quickly waned. The soil erosion 
specialists in the Basutoland administration obviously continued to take an interest, but 
their mission was no longer seen as politically vital
112 See, for example, cuttings from the Diamond Field Advertiser, 16 October 1957 to 18 May 1965, in 
KAB 3/KIM-4/1/183-039.
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7. The politics of land and rural development in colonial Lesotho
7.1. Introduction
Land has been, and still is, an intensely political issue in Lesotho. The loss of the
‘occupied territories’ to the Free State was a near fatal economic and political blow to
the Basotho state in the nineteenth century, and it is an issue that still has political
resonance in Lesotho today.1 During the Gun War (1880-82) land was a pre-eminent
issue; Basotho opposition to disarmament was often couched in terms of losing their
ability to defend their territory. The war was also spurred on by Gordon Spriggs’s
proclamation that his Cape Government were going to divide up Quthing district in the
south of Lesotho and sell it off as reparations for Cape expenditure in putting down the
Moorosi Rebellion. As Sandra Burman has noted:
The Sotho naturally regarded the Quthing confiscation as further evidence that the 
Cape Government desired to gobble up Sotho land for white men’s farms.2
The political sensitivity of land meant that rural development projects, which usually 
alter the way in which land is used, were always potentially highly political affairs.
In this chapter I will explore the politics surrounding colonial rural development 
projects and rights to control land use in general and the closure policy proposed in 
1947 in particular. One of the central arguments will be that the British colonial state 
was both unwilling and unable to radically reform land tenure arrangements, despite 
the fact that they believed the tenure system was a major cause of the country’s 
economic decline.3 The chapter will also suggest that the relationship between the 
colonial state and Basotho chiefs can not be adequately explained as either 
collaboration or resistance and needs to take into account more complex and dynamic 
political interactions. Underlying much of the chapter is a comparison with similar 
environment and development projects in the South African and Southern Rhodesian 
reserves.
1 Perry, J.A.G. ‘Land Power and the Lie’, Man, 16, 2,1981, pp. 235-250; Perry, J.A.G. ‘Land and 
Politics in Lesotho’, African Studies, 42 ,1 ,1983 , pp. 57-66; Parsons, N. and Palmer, R. 
‘Introduction: Historical Background’ in Palmer and Parsons, The Roots o f Rural Poverty in 
Central and Southern Africa, pp. 1-32, p.21.
2 Burman, S. Chiefdom Politics and Alien Law: Basutoland Under Cape Rule 1871-1884 (New 
York, 1981), p. 135.
3 Chakela, Review and bibliography, p.8.
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7.2. A ‘labour reserve’ with a difference
I started the previous chapter by criticising some literature on Lesotho for ignoring the 
country’s geopolitical reality; i.e. it is surrounded by South Africa. Rather perversely I 
start this chapter by suggesting that there is a danger that academics interested in the 
agrarian history of Lesotho may be blinded by South African historiography.
A flick through the bibliographies of most articles or monographs about Lesotho’s 
economic history will reveal many of the names familiar to South African historians: 
Legassick, Wolpe and Bundy followed by Keegan, Bradford and Beinart4 This is 
hardly surprising given the continued pertinence of the ‘labour reserve’ hypothesis, 
most cogently argued by Murray.5 Clearly any understanding of Lesotho’s economy 
has to be based on its structural position within the wider southern African economy 
and, as Murray mentions and Maloka has demonstrated,6 British policy was largely, or 
even primarily, determined by the urge to produce cheap labour for South African 
mines and farms. This does not mean, however, that Lesotho was ‘just another 
reserve’. Some of the differences between Lesotho and the South African reserves are 
clearly evident in the area of rural development policy.
While the Basutoland administration was influenced by many of the same ideas about 
the African environment, and Africans in their environment, that underlay livestock 
management and pasture reclamation policies elsewhere in southern and eastern Africa 
(see chapters 3 and 4) the projects actually attempted in Lesotho were very different to 
those in South Africa or Southern Rhodesia. The two major factors which inspired 
widespread resistance to livestock development policies in South Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia, namely fencing and forcible culling, were never attempted in Lesotho. 
Furthermore the major scheme in Lesotho, the massive grazing closure policy in 
Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek, was never closely administered by the colonial state, 
implementation being left up to the local chiefly authorities. The key to understanding 
these differences is in the very different nature of the state; the most crucial differences 
were in the field of public finances and in the political structure of the respective 
administrations.
4 See for example Franklin, Land Law in Lesotho.
5 Murray, ‘From granary to labour reserve’.
6 Maloka, ‘Basotho and the Mines’.
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7.2.1. Administration on a shoestring
The underlying rule of British administration of Lesotho was that expenditure should 
never exceed revenue. The government tended to produce an annual surplus that over 
the years built up to a fairly significant figure: in 1940 the Basutoland National Council, 
under the influence of Paramount Chief Seeiso, voted to grant £100,000 out of a 
£223,000 surplus to the British Government to help with ‘the War effort’.7 This figure 
was substantial compared with a total annual revenue in 1939/40 of only £421,035.8 
During the late 1940s and early 1950s the Basutoland government ran a small annual 
budget deficiet, though this more than covered by its healthy reserves (in March 1956 
the accumulated balance stood at £523,415).9
Figure 7.1 Surplus or deficit of revenue as percent of expenditure 
(1942/3- 1956/7).10
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7 Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f  the 35th Session , 19 October 1940, quoted by
Machobane, Government and Change in Lesotho, p. 195.
8 D 025/15, Basutoland Blue Book, 1940.
9 United Kingdom, Colonial Annual Report: Basutoland 1956 (London, 1957).
10 Calculated from United Kingdom, Colonial Annual Reports.
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This financial consideration meant that the Basutoland authorities were extremely 
constrained in their ability to intervene directly in the development of the colonial 
economy. This situation was alleviated, to an extent, after 1929 with the advent of the 
Colonial Development Fund and later loans and grants available under the 1939 and 
1945 Colonial Development and Welfare Acts.11 Although in 1969 Sandra Wallman 
placed a particular emphasis on the shortcomings of the Colonial Development and 
Welfare (CD&W) Scheme for the failures of the Taung Reclamation Scheme and the 
‘Farmech’ Mechanisation Scheme,12 the significance of CD&W has yet to be explored 
in the more recent literature on the history of rural development in Lesotho. Kate 
Showers mentions that funding for the massive lowland anti-erosion works came from 
the Colonial Development Fund but does not consider the implications of this form of 
funding for the way in which the project was managed.13
Given their peculiar administrative position any development scheme from the three
High Commission Territories had to be pushed extremely hard to gain wider attention
in Whitehall. Wallman noted that in order to attract funding:
A scheme must be drawn up in such a way that it will catch the eye of an 
extensive hierarchy of office-bound administrators and technicians. One is 
tempted, therefore, to exaggerate its importance and its likely effect - even [to] 
put up an unnecessarily large scheme so that London will consider it worthy of 
outside funds.14
In the immediate post-War era the new Labour administration attempted to introduce 
state-led development of large-scale capital projects with the aim of increasing African 
productive capacity.15 The system allocating CD&W funds meant that small countries 
such as the three High Commission Territories were only likely to get funding for one 
or two large-scale schemes. In Swaziland CD&W funding went mainly to road 
building and forestry, in the Bechuanaland Protectorate it went to the cattle industry and 
in Lesotho to the anti-erosion scheme begun in the lowlands in the late 1930s.16
11 Swaziland received some funding in the form of grants-in-aid in the two years prior to the 
establishment of the Colonial Development Fund and received the most generous funding out of the 
three Territories during the 1930s. Lesotho and the Bechuanaland Protectorate did not receive any 
funds from the Colonial Development Fund until after 1934, Spence, ‘British Policy Towards the 
High Commission Territories’, p. 233.
12 Wallman, Take Out Hunger, p. 165-170.
13 Showers, ‘Soil Erosion in the Kingdom of Lesotho’.
14 Wallman, Take Out Hunger, p. 168.
15 Cowen and Shenton, Doctrines o f  Development, p.296-297.
16 Baring, ‘Economic Development under the High Commission’. See also Samatar, A.I. and 
Oldfield, S. ‘Class and Effective State Institutions: the Botswana Meat Commission’, Journal of  
Modem African Studies, 33 ,4 ,1995, pp. 651-668. Baring commented that ‘the British Treasury 
always give a grant in aid with absolute... maximum of control and minimum of money’, Transcript 
of recording of a discussion between Lord Howick [Evelyn Baring] and Dame Margery Perhman
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The anti-erosion scheme was attributed huge significance by both the High 
Commissioner’s office and the Secretariat in Maseru. Some people within the 
administration feared that the anti-erosion scheme was actually being over 
emphasised17 and in 1946 the Basutoland administration almost over-played its hand in 
trying to secure renewed funds. Nevertheless it was this scheme that received the bulk 
of external funding: for the 1946/7 financial year the anti-erosion scheme was allocated 
£32,00018 out of a total of £36,165 expenditure on all CD&W schemes in the country.19 
Between 1947 and 1957 CD&W Funds contributed on average just under seven percent 
of the total national revenue (see Figure 7.2). These funds take on a greater 
significance when considered in the light of the need to always balance the annual 
budget (see Figure 7.1).
With CD&W funds being allocated to the lowland anti-erosion project and with very 
few other sources of possible revenue any scheme designed to prevent degradation of 
the mountain pastures had to be extremely cheap. This necessity of having a cheap 
scheme goes a long way towards explaining the differences between pasture 
regeneration projects in Lesotho and similar projects in South Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia.
It is not easy to directly compare the levels of expenditure in the South African reserves 
with expenditure in the High Commission Territories. Though many figures were 
banded about, most of these were unreliable.20 In 1954 the High Commissioner’s 
Office in Pretoria attempted to calculate figures to compare expenditure in South Africa 
and the Territories. They did not get very far in the exercise and eventually gave-up, 
concluding ‘whatever analysis was produced could not alter the basic fact that the 
Union do spend much more per head on Africans than we do’.21 This assessment 
would appear to be bom out by the figures that are available. According to Verwoerd 
the Union government spent £5,000,000 on ‘reclamation work’ during the period 1945- 
53 (this included things such as the construction of contour banks, grass strips, fencing,
which took place in Oxford on 19 November 1969, Rhodes House, MssAfr.s. 1574, p. 57.
17 In February 1952 the Chief Secretary to the High Commissioners Office noted that the Basutoland
Department of Agriculture as not ‘adverse to taking departmental advantage of the importance of its 
task’, PRO DO35/4014, Notes on the visit of the Chief Secretary to the High Commissioners Office 
to Basutoland, February 1952.
18 PRO D 035/1187/Y1136/23, Application for Colonial Development and Welfare Funds, Telegram 
from Dominion Office to High Commissioner, 25 October 1946. The total grant was for £282,000 
over a ten year period.
19 United Kingdom, Colonial Annual Report: Basutoland 1947 (London, 1947), p.19.
20 Robert Macintosh, pers.cors. 18 July 1997.
21 PRO D035/4538, Liesching to Le Rougetel, 10 August 1954.
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irrigation and sinking boreholes).22 The Basutoland administration’s expenditure on 
‘conservation work’ (mainly spent on building contour banks, dams and grass strips) 
amounted to just £404,000 between 1946 and 1954.23 Even in per capita terms the 
expenditure by the Union government was at least double that of the Basutoland 
administration.24
Figure 7.2 Sources of revenue for the Basutoland administration between 
1946/7 to 1956/7.
Colonial Development 
and W elfare Fund
I Other Revenue
Custom s & Excise
Wool and Mohair 
Export Duty
Income
Tax
This different level of expenditure goes a long way to explaining the difference in 
implementation of conservation/development policies between the South African
22 Robert Macintosh, pers.cors. 18 July 1997, quoting Verwoerd, Debates o f  the House o f  Assembly, 
p. 3514-3515, September 1953.
23 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1954, p. 20.
24 Hie 1956 population census reported a de facto  population o f 641,674 in Lesotho compared to an 
official 1954 population of 3,307,234 in the ‘Bantu Areas’ o f South Africa; Union of South Africa, 
Native Affairs Department Report o f  the Department o f Native Afairs fo r  the Years 1954-54, (UG 
53/1956), pp. 9-10.
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reserves and Lesotho. A full explanation, however, also needs to take into account its 
very different administrative and political structure.
7.2.2. Chiefly authority and colonial rule in Lesotho.
During the late 19th century the settler states of southern Africa attempted to confine 
and diminish the powers exercised by African chiefs over their followers. In the 
Transkei, for example, an administration was established based around district 
magistrates and village headmen which undermined the power of middle-and-upper 
ranking chiefs.25 During the short-lived Cape administration of Lesotho there were 
similar policies to reduce the independent power of African leaders, but for at least 
seventy years after the Gun War the British followed a policy of maintaining the 
existing powers of the chiefs: in the words of one Basutoland official ‘the 
administration is concerned in upholding the existing hierarchy’.26
This did not mean, however, that the Basutoland colonial authorities did not intervene 
in the country’s administrative system. The core pre-colonial institution linking chiefs 
with commoners, the pitso. was transformed into a simply ceremonial institution and in 
1903 a new National Council, where the chiefs and their closest advisors could discuss 
the domestic affairs of the territory, was established in its place. This and other changes 
tended to dilute pre-existing checks on the power of chiefs by commoners.27
The Basutoland administration also intervened in conflicts between different leading 
chiefs. They were keen to have a simple unitary chiefly structure under the leadership 
of the most powerful Koena clan (to which Moshoeshoe had belonged), as they felt it 
would be easier to work with than numerous semi-autonomous clans as had existed in 
the pre-colonial era.28
Nevertheless L.B.B.J. Machobane has argued that the Basutoland administration
basically followed a policy of non-interference prior to the late 1920s. He quotes from,
and agrees with, a statement made by the Pirn Commission in 1935:
The Protectorate policy followed with reference to ... [Lesotho] has little in 
common with indirect rule. It has been a policy of non-interference, of proffering
25 Beinart and Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa, p. 79.
26 LNA S3/22/2/1, Clifford to Stuirock, 8 October quoted by Edgar, Prophets with Honour.
27 Maloka, ‘“All Chiefs are Shepherds”; Gill, S. J. A Short History o f Lesotho (Morija, 1993); 
Weisfelder, The Basotho Monarchy.
28 Hamnett, I. Chieftainship and Legitimacy: An Anthropological Study o f Executive Law in Lesotho, 
(London, 1975), p.35. See Machobane, Government and Change in Lesotho for a detailed 
discussion of the political and constitutional manoeuvrings in this period.
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alliance, of leaving two parallel Governments to work in a state of detachment 
unknown in tropical Africa.29
Machobane argues that the key to understanding this non-interference was the
administrative inertia caused primarily by the confusion over the exact constitutional
position of the territory. It was not until the colonial government came under increasing
pressure during the 1920s from two commoners’ political organisations (Lekhotla la
Bafo and the Basutoland Progressive Association) that they began to consider
introducing reforms to the system of administration.
Some authors, such as Tishidiso Maloka, Judy Kimble and Gabriele Winai-Strom have 
downplayed the ‘parallel’ nature of the late 19th and early 20th century administration 
and labelled the territory as being administered by a system of ‘indirect rule’.30 
Whatever the exact nature of the early colonial state it is clear that the main thrust of 
British policy from the mid-1920s through to the mid-1940s was the establishment of 
an administration akin to the other African ‘indirect rule’ colonies, with Uganda 
providing a particularly important model.31 This shift from locally determined ‘laissez 
faire’ indirect rule to a more formalised Imperial notion of indirect rule was similar to 
the process many British African colonies underwent in the early decades of the 
twentieth century.32 The main difference in Lesotho was that this shift did not occur 
until the late 1930s to early 1940s.33
The process of reforming the system was long and complex, and the chiefs were able to 
resist the introduction of reforms they felt would challenge their authority. Under
29 Pim, Financial and Economic Position o f Basutoland, p.49, quoted by Machobane, The Political 
Dilemma of Chieftaincy . Hugh Ashton attributed a very similar phrase to Margery Perhman though 
he does not reference the quote: Ashton, E. H. ‘Political Organisation of the Southern Sotho’, 
Bantu Studies, 12,1938, pp.287 - 320, p. 290.
30 Maloka, “All Chiefs are Shepherds”; Kimble, ‘Clinging to the Chiefs’ and Winai-Strom, G. 
Migration and Development, Dependence on South Africa: a study o f Lesotho (Uppsala, 1978).
31 J.C Sturrock, the first Resident Commissioner to try to introduce fundamental reforms in the 
territory’s administration, had previously been posted to Uganda, where he had overseen the 
codification of customary law as the Uganda Native Administration and Court Regulations, 
Machobane, Government and Change, p. 178.
32 Berry, S. ‘Hegemony on a shoestring’. To make a distinction between an earlier ‘laissez faire’ 
system of indirect rule and the reformed system of administration I have capitalised the term 
indirect rule in the remainder of this chapter when referring to the post-1938 period to indicate its 
affinity to the wider model of administration.
33 The desire for reform, however, existed much earlier, at least amongst some Basutoland civil 
servants. Sturrock tried to introduce reforms in the late 1920s but his plans were scuppered by 
effective opposition from members of the Basutoland National Council, largely orchestrated by the 
leading light of Lekhotla la Bafo, Josiel Lefela (see Machobane, Government and Change, p. 177- 
182). Whilst Lekhotla la Bafo were severe critics of chiefly abuse of power they were strong 
supporters of the institution of chieftainship and resisted British reforms which they felt would 
weaken the institution, see Edgar Prophets with Honour.
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Proclamation 2B of 1884 the High Commissioner was empowered ‘to make such laws 
as may appear to be necessary for the peace, order and good government’of the 
territory.34 In reality the Basutoland administration rarely used these legislative powers 
to determine domestic policies. Though the Basutoland National Council was 
established merely as a consultative body the British administration tended not to 
legislate unless the Basutoland National Council agreed.
In 1929, when Sturrock first proposed reforms to the system of administration and the 
judicial function of chiefs, he simply dropped his plans when it became clear the 
Basutoland National Council would resist the policy.35 When the National Council did 
eventually agree to reforms, in 1938 and 1944, the quid pro quo was essentially that the 
major chiefs would maintain their authority, and be paid handsome salaries from state 
coffers, at the expense of the more junior chiefs and headmen.36
The Basutoland administration’s hopes of running the territory’s administration via a 
streamlined and efficient system of Indirect Rule proved to be short-lived, however. 
Internal squabbles amongst the major chiefs, and dissatisfaction on the part of more 
junior chiefs, resulted in a spate of widely publicised murders37 and the changing 
imperial mood led the colonial authorities to re-consider the role of the chiefs in the 
administration. As early as 1949 the Chief Secretary to the High Commissioner 
reported that:
I am far from happy about the picture which Basutoland presents today. It is very 
easy to criticise but we are now reaping the harvest of a long period during which 
we have bolstered up over much what is at best an obsolete feudalism and at 
worst a tyrannical dictatorship. I know that the administration officers in 
Basutoland argue that the tribal system there is extremely democratic; everyone 
has a say in tribal gatherings. But I do not put much faith in such protestations... 
The ‘Chiefery” has proved itself pretty rotten at the core and no longer worthy of 
blind support.38
34 Section 4 of Proclamation 2B of 1884.
35 The basic argument used against the reforms in the National Council was that the Resident
Commissioner did not have the power to introduce legislation under 1884 Proclamation, as the 
Proclamation dated from the era of direct Cape administration. This was not actually the case but 
Sturrock did not feel confident enough in his grasp of the territory’s constitutional history to argue 
against the point, see Machobane, Government and Change, p. 177-182.
36 Machobane, Government and Change, p. 221.
37 Jones, G.I. Basutoland Medicine Murder: a report on the recent outbreak o f  ‘liretlo’ murders in
Basutoland (Cmd. 8209, London, 1951); Eldredge, E.A. ‘Medicine murder and power, the 
consolidation of colonial control in British Basutoland in the 1940s’, (unpublished paper presented 
to The South African Historical Society, 16th Biennial Conference, University of Pretoria, 6 July 
1997); Murray, C. and Sanders, P. have work in progress on the Bereng and Gabashane case.
38 PRO DOl 19/1376, Ritual Murders and Witchcraft: Basutoland Memorandum on The Native 
Administration of Basutoland with particular reference to Ritual Murder, by W.A.W. Clarke (Chief 
Secretary, High Commissioners Office), 25 January 1949.
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The colonial authorities also began to come under increasing pressure from within 
Lesotho to institute a process of de-colonisation and establish a democratic political 
system. During the first half of the 1950s the National Council, still dominated by the 
chiefly elite but with a growing commoner representation, made increasingly vocal 
demands that it be given legislative powers. After 1952 these demands were given 
increased militancy by the establishment of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) and 
eventually led to the establishment of a Legislative Council in 1960.
7.3. Rural development projects before the Indirect Rule reforms
As we saw in chapters 3 and 4 fears about land degradation and its impact on 
Lesotho’s struggling agricultural economy increased rapidly during the early 1930s. 
These fears were not, however, turned into policy until after the middle of the decade. 
This was largely because of the perceived inability to intervene in the rural economy 
until the system of administration had been reformed and external funding was made 
available. Whatever the desires of the colonial officials to intervene they were 
essentially hamstrung until they could move some way towards overcoming these two 
constraints.
In the wake of Russell Thornton’s 1931 report on grazing in the mountains, F.A.
Vemey, the Principal Veterinary Officer, made a number of suggestions for livestock
development policies and other environmental protection measures. He placed
particular blamed for the situation on the system of administration:
The greatest weakness at the moment is the calibre of our Chiefs. It is to be 
regretted that so few of our Chiefs take any real interest in the ‘general 
agricultural’ welfare of the people.39
His report was not well received by Sturrock who had been forced to abandon his own 
attempt at reforming the system of chiefly rule in 1929. Beside Vemey’s comment 
that he agreed with Thornton’s recommendation that people be stopped ploughing up 
grazing land and that he had ‘advocated this sometime ago’, Sturrock wrote:
39 LNA 212, Vemey to Foord, 28 September 1931. Vemey also complained that: ‘most of our 
important chiefs today are far too sedentary; few ride a horse or go amongst their people and see 
what is really taking place, and the majority o f them do all their travelling in a luxurious motor car 
and I am perfectly certain, at their stage of evolution, the Almighty never intended this’. Beside 
this Sturrock commented ‘I fear that this is also a characteristic of many European administrators’. 
Intriguingly a similar complaint about chiefs driving around in cars had been made by Keable 
‘Mote, the Provincial Secretary of the Orange Free State Branch of the ICU (the ‘Lion of the Free 
State’) only a few months previously (though obviously without the racist social Darwinism): ‘The 
chiefs tour around in big motor cars and have no association with the peasants’. ‘Mote, K. ‘The 
awakening of Basutoland’, Ikwezi le Afrika, 18 April 1931, in Edgar, Prophets with Honour, p.168.
167
CHAPTER SEVEN: POLITICS OF LAND
We have all advocated it, but how to establish control. We have never really 
annexed this country and the relations between us and the Native Government are 
hopelessly undefined.40
A letter from Vemey suggested that the Paramount Chief should be ‘ordered to
institute the old method of the ploughing board, which in our experience does not
exist today’: beside the suggestion Sturrock simply wrote ‘By whom!’.41
In subsequent correspondence with the Sir H.J. Stanley, the High Commissioner,
Sturrock made it clear why he believed the Basutoland administration could do little in
the way of rural development:
I would ... stress the fact, so often stressed before, that all improvements of 
present agricultural practices, in as far as it is based upon accepted European 
principles, does in fact tend to undermine the traditional system of land tenure and 
on that account is apt to meet with suspicion and opposition from the Paramount 
Chief and his Chiefs.
He went on to say that any change in land tenure would represent a ‘social revolution’ 
and that the introduction of individual land tenure ‘could only be effected after a change 
in the relative position of Chiefs and people’.42
Sturrock also pointed out that the administration’s efforts to improve the productivity of 
the livestock sector benefited only the wealthiest members of the population who 
owned large herds of sheep and goats. Whilst Lekhotla la Bafo complained vigorously 
about the dipping campaign, opposition within the National Council tended to be 
muted.43 Owners of larger flocks may have been more willing to put up with the loss of 
some livestock in exchange for better returns on wool or mohair, especially if they were 
benefiting from the highly subsidised sale of high quality rams. The chiefs were not, 
however, willing to contemplate any moves to reduce the livestock population; in 1925 
the Council had discussed a recommendation from Vemey to reduce the livestock 
population, but every speaker was opposed to the plan and nothing came of it.
The National Council were much more supportive of a plan to introduce a national soil 
conservation scheme. When this was discussed in the 1932 session many chiefs 
expressed support for the idea. Some went so far as to suggest that commoners should 
provide free labour, presumably under the system of matsema labour.44 Chiefly abuse
40 LNA 212, margin note [by Sturrock] on Vemey to Foord, 28 September 1931.
41 LNA 212, Vemey and Wacher to Foord, 23 November 1931 and margin note [by Sturrock].
42 LNA 212, Sturrock to Stanley, 4  December 1931.
43 In the 1927 two prominant chiefs, Makhaola and Sekonyana, both requested that more dip tanks be
built in the mountain areas, Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f the 22nd Session, 1927,
pp.21-22.
44 Pirn, Financial and Economic Position o f Basutoland, p. 139.
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of matsema labour was, however, the issue over which Lekhotla la Bafo was most 
consistently vocal45 and the colonial authorities appeared to be more sensitive of the 
political ramifications of expanding the use of matsema labour for public works than 
some of the chiefs.46 Without the necessary funds, or a clear locus for intervention, the 
colonial authorities were unable to take forward the national anti-erosion project.
Nevertheless the colonial authorities kept the idea in mind and when the Pirn 
Commission arrived in the territory it was one of the things that the Department of 
Agriculture particularly stressed in their submission.47 Though the publication of the 
Pirn Commission report is often seen as a pivotal point in the history of Lesotho its real 
significance was simply that it gave what Machobane calls ‘moral support’48 to pre­
existing concerns amongst the Basutoland administration and led directly to the opening 
of Whitehall coffers. The section of the report on soil erosion was based largely on the 
submission from Thornton49 and the Commission was convinced of the necessity and 
feasibility of a national soil conservation plan after visiting the scheme initiated by 
Thornton in Herschel.50 Thornton’s detailed estimates for a similar programme were 
included as a annex to the report and these formed the basis of the funding subsequently 
granted from the Colonial Development Fund.
45 Edgar Prophets with Honour p. 10.
46 Rugege argues that the colonial state used matsema labour to ‘extract surplus labour from the 
peasants for all kinds of public works such as building court houses, roads, bridges etc.’ Rugege, S. 
‘Chieftainship and society in Lesotho’, p.24. He does not cite any evidence to support this 
contention and I believe it may be somewhat of an exaggeration. Sheddick (to whom Rugege refers 
later in the thesis when discussing matsema labour, p. 338) states that matsema labour was used in 
the construction of ‘native courts’, pulling up burr-weed from pastures and the construction of 
dams, Sheddick, Land Tenure, p. 151. The abuse of matsema labour by chiefs was a major 
complaint from Lekhotla la Bafo and they would have raised an out-cry if the colonial authorities 
made heavy demands on this form of labour. In 1943 they did complain to the Paramount Chief 
about matsema labour being used to plant trees in dongas on behalf of the government, Rabase 
Sekike to Chieftainess ‘Mantsebo Seeiso, 30 May 1943, MA 1/33.1937-1946 in Edgar, Prophets 
with Honour, p.137-140, but on the whole the complaints tended to be directed against the senior 
chiefs. Furthermore concerns about fulfilling the labour demands of South African mines and 
farms would have discouraged the Basutoland authorities from extracting large amounts of labour 
within the territory.
47 PRO DO 119/1051, Commission of Inquiry: Financial and Economic Mission to Basutoland, 
Department of Agriculture, Answer to Questionnaire sent by Sir Alan Pim in preparation for 
Commission, 31 August 1934.
48 Machobane, Government and Change, p. 187.
49 PRO DO 119/1051, Commission of Inquiry: Financial and Economic Mission to Basutoland, Dept, 
of Agriculture, Answer to Questionnaire sent by Sir Alan Pim in preparation for Commission, 31 
August 1934.
50 Pim, Financial and Economic Position o f Basutoland, pp. 137-140.
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When the Colonial Development Fund agreed to grant £160,233 over a ten-year period 
to institute the national soil conservation project51 the Basutoland administration was 
able to overcome the first of the two stumbling blocks outlined above. The prior 
acceptance of the principal of a soil conservation programme by the National Council 
might have suggested to the Basutoland administration that they could count on the 
support of the major chiefs and overcome the second major stumbling block. 
Nevertheless they remained extremely wary of the possible reaction to the policy 
amongst the Basotho population.
One good reason to be wary was the potential opposition from Lekhotla la Bafo to any 
external development funding. As Edgar notes in the introduction to Prophets with 
Honour:
Lekhotla la Bafo opposed any assistance - whether for soldiers’ pensions or anti­
erosion schemes - over which the Basotho had no control. It reasoned that no 
matter how positive a contribution development assistance might make, it was a 
subtle way of distracting the Basotho and paving the way for European 
settlement.52
Despite the fact that they tended to dismiss Lekhotla la Bafo as unhinged trouble­
makers the Basutoland authorities were wary about their opposition to any policy. Not 
only was the organisation able to claim widespread popular support in many areas of 
the country they were also, on occasions, able to muster support in the National 
Council. The Basutoland administration had already experienced the ability of Josiel 
Lefela to rally support within the National Council, despite his antagonism to some of 
the most important chiefs. Machobane argues that it was largely the influence of Lefela 
that led the 1929 National Council to reject Sturrock’s reform programme.53
According to Kate Showers and Gwendolyn Malahleha, Paramount Chief Griffith was 
opposed to the idea of the national anti-erosion scheme and only agreed to it at the last 
minute:
Discussion about implementing this programme took place between the British 
administration and the Paramount Chief Griffith in private meetings and with the 
chiefs and representatives of the National Council. Chief Griffith refused to 
consider any kind of soil conservation programme until he was quite old and 
weak. He finally agreed to the national soil conservation programme in a series 
of bargaining sessions in which concessions were made to him about nominating 
his successor in exchange for agreement to certain British administrative 
activities.54
Showers and Malahleha cite an unnamed oral source, a historian and teacher in Quthing 
district, as evidence for this secret bargaining session. Though Showers and Malahleha
51 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1936, p. 1.
52 Edgar, Prophets with Honour, p.15.
53 Machobane, Government and Change, p. 177-182.
54 Showers and Malahleha, ‘Oral Evidence in Historical Environmental Impact Assessment’, p. 287.
170
CHAPTER SEVEN: POLITICS OF LAND
make no reference to it there is a published source that appears to support their analysis: 
a letter from Rabase Sekike of Lekhotla la Bafo to Paramount Chief ‘Mantsebo. The 
letter starts by complaining about the anti-erosion campaign and later states that ‘in 
secret your father-in-law [Griffith] signed documents yielding [the rights of Basotho] to 
Europeans’.55 There is, however, some evidence to suggest that Showers and 
Malahleha’s informant and Rabase Sekike may have been mistaken. Firstly the 
Basutoland authorities did not make concessions to Griffith over the nomination of his 
successor. Indeed, as Machobane shows, they consistently refused formally to accept 
the nomination of his son Bereng over his other son Seeiso and, in fact, engineered the 
accession of Seeiso on Griffith’s death.56 Furthermore the official record of the 
discussion between Griffith and the Basutoland authorities over the succession question 
contained nothing about amending the administrative arrangements or about soil 
conservation. Essentially these discussion took place in the late 1920s, before the soil 
conservation scheme was mooted, and when discussion between the chiefs and colonial 
state was dominated by Sturrock’s’ draft Regulations.
Given the potential for opposition in the National Council the Basutoland authorities 
did not re-introduce the policy in 1935 and took the 1932 vote of support as their locus 
for action 57 Acceptance of the anti-erosion scheme did not, however, mean that the 
Basutoland authorities had overcome the constitutional difficulties concerning their 
rights to intervene in land tenure arrangements. In order for the project to go ahead the 
Basutoland authorities had to accept as a ‘first principal’ that contour banks would cut 
through and across fields 58 In 1937 there was no legislation under either the 
‘customary’ Laws of Lerotholi or from a High Commissioner’s Proclamation which 
gave them the right to intervene in land use in this manner.59
55 Rabase Sekike to ‘Matsaba Seeiso Griffith, 2 February 1941, MA 1/33,1937-1946, in Edgar, 
Prophets with Honour, p. 140-141.
56 See Machobane, Government and Change, p.188-196.
57 Showers and Malahleha make no reference to these discussions in the National Council, which they
simply dismissed as a ‘talking shop’ full of ‘yes men’, Showers and Malahleha ‘Oral Evidence in
Historical Environmental Impact Assessment’, p. 284.
58 The colonial authorities may have been willing to construct contour banks across fields but they 
stopped short of rearranging the pattern of field allocations so that fields were bounded by the 
banks, arguing that ‘the adjustment of fields is regarded as a matter to be settled between the people 
and the Chiefs’; LNA 1486, Thornton, R.W., Outcome of Investigations, March 1938.
59 It was not until 1941 that an Order was passed by the Paramount Chief (Order No. 1/26, Office of 
the Paramount Chief, Matsieng, 26 March 1941) which stated that: ‘It shall be lawful to lay down 
anti-erosion works, such as contour terrace banks and contour grass strips anywhere in Basutoland 
where these measures are considered necessary, irrespective of field boundaries’. See below for 
further details on this Order.
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The Basutoland authorities would also have been well aware that acceptance of the 
scheme by the National Council did not mean that individual chiefs would actually 
support its implementation in their wards or villages. Their concerns appeared to have 
been well founded: Showers and Malahleha’s oral informants in Quthing and Maseru 
districts reported that the local chiefs never arrested or fined anybody who removed or 
adapted the contour banks constructed across their fields.60
This concern about the willingness of chiefs at a local level to administer the 
construction and maintenance of contour banks may explain why the Basutoland 
authorities used mechanical power rather than labour power to build the contour 
banks.61 In his original plans for the scheme Thornton envisaged that contour banks 
would be built by teams of paid labourers.62 Indeed this is how the Herschel contour 
banks had been constructed. Showers and Malahleha report that the contour banks in 
the Mobu valley, which were probably the first to be constructed under the scheme, 
were built by hand but by 1938 manual labour had been largely replaced by mechanical 
labour.63 By relying on professional construction teams the anti-erosion scheme was 
able to free itself from having to rely upon teams of labourers organised by local chiefs 
and headmen. Showers and Malahleha cite the fact that contour banks were driven 
across the landscape with no reference to the local population as an example of the 
absolute authority of the British,64 but ironically it was the lack of control over the 
chiefly administration that probably led to the decision to use mechanical power.
60 Showers and Malahleha, ‘Oral Evidence in Historical Environmental Impact Assessment’. Though 
until 1941 there were no regulations pertaining to the maintenance of contour banks and it is not 
clear under what legislation people could have been fined before that date. There is one archival 
report prior to 1941 of someone being ‘strongly dealt with’ (by Chief Bereng on behalf o f his father 
at Matsieng) for ploughing up and down the contours, LNA 1486, Thornton, R.W., Outcome of 
Investigations.
61 PRO DO 119/1096 includes a set of photographs of contour banks being constructed by tractors in 
1946. Also see South African National Film Archive, FA1912 - 3 ‘The Story of Matsele’, filmed 
by Lewis, L. for the National Veld Trust, which includes footage o f contour banks being 
constructed in c. 1947.
62 Thornton’s original estimates were based on gangs of 100 men, paid a rate of 9d per day, Pim, 
Financial and Economic Position o f Basutoland, Annex XIX, Estimate of Sum Required for Soil 
Erosion Work, p. 221
63 Showers and Malahleha, ‘Oral Evidence in Historical Environmental Impact Assessment’, p. 290, 
footnote 60. Showers and Malahleha report that the contour banks in this valley were built 
sometime in mid-1937. Jacks and Whyte (The Rape o f  the Earth) include a picture (taken on 9 June 
1937) of contour banks near to Matsieng which they report were built in December 1935. If this is 
correct the banks at Matsieng were built before the CD&W funding was available and may explain 
why they were built by hand.
64 Showers and Malahleha, ‘Oral Evidence in Historical Environmental Impact Assessment’, p. 295.
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Another possible explanation may be British concerns about removing workers from 
the migrant labour system. It is likely, however, that labour would have been 
forthcoming within Lesotho at wage levels that would not have provided competition 
with either the mines or Free State farms. In Herschel District labourers were paid six 
pence a day, plus a ration of mealie meal valued at three pence. These rates were 
significantly lower than those for miners on the Rand65 and the Pim Commission noted 
that ‘the gangs employed consist... mainly of labourers who are unfit or unwilling to 
work on the mines’.66
The Basutoland Department of Agriculture saw the anti-erosion works begun in 1937 as 
very much a first stage in a more comprehensive anti-erosion programme. The 
degradation of mountain pastures was being examined in an ecological survey, also 
funded from the Colonial Development Fund67 and it was anticipated a programme 
would be begun there on the basis of the survey’s recommendations. There were also a 
number of changes in the system of agriculture in the lowlands which Thornton and 
others in the Department of Agriculture saw as being crucial if the anti-erosion works 
were going to be a success. In an internal report Thornton likened these changes to a 
spiked wheel ‘which stab into or through Native agricultural practice’, but argued that 
accelerated soil erosion would continue ‘until the whole wheel with all its points 
revolves freely’.68
Thornton recognised that it was beyond the abilities of the Department of Agriculture to 
constantly ensure that the contour banks were in good condition and that the funds 
available for maintenance under the Colonial Development grant were inadequate for 
the task. He therefore urged the Resident Commissioner to introduce regulations 
making people liable for the maintenance of contour banks driven through their fields. 
He was aware, however, of the political sensitivity of what he was proposing and 
suggested they should ‘avoid the use of Proclamations [from the High Commissioner]
65 According to the African Mineworkers Union Statement Submitted to the Witswatersrand Gold 
Mines Native Wage Commission, in the late 1930s mineworkers on the Rand were earning wages 
of about 2s3d per shift and those employed in secondary industry significantly more; Appendix II in 
Allen, V.C. The History o f Black Mineworkers in South Africa (Volume 1, Keighley, 1992).
66 Pim, Financial and Economic Position o f Basutoland, p. 138.
67 £3,070 was granted in 1936 for an Ecological Survey of the Mountains, Basutoland, Department of 
Agriculture, Annual Report, 1936, p. 1. The survey was carried out from 1 October 1936 to 22 
January 1937 and published as Staples and Hudson, An Ecological Survey o f  the Mountain Area o f  
Basutoland. The survey’s findings and recommendations are discussed in chapter 4.
68 LNA 1486, Thornton, R.W., Outcome of Investigations, March 1938.
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through-out this work... if our object can be attained by other means, such as an order 
from the Paramount Chief.69
7.4. Rural development projects after the Indirect Rule reforms
At the very time Thornton wrote this report the Resident Commissioner was attempting 
to push through the long discussed series of reforms to bring the country in line with 
other Indirect Rule territories. These were eventually promulgated in December 1938 
as Proclamations 61 and 62 of 1938, often referred to as the Native Administration 
Proclamations.70 Under Sections 8 and 15 of Proclamation 61 the Paramount Chief was 
empowered to issue Orders and Rules, within clearly defined areas, providing for the 
‘peace, good order and welfare of his people’.71 Many of the areas in which the 
Paramount Chief could issue Orders related to agricultural development or conservation 
policies including the right to issue Orders to ‘regulate grazing’ and ‘prevent soil 
erosion’.72
With the passage of Proclamation 61 the Basutoland administration could press the 
Paramount Chief to introduce new regulations concerning protection and maintenance 
of anti-erosion works. They were considerably delayed, however, by the death of 
Griffith in 1939, the debate over the succession of Bereng or Seeiso, the death of Seeiso 
just months after he was confirmed Paramount Chief, and the subsequent wrangling 
between Bereng and Seeiso’s widow ‘Mantsebo. Within months73 of her accession to 
the Regency, however, ‘Mantsebo signed an Order concerning the construction of 
contour banks through fields and pasture areas, ploughing on the contour, the protection
69 LNA 1486, Thornton, R.W., Outcome of Investigations, March 1938.
70 See Machobane, Government and Change, p. 185-186 for details.
71 Proclamation 61/1938 (Chieftainship Powers Proclamation) in Basutoland, Laws o f  Basutoland, pp. 
156-62. The exact distinction between Rules (issued under section 15) and Orders (issued under 
section 8) is a little unclear. The Basutoland authorities were themselves confused about the 
distinction, see Machobane, Government and Change, pp. 207-209. Several previous Laws of 
Lerotholi were revised as Rules. These appeared in the revised (1946) version of the Laws of 
Lerotholi as part II. Orders issued under Section 8 were supposed to related to essentially 
administrative decisions and were included in the revised Laws of Lerotholi as part III. Rules 
issued under section 15 had to have the prior approval of the High Commissioner, while this was 
not necessary for Orders issued under section 8.
72 Section 8, Proclamation 61/1938. Sheddick, Land Tenure in Basutoland, (p.30) lists the subjects 
relating to land tenure. Eric Limbach and Anita Franklin both mistakenly assumes that the 1938 
Proclamation refers to actual Orders rather than the right to make Orders; Limbach,‘Current Status 
of Range Management’ and Franklin, Land Law in Lesotho.
73 The Order was actually issued before her appointment was confirmed by the Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs on 10 May 1941.
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of contour banks, meadow strips and inlets, dams, grass burning trees planted in dongas 
and damage to fencing.74
With this Order the Department of Agriculture at last had a clear locus from which to 
intervene in the rural economy of Lesotho. In the words of one junior Basutoland 
official:
The principle of conservation - that government must have the right to drive 
terraces through private lands, take areas out of cultivation, to plant plantations - 
is now accepted.*5
Furthermore in the atmosphere of post-war reconstruction the Basutoland 
administration were hopeful of gaining access to more funds under the revitalised 
CD&W Fund. In the belief that they were now able to overcome the two major 
constraints on their activities the Department of Agriculture set about intervening in a 
much more fundamental way in rural land-use patterns. They were soon to discover, 
however, that their high hopes were misguided.
7.4.1. Agricultural Improvement Areas
In 1945 the Department of Agriculture unveiled a plan to declare Agricultural 
Improvement Areas in parts of the country deemed to be suffering from particularly 
acute environmental problems. Under the scheme chiefs and headmen in these areas 
were temporarily to abdicate their rights to allocate land to the Department of 
Agriculture. The Department was then to categorise the area as agricultural land, 
grazing land or tree plantations on the basis of its agro-ecological potential. All pre­
existing divisions of agricultural land were to be cancelled and each family allocated a 
single field in proportion to its size.76 The scheme was closely modelled on the 
Southern Rhodesian ‘centralisation* and South African Betterment policies though it 
did not include as strong an emphasis on the regrouping of residential sites.77
When proposals for the Agricultural Improvement Areas were put before the 
Basutoland National Council they received a very unfavourable reaction. In the 
aftermath of the administrative and judicial reforms of 1938 and 1944 the Chiefs were 
in no mood to give up their major remaining source of power: the allocation of land.
74 Order No. 1/26, Office of the Paramount Chief, Matsieng, 26 March 1941, reproduced in Thornton, 
R.W. ‘Anti-erosion measures and reclamation of eroded land’, Proceedings of the South African 
Society o f Civil Engineers, XL, 1942, pp. 79-104, p. 96.
75 Duncan to Robertson, 20 October 1944, Patrick Duncan Archives, University of York, DU5 81/10, 
emphasis in original.
76 Sheddick, Land Tenure, p. 129.
77 See Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War, pp. 71-75 on centralisation and Yawiteh, J. 
Betterment: the myth o f homeland agriculture, (Johannesburg, 1981) on Betterment.
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During a ‘stormy session’ the proposals were rejected.78 Despite this set-back the 
Department of Agriculture included many elements of the scheme in a proposal for 
further CD&W funding79 and attempted to re-introduce the schemes to the National 
Council the following year.
This time the Basutoland administration incorporated the Agricultural Development
Areas into proposals for the construction of a new mountain road, arguing that it
would open up new areas to agricultural expansion and the Department of Agriculture
therefore needed new powers over land allocation in a twenty-mile strip on either side
of the road.80 Most members of the Basutoland National Council were very much in
favour of the road and had been lobbying for its construction for some time. They
were, not surprisingly, extremely annoyed to discover the proposal was now tied to a
scheme they had rejected the previous year. Chief Leloko Lerotholi, one of the more
outspoken senior chiefs,81 clearly outlined the reason for their opposition to the
Agricultural Improvement Areas:
The declaration of Agricultural Improvement Areas means that the Government, 
that is through the Agricultural Department, should control the grazing and 
control the lands of the people which they never had the right to do before.
He went on to say that they would rather do without the road than agree to policies 
that would ‘persecute the whole Nation’.82
Opposition to the scheme was not confined to the National Council. In a series of 
editorials the influential bi-lingual Mochochonono newspaper, strongly associated 
with the Basutoland Progressive Association, spelt out its opposition to the 
Agricultural Improvement Areas, especially the suggestion that the schemes might 
include regulations for the compulsory culling of livestock.83 Furthermore they felt 
that any scheme should be implemented through elected District Councils and not via 
the Department of Agriculture and the chiefs alone.
78 Lefela, M. ‘Taxes up in Basutoland’, Inkulueko, 18 February 1946, in Edgar, Prophets with 
Honour.
79 PRO D 035/1187/Y1136/23, Application for Free Grant under the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act, 20 March 1946.
80 PRO D035/1187/Y1136/23, Application for Free Grant under the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act, 20 March 1946.
81 Over the next few years he raised a number of important constitutional issues in the National 
Council, including the question of whether Lesotho was a Crown Colony or a Protectorate, see 
Machobane, Government and Change, p. 248-249.
82 Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f the 42nd Session, October 1946, p. 48.
83 Editorial, 18 August 1945, and letter from B.N. Mathe, 15 September 1945, Mochochonono. Arden- 
Clarke later pointed to fears about culling as the primary cause of Basotho opposition, PRO DO 
35/1187/Y1136/23, Minutes of discussion with Arden-Clarke, 29 June 1946.
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In the National Council the Acting Resident Commissioner made the position of the 
British Government position clear: unless the National Council agreed to the 
Agricultural Improvement Area funds for the road would not be forthcoming.84 
Despite this threat the National Council again rejected the plans for a national scheme 
by a vote of 44 to 4.85
Given this opposition the Department of Agriculture decided to by-pass the National 
Council and try to get the backing of individual chiefs for projects in their wards. The 
policy was announced in an unusually downbeat manner in their 1946 Annual Report 
with a note that they regretted that the ‘question of stock limitation... will not at 
present be considered by the Basotho’.86 Only one Agricultural Improvement Area 
was ever declared,87 in the Maphutsang valley in Mohales Hoek District after the area 
was visited by a party of senior chiefs.88 Fields were to be allocated on the basis of 
family size and a further quarter-acre plot in a large block suitable for vegetable 
gardening was given to each family.89 A second stage of the plan was to include the 
implementation of rotational grazing, ‘the disposal of stock surplus to the estimated 
carrying capacity of the grassland’ and compulsory villagisation.90
At first the Department of Agriculture reported that the scheme was proceeding
satisfactorily and were pleased to show Dr W.C. Lowdermilk, the recently retired
head of the United States Soil Conservation Service, around the project.91 The
following year, however, they admitted, in an unusually candid statement, that things
had not gone according to plan:
One of the difficulties which has to be overcome in this scheme is the equitable 
distribution of arable land. Shortly after the scheme was commenced, land was 
redistributed on a family size basis, but this is such a fluctuating figure that within 
a few years what was equitable to start with has become wholly inequitable. As 
land issue is one of the few remaining props to authority which the chiefs and 
sub-chiefs have it is considered to be politically unwise, apart from it being 
almost impracticable, that the issue of lands should become yet another function 
of Government, as would be required in any extension of the Maphutseng scheme. 
Therefore, land issue is to be allowed to revert to the chiefdom 92
84 Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f the 42nd Session, October 1946, p. 55.
85 Basutoland National Council, Proceedings of the 42nd Session, October 1946, p. 57.
86 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1946, p.4.
87 Though they were discussed in other areas, including in Mokhotlong.
88 Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f the 42nd Session, October 1946, p. 8-9.
89 See Nobe and Seckler, An economic and policy analysis o f soil-water problems.
90 Sheddick, Land Tenure, p. 130.
91 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1949, p. 11.
92 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1950, p. 11.
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After the failure of the only Agricultural Improvement Area ever declared the policy 
was dropped.
Despite this set-back the Department of Agriculture were still keen to establish at least 
one area based agricultural development project. In 1952 they obtained CD&W funding 
for a Pilot Project in the Tebetebeng river valley. Apart from the inevitable 
construction of contour banks the major intervention associated with the Pilot Project as 
the introduction of co-operative ownership of tractors. Given the failures of the 
Agricultural Improvement Areas, however, the Department of Agriculture were 
extremely wary of tampering in pre-existing land tenure arrangements.93
The basic idea behind the scheme was that farmers in one area would co-operate and all 
have their fields ploughed at the same time by a communally owned tractor. Despite 
relatively generous external funding and high hopes amongst Basutoland officials, 
again the scheme did not go according to plan. Inevitably the land tenure system was 
one of the primary targets for blame: if one farmer in the centre of a block refused to 
take part it became extremely difficult to administer the ploughing.94 Unable either to 
reform or work with the agricultural land tenure system the Department of Agriculture 
changed its emphasis and from the mid 1950s decided to ‘concentrate on improving the 
methods and output of progressive individuals and not to undertake “mass” schemes’.95
7.5. Access to mountain grazing areas, boundary disputes and 
grazing closures
Given the opposition to the Agricultural Improvement Areas in the 1945 and 1946 
National Council the Department of Agriculture resorted to enacting development 
policy directly through the Paramount Chief and other ward chiefs. Furthermore, 
financial constraints were still very much to the fore; as CD&W funding had been 
funnelled into a continuation of the physical anti-erosion works begun in 1936 the 
Department of Agriculture had to look to alternative sources of revenue for other 
development projects. The Department of Agriculture therefore had to rely upon senior 
chiefs to agree to issue instructions for any new schemes.96
93 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1954, p. 19.
94 Wallman, Take Out Hunger, p. 116.
95 Wallman, Take Out Hunger, p. 117.
96 Howard, J. ‘Notes on a visit to Transkei, Ciskei and Basutoland, January 1950’, unpublished report, 
Rhodes House, Oxford, Mss Afr.s.787.
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Fortunately for the Basutoland Department of Agriculture it appeared that the 
Paramount Chief and her closest advisers were willing to go along with their plans, 
especially in the politically sensitive sphere of grazing control on the mountain 
pastures. They soon discovered, however, that relying on Orders from the Paramount 
and Principal Chiefs could be a fraught process and that they could also issue orders 
that did not suit the Department’s programme. To make matters worse it was unclear 
exactly who had the right to issue orders concerning the use of mountain grazing areas.
7.5.1. The 1946 Order
In November 1946 ‘Mantsebo made an Order that all livestock, with the exception of 
riding horses and donkeys, should be sent to the cattle post areas during the summer 
months and that smallstock should remain there year round.97 This Order appeared to 
come as a complete surprise to the Basutoland Department of Agriculture, and in fact a 
copy of it did not appear on their files until March 1947.
In the meantime Chief Bofihla, the Paramount Chiefs representative in Likhoele
ward,98 had issued instructions to all headmen in the ward telling them that, in line
with the new Order, they must:
inform all your people to send their livestock to the cattle posts further up beyond 
Moholobela’s and right up to Oetsi’s, which pastorate is solely the Paramount 
Chiefs plateaux.99
When these instructions were brought to the attention of the Mafeteng District 
Commissioner he wrote to the Government Secretary expressing his concerns that they 
would lead not just to overgrazing in the cattle-post area but also to ‘political 
disturbance’.100
The ward boundaries in this area were extremely complex and there were a number of
chiefs who came under the Paramount Chiefs Matsieng ward but whose own areas
were in the Mafeteng District. G.I. Jones noted:
The boundaries of certain wards and hence of the Districts to which they belong, 
are not defined or even accurately known in certain areas of recent settlement - for 
example in south central Basutoland in the area of the Maletsunyane and
97 Order 37/1946, Paramount Chief, Matsieng, 20 November 1946, translated copy on LNA 2476.
98 Chief Bofihla was a half brother of the late Paramount Chief Seeiso and became one of ‘Mantsebo’s 
official advisers in February 1949. They later fell out (March 1952) after Bofihla asked ‘Mantsebo 
what contributing she was making to a fund to provide higher education for chiefs' sons and 
daughters, PRO DOl 19/1382, Arrowsmith to Wray, 26 November 1952.
99 LNA 2476, Bofihla G[riffith] Lerotholi to Chiefs and headman in Likhoele ward, 9 December 
1946.
100 LNA 2476, DC Mafeteng to Government Secretary, Maseru, 3 January 1947.
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Sinquyane rivers where there exists a mosaic of villages and village groups said to 
belong to three or more different wards, in three different Districts.101
In the mid 1940s the dispute seemed to centre around the village of Headman Oetsi who
apparently had the option of remaining under the Paramount Chiefs ward of Likhoele
(in Mafeteng District) or of switching allegiance to Chief Bereng’s Phamong ward (in
Mohale’s Hoek district).102 In 1942 the dispute had erupted into violence, though I
have not been able to trace reports of exactly what occurred.108 This boundary dispute
was obviously given added tension by the dispute over succession between ‘Mantsebo
and Bereng. When discussing boundary disputes Sheddick noted that these tended to
have a very different character depending on the relationship between the ward chiefs
(whom he termed Governors):
It may happen that the neighbouring Governors are not friendly, and in such cases 
the ill-defined and inadequately demarcated boundaries are exploited to their 
limit; they suddenly “expand”, on the one side to justify the seizure of the cattle of 
the rivals supporters and on the other to permit the attempted invasion and seizure 
of part of the other’s area.104
It would appear that ‘Mantsebo was using her powers to issue Orders concerning 
grazing control as a way of expanding the area under her jurisdiction; and she was 
doing it in such as way that her claims would seem to be justified by colonial 
government policies.
When this Order came to light the Maseru Secretariat quickly wrote to the Paramount
Chief asking her to suspend the instructions, pointing out that in the opinion of the
Director of Agriculture, W.G. Leakie, the instructions would lead to the devastation of
the mountain pastures.105 ‘Mantsebo, however, skilfully deflected their request by
saying she was just trying to issue orders in line with the Department of Agriculture’s
calls for rotational grazing:
what the Agricultural Department says is in opposition to their usual advice that 
grazings should be rotated.
She protested that her instructions were simply to allow the lowland grazing areas in
Mafeteng to be rested and to recover. Furthermore she did not see how the instructions
could cause any political problems as the second paragraph of the letter ‘orders these
people... to live in peace’.106
101 Jones, Basutoland Medicine Murder, p. 75.
102 LNA 2476, DC Mafeteng to Government Secretary, Maseru, 3 January 1947.
103 Sheddick, Land Tenure in Basutoland, p. 176.
104 Sheddick, Land Tenure in Basutoland, p. 155.
105 LNA 2476, Kennan to ‘Mantsebo, 16 January 1947.
106 LNA 2476, Mantsebo to Forsyth-Thompson, 20 January 1947.
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It was clear to the Basutoland authorities that ‘Mantsebo was using their supposedly 
politically-neutral agricultural policies to ‘further her own ends’.107 When the nation­
wide Order that people should move their livestock to the cattle-posts came to the 
notice of the Department of Agriculture they decided that it, and the instruction in 
Likhoele ward resulting from it, should be overturned. Quite how this was to be done, 
however, was not clear. The Paramount Chief had been granted the powers under a 
High Commissioner’s Proclamation (Proclamation 61, section 8) and it could, therefore, 
only be overturned if it was found to be ultra vires in Court, not just because the 
Department of Agriculture did not like it.
Nevertheless when Kenneth Moeletsi, a representative from Mafeteng district, raised 
the issue of Order 37/1946 in the 1947 National Council the Resident Commissioner 
reported that his understanding was that the Paramount Chief had cancelled the Order. 
When Josiel Lefela attempted to join in the criticism of the Order the Resident 
Commissioner, in his role as president of the Council, simply quashed the debate and 
moved onto the next item on the agenda.108
Despite these statements from the Resident Commissioner it appears that Order 37/1946 
remained on the statute books, though it was certainly rarely enforced. Sheddick, who 
undertook fieldwork in the late 1940s, makes no mention of the Order and describes a 
system of transhunimance between lowlands and mountains, though he does also note 
that increasing population pressure had led some livestock owners to leave their 
livestock in the mountains year round, moving them to cattle posts in the lower valleys 
during the winter months.109 There are numerous other reports of smallstock in the 
lowlands during this period; for example, in January 1954 N.C. Pollock observed a 
mixed herd of 700 head of livestock moving from a village in the lowlands of Berea 
District to a mountain cattle post near the Buthe-Butha/Mokhotlong border.110 The 
Basutoland administration did however attempt to settle the boundary dispute and the 
boundaries in the area were officially delimitated in February 1948.111 Conflict over
107 LNA 2476, file note [probably by Leakie] dated 1 February 1947. The note also accused her of 
confusing rotational grazing with closing areas of grazing. This was extremely ironic as that was 
exactly what the Department of Agriculture and others in the administration would itself do latter 
that year with the massive grazing closures in Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek.
108 Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f the 43rd Session, 1947, p. 562-3.
109 Sheddick, Land Tenure in Basutoland, p. 105-106.
110 Pollock, N.C. ‘The Economic and Social Geography of Basutoland’ (unpublished B.Litt, Oxford, 
1956), p. 127.
111 The settlement is referred to in LNA 2476/II[I], Driver to ‘Mantsebo, 10 November 1951 but I have 
been unable to locate any correspondence on the delimitation in either LNA or the PRO.
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access to pastures in the area, however, appeared to continue at least into the early 
1950s.
Curiously Order 37/1946 did appear to be enforced, to some extent, in Qacha’s Nek 
district, though it may well be that this was a result of confusion between the 1946 
Order and the 1947 instructions to totally close large areas to all grazing. During the 
1950s complaints about the Order were raised in the National Council by 
representatives from Qacha’s Nek. A motion was initially introduced in the 1952 
National Council112 and was then raised again in 1954 when Thabo Tsepa, a 
representative of the Qacha’s Nek District Council, complained that the 1946 Order 
causing great hardship during the winter months. He pointed out that in the previous 
winter nine herd-boys had died as a result of the cold. Another Councillor from Qacha’s 
Nek, Mahlabe Mokhachane, reported that one person had lost a flock of 500 sheep and 
goats in the snow and that people therefore disobeyed the Order.113 The Council passed 
a resolution that the Order be amended to exempt ewes in lamb and other smallstock if 
the Ward Chief granted ‘special permission’:114 an option that might have decreased the 
mortality rate of livestock but not of the herd-boys looking after the remaining herds. 
The following year the ward chief, Theko Makhaola, raised the issue during a session of 
the Standing Committee of the National Council but the resulting discussion was 
inconclusive.115
These discussion in the National Council and Standing Committee were noted by the 
Department of Agriculture, but they did not appear to do anything about the Order. The 
District Commissioner of Qacha’s Nek wrote to the Government Secretary in Maseru in 
early 1952 complaining that Order 37/1946 was causing problems as it had lead to an 
increase in the number of smallstock in the District, especially from Mokhotlong
112 Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f the 48th Session, 1952, motion 78, pp. 517-522.
113 Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f the 50th Session, 1954, p. 399. 86 mm of 
percipitation were recorded at the Sehlabathbe Rainfall Station (in one of the major mountain 
grazing areas in Qacha’s Nek) during July 1954, Government of Lesotho, Hydrological Survey 
Depertment, Metrological data to December 1970. Percipitation during the month of July is 
unusual and almost always falls as snow.
114 During these discussions there was no mention of the fact that the closure policy meant that all 
livestock should have been in the high cattle-posts year round. The obvious inference to make is 
that, as in Mokhotlong District, the closure policy was never enforced in a systematic manner (see 
chapter 9). The most likely explanation is that the Ward Chief (Theko Makhaola) enforced 
elements of both policies. The pattern may have been something like this: all livestock (except 
probably those belonging to the important chiefs) were order out of the village grazing areas, and 
possibly the lower altitude cattle-post areas, during summer, but cattle and equines were allowed to 
return to the valleys (village grazing and winter cattle-posts) in the winter.
115 LNA 2476 V, Grazing Areas in the Mountains, Extracts from Minutes of the Standing Committee, 
28-30 June 1955.
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ward116 though the fact that the policy appeared not to have been applied elsewhere 
leads to the conclusion that this was due to factors other than the 1946 Order. There was 
no follow-up correspondence or file notes from the Department of Agriculture at this 
date or in response to the motions in the National Council. The assumption has to be 
that they were content just to see the Order quietly forgotten. It is not clear what 
happened to the Order after 1955 as the Department of Agriculture files on grazing 
policies in the mountain petered out soon afterwards.
7.5.2. The 1947 instructions
At the time of the initial worries about ‘Matsebo’s 1946 Order the Department of 
Agriculture was involved in discussions with Chiefs Matlere and Theko, who headed 
the two biggest wards in the mountain areas, Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek. When 
Evelyn Baring, the High Commissioner, first discussed the possibility of some sort of 
grazing policy on the mountain pastures in early 1946 he reported that Chiefs Matlere 
and Theko:
appeared to be afraid to touch cattle post areas and probably fear the accusation 
that they are being used as tools by the government to deprive the Basuto nation 
of its ancient rights to free and untrammelled communal grazing above the 
cultivation line.117
A year later, however, Matlere and Theko had both changed their minds. At a meeting 
with Leakie at Umkomozana in March 1947 they agreed to institute the Department of 
Agriculture’s plans and close large areas of their wards to all grazing.118 Quite why 
they changed their minds is unclear, though for Matlere there were some obvious 
political advantages (which are discussed in chapter 9).
The Department of Agriculture argued that this new closure policy was simply an 
extension of ‘customary’ lehoella regulations119 and they saw it as a successful 
modernisation of ‘customary’ practices. The lehoella regulations were a well 
established method of conserving scarce resources from over use and were most 
commonly associated with the closure of pastures close to villages during the summer 
to ensure sufficient fodder for the lean winter months. Areas of grazing, or other scarce
116 LNA 2476/II[I], DC Qacha’s Nek to Government Secretary, Maseru, 3 March 1952.
117 PRO D 035/1180/Y950/5, Baring to Machtig, 25 February 1946.
Unfortunately the minutes of this meeting were on a file (1570/1) I was unable to locate in the 
LNA. The meeting was, however, frequently referred to in correspondence on files in the LNA 
2476 series. Thought is not quite clear from the archival record, the location Umkomozana 
probably refers to the Natal side of the Sani Pass where the Mkhomozana valley runs up to the pass. 
Presumably Leakie either flew or travelled through the Union via Underberg and Matlere and 
Theko treked over from Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek.
119 Duncan, Sotho Laws and Customs, p. 78.
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natural resources, were declared closed to everyone for an agreed period and anyone 
found trespassing on the area would be fined.120 Lehoella was supposedly declared by 
the local chief and headman with the consensus of the resource users,121 though in 
reality chiefs tended to declared lehoella when it best suited their needs.
Despite the Department of Agriculture’s assertions that the closure policy was just a 
development of these ‘customary’ practices the closures differed from leboella in a 
number of crucial respects. Firstly under the closure policy grazing land was closed 
year round not just seasonally. Secondly livestock owners held semi-private rights to 
small areas of the cattle-post grazing area (i.e. the cattle posts themselves) unlike in the 
leboella areas near villages. Thirdly, there were no pre-existing mechanisms for 
achieving consensus among all resource users at the ward level and there was never 
even a pretence at consultation between the ward chief and resource-users. Indeed it 
was unclear exactly who made up the category of potential resource users in the case of 
mountain grazing areas. This was to become a matter of considerable debate.
7.5.3. The 1949 Order
The debate was sparked off by a new Order from the Paramount Chief, promulgated on
15th August 1949. In this new Order ‘Mantsebo instructed all Principal Chiefs:
to inform all the people in your ward who have cattle posts in my mountain area 
and on my plateau land to remove their cattle posts... You should see to it that this 
order of mine is carried out and that no animals from your wards will come into 
my mountain area country.122
Again this Order was not brought to the attention of the Department of Agriculture until
some months after it was sent out from Matsieng, and again it was a District
Commissioner, this time from Teyateyaneng, who brought it to their attention because
of his fears about possible repercussions.123 Gideon Pott reported that the Order would
cause ‘problems’ and that his local informants told him ‘grazing has always been
communal in the Malutis and a man can have his cattle where he liked’.124 This
contradicted the understanding of ‘customary’ law used by the Department of
120 Swallow, Brokken, Motsamai, Sopeng, and Storey, Livestock Development and Range Uilisation, 
p. 8-9.
121 Duncan, Sotho Laws and Customs, p. 78.
122 LNA 2476/n, Order from Paramount Chief, Matsieng (the original Order was not given a reference 
number).
123 Teyateyaneng was the district immediately to the north o f Maseru district and livestock owners 
from the three Teyateyaneng wards probably made use o f the extensive cattle-post country in 
‘Mantsebo’s Matsieng ward. The biggest ward in Teyateyaneng was ‘Mamathe’s, under 
‘Mantsebo’s influential rival Chief Gabashane. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the Order was 
sent out just days after Gabashane and Bereng were hanged for their part in a ‘medicine’ murder.
124 LNA 2476/11, DC Teyateyeng to Government Secretary, 15 November 1949.
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Agriculture to enact the closure policies. The debate basically came down to a 
disagreement about whether principal chiefs had the right to refuse access to cattle post 
areas in their ward to livestock owners from other wards.
7.5.4. Different understandings of ‘customary’ law
As we have seen Staples and Hudson’s Ecological Survey reported that the first agro- 
pastoralists to settle in the mountain areas of Lesotho were a group of ‘Zulus of the 
Matooane tribe’ in the early nineteenth century. They had left the area during ‘the wars 
of Chaka’s time’ and from then until the 1880s the area was ‘occupied solely by the 
Bushman and the game on which they preyed’.125 It was only with the arrival of the 
Batloka126 that domestic livestock were re-introduced into the area. Increasing 
population in the lowlands, especially with the influx of people from the Free State in 
the aftermath of the South African 1913 Natives Land Act, had resulted in the internal 
migration of people to the mountain valleys and the rapid increase in the livestock 
populations of the mountain pastures. This history of occupation was accepted as a 
matter of course by the Basutoland administration and they believed that it largely 
accounted for both the recent environmental degradation of the area and the ‘open 
access’ land-tenure arrangements.
D.W. How, the Government Secretary, wrote the section of Staples and Hudson’s 
Ecological Survey dealing with land tenure in the mountain areas. He stated that all 
mountain grazing areas came directly under the control of the Paramount Chief and that 
these areas were officially open to every Mosotho livestock owner. The Paramount 
Chief’s control of the area was, however, delegated to ward chiefs who sometimes 
prevented the access of livestock from other wards. This action was considered to be 
illegal, though How admitted it was fairly commonplace.127
Three anthropologists who carried out fieldwork during the colonial era disagreed with 
this understanding and argued that Principal Chiefs did indeed have the right to exclude 
people from other wards. Hugh Ashton, who wrote an ethnography based on fieldwork 
carried out in the mid-1930s, noted that livestock owners could establish a cattle-post in 
the area controlled by their immediate chief or a neighbouring chief as long as they 
were both under the same Principal Chief. This suggested that Principal Chiefs only had 
to allocate grazing land to residents of their ward and could deny access to anyone from
125 Staples and Hudson, Ecological Survey, p. 19. This section of the report was based on information 
from R.C. Germond.
126 See chapter 9.
127 Note by How, D.W. (Government Secretary) in Staples and Hudson, Ecological Survey, p. 20.
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a neighbouring Principal Chiefs ward.128 Sandra Wallman, who carried out her 
fieldwork in the early 1960s, also mentions that chiefs in the lowlands had specific 
cattle-post areas reserved for local residents and that if livestock owners from other 
areas wanted to graze there they had to come to some sort of temporary agreement.129
Vernon Sheddick, who carried out fieldwork on land tenure arrangements in the late
1940s, at the invitation of the High Commissioner and funded by the Colonial Social
Science Research Council, also stated that a Principal Chief (whom he called Provincial
Governors) only had a duty to allocate grazing land to his/her own ‘subjects’:
Grazing in catde-post country is partially a personal right in so far as a man may 
be assigned a particular area within which he may build his own huts, byres and 
stockpens and partially a public right in that grazing itself cannot be denied to any 
stock whose owner is a subject of the Provincial Governor. A stock owner 
seeking semi-personal grazing rights first approaches his immediate Sub-Area 
Chief, informing him of his requirements. When he has satisfied his chief that he 
is a lawful resident under his jurisdiction, he, the stockowner, is directed to the 
Provincial Governor. It is the subjects of any one Provincial Governor who have 
prior claim to the grazing within die control of their chief. Their claim does not 
prevent the Governor considering application from persons, subject to other 
chiefs, who have failed to obtain grazing within their own province.130
The Basutoland authorities were unhappy with Sheddick’s report in general and with 
this passage in particular. Comments on the text of the original report batted backwards 
and forwards between the Secretariat in Maseru the High Commissioner’s Office in 
Pretoria/Cape Town and the Dominion/Commonwealth Relations Office in London.
By this process they managed to block the publication of the report until 1954, when 
Sheddick threatened to have it published commercially. The report that was eventually 
published as part of the Colonial Research Studies series included a number of changes 
from the original draft and a foreword from the Commonwealth Relations Office 
pointing out which parts of the report the Basutoland administration did not accept131
Attached to the section cited above, Sheddick was persuaded to include a footnote 
stating that:
The Basutoland Government maintain that all cattle-post country is common to all 
Basuto and not only the fellow subjects of the same provincial governor.
Given the 1946 and 1949 Paramount Chiefs Orders, the next sentence of the footnote is 
particularly noteworthy:
128 Ashton, The Basuto, p. 152.
129 Wallman, Take out Hunger, p. 103-4.
130 Sheddick, Land Tenure, pp. 158-159.
131 Sheddick’s comments on the grazing closure policy, and the reaction of the authorities to them, are 
discussed in chapter 9.
186
CHAPTER SEVEN: POLITICS OF LAND
They also point out that the Paramount Chief has said very firmly that any 
arrangement whereby the cattle of one chief may be prevented from grazing 
where the cattle of another chief are permitted to graze is strictly forbidden.132
One of the severest Basutoland critics of Sheddick’s statements about access to cattle
post grazing was Patrick Duncan. From May 1947 to October 1949 Duncan had been a
Assistant DC in Teyateyaneng and in mid 1951 to 1952 was the Judicial
Commissioner.133 His position as Judicial Commissioner gave him significant scope to
comment on Sheddick’s draft report134 and he later (after he had left the Basutoland
service) wrote a scathing review of the book, describing it as ‘idiosyncratic and
pretentious’ and ‘full of serious inaccuracies’.135 The most serious inaccuracy,
according to Duncan, was Sheddick’s statement that the mountain grazing was divided
between separate chiefdoms. This, said Duncan, was totally opposed to the view of
both the Government and Paramount Chief and was contrary to ‘customary’ law:
The Government view is based on Sotho law, which firmly lays down that the 
cattle of any member of the Sotho people may graze anywhere which is open to 
public grazing. There have, it is true, been cases where chiefs have arrogated to 
themselves the right to exclude cattle from other chiefs. But wherever they have 
been discovered it has been put an end to... [I]t is surely incorrect to lay down in 
the text of a handbook on land law that a practice, condemned as illegal by the 
highest administrative authorities in the land, is the rule.136
In his own handbook on the ‘customary’ law of Lesotho Duncan reiterated that
‘grazing-area of the country is communal, no adult having the right to graze privately
where others are not allowed’. He went on to quote the words of a representative of the
Paramount Chief:
When they were on the plateau they found a grazing practice of the herds of the 
people on the plateau, a practice unknown here in Basutoland; a practice 
resembling only that of the Boers on the farms of the Orange Free State; a 
practice whereby the animals of one are not allowed to graze on the farm of 
another. I reprimand the deed, and I do not wish to see or hear again that there are 
some herds which are prevented from grazing where other herds are allowed to 
graze.137
While Sheddick’s understanding of ‘customary’ law may have seemed to act in the 
interests of the most powerful chiefs not all of them agreed with the analysis. In the 
1944 National Council Chief Bereng spoke out against plans announced by Leakie for
132 Sheddick, Land Tenure, p. 158, footnote 3.
133 At the time of the Order he was at the London School of Economics on a two term study leave, 
Driver, Patrick Duncan.
134 Comments on Sheddicks Report, in DU 7.12, Patrick Duncan Archives, University o f York.
135 Duncan, P. ‘Review of Land Tenure in Basutoland by Vernon Sheddick’, Man, January 1957, pp. 
11- 12.
136 Duncan,‘Review’, p. 12
137 Duncan, Sotho Laws and Customs, p. 74. Duncan did not reference this quote nor say from which 
Paramount Chief the orders emanated. My suspicion is that it is from the early colonial period.
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grazing control policies on the mountain pastures. Chief Bereng argued that the ‘chief
does not give cattle posts to people’ and that, unlike on the village grazing areas, every
(male) Mosotho had a right to graze his animals wherever he liked:
If 70 of us like a certain place we shall go and peg out cattle posts there and we 
shall never agree if one of us suggests we should graze a certain part and rest 
another.138
It should be noted that livestock owners from Bereng’s and ‘Mantsebo’s wards had 
clashed over access to grazing lands on the borders of the ward in 1942. It is possible 
Chief Bereng foresaw the political use ‘Mantsebo could make of supposedly politically 
neutral grazing policies.
Other Chiefs and the Department of Agriculture agreed with Sheddick’s understanding 
of the ‘customary’ law: indeed that understanding provided the basis of the 1947 
closure instructions. In a memo written after Gideon Pott had voiced his concerns 
J.G.M. King reported that their assessment was based on what Leakie, his predecessor, 
had been told by Chiefs Matlere and Theko at the meeting in March 1947. The Chiefs 
had:
stated categorically that all cattle posts in their wards fell under [their] direct 
control and that if a ward chief does not want people from other wards to use his 
cattle posts he has the liberty to remove them.139
King pointed out that this was essential for effective grazing control:
If grazing control in the cattle post areas is to be effective it is of fundamental 
importance that the whole of the catdepost area should fall under one or other of 
the ward chiefs. This allows of [sic] the redistribution of posts within wards, and 
where necessary the complete removal of posts.140
Furthermore, if Principal Chiefs had exclusive administrative rights over the cattle post 
areas in their wards it would help stimulate their interest in grazing control, and by 
making access more difficult it worked ‘towards creating a squeeze which will make 
stock limitation much more acceptable when the time for it comes’. King asked the 
Government Secretary to point out to ‘the critic [Pott] that these considerations far 
outweigh the possibility of damage of a relatively minor nature that is likely to occur in 
the wards of chiefs who control comparatively small areas of cattle post’.141
King admitted that ‘some chiefs consider that the Paramount Chief has acted in an 
arbitrary manner’ and conceded that it might be a good idea to debate the question of 
access to mountain cattle posts in the National Council. He went on to argue, however, 
that ‘when it is discussed the result must be a foregone conclusion’.142 In the end the
13  ^ Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f the 39th Session, 1944, p. 255.
139 LNA 2476/n, memorandum from King to Government Secretary, n.d. [c. Dec. 1949].
140 LNA 2476/11, memorandum from King to Government Secretary, n.d. [c. Dec. 1949].
141 LNA 2476/11, memorandum from King to Government Secretary, n.d. [c. Dec. 1949].
142 LNA 2476/11, memorandum from King to Government Secretary, n.d. [c. Dec. 1949].
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Order was not discussed in the Council and, as the reaction to Sheddick’s report 
indicates, the Secretariat went against the wishes of the Department of Agriculture and 
followed the line that mountain cattle-post areas were open to all, regardless of which 
Principal Chief controlled the area.
According to this interpretation the cattle-post areas came directly under the jurisdiction 
of the Paramount Chief (holding the land in trust for ‘the nation’). Administration of 
the areas was, however, devolved to the ward Chiefs who were to act, in effect, as 
caretakers.143 This meant that there were advantages for ‘Mantsebo in both analyses of 
the ‘customary’ law: under Sheddick’s interpretation she could exclude any livestock 
owner from outside the three wards she ran directly (Matsieng, Likoele and 
Mokhotlong) which in total accounted for a large percentage of the mountain grazing 
area, while under Duncan’s interpretation she could intervene in the way other Chiefs 
ran the cattle-post grazing within their wards.
7.5.5. The 1950 Order
This is exactly what she did in a new Order dated 3 August 1950.144 This new Order 
instructed all ward chiefs that they must set aside ‘pasture improvement areas’ (i.e. 
areas closed for grazing) within the areas under their jurisdiction. It is unclear to what 
extent this Order was made under the Department of Agriculture’s instructions but 
unlike the 1946 order they were very much in favour of it. The fact that a meeting was 
arranged some time after the Order was passed for King to explain to ‘Mantsebo, her 
advisors and other chiefs and headman from Matsieng ward ‘the technical reasons for 
putting unsuitable areas back to grass and also to inform them of the political necessity 
for such measures’ suggests where the impetus probably came from.145
District Commissioners in various parts of the country took the new Order as a signal to 
pressurise local ward chiefs to close areas of cattle-post grazing. The degree to which 
this occurred was largely determined by the keenness of the particular District 
Commissioner and the ward Chief. In Mohales Hoek Stanford Driver was particularly 
concerned about the grazing areas around the headwaters of the Qabane river. He 
‘suggested’ that ‘Mamohato Bereng Lerotholi close the area on a one-year-on, one- 
year-off rotation and that she appoint caretakers to ensure the regulations were enacted:
143 Oral informants in Mokhotlong reported this was their understanding of what the position had been, 
informants 7,8 and 15 (Table 9.1).
144 Order 41/1950, referred to in Duncan, Sotho Laws and Customs, p. 78.
145 LNA 2476/II[I], Forsyth-Thompson to ‘Mantsebo, 23 September 1950.
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The caretakers must be good and reliable men because your action in closing a 
considerable mountain area will not be popular and cattle post owners will no 
doubt deliberately poach in the closed area. You must not, however, shirk the 
responsibility of closing each area in turn for I can assure you that the area at the 
Qabane headwaters is very badly denuded and something drastic must be done 
without delay.146
Driver’s other instructions indicated that there was still a degree of confusion over the 
exact rights of Ward Chiefs to restrict access to people from other wards. He claimed 
that the damage had been ‘caused chiefly by stock... from Qacha’s Nek district’ and 
that the Chief of Phamong should order these stock owners to remove their cattle posts 
as soon as possible.147
The 1950 Order from the Paramount Chief once again fed into the boundary dispute 
between Mohale’s Hoek and Mafeteng districts which seems to have continued despite 
the February 1948 ruling. In October 1951 Driver and ‘Mamohato Bereng decided that 
a large area to the east of Qhoobeng river should be closed to all grazing, but it was 
discovered that there were many livestock belonging to residents of Matelile ward in 
Mafeteng district grazing in the area. By November 1951 these animals had not been 
removed so Driver sent a telegram to ‘Mantsebo asking her to intervene and instruct the 
chief of Matelile, Joel Moholobela, to has his followers remove their stock.148 To 
Driver’s annoyance this only resulted in an increase in the number of livestock from 
Matelile ward grazing in the area.149 It is not clear what happened to the plans to close 
this area after this date as there is no further correspondence on the relevant file. 
Driver’s actions in this particular mountain grazing zone suggest that District 
Commissioners were, like Ward Chiefs, well aware of the potential political uses of 
grazing regulations. It seems more than likely that Driver was keen to implement this 
general closure in order to prevent the possibility of further conflicts over grazing land.
7.5.6. The 1955 Order
The confusion over whether or not Principal Chiefs had a right to deny access to 
livestock owners from other wards was clarified by a further Order from the Paramount 
Chief. As in 1950, and in contrast to the 1946 and 1949 instructions, this Order had the 
full backing of the Basutoland administration and essentially settled the dispute by 
giving the Department of Agriculture much greater rights to determine the grazing 
pattern in the mountain cattle-post areas. The Order stated that the cattle-post grazing
14^ LNA 2476 II[I], Driver to Chief of Phamong, 2 November 1951.
147 LNA 2476 II[I], Driver to Chief of Phamong, 2 November 1951.
148 LNA 2476 II[I], Driver to ‘Mantsebo, 10 November 1951.
149 LNA 2476 II[I], Driver to Government Secretary, 19 December 1951.
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areas would be the responsibility of the Principal Chief of each ward but that this was a 
function that was delegated to them by the Paramount Chief, at whose ‘disposal’ the 
whole cattle-post area remained. The Principal Chief did not have the right to refuse 
permission to anyone who requested grazing in the ward unless this would ‘result in the 
carrying capacity of the ward being exceeded’. The grazing areas would be divided 
into sections, defined by natural boundaries and not greater than 12 square miles, and 
the Department of Agriculture would set a specific carrying capacity for each individual 
section. A written record of this had to be kept by each Principal Chief and each 
livestock owner had to apply for written permission to graze in the section on a yearly 
basis.150
The plan to divide the whole mountain grazing area into sections and then determine the 
carrying capacity was never carried out. Bowmaker had attempted to do this while on 
trek in Mokhotlong in 1952 but had found the maps available too inaccurate and aerial 
photographs too confusing without the correct equipment and had abandoned the 
attempt.151 In 1955 the Department of Agriculture recognised that the work involved in 
assessing the carrying capacity would be ‘heavy’ but argued that the new 1:50,000 map 
series then being prepared would make the job possible.152 In the 1956 Annual Report 
it was reported that ‘fair progress’ had been made in assessing the carrying capacity153 
but archival evidence again casts doubt on this claim as the survey appeared not to have 
even been started by June 1956. In Mokhotlong, Madere was reported to be keen to 
carry out the Order but the Agricultural Department were ‘anxious that no unilateral 
action should be taken...until the carrying capacity of the Territory as a whole be 
determined’.154 Neither the survey, nor the Order, were mentioned in any subsequent 
annual report and I have found no reference to either of them in post-1956 archival 
material.155
The 1955 Order essentially marked the end of a ten year period in which concerns over 
the deterioration of mountain pastures had been central to the Basutoland 
administration. Bowmaker, the Department of Agriculture official most closely 
involved with the mountain grazing ‘problem’, had been promoted to the position of
150 Order 1/1955 issued by ‘Mantsebo on 18 November 1955, reproduced as Appendix IV of 
Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1955, p. 65-66. See p. 9 of the Annual 
Report for a discussion of the Order.
151 See chapter 9.
152 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1955, p. 9.
153 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1956, p. 10.
154 PRO D035/4361, Basutoland: Paramount Chief Regent, Extract from Tergos, no.6, Junel956.
155 Stephen Lawry states that the stock limitation elements of the 1955 grazing regulations were ‘in no 
instance applied’; Lawry, ‘Private Herds and Common Lands’, p. 110.
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Director when King was transferred to Uganda in 1954 and presumably had less time to 
devote to the issue. He died in 1957 while still in the post. With pressure from South 
Africa off, and a run of years with good rainfall, the 1955 Order was quietly forgotten 
as concerns over the mountain grazing waned.156
7.6. Semi-private and public rights to grazing
The debate within the Basutoland administration over the interpretation of ‘customary’ 
law of access to mountain pastures curiously ignored an important factor raised by 
Sheddick in his report on Land Tenure: namely the contrast between public rights to 
grazing and (semi)private rights to cattle-posts. As the communal nature of grazing 
land was consistently cited as the primary cause of overgrazing this lacuna in the debate 
is highly significant.
Since the early 1930s the problem of overgrazing on Lesotho’s mountain pastures has 
tended to be blamed on a ‘primitive’ communal land tenure system. Because access to 
grazing land was communal, the argument went, it did not make sense for an individual 
to reduce his livestock holdings to within the carrying capacity as this did not affect the 
actions of other livestock owners using the same area of rangeland.157 In his initial 
report in 1931 Thornton suggested that the key problem in the mountain areas was that 
communal tenure stifled all individual effort, and that the objective of the Basutoland 
authorities should be the development of individual land-tenure arrangements. While 
different policies came and went this basic belief persisted: in 1958 the Department of 
Agriculture Annual Report described the land tenure system as ‘antiquated, out of date 
and ... the basic cause of all drawbacks in the proper usage of land in Basutoland’.158
As I have indicated above, however, there was always a tension between this stated 
objective of moving towards a system of individual tenure and the political and 
administrative needs of a colonial state based on Indirect Rule. The Basutoland 
authorities could never determine a policy that would reform land tenure arrangements 
without destroying the power of the chiefs and, with the exception of the Agricultural 
Improvement Areas scheme, they tended to steer clear of the issue. Given this tension
156 Elements of the Order were later included in the 1959 revision of the Laws of Lerotholi (Part in, 
Orders made under section 8(i) of Proclamation 61/1938). Significantly the sections of Order 
1/1955 relating to the ulimate authority of the Paramount Chief were dropped from the 1959 Laws 
of Lerotholi where section 5(i) states that ‘Control of grazing in the cattlepost areas shall be the 
responsibility of the Principal or Ward Chief in whose ward the grazing is found’ (p. 45-46).
157 In recent literature on African rangelands this idea is often associated with Hardin, G. ‘The Tragedy 
of the Commons’, Science, 162,1968, pp. 1243-8.
158 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1958, p. 14.
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it is perhaps surprising that there was never an attempt to question the exact tenure 
arrangements on the mountain pastures to determine if they really were communal. As 
Sheddick pointed out, access to grazing might be communal but access to cattle-posts 
themselves was (semi)private.
In order to graze livestock on the mountain pastures it was, and still is, necessary to 
have access to a cattle-post. Even though cattle-posts were usually no more than rough 
stone huts they provided vital shelter for herd-boys: even in summer months 
temperatures can plummet to below freezing at night. Livestock clustered near the huts 
or were kraaled in stone enclosures at night as protection from the elements, predators 
and thieves.159 Livestock were released early in the morning and foraged over the 
surrounding hillsides, with smallstock tending to graze on the slopes above a cattle post 
and largestock on the lower valley slopes. Livestock returned to the kraal with minimal 
herding each night. In 1937 Staples and Hudson reported that this practise had only 
begun a few years previously because of a sharp increase in stock theft, but, as herd- 
boys would still have needed shelter, livestock would have had to remain fairly close to 
a cattle-post even if they were not kraaled at night. The pattern of grazing on the 
mountain pastures was therefore largely determined by the location of cattle-posts. As 
these were scattered at intervals along the valleys, often on an exposed spur to afford a 
good view of the areas to be grazed, each cattle-post had its own more or less discreet 
grazing area.160 Individual cattle post owners had, in effect, a de facto private grazing 
area surrounding their cattle post. Even where these overlapped, neighbouring cattle- 
post owners tended to be relatives or close friends161 and were, therefore, probably able 
to come to mutually acceptable grazing strategies.
159 Ashton (The Basuto, p. 137) whose fieldwork was mainly carried out in the late 1930s reported that 
cattle-posts only occasionally had stone stock-pens while Sheddick (Land Tenure, p. 106) who 
carried out fieldwork in the late 1940s suggested that every cattle-post had at least one walled 
stock-pen. Dobb (‘The Organization of Range Use in Lesotho’) reported that smallstock were 
kraaled each night but that largestock were allowed to graze where they chose and only checked 
every few days.
160 Dobb ( ‘The Organization of Range Use in Lesotho’) working in the mid-1980s, reported that 
livestock from different cattle posts often used overlapping areas but the significantly lower density 
of cattle posts in the 1940s and 50s would have made this more unusual (see Table 7.1):
Table 7.1 Numbers of cattleposts in five cattlepost areas 1936-1988
Valley__________ 1936 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1988
Langalabalele 2 2 3 4 7 7 14
Jareteng 2 3 5 6 14 12 20
Merareng 0 1 3 4 4 4 12
Sanqebethu 1 1 1 1 2 3 6
Khohlo Li Ntia 0 0 0 2 3 8 9
From Quinlan, ‘The Livestock Economy in the Mountain Zone’, p. 70 
161 Quinlan, ‘The Livestock Economy in the Mountain Zone of Lesotho’.
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It was widely accepted that according to ‘customary* law every livestock owner had to 
get permission from the Ward Chief before constructing a cattle post. When Baring 
originally spoke to Chief Matlere he was specifically told that the Ward Chief could 
stop the construction of cattle posts but he had no right to determine how people who 
had been granted cattle posts grazed the area (as I showed above, Matlere later changed 
his story and reported that the ward chief could also declare leboella at the cattle 
posts).162 This version of ‘customary’ law was supported by Duncan who stated that ‘it 
has always been necessary for a person wishing to establish a cattle-post to obtain first 
the permission of the chief of the mountain area’.163 Allen Dobb reported that in the 
mid-1980s it was still the case that people had first to seek permission from the Ward 
Chief but that this was not always done. If the surrounding cattle-post owners did not 
want someone new moving into the area they would report him to the Ward Chief, but 
if they did not mind the new arrival they would say nothing.164
The tenure of a cattle post was essentially the same as the tenure of a village site. Once 
it had been allocated, the owner had a right to occupy the site and the chief was not 
allowed to reallocate it or order its removal unless it had been abandoned by the owner. 
Cattle posts were also freely inheritable.165
All this meant that despite the frequent statements to the contrary the mountain cattle- 
post area did not represent a open-access zone. Although an individual livestock owner 
could not legally prevent another livestock owner from grazing within the sphere of his 
cattle post, the reality of the grazing regime in the mountains must have made this a rare 
occurrence. The whole theory underlying the Department of Agriculture’s 
understanding of overgrazing in the mountains therefore looks more than a little shaky. 
If livestock owners had more or less exclusive use of the pasture area surrounding their 
cattle post the Department’s goal of individual tenure had, in practice if not in theory, 
already been achieved.
Interestingly the Department of Agriculture obliquely stated that this was the case in its 
1944 Annual Report by making a comparison between the mountain and village grazing 
areas:
With the exception of the high mountain cattle post areas, where individually
owned flocks and herds graze the area surrounding the cattle post, the grazing
162 D035/1180/Y950/5, Baring to Machtig, 25th February 1946.
163 Duncan, Sotho Laws and Customs, p. 84.
164 Dobb, ‘The Organization of Range Use in Lesotho’, p. 193.
165 Duncan, Sotho Law and Customs, p. 85.
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attached to villages is communal and under the control of the local Chief or 
Headman.166
A statement by Leakie, written in an internal memorandum around the same time, 
arguing that each individual cattle-post owner would have to be responsible for grazing 
control in the area around his cattle post, suggests that he might have been the source 
of the observation in the Annual Report.161 Whatever the source of the idea, however, 
it was not repeated in subsequent Annual Reports or Departmental correspondence and 
certainly never informed policy.
Indeed the grazing closure policy, and other recommendations, showed a total disregard
for the reality of the grazing regime in the mountains. When the Department of
Agriculture talked of closing areas to grazing or enforcing large-scale rotations, it never
discussed the cost to the average Mosotho livestock owner. Though cattle posts tended
to be no more than simple stone huts, their construction involved a significant input of
labour and capital. If the area in which a cattle post was sited was subsequently closed
to grazing, the livestock owner may have been able to negotiate the use of a friend’s or
relative’s cattle post in an area still open for grazing168 or negotiated a mafisa (loaning
out) arrangement but would have lost all the returns on the investment in the original
cattle post. If no relative or friend was able to help, or if he was unwilling to enter a
mafisa arrangement, a livestock owner would have had to find a new location for a
cattle post, negotiate permission with the Ward Chief and construct a new hut and kraal.
Because the tenure arrangements on the mountain pastures had been labelled as
communal, however, there seemed to have been an assumption amongst the Basutoland
authorities that it was easy for livestock owners to simply move their herds to a new
area. In the words of A.D. Forsyth-Thompson, the Resident Commissioner:
the removal o f ... stock in itself would not present any great problem (other of 
course than the disinclination of the people concerned to move).169
While the Basutoland authorities may have constantly blamed overgrazing on 
‘primitive’ land tenure, it was also in their interests to emphasise the communal nature 
of land ownership in reference to their development projects. By ignoring the 
individual tenure aspects of land ownership they were better able to justify large-scale 
land-use reorganisations. A similar tendency has been noted by Mary Tiffin in her
166 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1944, p. 3.
167 LNA 2076, Agriculture: Plans for post-war development, Memorandum by Leakie, n.d. [c.1944], 
p.9.
168 Quinlan ( ‘The Livestock Economy in the Mountain Zone’) reports that at the time o f his fieldwork, 
in the late 1980s, this was a common occurrence.
169 PRO DO35/1180/Y950/3, Forsyth-Thompson to Baring, 13 June 1946.
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work on Machakos district in Kenya. Here the individual nature of Akamba rights to
land was clearer than in Lesotho but nevertheless:
Most administrators and agriculturalists preferred to believe that African land was 
managed by tribal authorities and that individuals held only use rights. This 
conveniently implied that a right to use another piece of land could be substituted 
if the government for any reason wanted to dispossess the user.170
The Akamba on the other hand stressed the individual nature of their land holdings and
were keen to have their tenure arrangements recognised by the Kenyan colonial state.
Even where colonial development projects did result in individual tenure arrangements
these were often in the form of leasehold rather than freehold arrangements. The
Swaziland Land Settlement Scheme allocated plots of land to settlers under a system of
leasehold using ‘Certificates of Occupancy’. Peasant farmers who did not abide by
conditions of occupation imposed by the colonial government could be evicted from the
plots. Thornton commented on the issue:
I have come to the conclusion that there is no surer way of ruining the land than 
where freehold is applied in the case of people who have not developed 
sufficiently to permit of their realizing that the land is not theirs to ruin for rapid 
temporary gain, but is only theirs to to live from economically, and has to be 
maintained and even built up for proseprity. I would strongly recommend that in 
the case of the land in Swaziland leasehold tenure be applied.171
Unlike the Akamba, Basotho tended to avoid any reference to aspects of the tenure 
system that emphasised the rights of the individual. For the chiefs the reason was 
obvious, but for commoners the stress on communal ownership was also politically 
advantageous. The linking of rights to land with membership of the Basotho nation was 
seen as a vital element in the battle against land alienation and transfer. Lekhotla la 
Bafo often complained about the presence of European traders on the grounds that they 
had no right to secure tenure of residential plots as they were not members of the 
nation.172
170 Tiffin, M. ‘Land and Capital: Blind Spots in the Study of the ‘Resource-Poor’ Farmer’ in Leach and 
Meams,77ie Lie of the Land, pp. 168-185, p. 171.
171 Swaziland National Archives 486F, Report on Native Land Settlement Scheme, 22 March 1949, 
quoted in Simelane, H.S. ‘Landlessness and the Imperial Response in Swaziland, 1938-1950’, 
Journal o f Southern African Studies, 17,4,1991, pp. 717-741, p. 730-1.
172 See for example Presidential Address, Maseru ,13 October 1929, LNA S3/22/2/4 in Edgar,
Prophets with Honour, p. 103-111. Berry ( ‘Hegemony on a Shoestring’) notes similar motivations 
across sub-Saharan Africa: in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, for example, the communal nature of 
land tenure was used as an argument against plans by the colonial state to declare all ‘vacant’ land 
as Crown property.
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7.7. Land alienation and opposition to fencing
Fears about the possibility of land alienation also largely explain the more or less 
universal opposition to fencing that existed in colonial Lesotho, especially if the fencing 
was erected by the colonial state. The Basutoland authorities recognised that any large- 
scale fencing plan would be extremely expensive, especially taking into account the 
country’s broken topography, and would only lead to vocal opposition. Fencing was 
not, therefore, ever carried out to the same extent as it was in either the reserve areas of 
South Africa or Southern Rhodesia.
The anti-erosion scheme initiated by Thornton in Herschel district, South Africa, had
included substantial investments in fencing to protect areas suffering from severe
erosion. The Pirn Commission recommended that this part of the scheme should not be
attempted in Lesotho, noting that:
Fencing is...regarded with intense suspicion and ... an attempt should be made to 
give the necessary protection to the slopes on the lines of ancient custom instead 
of adopting measures which would antagonise both the Chiefs and the people.173
Where fencing was erected, for example around the experimental plots discussed in 
chapter 8, great pains were taken to ensure that the local ward chief agreed to the plan.
Despite the extremely cautious attitude of the Basutoland authorities the few projects 
that did include fencing were met with resistance from Basotho. During the Second 
World Ward the Department of Agriculture was particularly keen to increase output of 
food crops, in line with general imperial policy. As they believed low yields were 
primarily the result of low soil fertility they placed a particular emphasis on the 
manuring of arable fields. The removal of manure to use as fuel was identified as a 
major issue and it was decided that they should encourage the planting of trees as a way 
of increasing the availability of fuel wood.174 This scheme was criticised by Lekhotla la 
Bafo both because tree planting was done under the matsema labour system and 
because the tree plantations were fenced.175 The difficulties the Basutoland authorities 
encountered with this limited fencing scheme, and its expense, discouraged them from 
using any fencing in the grazing closure policies attempted in the decade following the 
Second World War.176
173 Pim, Financial and Economic Position o f Basutoland, p. 139.
174 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1942, p.2.
175 Rabase Sekike to Chieftainess ’Matsaba Seeiso, 2 February 1941 and 30 May 1943, MA 1/33, in 
Edgar, Prophets with Honour, p.137-139 and 140-142.
176 See Lambert, R.T. ‘Notes on a trip to Basutoland and South Africa, February - March 1945’, 
unpublished report, Rhodes House, Oxford, Mss Afr.s.397(9).
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The lack of emphasis on fencing is in stark contrast to grazing schemes in the South 
African and Southern Rhodesia reserves. In Zimutu reserve, Southern Rhodesia, a 
grazing scheme begun the same year as the Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek closures 
involved the fencing of 1,460 hectares into four paddocks.177 In South Africa the 
Director of Native Agriculture saw fencing as the key to the development of ‘modem 
agriculture’.178 Fencing became a potent symbol in the conflicts between Africans and 
the settler state in decade between the mid-1940s and mid-1950s, and the cutting of 
fencing became one of the major acts of resistance to the state’s rehabilitation 
policies.179
7.8. Livestock culling
The second crucial area in which the Basutoland authorities felt unable to intervene was 
in the forcible culling of livestock populations. This does not mean, however, that the 
Department of Agriculture did not see a smaller national livestock population as an 
important objective.
As we saw above the Director of Veterinary Services in the Department introduced the 
idea of culling to the 1925 National Council, but it was flatly rejected and the scheme 
was dropped. Six years later, when Thornton first reported on Lesotho’s mountain 
pastures, he also recommended that the livestock population be reduced, saying that 
there were twice too many head of smallstock in the country. Thornton recommended 
that a start be made by placing a tax on ‘surplus sheep’. He did not fully define the 
concept but it seemed to imply the number of sheep an individual person held above the 
country’s carrying capacity divided by the adult male population.180
While the Department of Agriculture were discussing how to implement Thornton’s 
recommendations the livestock population in Lesotho altered, in the words of one 
official, in a ‘most unexpected manner’.181 The succession of droughts in the early 
1930s and a slump in world wool and mohair prices meant that Thornton’s goal of 
halving the smallstock population was achieved without any government intervention 
whatsoever (see Figure 4.5).182 This was greeted with mixed feelings by the
177 Robinson, D.A. Pasture Improvement in Zimutu Reserve (Bulletin No. 1578, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Lands, Sailsbury, 1951).
178 Beinart, ‘Soil Erosion, Conservation and Ideas about Development’, p.80.
179 Mager, ‘The People Get Fenced’.
180 LNA 212, Thornton, R.W., Report on Pastoral and Agricultural Conditions in Basutoland, n.d. [c. 
July 1931].
181 LNA 212, Principal Veterinary Officer to Government Secretary, 8 February 1933.
182 Mohair prices dropped from about 20p per lb in 1929 to between 2 and 3p per lb in 1932, Uys, The
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Basutoland administration. On the one hand they felt that all that was now needed for 
pasture improvement was ‘plenteous rains’,183 but on the other that the decrease in 
livestock meant that there were ‘not sufficient oxen for ploughing purposes’.184 It was 
decided that for the time being no further moves should be made to reduce the livestock 
population. This decision was, however, to be short-lived and it was not long before 
new calls for a reduced livestock population began to be heard.
Despite the fact that the sheep population remained at a level roughly half that deplored 
by Thornton in 1931 and the goat and cattle populations rose only very slowly from 
comparably low levels there were persistent calls for a reduction in the total livestock 
population from the late 1930s onwards. The fact that the livestock population had 
fallen so dramatically in the first half of the 1930s meant, however, that the Department 
of Agriculture often got itself into a state of confusion over the issue of overgrazing. 
They were sure that livestock culling was the correct policy, but by their own 
calculations it hardly seemed necessary.
The Mochochonono newspaper exploited this confusion in a June 1947 article in which 
it reported a recent conversation between a deputation of ‘Basuto farmers’ (presumably 
members of the Progressive Association) and Forsyth-Thompson. According to 
Mochochonono Forsyth-Thompson had told them that the country was not overstocked 
and that it had more than sufficient pastures for the present animals.185 Mochochonono 
argued (I would suggest correctly) that this meant that the Department of Agriculture’s 
attitude towards livestock culling was ‘based more on theory than upon experience and 
practice’.186
The Basutoland administration responded in a lengthy letter, signed by T.B. Kennan the 
Government Secretary, which the newspaper printed in full. He agreed that the 
country’s livestock population was well within the accepted carrying capacity but that 
this figure represented the position ‘once the grazing has been rehabilitated’. Kennan 
went on to argue that large areas of the country were heavily degraded because stock 
were concentrated in certain areas and that they needed to be properly redistributed.
The recently instituted closure policies would ensure that this redistribution occurred
Lesotho Mohair Industry.
183 LNA 212, Principal Veterinary Officer to Government Secretary, 8 February 1933.
184 LNA 212, file note by Sturrock, n.d. [c. March 1933].
185 Leakie made a similar statement in the Basutoland National Council in 1944, Proceedings o f the 
39th Session, 1944, p. 255.
186 Editorial, ‘Limitation of Stock’, Mochochonono, 14 June 1947.
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but it had to be carried out ‘conscientiously’ and with ‘great urgency’. He finished with
a barely veiled threat:
If limitation, redistribution and grazing management are carefully observed, it is 
hoped that the reduction in stock may be unnecessary.187
This threat, and others of it kind, were apparently taken relatively seriously by members
of the National Council who often spoke in favour of grazing control in the same breath
as speaking against compulsory culling. Even Josiel Lefela spoke up in favour of
grazing control policies188 while a Councillor from Qacha’s Nek best summed up the
general opinion of the Council:
I agree firmly that control of grazing... is the only solution, not that the country is 
overstocked.189
Despite the fact that the livestock population seemed to be below the government 
calculations of the country’s carrying capacity a whole series of policies were enacted 
from the mid 1930s through to the late 1940s, designed to keep the livestock population 
low. These were mostly concerned with placing restrictions on imports, encouraging 
exports and castrating ‘bastard’ rams and ‘scrub’ bulls. The various Proclamations 
promulgated by the High Commissioner resulted in numerous complaints in the 
National Council, many of whose members believed that the livestock population was 
too low, and should increase.190 Another constant complaint in the National Council 
was that white traders were allowed to circumvent the rules191 and that Free State 
farmers waited near the border crossings and brought up any livestock prevented from 
entering Lesotho at extremely low prices.192
While these ad hoc control policies seemed to fulfil the Basutoland authorities desire to
do something about the overall livestock population, the advent of a Nationalist
government in South Africa encouraged them to consider more direct reduction
policies. As we saw in chapter 6, a letter from Baring to Forsyth-Thompson makes it
clear where the motivation for a more interventionist policy emanated from:
I think it is particularly important for all three High Commission Territories to 
emphasise the measures we are taking to enforce in the future the limitation of 
stock. My impression from conversations with the Union authorities and from
187 Letter from Kennan, T.B. Mochochonono, 5 July 1947. Copy of original in LNA 2526, Kennan to 
the Editor of Mochochonono, 26 June 1947.
188 Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f the 44th Session, 1948, p. 221.
189 Councillor Theko Bereng, Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f  the 44th Session, 1948, p. 
173.
190 See for example discussion in Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f the 45th Session, 1949, 
p. 153-166.
191 See for example discussion in Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f  the 47th Session, 1951, 
p.484-491.
192 See for example a statement by Councillor K. Moelesi, Basutoland National Council, Proceedings 
of the 43rd Session, 1947, p.562.
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visiting Betterment Areas in the Transkei is that (i) they lay more emphasis on the 
limitation of stock and the improvement of pasture than they do on the protection 
of arable land and (ii) they believe that without compulsory limitation no measure 
to save the soil are of any use193
Just months after the election victory of the National Party in South Africa the 
Basutoland authorities raised the issue of reducing the goat population to the National 
Council. The desire to mount a particular attack on goats had existed for many years. 
Thornton had regarded goats as ‘uneconomical’ and ‘destructive’,194 and his distaste for 
the animal was shared by his successors. While they believed that an attack on the goat 
population would not be as unpopular as moves to reduce the sheep or cattle population 
the Basutoland authorities were nevertheless concerned that the National Council might 
reject the plans.
The debate in 1948 was inconclusive, with a number of speakers picking-up on the
contradiction pointed out by the Mochochonono newspaper the previous year. One
speaker referred to a speech made by Leakie at the Umkomozane meeting in March
1947 in which he ‘stated that the number of livestock... is lower as compared with
former times’.195 P.A.O. Bowmaker, who stood in as Acting Director of Agriculture
between Leakie’s departure in April 1948 and King’s arrival in October, attempted to
re-interpret his former boss’s comments in a way that suited their present task:
When Mr Leakie... said that the country was not overstocked that was not exactly 
what he meant. He intended to say that if the grazing in Basutoland was as it 
should be it could carry all the stock which was in the territory at that time, 
providing that the stock were properly distributed and not clustered in the 
neighbourhood of the villages and in certain grazing areas.196
Although many members spoke out against any plans to reduce the goat population they 
did agree to elect a committee to look into the issue. While the Basutoland authorities 
claimed that the committee was representative of a cross section of the country’s goat 
owners, in reality it was dominated by close advisors to the Paramount Chief. The 
Angora Goat Committee, chaired by King, met in April 1949 and agreed to recommend 
a plan to reduce the total goat population by 25 percent over 5 years.197 
Much was made of the plan by the Department of Agriculture but it was extremely 
short on details. Quite how the mechanism was to work was totally unclear. All that
193 PRO DOl 19/1442, Baring to Forsyth-Thompson, 11 October 1949.
194 LNA 2076, Thornton’s comments on Memorandum on post-war development prepared by Leakie, 
n.d.
195 Samuel Matate, Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f the 44th Session, 1948, p.175.
196 P.A.O. Bowmaker, Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f the 44th Session, 1948, p.176.
197 Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f the 45th Session, 1949, p.167.
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was agreed was that goats would be purchased and exported by the Department of 
Agriculture and that Ward Chiefs would organise ‘the presentation for goats for 
purchase’. As a quid pro quo the Department of Agriculture would buy good quality 
angora goat rams which would be sold at reduced prices to Basotho flock owners.198
The second part of the scheme was the only part of it to be implemented. In 1950 and 
1951 almost 200 hundred rams were imported, using funds from the Wool and Mohair 
Fund and re-sold at reduced prices.199 Presumably the rams tended to be brought by the 
better off angora goat owners running large commercial herds. As the early 1950s were 
a time of generally good mohair prices (see Figure 9.2), these livestock owners were 
probably entirely satisfied by the intervention.
The actual plans for reducing the goat population were somewhat hazy. They seemed 
to involve a system whereby livestock owners would be forced to sell their goats to the 
Department of Agriculture at the current market price in Durban where the Department 
would then re-sell the goats. It was not clear how the people forced to sell, or the 
number they would have sell, was going to be determined. The original plans had 
suggested this would be the responsibility of ward chiefs but the Department of 
Agriculture later claimed that the plans were held up by delays in appointing 
Development Officers who were to undertake the work. Until there was one 
Development Officer per district it was deemed ‘not desirable on political grounds’ to 
commence the plan.200
Despite a half-hearted attempt to revive the plan at a meeting between Forsyth- 
Thompson, Bowmaker and the Paramount Chiefs advisers in March 1953, the plan was 
never translated into action. At that meeting the Paramount Chiefs advisers objected to 
the plan to pay the current market price in Durban as they said traders in Lesotho were 
paying higher prices. They were, however, willing to support, a scheme whereby the 
Department of Agriculture would pay the current local market price for goats whose 
meat would then be distributed to ‘lepers, lunatics and prisoners’. Bowmaker pointed 
out that there was no way the Department could subsidise such a scheme, and he 
suggested instead a tax on all Boer goats to encourage people to sell.201 This plan was 
not greeted with enthusiasm by the advisers and, as with Thornton’s original proposal in 
1931 for taxing ‘surplus sheep’, the policy was never implemented. Through-out the
198 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1949, p.79.
199 LNA 2537/III, King to Government Secretary, 13 May 1952.
200 LNA 2537/ni, King to Government Secretary, 13 May 1952.
201 LNA 2537/m, Extracts of a meeting between the Resident Commissioner and the Paramount 
C hiefs advisers, 18 March 1953.
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colonial period all that the Basutoland authorities could do to reduce the livestock 
population was to try to control imports and encourage exports; they were never able 
either to intervene directly and cull livestock or to introduce grazing fees or livestock 
taxes.
7.9. Conclusion
One of the reasons the Basutoland authorities were keen to try to revive the goat 
reduction campaign in the early 1950s was that ‘Mantsebo had spoke out in favour of 
the idea. Early on in ‘Mantsebo’s reign the British authorities decided that they should 
try to interest her in agricultural development issues. This was largely because they 
wanted her support in getting the National Council to accept their plans for Agricultural 
Improvement Areas but also because they hoped it would divert her attention from 
political battles with her chiefly rivals. Evelyn Baring’s approach to Basutoland in 
general and ‘Mantsebo in particular was to ‘try to divert attention from political to 
agricultural issues’.202 Through-out her reign they continued to pursue this policy and 
she frequently went along with their programme.
Under the reforms of the late 1930s and early 1940s the powers of the Paramount Chief 
had become increasingly circumscribed, and functions that the Paramount Chief had 
previously controlled individually were increasingly usurped by either the National 
Council or the colonial state. Agricultural development policies were one of the few 
arenas in which the Paramount Chief could find a space in which to negotiate power. 
Marc Epprecht has noted that “ Mantsebo and other female chiefs were ... known for 
employing innovative means to increase the powers and prestige of their office’. He, 
however, underestimates just how ‘innovative’ ‘Mantsebo could be when he argues that 
she:
won grudging respect from the British by her willingness to enforce the often 
highly unpopular erosion control laws on her lands, an extension of her authority 
she eagerly embrace in the name of ‘progress’.203
The evidence cited above suggests she was even more innovative in the way she chose
to enforce, or not to enforce, erosion control and other development policies. In the
next chapter I will show how she used the Department of Agriculture’s plans for
experimental grazing control plots to her own material advantage and in chapter 9 I
202 PRO D035/4007, Baring to Machtig, 24 June 1947. See also PRO D035/4010, Baring to Gordon 
Walker, 22 October 1950.
203 Epprecht, M. ‘Women’s “Conservatism” and the Politics of Gender in Late Colonial Lesotho’, 
Journal o f African History, 36,1995, pp. 25-56, p. 42. This assessment is based on personal 
correspondence between Epprecht and Gordon Hector, Deputy Resident Commissioner and 
Government Secretary, 1956-1965, who may not have been fully aware of ‘Mantsebo’s 
manoeuvrings over grazing control orders earlier in the 1950s.
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discuss how her support for grazing control in the ward of Mokhotlong significantly 
bolstered her political position and that of her closest adviser and lover, Chief Matlere 
Lerotholi.
In his review of literature on rural resistance in sub-Saharan Africa in 1990, Allen
Isaacman comments:
Even when the colonial administration used strong hereditary chiefs, these 
historic authorities had little room to negotiate. As a result, their ability to 
command mass loyalty and to govern by consensus declined. Chiefs had to make 
a judicious calculation of when to enforce colonial policies and when to speak out 
in opposition to the state. Each had an obvious cost. However much they may 
have wished to straddle [these two options], most chiefs usually opted to be 
loyalists.204
The political ingenuity of ‘Mantsebo, Matlere and other senior chiefs concerning 
development policies suggests a slightly different perspective. Another option pursued 
with great skill by some senior chiefs in Lesotho was to speak out in favour of the 
colonial policies but then either to manipulate the implementation to their own political 
ends or not to implement them at all, all the while saying that the implementation is 
progressing satisfactorily.
Basutoland and High Commission officials regularly pointed to the senior chiefs as
being the key to the successful implementation of soil conservation and other
development policies. Evelyn Baring was especially keen to emphasise the central role
played by the chiefly authorities in the remote mountain areas:
It is they and they alone who will be able to enforce rotational grazing and stock 
limitation in the steep valleys of the roadless mountain country which makes up 
the catchment of the Orange...Basutoland’s survival as a political unit separate 
from the Union depends on the success of soil conservation. This, in turn, 
depends on the co-operation of the chiefs and the maintenance of their 
authority.205
This emphais on the role of chiefs in the development process meant that, while the 
general trend from the 1910s through to the 1960s was for the political position of the 
chiefs to come under increasing pressure, from both a more interventionist colonial 
state and political organisations commanding mass support, a few of the most powerful 
chiefs were able to find significant ‘room to negotiate’ in the arena of development, 
especially in the period between the mid-1940s and mid-1950s.
204 Isaacman, ‘Peasants and Rural Social Protest in Africa’, p.41.
205 PRO DO35/4025, Notes by Sir E. Baring on the Political and Economic Position of the HC 
Territories, [c.1950]. This was sentiment expressed often and forcably by Baring, also see, for 
example, PRO D035/4010, Baring to Gordon Walker, 22 October 1950 and Baring to Liesching, 
20 July 1951.
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While I have tended to contrast the developmental policies in Lesotho with those in
South Africa and Southern Rhodesia some recent research has suggested that even in
the settler states there were, on occasions, significant opportunities for chiefs to
negotiate a more complex route between the two poles of resistance or loyalty than
Isaacman’s simple dichotomy suggests. Jocelyn Alexander’s detailed examination of
agrarian policy and rural politics in two districts of Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe from
the 1940s through to the 1990s reveals just such an approach amongst local chiefs,
especially when ‘officials were thin on the ground, as they often were’.206 The
following statement by Alexander could serve equally well for Lesotho:
Government officials’ reliance on chiefs to maintain order and implement policies 
allowed chiefs a flexible space in which to negotiate for concessions and to 
undermine or mitigate the impact of policies. The state’s success in implementing 
policies, and in co-opting rural leaders has been exaggerated: policies did not 
have the effects they were intended or which were claimed for them.207
Nevertheless there are some key contrasts between the reserve areas of settler states and 
the Indirect Rule colony of Lesotho. The first obvious contrast was in the opportunities 
available to senior chiefs to scupper policies before they were even implemented. The 
Basutoland administration’s desire to get National Council support for all their policies 
meant that it was unlikely that a development policy, such as forcible culling, would be 
introduced if it were not in the interest of the senior chiefs.208 In the South African 
reserves many chiefs were also opposed to forcible culling, but their powers to 
influence policy were much weaker. In some cases chiefs in South Africa were at the 
forefront of resistance to forced culling when it was in the process of being 
implemented,209 but in Lesotho this resistance took place at a quasi-legislative level and 
the policies were therefore often never even enacted.
Secondly South African development projects often took place on Trust Lands where 
state technocrats could institute land tenure policies that fitted their ideas about the 
productivity of land under different tenure regimes. It was only after the mid-1950s, 
with the debate over the Tomlinson Commission, that South African government 
attitudes to communal tenure began to shift and attempts were made to bolster or 
reactivate chiefly control over land allocation. In Lesotho both the colonial state and the 
chiefs were aware that the cornerstone of chiefly authority was their power to allocate
206 Alexander, ‘The State, Agrarian Policy and Rural Politics’, p. 34.
207 Alexander, ‘The State, Agrarian Policy and Rural Politics’, p.3-4. On the point about policies not 
being implemented see also Phimister, I ‘Rethinking the Reserves: Southern Rhodesia’s Land 
Husbandry Act Reviewed’, Journal o f Southern African Studies, 19, 2,1993, pp. 223-239.
208 Edgar, Prophets with Honour, p. 4-5.
209 Mager, ‘The People get Fenced’; Delius, ‘Sebatakgomo: Migrant Organisations, the ANC and the 
Sekhukhuneland Revolt’.
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land and they avoided any projects that appeared to undermine the communal nature of 
land ownership.
As I have attempted to demonstrate, however, even the ‘communal’ nature of Lesotho’s 
land tenure system has to be understood in an essentially political framework; a 
framework that was open to conflicts over definitions and conflicts over rights. Anita 
Franklin, citing the work of Martin Chanock,210 has argued that, as elsewhere in 
southern Africa, the Basutoland administration’s codification of ‘customary’ law led to 
‘the artificial “freezing” of what had previously been a dynamic system’.211 As we 
have seen above, however, interventions by the colonial administration did not simply 
serve to freeze the system of land tenure into a shape that favoured the state’s interests, 
but were rather just one factor in the political battles over land. In this context it is 
important to recognise not only that the majority of development policies attempted by 
the colonial state failed, but that both their success and failure had important political 
implications. The political implications of the Mokhotlong closure policy are examined 
in chapter 9, but first we will turn to the experimental plots in Maseru district.
210 Chanock, M.L. ‘Making Customary Law: Men, Women and Courts in Colonial Northern 
Rhodesia.’ in Hay, M. and Wright, M. (ed.) African Women and the Law: Historical Perspectives, 
Boston University Papers on Africa, Vol. 7,1982; Chanock, M.L. Law, Custom and Social Order: 
the Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia, (Cambridge, 1985).
211 Franklin, Land Law, p. 47
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8. The pilot grazing schemes in the mountain areas of Maseru
district
One of the results of the visit by Russell Thornton to Lesotho in 1931, outlined in 
chapter 4, was the establishment of two experimental grazing schemes in the mountain 
area of Maseru district, near the village of Semongkong. This experimental programme 
was one of the two major highland grazing projects attempted during the colonial era 
(the other being the massive closure policy in Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek). The 
history of this experimental programme was fairly carefully documented in the 
Department of Agriculture files from the 1940s; there are certainly more details on 
them than on the closure policy. The area in which the schemes were attempted was 
visited fairly regularly by Basutoland officials, probably not least because of its 
proximity to the stunning Maletsunyane Falls. This chapter outlines the schemes’ 
history in some detail as they provide a good case study highlighting many common 
features of colonial development policies in Lesotho.
8.1. An experiment in fencing, stock removal and deferred 
grazing
In February 1932 the Resident Commissioner, J.C. Sturrock, and an officer from the 
Department of Agriculture met with two representatives of the Paramount Chief (Chief 
Joel and Chief Tebesi) to discuss the state of Lesotho’s rangelands and policies for 
rehabilitation. Tebesi suggested that the best way of dealing with bitter karoo bush was 
to bum it, reporting that in the following season grasses would return. Sturrock 
concurred with his analysis but added that grasses would only return if the areas were 
allowed to rest in order to give grasses time to re-seed.1 Sturrock suggested the idea of 
putting up fencing around areas of bitter karoo bush in order to see if the grasses grew 
back when all grazing was stopped. He was a great pains to stress that the fences would 
only be put up around areas where the grazing potential was already severely reduced 
and that ‘we are not depriving any man of his pastures’.2
As in other issues connected to land use, Sturrock feared that the Paramount Chief 
might reject the proposals. When the possibility of establishing a Pasture Research
This is a good example of the non-expert administrator taking on the language and ideas o f  
rangeland specialists and repeating them with the voice of authority. It is especially striking here as 
Sturrock seemed very shaky on details during his early questions to Chiefs Tebesi and Joel.
LNA 212, Notes of an interview with representatives of the Paramount Chief, 24 February 1932. A 
report on the enclosures by L. F. Wacher, in Staples and Hudson’s Ecological Survey, gives the date 
of the meeting as 24 January 1932.
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Station was first raised in 1931 he reported these concerns, along with the question of
finance, to the High Commissioner:
The Paramount Chief would almost certainly be opposed to the Grant of any land 
for the purpose of instituting a Pasture or Reclamation Station, assuming that the 
necessary funds for the purpose could eventually be found.3
He must have been relieved, therefore, when the two chiefs accepted the idea and said
they would recommend it to Paramount Chief Griffith.4 Griffith’s response is not
recorded on the relevant file but as there was no further discussion it can probably be
safely assumed to have been positive. Given subsequent events it is possible that
Griffith was offered the chance of grazing his livestock inside any fenced areas at some
future date; this was certainly on offer to ‘Mantsebo in the 1940s and Griffith’s close
involvement was seen as vital to the projects workability.5 In February 1933 it was
reported that two sites, one at Thaba Putsoa and another at Thaba Tsoeu, were due to be
fenced the following month.6
Unfortunately details of how these areas were managed during the rest of the 1930s are 
not readily available as the subsequent file was not traceable in the Lesotho National 
Archives. From what can be gleamed from Department of Agricultural Annual Reports 
it appears that the enclosures at Thaba Putsoa and Thaba Tsoeu were to be closed to all 
grazing, whilst an area of about 1,000 acres just to the west of the Thaba Tsoeu 
enclosure was to be subjected to a 'deferred grazing' regime. Unlike most “deferred 
grazing” schemes practised in southern Africa at this time the Thaba Tsoeu scheme 
involved not just leaving two thirds of the area ungrazed each year but also the 
exclusion of all livestock in the winter months, on the grounds that in these months 
livestock returned to village pastures. It is unclear exactly how the rotation was 
administered; at some point a local headman, Sekoolo Sethnoamajoe,7 was appointed as 
caretaker but subsequent events suggest he did little to enforce regulations.8 In fact it is 
highly unlikely that the Thaba Tsoeu ‘deferred grazing scheme’ was actually 
implemented in any systematic way during the 1930s.
In 1936 the Department of Agriculture’s Annual Report recorded that after just two 
years (i.e. before the three year cycle was completed) there were ‘remarkable’ signs of 
pasture improvement, despite the fact that the stocking rate was ‘far too heavy’.9 This
3 LNA 212, Sturrock to Tweedie, 21 March 1931.
4 LNA 212, Notes of an interview with representatives of the Paramount Chief, 24 February 1932.
5 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1939, p. 2.
6 LNA 212, Agricultural Officer to Government Secretary, n.d. [c. February 1933].
7 At various times his first name was also spelt Seholo or Sekoalo and his surname Sethnamajoe.
8 He was later sack from this position, see below for fuller discussion.
9 According to the Annual Report (p.l) there were 1,200 head of cattle and horses in the area. The
Report did not mention smallstock, so it is not clear if they were excluded from the scheme or not
208
CHAPTER EIGHT: PILOT GRAZING SCHEMES
report of success needs to be treated as extremely dubious. The following two Annual
Reports make no mention of the scheme and the 1939 Report states that:
The full progress desired in connection with this difficult and far-reaching project 
was not achieved due to several causes, the chief of which were the protracted 
illness and subsequent death of the Paramount Chief, and the Director of 
Agriculture’s absence of leave for a period of seven months.10
Despite these set-backs the Annual Report continued in up-beat terms:
The delay has not been unfruitful, as the examination of experimental results, etc. 
has led to a close re-examination of the original proposals, which will result in a 
further simplification of the general plan dealing with pasture control throughout 
the territory.11
An internal report on the experimental plots, written by L.H. Collett in 1950 suggested 
that there were more widespread problems with the scheme. He noted that in the period 
from April 1935 onwards there were many ‘accidental (?) fires’ [punctuation in 
original] and that the fences around the two enclosures were frequently cut. In 1938 
Staples and Hudson reported that the enclosure at Thaba Tsoeu was ‘maliciously burnt’ 
in September 1934 and the one at the Thaba Putsoa in July 1935.12
It is pretty clear that the ‘deferred grazing’ scheme was never implemented. 
Significantly the ‘deferred grazing’ scheme was not even mentioned in Staples and 
Hudson’s Ecological Survey, despite the fact the carried out their field work in 1936, 
the year the scheme was supposedly so successful. In 1950 Collett mentioned that in the 
early 1940s it was decided to institute a new ‘proper grazing trial in place of the work 
which had been contemplated’ [my emphasis].13
8.2. A second attempt
This new grazing trial first began to be mooted after a June 1941 visited to the 
enclosures at Thaba Tsoeu and Thaba Putsoa by Collett and one of the Paramount 
Chiefs representatives, Chief Maama Letchesa. Officially these two enclosures were 
simply closed to all livestock to see what happened to bitter karoo bush, though as 
Collett’s 1950 report indicated they were both frequently burnt and grazed.
Nevertheless in 1941 Collett reported that both enclosures looked in good condition and 
that:
The chief was very impressed with the marvellous recovery in this enclosure and 
expressed the wish that this fence be left standing and that the enclosure be used 
by the Paramount Chiefs cattle for future grazing experiments.
recorded. A figure of over one livestock unit per acre is far in excess of the figures most livestock 
experts recommended at this time.
10 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1939, p.2.
11 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1939, p.2.
12 Staples and Hudson, An Ecological Survey of the Mountain Area, p. 31-32.
13 LNA 2476/n, Note on Grazing Experiments at Thaba Putsoa and Thaba Tsoeu, sent to Government 
Secretary, 12 August 1950.
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To make this possible it was suggested that the enclosure at Thaba Tsoeu be extended 
to include a nearby stream so that livestock would have access to water.14
Collett and Letchesa also discovered, however, that the Thaba Tsoeu fence was broken 
at one point and cattle were grazing within the enclosure. Sekoolo Sethnoamajoe, the 
caretaker appointed to oversee the enclosure was berated by Letchesa and the keys to 
the enclosure gate were taken away from him.15 At some point in 1941 (most probably 
then) Sekoolo was sacked as caretaker.16 The Department of Agriculture officials 
involved all seemed to agree that the ‘untrustworthy and useless’ Sekoolo was 
‘responsible for most of the damage’.17
The Agricultural Officer based at Mafeteng, who visited the enclosures fairly regularly, 
reported that Sekoolo had threatened, in January 1941, that the next ‘winter would not 
pass without the whole enclosure being burnt’.18 In September the enclosure was 
indeed ‘entirely burnt out’19 and in the following summer and autumn there were 
reports of the fencing being broken down and livestock grazing in the enclosure.20
In April 1943 Leakie reported that:
The wire fence is continually being damaged and broken and large herds of cattle 
graze in the area, so that the enclosure is worthless for experimental purposes.21
He suggested that the best course of action was to remove the fence entirely and to
concentrate on the Thaba Putsoa site, which was not suffering to the same extent The
Paramount Chief, however, asked the Agriculture Department not to remove the fence
and suggested that she could send livestock to graze the area on an experimental basis
as suggested by her representative, Chief Letchesa when he visited the enclosure with
Collett in June 1941. As footnote 20 indicates there is some evidence that her cattle
were already grazing within the Thaba Tsoeu enclosure in any case. Later that year she
changed her mind22 and in June 1943 the fence was pulled down.23 Her reasons for
14 LNA 1012/n, Collett, L.H., Report on Grazing Experiments, 15 June 1941.
15 LNA 1012/n, Collett, L.H., Report on Grazing Experiments, 15 June 1941 and Agricultural
Officer, Mafeteng to Wacher, 19 October 1941.
16 LNA 1012/n, Leakie to Government Secretary, 7 April 1942.
17 LNA 1012/n, Leakie to Government Secretary, 7 April 1942.
18 LNA 1012/n, Agricultural Officer, Mafeteng to Wacher, 19 October 1941.
19 LNA 1012/n, Wacher to Thornton, 1 September 1941.
20 LNA 1012/n, Collett to Leakie, 17 March 1942 and Leakie to Government Secretary, 7 April 
1942. Collett reported that 30 of the 62 cattle found in the enclosure belonged to ‘Mantsebo of 
Qeme’. Leakie noted in the margin of the letter that this was the Paramount Chief, but the 
Government Secretary suggested that it could refer to cattle from the Mantsebo area of the Qeme 
valley. The issue was not pursued.
21 LNA 1012/n, Leakie to Government Secretary, 10 April 1943.
22 LNA 1012/n, ‘Mantsebo to Arden Clarke, 12 June 1943.
23 LNA 2476/n, Collett, L.H., Report on Grazing Experiments, 12 August 1950.
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changing her opinion were not recorded but it is probable that she was offered the 
chance of grazing her livestock both in the enclosure at Thaba Putsoa and on a new 
rotational grazing scheme to be tried on the site of the previous ‘deferred grazing’ 
experiment next to what had been the Thaba Tsoeu enclosure.
During the winter of 1944 R.K. Tennant, an officer in the Agriculture Department,
visited Thaba Tsoeu with an unnamed representative of the Paramount Chief to beacon
off three different camps, of more or less equal size (totalling 1,150 acres), that would
form the basis of the rotational grazing scheme. Tennant reported that the Paramount
Chiefs representative and Headman Sekoolo stated that:
If the area was beaconed they thought it would be more respected than if it was 
fenced. If this proves correct it should prove easy to control the grazing.24
The area was to be stocked at a rate of one livestock unit to 10 acres and each year only
two of the three camps were to be grazed. The two plots being grazed would be utilised
on a one month rotation. The whole area was to be closed to grazing during the winter
months of May to September.25 After numerous delays the requisite number of
Mantsebo’s cattle were sent to Thaba Tsoeu and installed on the rotational grazing
scheme on 17th January 1945. Sekoolo was appointed, on the advice of ‘Mantsebo, as
caretaker.26 Nobody in the Department of Agriculture seemed to realise they had
appointed the person blamed for destroying the previous experiment as overseer of the
new one, possible because Tennant spelt his name as Seholo, while Collett spelt it as
Sekoolo. Furthermore they were happily passing on his advice that a ‘beacons will be
better respected than ... fences’ to other members of the Basutoland administration.27
This assessment proved to be somewhat wide of the mark. When the Agricultural
Officer from Mafeteng visited the scheme a couple of months later he reported
‘hundreds of sheep and goats are already running at random within the selected area’
and, realising who they had appointed as caretaker, blamed Sekoolo:
The whole demonstration is doomed to failure, unless the Paramount Chief can 
appoint someone who will take more interest in the work and prevent trespass by 
outside stock.28
To make matters worse ‘Mantsebo sent Arden Clarke a note informing him that the 
grazing scheme ‘had been eaten bare’ and she was moving her livestock elsewhere 29 
The first year of the rotational grazing was not a great success.
24 LNA 1012/n, Tennant to Leakie, 16 September 1944.
25 LNA 2476/n, Collett, L.H., Report on Grazing Experiments, 12 August 1950.
26 LNA 1012/n, Form [signed by Leakie] appointing Seholo Sethuamajoe as caretaker with effect 16
January 1945 with a salary of £2 per month.
27 LNA 1012/n, Leakie to Government Secretary, 4 October 1944.
28 LNA 1012/n, Leakie to Government Secretary, 15 March 1945.
29 LNA 1012/n, ‘Mantsebo to Arden Clarke, 23 March 1945.
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Over the next winter the Department of Agriculture tried to put the problems right.
Sekoolo was sacked (for the second time) and a new caretaker, Headman Lesala
Mahomo, was appointed. Nevertheless by September 1945, when ‘Mantsebo’s cattle
were due to return, two of the three sections were found to be completely denuded.30 It
was considered inadvisable for her livestock to be sent to the scheme, especially as the
new caretaker, who lived some distance away in Semongkong, was not overseeing the
grazing area. In exasperation Leakie commented:
One would have thought that the Paramount Chief had only to declare certain 
areas ‘spare veld’ for the local Headman to see that her orders were carried out. 
This is not apparently the case.31
After discussing the whole issue with advisers of the Paramount Chief, the Agricultural
Department decided to appoint a second sub-caretaker, who lived nearer Thaba Tsoeu.
The two caretakers were told to impound any livestock found in the beaconed area and
hand them over to the Paramount Chiefs adviser, Chief Leloko Lerotholi, who would
impose a heavy fine. It was reported that after just a few weeks of this new regime the
grazing was improving and that ‘Mantsebo’s herds should be sent up to the project
area.32 The rotational grazing scheme now appeared to run more smoothly and the
Annual Report for the year ending 30th September 1946 gave a very upbeat assessment: 
The Paramount Chief has set aside an area of 1,150 acres at Thaba Tsoeu on 
which the good effects of controlled rotational grazing may be demonstrated. 
When the demonstration was commenced two and a half years ago, the area was 
densely covered with Chrysocoma and the grazing so poor that it was almost 
impossible to maintain adequately the correct number of animals on the available 
grass. The results of the control are most satisfactory for after only three seasons 
the Chrysocoma is dying out and grass rapidly taking its place. As the area is not 
fenced the demonstration is capable of large scale and immediate application.33
During the 1946/7 summer months there were no reports of livestock, other than those 
belonging to the Paramount Chief, in the demonstration area and towards the end of the 
grazing season Forsyth-Thompson wrote to ‘Mantsebo congratulating her on the state 
of her ‘own personal grazing area’ and for setting such a good example in grazing 
control.34 Given the good results it was decided that the stocking rate should be 
increased from 1 lu per 10 acres to 1 lu per 8 acres.35 The Department of Agriculture
30 LNA 1012/D, Report from Senior Agricultural Officer, Mafeteng forwarded by Leakie to 
Government Secretary, 27 September 1945.
31 LNA 1012/n, Leakie to Government Secretary, 27 September 1945.
32 LNA 1012/n, Leakie to Government Secretary, 4 January 1946.
33 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1946, p. 16.
34 LNA 1012/n, Forsyth-Thompson to ‘Mantsebo, 22 March 1947.
35 LNA 2476/11, Collett, L.H., Report on Grazing Experiments, 12 August 1950.
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Annual Reports for 1947 to 1950 all reported the Thaba Tsoeu experiment to be a great 
success.36
Correspondence between ‘Mantsebo and the Department of Agriculture, however, 
reveals that problems with the demonstration continued and, though reports of 
trespassing declined, the area was never grazed on the rotational plan as originally 
intended. In the spring of 1947 the area was in poor condition and livestock were not 
installed until mid-summer.37 The following scheduled grazing season the problem was 
the opposite, the pasture had grown rank. Local herdboys apparently suggested the best 
thing was to bum the pasture, but the Department of Agriculture resisted this idea and 
instead suggested that the stocking rate could be further increased to 1 lu per 5 or 6 
acres.38
After 1950 Department of Agriculture interest in the rotational grazing scheme seemed 
to wane. Collett summarised the results of the experiment in an internal report in 
August 1950, concluding that with a stocking rate of about 1 lu per 8 acres, pasture 
lands should show signs of improvement. It was noted that the area at Thaba Tsoeu 
which had been fenced between March 1933 and April 1943 was, in 1950, showing 
evidence that ‘bitter karoo was starting to flourish again’.39
The enclosed area at Thaba Putsoa, which appeared not to suffer from fence cutting 
during the 1940s, was grazed in a more controlled fashion. The area had been divided 
into two by an internal fence and each half was utilised by cattle belonging to 
‘Mantsebo at a different stocking rate in order to determine the impact of grazing. As at 
Thaba Tsoeu the aim was to graze the area from as ‘early as possible in spring’ through 
to May the following year. The results reported by Collett are summarised in Table 
8.I.40
36 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1947, p. 16; 1948, p.16-17; 1949, p.10-11; 
1950, p. 10.
37 LNA 2476, Correspondence between ‘Mantsebo and Leakie; Leakie and Government Secretary;
and Government Secretary and ‘Mantsebo; December 1946 - March 1947.
38 LNA 2476, File notes, n.d. [c. January 1948].
39 LNA 2476/11, Collett, L.H., Report on Grazing Experiments, 12 August 1950.
40 LNA 2476/n, Collett, L.H., Report on Grazing Experiments, 12 August 1950.
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Table 8.1 Results of grazing experiment at Thaba Putsoa enclosure, 1944
1948.
year dates grazed general comments comments on different 
1 lu per acre
paddocks 
1 lu per 4 acres
1944-
1945
5/1/45 to 30/5/45 rains very late; stock 
in good condition at 
end of season
cover good cover good
1945-
1946
12/1/46 to 31/4/46 rains very late again enclosure grazed 
down, even Festuca 
grazed
selectively grazed, 
uneven cover
1946-
1947
21/11/46 to 2/4/47 none too many livestock too few livestock
1947-
1948
12/11/47 to 7/12/47 obvious results would 
be same as 1946/7, 
decided to remove 
livestock and rest 
pasture
too many livestock too few livestock
It is not clear why the enclosure at Thaba Putsoa suffered less from fence cutting and 
burning than the enclosure at Thaba Tsoeu. During the 1930s both enclosures suffered 
from trespassing, but after the fence was removed at Thaba Tsoeu there were no reports 
of similar incidents at Thaba Putsoa. One possible reason may be that Thaba Tsoeu is 
nearer to the large village of Semongkong and areas of permanent (year round) 
habitation than Thaba Putsoa. It is not totally clear from the archival record that Thaba 
Tsoeu fell within a cattle-post area. The presence of a village headman nearby 
suggests, rather, that it was a village grazing area and therefore used in winter or spring. 
The late winter burning of the area was in keeping with pre-existing Sesotho pasture 
management practices for village grazing areas: burning the pasture encourages early 
spring growth, vital for strengthening cattle before their heavy ploughing duties that 
start with the first rains.
In addition to the gaping holes in the archival record, this experimental programme 
exemplify many issues and themes frequently encountered in analyses of colonial 
development projects in Lesotho. These are outlined below.
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8.3. Discussion
8.3.1 . What happened next?
As with so many other schemes in colonial Lesotho these two grazing experiments were 
not followed up in subsequent plans. The last Annual Report to mention the rotation 
grazing scheme at Thaba Tsoeu was the one for 1950, when it was reported that the 
scheme was continuing and grazing conditions had improved to the extent that the 
stocking rate would be increased in the following year.41 A report written in 1960 by 
R.O. Barnes, the influential Kenyan government soil conservation officer, made an 
obscure reference to ‘much information’ being obtained from ‘experiments in fencing’ 
in Maseru and Mafeteng districts, but no details were reported.42 I have been unable to 
trace any other references to the Thaba Tsoeu rotational grazing experiment in any 
other literature on livestock and grazing issues in Lesotho.
Results from the Thaba Putsoa experiment, wound up in 1947, were used again by P.A. 
Bowmaker, the Agricultural Department official most active in the mountain grazing 
sphere. In 1950 he used them to refute a claim by I.B. Pole-Evans that the correct 
stocking rate for the mountain pastures of Lesotho should be 1 lu per 25 acres43 and 
then in 1953 as the basis for assessing an appropriate stocking rate for the areas of 
Mokhotlong when they were due for re-opening after the ending of the closure policy.44 
However, as we will see in the next chapter, these assessments of stocking rates in 
Mokhotlong were never carried through into policy.
The results of the Thaba Putsoa experiment were not considered conclusive for long; in 
1959 a new experiment was set-up in the Ox-Bow area of Butha-Buthe district ‘to 
establish an indication of the stock carrying capacity of the area’.45 D.R. Phororo 
reports that a stocking rate of 1 lu per 8 hectares (1 lu per 19.8 acres) was calculated as
41 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1950, p. 10.
42 Barnes, R.O. ‘Grazing Control: a memorandum prepared for the Guidance of District Councils for 
application Basutoland.’ unpublished report in the Papers of R.O. Barnes, Mss Brit. Emp.Ll(2), 
Rhodes House, Oxford. I am not sure what the experiment in Mafeteng refers to: possibly it may 
have been another project or more likely simply confusion as the two Maseru district schemes were 
close to the boundary with Mafeteng and visited fairly regularly by the Mafeteng District 
Agricultural Officer.
43 LNA 2476/n, Bowmaker’s comments on Pole-Evans report, n.d. [c. May 1950].
44 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1953, p. 16. See also LNA 2476/11, 
Bowmaker, P.A.O., A report on a visit to Mokhotlong from 6th-28th March 1952, for details of the 
problems he faced in trying to produce this detailed break-down of stocking rates for individual 
valleys.
45 Barnes, ‘Grazing Control: a memorandum prepared for the Guidance of District Councils’.
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being the correct rate for the Ox-bow region.46 This figure suggests a much lower 
stocking rate than that calculated at Thaba Putsoa, but it is not clear if the rate was 
calculated for grazing in just the summer months, as at Thaba Putsoa, or for the entire 
year. At around about the same time a degraded area of Qacha’s Nek was fenced in ‘to 
allow observation of effects of protection’:47 the same aim as the original Thaba Tsoeu 
and Thaba Putsoa enclosure experiment started over two and a half decades previously.
The archival record does not give many clues about the fate of the enclosure at Thaba 
Putsoa or if any attempt to continue the rotational grazing scheme at Thaba Tsoeu was 
ever made. In 1951 ‘Mantsebo did write to Forsyth-Thompson, the Resident 
Commissioner, asking for the whole Thaba Tsoeu plateau to be declared an 
‘improvement area’ and closed to grazing (presumably with the exception of her 
livestock).48 The fact that this request was never followed up strongly suggests that the 
Agricultural Department had given up on the rotational grazing experiment.
As chapter 9 will demonstrate the massive closure polices supposedly implemented in
Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek Districts between 1947-1956 were similarly promptly
forgotten. The closure policy is only mentioned briefly in a handful of studies of the
livestock sector in Lesotho after 1956, quoting either the Department of Agriculture
Annual Reports or Patrick Duncan’s 1960 textbook Sotho Law and Custom.49 In his
bibliography of literature on soil and water resources in Lesotho, Q.K. Chakela
commented that the Department of Agriculture Annual Reports:
do not give one any clear idea of what any scheme is about except that it makes 
‘good progress’, it is ‘a success’, showed ‘improved progress’, and one has no 
idea what any of these words are supposed to imply because suddenly the scheme 
disappears from the reports without any comment.*0
This general comment is an exact description of the reporting of the two demonstration 
plots at Thaba Tsoeu and Thaba Putsoa.
8.3.2. Rhetoric and reality
A cursory reading of the published reports on the grazing experiments might lead one to 
conclude that they ran smoothly, that they were a huge success and that the results were
46 Phororo, Livestock Farming in Lesotho, p. 133-4.
47 Phororo, Livestock Farming in Lesotho, p. 134.
48 LNA 2476/ II[I], ‘Mantsebo to Forsyth-Thompson, 1 August 1951.
49 Duncan, Sotho Laws and Customs, p. 78; Quinlan, ‘The Livestock Economy in the Mountain Zone
of Lesotho’, p. 30; Swallow, Motsamai, Sopeng, and Storey, Livestock Development and Range 
Utilization In Lesotho, p. 23; Lawry, ‘Private Herds and Common Lands’, p. 107-108.
50 Chakela, Review and bibliography, p.13.
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significant. A more detailed reading of the published reports and certainly a reading of 
the archival records would suggest otherwise.
As was the case with many other schemes initial plans were reported as successful 
implementation. The 1936 Annual Report described the initial ‘deferred grazing’ 
experiment as a huge success before it had even had time to be up and running, and then 
in 1939 it was reported that the scheme had never even happened. The Annual Report 
for the year ending 30th September 1946 described the ‘rotational grazing’ scheme as 
having been up and running for two and a half years, but the archival record shows that 
in March 1944 the scheme had only been talked about and it was not until later in 1944 
that the beacons were even set-out to delimit the area to be controlled. The first season 
that the rotation was even nominally attempted was 1945/46.
Often the Annual Reports regurgitated the previous years descriptions of the policy, 
simply changing the dates. The 1946, 1947 and 1948 Annual Reports contain exactly 
the same paragraphs on Thaba Tsoeu and Thaba Putsoa; only the number of years since 
the scheme was initiated were changed. In the section on Thaba Putsoa they did not 
even managed to change that between the 1947 and 1948 Annual Reports.
8.3.3. The Pilot is the project
The two fenced plots were originally conceived of as an experiment to see what would 
happen if bitter karoo bush was left ungrazed. The results were as the Agriculture 
Department would have expected: that with reduced grazing pressure plots returned to 
their ‘climax’ community of Themeda triandra dominated rooigras. As the plots were 
often burnt, and grazed, the findings of the research should have been treated with a 
greater degree of scepticism: perhaps it was actually the burning that reduced the 
coverage of bitter karoo bush, as some Basotho informants contended.51 The findings, 
flawed though they may have been, did, however, inform subsequent policy, in 
particular the closure policy, and could, therefore, be seen as an example of a successful 
experimental project.
The post 1945 rotational grazing scheme was supposedly not just an experiment but 
also a pilot or demonstration project, which could then be applied to the country as a 
whole. As with most pilot projects in Lesotho, and elsewhere in Africa, the ‘success’ of 
the pilot project was not replicated nationally.
51 In February 1932 Chief Tebesi told the Resident Commissioner and officials of the Department of 
Agriculture: ‘when they bum the veld this karoo bums and next season grass grows’. LNA 212, 
Notes of an interview with representatives of the Paramount Chief, 24 February 1932.
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Indeed it would have been extremely surprising if it had been. The rotational grazing 
scheme on 1,150 acres had taken two years and many man-hours of work to simply 
demarcate and organise and subsequently needed constant supervision from two local 
caretakers, a visiting advisor to the Paramount Chief and the occasional visiting official 
from the Department of Agriculture. Assuming similar levels of administrative input 
and supervision, extending the pilot project to the 6100 sq. miles defined as mountain 
grasslands52 would have required some 6,790 caretakers, at a cost of approximately 
£162,95053 per annum, or more or less double the total 1949/50 budget for the 
Department of Agriculture.54 At the Thaba Tsoeu plot the caretakers were also 
supervised by fairly frequent visits from Department of Agriculture officials and the 
plots were originally demarcated by a Department officer; an expansion of the scheme 
would have involved substantial recruitment of new staff, again with major implications 
for the budget.
How would have the Basutoland administration responded if these figures had been put
to them in the 1940s or early 50s? Probably by pointing out that the project was
designed as a demonstration and that once neighbouring livestock owners saw the
tremendous improvements in pasture cover they would establish similar schemes with
no need for caretakers or supervisors. This was, indeed, what was suggested in the
Colonial Annual Report of 1947:
In view of the success attending this demonstration of the Paramount Chief, the 
Ward Chiefs in Qacha’s Nek and Mokhotlong are undertaking grazing control 
through-out their wards and work in this direction is already underway. By these 
means it is hoped that within a few years the mountain areas will again be covered 
with luxuriant pasture.55
After reading the archival report of the project the first obvious point is that calling it a
‘success’ in 1947 is highly misleading. The 1946/7 summer grazing season was the
first in which it was seriously attempted and it encountered many problems. Secondly
the closure policy (‘grazing control’) was not undertaken by the Ward Chiefs of
Mokhotlong (who was one and the same as the Paramount Chief in any case) and
Qacha’s Nek after seeing the demonstration project, but rather after they were
persuaded to do so in a meeting with the Resident Commissioner and senior
Department of Agriculture staff.56
52 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1949, p. 33
53 This figure is extrapolated from the fact Headman Seholo was paid a salary of £2 per month in 
1945.
54 The total allocation was £80,101, Great Britain, Colonial Annual Report: Basutoland 1950 
(London, 1951), p. 21.
55 Great Britain, Colonial Annual Report: Basutoland 1947 (London, 1949), p.4.
56 See chapter 9.
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Given the fact that at the very least a significant minority of neighbouring livestock 
owners were hostile to the demonstration (at least this is how the Department of 
Agriculture viewed their activities such as grass burning and trespassing) even the 
greatest Departmental optimist must have thought it unlikely that the project would be 
taken up spontaneously. The above quote from the 1947 Annual Report tacitly reflects 
this reality: it was not neighbouring livestock owners but other senior chiefs who were 
impressed by the results.
Pilot projects have been attempted with great regularity in both colonial and post­
colonial Lesotho. Rarely have these area based pilot projects been translated into 
national projects or policies. To an extent this could be seen as a successful application 
of the pilot project concept: a policy was attempted, found to be a failure and 
abandoned. Nevertheless pilot projects have often been implemented with no prior 
consideration of their national feasibility. In the case of Thaba Tsoeu the Department 
of Agriculture did not even do something as simple as extrapolating nationally from the 
rotational grazing scheme’s suggested stocking rate of llu per ten acres during the 
summer months with one third of the range closed at any one time. Applied nationally 
this would have meant that the mountain area could have accommodated only 260,300 
lu during the summer (and no livestock in the winter) compared to a national herd of 
1,015,573 lu, according to the official census in 1949.57 As the lowland grazing 
resources were perceived to be severely over utilised the only solution would have been 
a massive programme of forced culling: something the colonial authorities never felt 
able to attempt. Clearly there was never any serious possibility that the scheme could 
be applied nationally: the project was designed in such a way that it could never go 
beyond the pilot stage.
8.3.4. De facto land alienation
During the 1940s the enclosure at Thaba Putsoa and the rotational grazing scheme at
Thaba Tsoeu were both reserved for the exclusive use the Paramount Chiefs livestock.
In effect the Basutoland administration and the Paramount Chief simply ignored one of
the key constitutional principles of the Basotho state: that all land belongs to ‘the
nation’. Under the Laws of Lerotholi it was explicitly stated that:
The grazing area of the country is communal, no chief, headman or commoner 
having the right to graze privately where others are not allowed to graze.58
57 See Figure 4.5.
58 Duncan, Sotho Laws and Customs, p. 74.
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Under the mahoella regulations areas of grazing could be declared closed, or closed to 
specific classes of livestock, but under customary law these mahoella restrictions were 
supposed to apply to everybody.59
In addition areas of lehoella were usually declared in order to ensure adequate winter 
grazing for local villagers livestock. At Thaba Tsoeu the opposite appeared to be the 
case: local livestock owners were denied access on a year round basis to what seems to 
have been a village grazing area which had probably previously been used mainly as 
winter grazing. If this was indeed the case local livestock owners may have found 
themselves denied access not just to an area of grazing but to a key resource for getting 
livestock through the lean winter months.
The enclosure or demarcation of specific areas for the exclusive use of an individual, 
even if that individual was the Paramount Chief, was clearly unlawful. When Sturrock 
first discussed the possibilities of fencing in two enclosures in 1932 with representatives 
of the Paramount Chief, he stressed that, as the areas to be fenced were ‘useless’ bitter 
karoo bush, they would not be ‘depriving any man of his pasture’.60 This concern did 
not seem to figure in 1941-2 when the experiment was reformulated and when the 
Thaba Putsoa enclosure was described as having made a ‘marvellous recovery’.61 The 
tone of the reports and correspondence on the relevant Department of Agriculture files 
suggests that in the mind of the officials the act of enclosing the land had conferred 
ownership on them or on ‘Mantsebo. Indeed when Leakie first outlined the plans for 
the rotational grazing scheme to the 1944 National Council he referred to the area as 
being owned by ‘Mantsebo.62
8.3.5. Favouring the chiefly elite
Chapter 7 showed how the politics of land constrained the ability of the colonial 
authorities to undertake projects that involved removing power over land allocation 
from the chiefly authorities. Though the scheme was clearly resented by many local 
inhabitants it was supported by ‘Mantsebo who, as the Ward Chief, was in charge of the 
administering the cattle-post grazing areas of Matsieng ward which made up the vast 
majority of Maseru district.63 Mantsebo’s reason for supporting the scheme is obvious
59 Sheddick, Land Tenure in Basutoland, p. 121-122.
60 LNA 212, Notes of an interview with representatives of the Paramount Chief, 24 February 1932.
61 LNA 1012/n, Pasture Reclamation, Report on Grazing Experiments, Thaba Putsoa and Makhakas 
Pass, 15 June 1941.
62 Basutoland Proceedings o f the National Council, 1944, 39th Session, p. 255.
63 Though see chapter 7, the rights of administration over mountain cattle post areas were open to 
some debate. Also note that it is possible that the Thaba Tsoeu scheme fell within a village cattle-
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and material; she gained access to areas of summer grazing where her livestock did not 
have to compete with other livestock. A year after the scheme was dropped by the 
Basutoland authorities ‘Mantsebo tried to get them to revive the project, and sought 
their support in extending her ‘private grazing area’ to a larger portion of the Ward.64
Despite the Department of Agriculture’s aim of implementing both an experiment to 
determine the ‘correct’ grazing pressure and a demonstration of the success of rotational 
grazing the scheme was actually managed to ensure the best grazing possible for 
‘Mantsebo’s herds. Rather than deciding upon a management strategy and then 
observing how this affected the quality of grazing and productivity of the livestock the 
Department of Agriculture altered the management strategy in line with availability of 
grazing in order to ensure the maximum nutrition for ‘Mantsebo’s livestock.
In short the Basutoland authorities implemented a project that directly favoured the 
most powerful member of the Basotho chiefly hierarchy at the expense of local 
livestock owners. In so doing they probably hoped to quell any national political 
opposition to the scheme and to further their project of interesting ‘Mantsebo in 
agricultural development.65 They were indeed successful in averting any national 
political opposition to the scheme; but in so doing they destroyed any chance of the 
schemes acting as a demonstration to encourage the average Mosotho livestock owner 
in the environs of Semongkong to rally behind their plans for a national rotational 
grazing policy.
As with the closure policies in Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek the Department of 
Agriculture attempted to portray the schemes as simply a refinment of an existing 
Basotho resource management technique: the system of declaring leboella. As the 
previous section has made clear there were significant differences in the usufactory 
arrangements for the schemes and areas of leboella. There were also differences 
between the manner in which the schemes were decided upon and the manner in which 
mahoella was supposed to be declared, especially if the scheme at Thaba Tsoeu was 
indeed within a village grazing area. Instead of the local chief of headman’s declaring 
the area leboella on the basis of discussion with local resource users, the areas were 
declared closed by the Paramount Chief on the basis of discussions between her 
advisors and officials from the Department of Agriculture. The schemes, therefore,
post area: the administration of which would usually have been delegated to a lower ranking chief 
or headman,
64 LNA 2476/ II[I], ‘Mantsebo to Forsyth-Thompson, 1 August 1951.
65 See chapter 7.
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undermined the role (and power) of a lower ranking chief in favour of the Paramount 
Chief.
8.3.6. Problems caused by Abnormal years’
Throughout the life of the projects at Thaba Tsoeu and Thaba Putsoa there were reports 
that the experiments or demonstrations were hampered by abnormal weather conditions. 
In 1941 L.F. Wacher, the Senior Agricultural Officer, reported that ‘the season, as 
regards the growth of grass, was a most curious one’66 and in 1942 that ‘the year under
review has again been an abnormal one*.67 The experiment at Thaba Putsoa was
hampered by ‘late rains’ in both the 1944/5 and 1945/6 seasons68 and Leakie advised 
the Government Secretary, in October 1945, that the implementation of the rotational 
grazing scheme at Thaba Tsoeu would have to be delayed ‘on account of the drought’.69 
The assumption amongst the Department of Agriculture officials seems to have been 
that the experiments would work so long as the weather would act ‘normally’; with no 
recognition that extreme inter-annual variability was the norm.70
8.3.7. Weak administration
Despite the fact that these two projects were visited relatively frequently by officials 
from the Department of Agriculture and were actively supported by the high ranking 
chiefs of the Ward, the projects were plagued by the lack of control over the activities 
of local livestock owners. During the 1930s and early 1940s fence cutting, burning and 
‘trespassing’ were frequent occurrences at both sites and during the mid-1940s 
‘trespassing’ on the rotational plots at Thaba Tsoeu appeared to be the rule rather than 
the exception. There is no record in the archives of anyone ever being charged with 
‘trespassing’, fence cutting or grass burning.
The Basutoland authorities tended to blame this lack of control on the incompetence (or 
resistance) of the local Basotho administration, in particular the local headman Sekoolo 
Sethnoamajoe. The fact that they managed not only to employ him twice, but also pass 
on his advice about the likelihood of people respecting beacons, is simply ignored in the 
archival record. Quite why ‘Mantsebo should have suggested Sekoolo be employed as 
the caretaker in January 1945 is unclear. One possible clue is that when Collett visited 
Thaba Tsoeu in March 1942 he found 32 cattle in the enclosure belonging to Sekoolo
66 LNA 1012/n, Wacher to Thornton, 15 July 1941.
67 LNA 1012/n, Wacher to Leakie, 18 July 1942.
68 LNA 2476/n, Collett, L.H., Report cm Grazing Experiments, 12 August 1950.
69 LNA 1012/n, Leakie to Government Secretary, 27 October 1945
70 See Table 1.1.
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and a further thirty who most probably belonged to ‘Mantsebo:71 this strongly suggests 
that Sekoolo was at that point acting as the manager for part of ‘Mantsebo’s herd and 
her recommendation that he be appointed caretaker of the rotational grazing scheme 
reflected his position.
The Department of Agriculture officials appeared to report the advice that beacons 
would be better respected than fencing with no sense of irony. Of course it is not 
possible to determine their private discussions or beliefs about the validity of this claim 
but the archival record leaves an impression either of hopeless optimism or extreme 
gullibility. The records of the massive closure policy in Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek 
district create a similar impression. It is to this project that we turn in the next chapter.
71 LNA 1012/n, Collett to Leakie, 17 March 1942.
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9. Chief Matlere Lerotholi and the 1947 Closure Policy in
Mokhotlong District
The centre piece of British colonial development policy in the mountain areas of 
Lesotho in the immediate post-war era was a policy to close vast swathes of rangeland 
to all livestock. In this chapter I argue that this policy was never actually implemented, 
despite the numerous reports of its success. After weighing up the evidence for and 
against implementation of the policy, I discuss the local political issues which I believe 
account for its non-implementation and the local and national political implications of 
this gap between discourse and actual events.
As we saw in chapter 6, pressure from the Dominions Office (and indirectly from South 
Africa) meant that in 1946 and 1947 the Basutoland administration needed to come up 
with some sort of policy that would be seen to be tackling the issue of overgrazing and 
soil erosion in the mountains. Their options were severely limited, however, by 
financial and administrative constraints. The policy that was devised in response to 
these dual pressures was crude in the extreme: it simply consisted of declaring huge 
areas of communal grazing totally closed to all livestock. Range science taught the 
Department of Agriculture officials that total exclusion of grazing would allow the 
pasture to return to its climatic climax formation which would, in turn, inevitably lead 
to a decrease in the rate of soil erosion.
The Department of Agriculture were fortunate that the two chiefs of the major mountain 
wards appeared to instruct their people to remove all their livestock from the designated 
areas. As we saw in chapter 7, however, the chiefs' rights to issue these instructions 
was a matter for considerable debate. It is notable that the instructions were never 
issued as formal Orders from the Paramount Chief: indeed there have to be serious 
doubts about whether the instructions were ever actually made known to the relevant 
livestock owners, at least in Mokhotlong district.
9.1. The official version of the closure policy
The Department of Agriculture's Annual Report for the year ending 30th September
1946 announced that:
Systems of rotational grazing have been introduced in a number of centres, with 
the object of improving grazing, or, as is more often the case, allowing the re­
establishment of proper grass cover on the mountain slopes.1
1 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report 1946, p. 1.
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There were no further details about these systems in the Report and from the archival 
record it would appear that the only rotational grazing project in existence in 1946 was 
the one at Thaba Tsoue (discussed in chapter 8), though it is possible that there were 
other ad hoc schemes attempted by District Commissioners or District Agricultural 
Officers which were never written up in the Departmental files.
Exactly the same paragraph on ‘systems of rotational grazing’ appeared in the 1947 
Annual Report, again with no further details. By this date the closure policy had been 
agreed to by the Ward Chiefs of Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek but it is unclear if this 
was is what the paragraph in the Annual Report was actually referring to. The 
paragraph was repeated for a third time in the 1948 Annual Report, but was now 
accompanied by details of the closure policy: something that could in no way be 
described as a ‘systems of rotational grazing’. It was reported that in September 1947 
the two Ward Chiefs had instructed livestock owners in their wards to de-stock ‘badly 
denuded mountain slopes’ until adequate grass cover had been re-established. The 
stock were to be removed to ‘areas which in the past have carried little or no stock’.
The area to be destocked totalled about one-third of the entire mountain grazing area.2
These sketchy details were elaborated on in an appendix to the Annual Report in the 
following year.3 The report detailed the areas of Mokhotlongthat had been closed to all 
grazing and made a vaguer reference to ‘similar arrangements’ in Qacha’s Nek. Figure
9.1 indicates the approximate areas of Mokhotlong district that were to be closed to 
grazing. The appendix to the 1949 Annual Report is the most detailed description of the 
closure policy in any source, but it is still difficult to work out exactly which areas were 
to be closed, especially in the western sections of the district.
The 1949 Annual Report, and every Annual Report threafter until 1956, carried reports 
of the success of the closure policy. These reports were in turn often cited in other 
reports and correspondence sent from Basutoland officials to the High Commissioner’s 
office in Pretoria/Cape Town and thence on to the Dominions/Commonwealth 
Relations Office in London. Sections on grazing policy from the Department of 
Agriculture's Annual Reports often turn up verbatim in the Colonial Annual Reports for 
Basutoland. They were also cited in press and academic reports on soil conservation.
An article in VeldTrust in August 1954, entitled ‘Basutos Avert Disaster’, for example,
2 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report 1948, p. 13-14.
3 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report 1949, p. 27-33.
225
CHAPTER NINE: THE 1947 CLOSURE POLICY
repeated the Department of Agriculture's claim in 1949 that ‘more than 1,400 square 
miles of grazing have already been removed from grazing’.4
As reports on the policy were passed up along the chain of command from the 
Basutoland Department of Agriculture to London it was given increasingly grand titles. 
A crude policy of closing areas to grazing was translated into ‘grazing control’ in the 
Department of Agriculture's Annual Reports.5 In a letter to the Commonwealth 
Relations Office in June 1947 Evelyn Baring went a step further: he stated that 
compulsory rotational grazing was being enforced and that the whole of the two 
districts had been declared Agricultural Improvement Areas.6
The impact of closing grazing on the mountain grasslands and on rates of soil erosion
was likewise described in very positive tones. The return of rooigras species, in
particular Themeda triandra. into the areas destocked was reported in Annual Reports
from 1950 onwards. The 1952 Annual Report claimed that there had been a
‘widespread improvement in the grass cover with consequent slowing down of
erosion’,7 while in 1953 it was:
... stated confidently that soil loss from storm water run-off is now very well 
under control in the cattle post areas.8
On occasions these claims of success were further exaggerated in reports sent on to
London: one document (appropriately dated 1 April 1954) made the highly unlikely
claim, seemingly based on the 1953 Annual Report, that ‘loss of soil by storm water run
off in the mountain area has now ceased’.9
4 Anon. ‘Basutos Avert Disaster: Fight to Conserve Cradle of the Orange River’ VeldTrust August 
1954, p.25; Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report 1949, p. 33.
5 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1948 through to 1956.
6 PRO D035/4007, High Commissioner: Visits, Baring to Machtig, 24 June 1947. This is despite the
fact that the National Council had convincingly rejected the Agricultural Improvement Area policy 
the previous year, see chapter 7.
7 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1952, p. 19.
8 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1953, p.15.
9 PRO DO35/4330, Revised Copy of a Collection of Notes on Various Aspects of the Administration 
of the High Commission Territories likely to arise in Connection with Transfer, 1 April 1954. This 
claim is totally ludicrous; even on grasslands totally unaffected by any human activity some soil 
erosion will occur due to storm water run-off.
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Figure 9.1 Mokhotlong District, showing 9,000 foot contour line and 
interview sights
BUTHA-BUTHE
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Map drawn from; The 1911 War Office map is inaccurate in many places - the alignment of the borders and
Basutoland N.E. Sheet, 1:250,000 the contour lines, in particular, often deviate significantly from modem maps.
Drawn and printed by the War Office, June 1911 - 67390 (1) I have used the 1911 map as a base as this was the map still used by the colonial 
Geographical Section General Staff, No. 2567 authorities during the 1940s and 1950s.
A steep escarpment at around the 9,000ft contour in the valleys to the east of the Senqu 
river is shown on the 1911 map, but it is not shown on any more recent maps of the 
area.
The boundary between Qacha's Nek and Mokhotlong Districts is not shown on the 1911 
map. The boundary shown here is approximate and based on the map appearing in 
Ashton, The Basuto.
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Despite these confident claims, the direct evidence for the successful implementation of 
the policy in Mokhotlong district amounts to no more than a handful of reports by 
colonial officials who had trekked through the mountains. Evidence for an increase in 
favourable grass types is confined merely to casual observation, and evidence for a 
decrease in the rate of soil erosion was based simply on a supposition that observations 
that the species composition of the range was changing inevitably meant a decrease in 
erosion.
There were two officially sanctioned surveys of siltation rates in the Senqu/Orange river 
during this period which could possibly be used to indicate the impact of the closure 
policy on rates of erosion.10 However neither of these reports quantify the rate of 
siltation precisely. Both reports merely assess the siltation rate qualitatively at one 
point in time, and do not indicate how it was changing over time. This means that even 
if it were possible to compare the two surveys directly it would be impossible to tell if 
they represent a long term trend or are simply two points on a fluctuating trace. 
Furthermore, even if it were possible to show that siltation rates were falling during the 
period in question, it is quite another matter to prove that this was directly attributable 
to the closure policy.
The direct archival evidence for the implementation of the closure policy in 
Mokhotlong (as opposed to unsubstantiated statements of success) consists of five 
separate reports written after treks through the cattle-post areas.11 Two of these were 
written by P.A. Bowmaker, the Principal Agriculture Officer in charge of the policy 
(November 1949 and March 1952)12 and two by Evelyn Baring, the High 
Commissioner (November 1948 and c. May 1951).13 The only independent report was 
written by I.B. Pole Evans (February 1950), but as Pole Evans had been specifically
10 In 1949/50 H.H. Green and R.C. Germond of Jeffares and Green, Consulting and Chartered Civil 
Engineers, Johannesburg carried out a survey, funded by the CD&W, of possible sites to build a 
dam in the lower reaches of the Orange river inside Lesotho, PRO D 035 4061, Jeffares and Green, 
‘A Water Resource Survey o f Basutoland’, January 1951. See chapter 6 for of the political 
significance of the investigation and its findings. N. Shand did a further survey of water resources 
in Lesotho in 1956, Shand, ‘Report on the Regional Development o f the Water Resources’.
11 Though it should be noted that a vital file (LNA 2476/IV) was missing from the archives. This file 
might contain further evidence of successful implementation during the period mid-1952 to late- 
1954. There are not, however, references to further treks or other surveys of the policy on the 
relevant PRO files.
12 LNA 2476II, Bowmaker, P.A.O. ‘Cattle Post Trek, 14th to 26th November 1949’ and Bowmaker, 
P.A.O, ‘A Report on a visit to Mokhotlong from 6th -28th March 1952’. Bowmaker also made a 
trip sometime in 1947 when the closure policy was about to be enacted (references to it are made in 
the above two reports) but I have been unable to locate a copy of a report either in the PRO or LNA.
13 PRO D035/4007, High Commissioners visits to Basutoland and PRO D035/4010, High 
Commissioners Visits to Basutoland. Baring also went on a trek in early 1946, before the closure 
policy was established, to investigate the National Veld Trust claims, PRO D035/1180/Y950/5.
228
CHAPTER NINE: THE 1947 CLOSURE POLICY
commissioned by the Basutoland authorities to write a complimentary report it is 
perhaps a bit exaggerated to call the report independent.14 The two reports by 
Bowmaker and the report by Pole Evans go into a great deal of detail about the areas 
visited and make detailed observations on the existence of different species and the 
general state of the range.15 It is possible to trace their routes and to locate some of 
their observations on the map. An obvious lacuna in the archival record is the regular 
quarterly reports from the Mokhotlong District Commissioner that I know existed 
because of extracts in other files. There is, however, no reference to any such reports in 
the files specifically on the grazing closure policy and no extracts pasted into the files 
on grazing control, so I have had to assume that they do not say anything significantly 
different from the reports in the grazing control files.
All five trek reports describe the success of the closure policy. They all specifically 
mention a marked improvement in the species composition of the range in most closed 
areas, with an increase in rooigras species and a decrease in sehalahala/bitter karoo 
scrub. Just two years after the enactment of the closure policy, Bowmaker reported a 
‘very marked recovery’ in the state of the rangeland upper Mokhotlong river valley and 
the other southern Mokhotlong district cattle-post areas.16 By the time of his 1952 trek, 
which also covered the right-hand tributaries of the Senqu/Orange river, the range was 
deemed to be fully recovered (i.e. close to its climatic climax) and ready to be re­
opened to grazing. The official re-opening of the closed areas was delayed until 1956 
while the Department of Agriculture persuaded the Paramount Chief and National 
Council to institute new regulations to allow Ward Chiefs greater control of cattle post 
areas.
All five reports include either references to ‘trespassers’ or descriptions of herds in 
areas that, according to the placing of 9,000 foot contour line on the 1911 map (Figure 
9.1), should have been closed. In February 1950 Pole Evans reported cattle and horses 
‘trespassing’ in the closed areas of upper Senqebethu valley and mentioned ‘several 
large flocks of sheep ... and some cattle’ in a section of one of the tributary valleys of 
the Mokhotlong river that appears to be just below the 9,000 foot contour. In the valley 
of the Mohlesi stream and the area around the headwaters of the Sakeng he observed 
‘many cases of trespassing stock’ in ‘country which was supposed to be protected’.17 
After his trek in March 1952 Bowmaker reported that a mission station, almost
14 LNA 2476, Pole Evans, I.B. ‘Visit to Basutoland in February, 1950’.
15 Pole Evans report refers to a number of photos and numerous figures. Unfortunately these are
missing from the report in the LNA.
16 LNA 2476/n, Bowmaker ‘Cattle Post Trek, 14th to 26th November 1949’
17 LNA 2476/11, Pole Evans, ‘Visit to Basutoland in February, 1950’.
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definitely St. James Mission in the lower Sehonghong valley,18 had a few hundred head 
of sheep grazing in the closed area and also mentioned that ‘odd groups of cattle’ 
belonging to the Ward Chief (or perhaps the Paramount Chief) had been seen in the 
closed area of the Moremoholo valley. His report in November 1949 does not explicitly 
mention infringements of the regulations but one section describes large herds in the 
upper Mokhotlong valley which is almost all below the 9,000 foot contour right up to 
the South African border.19 Nevertheless these infringements are dealt with in a way 
that suggests they were the work of only one or two individuals and that on the whole 
livestock owners adhered to the regulations.
These five reports are the only direct sources of evidence that I have been able to 
discover showing that the closure policy was fully implemented (despite a few 
infringements) and that it was a success. Although, as I have noted above, three of 
them seem comprehensive and detailed, they appear to me to provide a rather flimsy 
foundation for the glowing reports about the policy in Colonial Annual Reports and 
other official and unofficial literature.
9.2. Evidence from Oral History
In April and May 19951 carried out a series of interviews with elderly people at various 
sites in Mokhotlong (see Figure 9.1). The interview sites are clustered around two 
locations, one in the ‘Batloka area’ of the district and one covering the Mokhotlong and 
Sakeng valleys. I chose to centre the interviews on these two locations because of their 
particular administrative history which will become apparent later in the chapter. 
Specific villages20 were chosen to give a balance between areas closer to the main 
agricultural valleys and more distant areas close to the cattle post areas. In each village 
I interviewed the oldest competent and willing person. In most villages there was only 
one willing person of a suitable age to interview.
For two reasons the vast majority of interviews were with men; firstly, at marriage 
women usually move to a new village so they are rarely the oldest inhabitant; and 
secondly, older women were almost always unwilling to answer questions about 
livestock, quoting the ‘traditional taboo’ on women handling livestock. Most
18 This issue was eventually taken up with the mission in November 1953, but apart from asking them 
how many livestock they had (220 sheep, 15 oxen, 9 horses, 2 mules, 4 cows) nothing was done, 
LNA 2202/n, Cattle Posts: Traders and Missions.
19 LNA 2476/n, Bowmaker ‘Cattle Post Trek, 14th to 26th November 1949’
20 Villages in the mountain area tend to be much smaller than in the lowlands and may simply consist 
of a handful of homesteads.
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interviews were carried out in Sesotho via an interpreter. The majority were tape 
recorded and an independent source later listened to the tapes and confirmed that the 
translation was by and large accurate.21 There were four interviews that did not 
conform to this pattern (numbers 2,7, 8 and 15 in Table 9.1). These were interviews 
were I specifically sought out a key informant who I thought may be particularly 
knowledgeable.
The most striking result of these interviews was that not one person had ever heard of 
the policy to close large tracts of grazing for a eight-to-nine year period. It is possible 
that everybody I interviewed had simply forgotten about the grazing closure. This, 
however, does not seem very likely.
Every man I spoke to had either owned or managed livestock during the period 1947- 
56. The closure policy (if implemented) would have led to a wholesale shift in the way 
livestock were managed and would have had severe impacts on the lifestyle of 
herdboys. Herdboys would have been forced to move their livestock from the valley 
(winter) cattle-post areas to the high (summer) mountain cattle-post areas year round. 
This would obviously have involved a huge loss of grazing land - particularly more 
sheltered winter grazing areas and a huge change in the pattern of grazing and seasonal 
movements. A number of men (2, 6, 9,10,12) described working as herdboys during 
the period in question at cattle posts within the area supposedly closed to grazing.
The end of the Second World War (or the ‘war with Hitler’ as it was universally called) 
and the return of the Basotho soldiers to the mountain villages proved to be an 
important point around which people could order their memories. Informants were all 
able to tell me about what they were doing in the years following the war.
Most interviewees were able to tell me about other policies that were implemented 
during the 1940s and 1950s, such as the programme of forced villagisation (1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 
8, 11,12,13, 14,15). Interviewees at the eastern sites also told me about a more recent 
policy that has closed a large area of grazing near Sani Pass (9,11, 12,13) and about a 
current USAID grazing project (9, 10, 11, 12).
21 In the interests of confidentiality I did not record informants names. Though the closure policy is 
clearly not controversial, other issues that arose during interviews, such as the recent formation of 
Grazing Associations, were contentious. Following the advice of Liana Kente, my interpreter, the 
tape recorder was only switched on after initial introductions and only when the informants agreed. 
On a couple of occasions informants asked me to switch-off the tape recorder when discussing 
certain issues. All copies of the tapes remain in my possession.
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It is also possible that interviewees did not want to discuss, with an outsider, a policy 
that may have been controversial. It would be unlikely that this would be the case with 
every individual and some interviewees happily told me about how people had resisted 
the programme of forced villagisation during the 1940s and 1950s (1, 8,11, 15), or why 
they disliked the recent USAID project (10,11, 12) and one man even told me why he 
refused to obey lehoella regulations (10).
Two people I interviewed were members of the local political elite of the district (7,
15). One had been a District Council member through-out this period and even he
claimed never to have heard of the policy! He was very surprised when I showed him
photo-copies of the reports of treks outlined above. His reaction to these documents is
perhaps the most convincing argument against these policy being implemented:
How could they have stopped all grazing? It is people’s livelihoods - they would 
have starved - they would have refused to do it. Nobody could attempt this.
The secretary to the present Batloka chief and the ‘Batloka court historian’ (8) also
denied all knowledge of the policy though they said they were not surprised by the trek
reports as the Basutoland authorities and the Ward Chief often claimed to be doing
things in the Batloka area that in reality never happened. They both maintained,
however, that it would have been impossible for the policy to have been implemented in
the valleys to the west of the Senqu/Orange river without their knowledge.
In summary the oral evidence strongly suggests that there was never even an attempt to 
implement the closure policy.
9.3. Other evidence for non-implementation
There are other, mainly circumstantial, pieces of evidence to support the view that the 
closure policy only ever existed on paper despite the up-beat reports of success in the 
Annual Reports and other published documents. The 1954 Department of Agriculture 
Annual Report did admit that in the more ‘lawless’ districts grazing control had proved 
to be difficult to enforce, but, on the whole, there were very few hints of any problems 
what-so-ever.22 There are however a few hints in the five trek reports themselves and 
in the confidential files that suggested the Basutoland authorities were aware that the 
closure policy was not being enforced exactly to plan.
22 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture Annual R eport, 1954, p.9.
232
CHAPTER NINE: THE 1947 CLOSURE POLICY
Table 9.1. Interviews In Mokhotlong District April/May 1995.
Year
of
birth
Sex Language
of
interview?
Literate? Reco
rded
?
Site of 
interview
Notes
1 1918 F Sesotho
(English)
Sesotho yes Outside son’s 
hut
Ex-school teacher, gave 
lots of detail about 
villagisation programme 
but relucant to talk about 
grazing.
2 1936 M Sesotho Sesotho yes In office Department of Agriculture 
employee, stressed 
environmental decline and 
complained about people 
not following regulations.
3 1900
(?)
M Sesotho no yes Outside hut Went to mines three times, 
unwilling to discuss 
anything in detail.
4 1918 M Sesotho no yes Outside hut In army 1941-46 then 
mines for a few years. 
Excellent memory for herd 
sizes and locations of 
grazing areas.
5 1902 M Sesotho
(English)
no yes Outside hut In army - very keen to talk 
about war experiences. 
Went to mines before war.
6 1933 M Sesotho no no Outside
headman’s
hut
Very difficult interview. 
Interventions from 
headman and Village 
secretary’.
7 (?) M English Sesotho and 
English
yes In office In charge all district 
primary schools and a LEC 
minister. Father was 
member BNC.
8 1928 M Sesotho Sesotho
(semi)
no In Area 
Chiefs 
office/court
Introduced as the Batloka 
court historian. The 
Secretary to the Area Chief 
joined in the discussion 
later on (in English).
9 1935 M Sesotho no yes Outside clinic Member of USAID grazing 
project Testimony was 
somewhat inconsistent.
10 1928 M Sesotho no yes Outside hut Very poor -went to mines 
four times. Confident and 
outspoken.
11 1924 M Sesotho no yes In village 
grazing area
Miner for about ten years - 
had quite a few ponies.
12 1936 M Sesotho Sesotho
(semi)
yes In PeaceCorp 
worker’s hut
Miner for about fifteen 
years. Opposed to US AID 
project but very diplomatic.
13 1914 M Sesotho no yes Outside hut Long term miner. His hut 
had been removed in 
villagisation programme 
during 1950s without his 
knowledge.
14 1920 F Sesotho no no Outside hut Very nervous about being 
interviewed.
15 1924 M English Sesotho and 
English
yes In office Ex-member of District 
Council in 1940s-50s. 
Successful business man.
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The are hints in Bowmaker’s 1952 report that he suspected there were more problems 
than he was willing to admit in writing. In his abbreviated report (later translated into 
Sesotho and sent to the Paramount Chief) he stated that ‘considerably more closing 
needs to be done in the Batloka area’. As the vast majority of the area was already 
officially closed to grazing (see Figure 9.1) he presumably meant that the closure policy 
needed to be enforced. The report also frequently mentions cattle posts that needed to 
be removed, for example in the Koakoatsi valley, but it is not clear if these are 
references to cattle posts in use or to the huts themselves.23 While his November 1949 
report states that ‘Destocking measures have been very effectively carried out ...[with] a 
few minor exceptions’, it also mentions that there was no noticeable increase in the 
stocking rate for the areas where livestock should have been sent.24 Pole Evans’s 1950 
report mentions that the lower Mokhotlong valley was characterised by an extremely 
short grass cover, probably an indication that the area had been heavily grazed.25
There was never any attempt to do even the simplest calculations about the impact of 
the closure scheme on livestock densities in the open areas.26 It is difficult to estimate 
the exact livestock population of Mokhotlong district during the period in question.
The Department of Agriculture stopped producing district level figures for livestock 
populations in 1937 after it abandoned the national sheep-dipping campaign. National 
figures, however, continued to be produced throughout the colonial period.
The livestock population of Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek in 1937 are given in Table 
9.2. These figures need to be treated with a great deal of caution: there were many 
reasons why livestock owners would want to keep the numbers of livestock in their 
possession secret from the colonial administration. Up until 1937 the livestock census 
figures were collected from the dipping tanks where officially people had to dip their 
sheep every few months for scab. Many livestock owners resisted this policy as they 
believed that the dip poisoned their livestock and it is, therefore, likely that the figures 
often contained significant errors. It is not clear how the figures were collected for the 
period after 1937.
23 Bowmaker, ‘A Report on a visit to Mokhotlong from 6th -28th March 1952’
24 LNA 2476/n, Bowmaker ‘Cattle Post Trek, 14th to 26th November 1949’
25 LNA 2476/11, Pole Evans, ‘Visit to Basutoland in February, 1950’.
26 Cf chapter 8 on the Pilot Projects in Maseru District
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Table 9.2 Head of livestock by species and total livestock units for
Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek, 1937.
Mokhotlong Qacha’s Nek
sheep 258,173 255,699
goats 42,047 71,254
cattle 29,622 41, 325
equines 13,222 12,582
Total lu 102,888 119,298
According to the Basutoland Department of Agriculture the cattle-post areas of 
Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek totalled an area of some 1,500 square miles. Out of this, 
1,080 square miles had been closed to grazing - leaving and area of 420 square miles 
open to grazing.27 If we assume that the livestock population of the two mountain 
wards remained in a similar proportion to the national herd between 1937 and 1949 
there would have been something in the order of 260,400 livestock units in the two 
wards by 1949 (a rise of 17 percent from 1937).28 If all these animals had been moved 
onto the open areas of the wards the stocking rate in these areas would have been a 
touch over one lu per acre. This contrasts with Staple and Hudson’s recommendations 
of 8 acres per lu for rangeland above 8,500 feet.29
A stocking rate of one lu per acre would have represented a huge increase in the 
stocking rate of these high pastures. The fact that Bowmaker did not notice any 
significant increase in livestock densities in these areas suggests that livestock from the
27 Basutoland, Department of Agriculture Annual Report, 1949
28 The next year for which District level data is available is 1965. The following table indicates that 
the proportion of in national herd in the two districts remained relatively constant over a 28 year 
period:
Table 9.3 Livestock populations in Mokhotlong and Qachas Nek as Percent
of National Totals, 1937 and 1965.
1937 1965
National Mokhotlong Qacha’s National Mokhotlong Qacha’s
total (%) Nek total (%) Nek
(%) (%)
sheep 1,283,394 20.1 19.9 1,661,502 18.9 11.5
goats 411,931 10.2 17.3 877,820 13.8 8.9
cattle 418,921 7.1 9.9 346,079 8.5 8.6
equines 108,851 12.1 11.6 123,073 14.5 11.0
total (lu) 866,837 11.9 13.8 977,016 13.7 9.9
29 See chapter 4.
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closed areas were not moved above the 9,000 foot contour line. It is also significant 
that another report about the high plateau grazing areas, written during the early 1950s, 
makes no mention of the closure policy.
The high altitude grazing areas include bogs in the vicinity of many stream heads.
These bogs were seen as being particularly vulnerable and highly susceptible to 
destruction by overgrazing or trampling by cattle. In January 1954 and 1955 a South 
African ecologist, E.M. van Zinderen Bakker, visited these areas to write a report on the 
bogs which was submitted to the colonial authorities. It is clear from both the content 
and the tone of the report that Van Zinderen Bakker’s primary interest was in the 
intrinsic value of the bogs themselves and not their economic or wider environmental 
significance. One might, therefore, safely assume that any policy that could threaten 
this ecosystem would be discussed in detail (and presumably condemned). The closure 
policy, which would have inevitably led to increased grazing pressure on bog 
vegetation in the open areas, is not, however, even mentioned in the report.30
Another report that does not mention the closure policy is the Jeffares and Green report 
on water resources. The survey team carried out fieldwork during 1949 and 1950, but 
make no mention of the fact that significant areas of the catchment area they were 
investigating were totally close to grazing. Indeed they state in their final report that 
overgrazing was a problem below the 8,000 foot contour line: an area supposedly closed 
to all livestock.31
Just as no calculations were done about the feasibility of increasing the livestock 
density in the areas to be left open there was never any discussion in the Departmental 
files about how the areas officially closed were to be demarcated. Fencing and even 
simple beaconing were dismissed as too expensive and it was decided to rely upon 
natural physical features to describe the area to be closed. In this context it is notable 
that on the 1911 1:250,000 map an escarpment is recorded at or around the 9,000 foot 
contour line on the slopes above and to the east of the upper reaches of the Senqu river. 
More recent maps, such as the 1982 1:50,000 series, do indicate that there is a break of 
slope at or around the 3,000 metre mark but this is nowhere as pronounced as the 1911 
map would suggest. Furthermore in other areas of the Ward, especially towards the 
west, this distinction between valley sides and plateau is not altogether clear. In none
30 PRO DOl 19/1385, E.M. van Zinderen Bakker, ‘Report to the Government of Basutoland on the 
Origin and Importance of the Bogs in the Basutoland Mountains’ (unpublished, 1955).
31 PRO DO35/4061, Jeffares and Green, ‘Water Resource Survey of Basutoland’, January 1951, p.20.
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of the files or official reports is there any indication of how livestock owners were 
informed of the natural features that would be used to indicate which areas were closed.
The inaccuracy of the 1911 map was never mentioned on the files or reports on grazing
control. Nevertheless it was clearly a frustration for the officials trying to oversee the
closure policy. In the late 1940s the Basutoland administration requested that the High
Commissioner try to get the Directorate of Colonial Surveys to push Lesotho up the list
of territories waiting to be properly surveyed:
The existing Ordinance Survey map can only be regarded as a sketch map suitable 
for travelling. Many deficiencies have been found both by the Surveyor to Public 
Works Dept and by officers of the Agricultural Department who are now 
engaged on the controlled grazing work in the mountains. The consensus of 
opinion of these officers is that the present map is inaccurate and totally 
inadequate for present requirements....Now that the Basuto are beginning to 
accept the principal of controlled and rotational grazing a great deal of 
demarcation will have to be done. An accurate topographical map is essential for 
this type of work and an aerial survey would be immense help in deciding upon 
detail.32
The High Commissioner’s office passed on these requests to London, stressing the 
political importance of the closure policy for the transfer issue.33 The Directorate of 
Colonial Surveys regretfully informed the High Commissioner’s office that they could 
not begin to survey Lesotho until 1951 at the earliest, unless they asked the Union 
government for help with the aerial photography. Not surprisingly Baring and his Chief 
Secretary, A. Clarke, thought this was an extremely bad idea and Clarke made a file 
note: ‘Basutoland has “had it” and must wait until 1951’.34
In March 1952 Bowmaker took a set of aerial photographs taken for the Directorate of
Colonial Surveys into the field in an effort to delimit areas to be used as units for stock
limitation policies He found the task impossible and was forced to abandon the
project.35 In June 1952 he wrote to the Directorate of Colonial Surveys asking them
when they would have the maps of the mountain zone ready:
I believe I mentioned to you when you were last at Maseru that I intended to visit 
Mokhotlong during March to start a system of stock limitation there. For this a 
fair notion of the area of each small valley was required, and I intended to work 
this out from the aerial survey photographs while passing through the country. 
For the reason a) occasional variation in height from which the photographs were 
taken, and consequently upsetting of scale, b) snow and c) shadow I have found 
the job practically impossible to complete, and as, politically, it is desirable to 
proceed with delimitation in the Leribe, Maseru and Mokhotlong district as soon 
as possible, i.e. while the Native Authority is agreeable, I would be most grateful 
for any advice and help you are able to offer.... I would be most grateful if you
32 PRO DOl 19/1442, Marwick to Clarke 16 March 1949.
33 PRO DOl 19/1442, Clarke to Humphries, 30 August 1949.
34 PRO DOl 19/1442, File Note by Clarke, November 1949.
35 LNA 2476/n, Bowmaker ‘A Report on a Visit to Mokhotlong From 6th - 28th March, 1952’.
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could let me know ... when your first maps of the three districts are likely to be 
ready.36
Bowmaker clearly totally underestimated the amount of time a survey team needed to 
produced accurate topographical maps. Ground truthing of the aerial photographs was 
an extremely difficult affair in the broken topography of Lesotho’s mountains and the 
final maps were not released until the late 1950s.37
Another hint that the Basutoland authorities knew there were more problems with the 
closure policy than they let on in official publications is the totally disproportionate 
response from the Basutoland authorities to the very mild implied criticisms of the 
closure policy in Sheddick’s Land Tenure in Basutoland.38 Sheddick had originally 
been commissioned to write a report on land tenure by the Basutoland authorities but as 
we saw in chapter 7 his report was not to the administration’s liking. As well as 
disagreeing with some of his arguments about rights to administer the mountain grazing 
areas the Basutoland authorities reacted strongly to a couple of his quite minor 
comments on the closure policy.
The Basutoland authorities were particularly irked by Sheddick’s implication that the
closure policy was the work of the Department of Agriculture and not the chiefly
authorities. Sheddick reported that the Basutoland administration had ‘arranged for the
imposition of a series of restrictions designed to control animal density and restrict the
movement of stock’.39 Forsyth Thompson thought that this was
A rather inadequate and malicious reference to the Basutoland system of 
rotational grazing which is based on traditional methods and is being introduced 
by the Paramount Chief on the advice of her professional advisers in the 
Agriculture Department.40
Sheddick’s published report contained a short foreword from the Commonwealth
Relations office pointing out which parts the report they did not accept, and reiterating
that ‘grazing control has not been imposed on the Basuto’.41
How can this large gulf between the official version of the closure policy and that 
suggested by oral history be accounted for? I believe the answer can be found in the
3b p r o  OD6/275; Bowmaker to Col. GJ. Humphries, Directorate o f Colonial Surveys, Tolworth, 11 
June 1952.
37 See PRO OD6/548 for correspondence from survey party in Lesotho, 1956-58.
38 Sheddick, Land Tenure.
39 Sheddick, Land Tenure, p. 112.
40 Letter from Resident Commissioner to High Commissioner, 12 February 1952, Patrick Duncan 
Papers, University of York, DU7.12 Minutes to Government
41 Commonwealth Relations Office ‘Foreword’ in Sheddick Land Tenure, p. xiv.
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particular administrative circumstances of the district and it is to these I turn in the next 
section.
9.4. The Administration of Mokhotlong
In the period 1947-56 the sparsely populated Mokhotlong district was officially 
administered by a European District Commissioner and District Agricultural Officer42 
with a small Basotho staff43 and by the local Basotho chiefly authorities. Up until 1945 
the area had been administered as a sub-division of Qacha’s Nek district with an 
Assistant District Commissioner stationed at Mokhotlong camp. The 1946 Census gave 
a total Basotho population for the district of 36,765 (and 35 Europeans) in an area of
1,770 square miles.44
\
Communications with the rest of the territory were very poor and post and supplies 
came up from Natal over the Sani Pass rather than directly from the lowlands. By the 
early 1950s there was radio contact with Maseru, but the wind-power generator took up 
to a week to charge up enough electricity for even a short conversation. During this 
period regular plane journeys with Maseru did become possible, though Mokhotlong 
Camp could still be cut off from the rest of the country for weeks because of poor 
weather.45
The constitutional and administrative uncertainty in Lesotho as a whole during the 
colonial period was reflected in Mokhotlong at the district level. Officially the chief of 
Mokhotlong ward was the Paramount Chief Regent, ‘Mantsebo, though in reality the 
ward was administered on her behalf by Matlere Lerotholi, who came to be regarded by 
the British as de facto Ward Chief and was more often than not given that title in 
official documents.
Matlere was a descendant of Paramount Chief Lerotholi via a very junior house. When 
Seeiso was placed as Ward Chief in Mokhotlong by Paramount Chief Griffith in 1926, 
Matlere was ordered to move to the mountains with him and placed in a village in the 
Moremoholo valley. According to some oral sources, and to Gideon Pott who was 
stationed at Mokhotlong Camp in 1942-45, Matlere spent his younger years working as
42 The first Agricultural Officer was posted in MokhoUong in 1949, Basutoland, Department of 
Agriculture Annual Report, 1949.
43 Including from the mid- 1950s onwards the country’s first Mosotho Assistant District 
Commissioner, Interview with Sir James Hennessy, 12 November 1996, Cambridge.
44 Great Britain, Colonial Annual Report: Basutoland 1947 , (London, 1949), p. 15.
45 Interview with Sir James Hennessy, 12 November 1996, Cambridge.
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Chief Seeiso’s herdboy.46 When Seeiso was appointed Paramount Chief (in 1939), and 
moved to Matsieng, Matlere was appointed to look after his affairs in Mokhotlong 
district. He continued in this position after Paramount Chief Seeiso died and ‘Mantsebo 
was appointed as Regent. He was able to use his position as de facto ward chief to 
promote his brothers to more senior positions within the headman/chief hierarchy and 
together they were able to form a powerful local clique.
Despite his royal lineage and his support from the Paramount Chief, his political
position in Mokhotlong was actually quite weak in the early 1940s. Assistant District
Commissioner Pott had little confidence in Matlere and his brothers and in fact tried to
get him removed from his position as de facto Ward Chief. In a letter to his District
Commissioner at Qacha’s Nek (forwarded to the Government Secretary in Maseru) he
alleged that Matlere was lining his own pockets, and the pockets of ‘Mantsebo, with the
fines he collected from his court at Thabang instead of handing the money over to be
held in Trust for the young Paramount Chief elect.47 There were also rumours that
Matlere was ‘Mantsebo’s lover:
Matlere is a “great favourite” with the Regent. The natives of the district in fact 
refer to him as the Regent’s husband. I understand the paramount chief suspected 
this liaison before he died. He [Matlere] is called away frequently on 
‘business’.48
Pott reported that, despite their growing influence, the Lerotholi brothers were
unpopular in Mokhotlong. In May 1941 he wrote to his DC in Qacha’s Nek that:
They come from a junior house of the Late Paramount Chief Lerotholi and as my 
interpreter and sergeant state “would be nobodies” in the lowlands.49
A year later he was still trying to bring pressure to have the Matlere faction removed:
I have no hesitation in saying that these four brothers of the Lerotholi family, i.e. 
Matlere, Mabina, Mahlomola and Mosinoa are thoroughly disliked, are self- 
seeking individuals and are only tolerated because chief Seeiso placed them here. 
They will stop at nothing to enrich themselves in spite of an apparent social 
charm.50
Matlere’s position was made more difficult because of an ongoing dispute about the 
right of the ward chieftainship centred at Thabang to rule over the whole of the 
administrative district. To explain why it is first necessary to briefly consider the 
previous history of Mokhotlong district.
46 LNA/1882, Pott to D.C.,
47 LNA/1882, Pott to D.C.,
48 LNA/1882, Pott to D.C.,
49 LNA/1882, Pott to D.C.,
50 LNA/1882, Pott to D.C.,
Qachas Nek, 20 August 1941. 
Qachas Nek, 29 October 1942. 
Qachas Nek, 29 October 1942. 
Qachas Nek, 20 August 1941. 
Qachas Nek, 29 October 1942.
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9.4.1. Chiefly rivalries and ‘Medicine Murders’ in Mokhotlong
Prior to the late nineteenth century the mountain areas of Lesotho were mainly 
inhabited by groups of San plus the occasional Nguni. As in many other areas of 
southern Africa during the nineteenth century the San population was gradually wiped 
out or absorbed into surrounding communities. In 1868 the first British Government 
Agent of Basutoland instituted a policy of genocide against the San groups and by 1873 
the last independent San communities, located in Sehonghong valley, had been 
destroyed.51
The first organised group of Basotho to move into the Mokhotlong area were the 
Batloka clan who had previously been settled in the Mount Fletcher area of the Cape. 
Under their powerful leader, Chief Lelingoana, they allied themselves with those 
groups resisting British attempts to dis-arm the Basotho during the 1880-81 Gun War 
(to display their loyalty to Letsie they sent him the de-capitated head of the British 
magistrate John Austin) and were granted, in thanks, the whole of Mokhotlong district 
with the promise that no other chief would be placed over them. Shortly afterwards, 
however, Letsie decided, for strategic reasons, to placed one of his sons, Rafolatsane, in 
Mokhotlong and it was agreed that he would control the valleys to the east of Senqu and 
Lelingoana would control the valleys to the west.
This division of the area remained until 1925 when Griffiths placed his son Seeiso as 
Ward Chief over the whole district.52 Both Lelingoana and Rafolatsane rejected 
Seeiso’s authority over them, and for a number of years appeared to have been able to 
maintain their power base within their respective areas.53 When Rafolatsane died in 
1932, however, his successor (‘Mankata, the widow of Rafolatsane’s senior son who 
had died before his father) was unable to maintain full control over her area. In 1935 
Chief Seeiso, after an intervention from his father, was allowed to place his headmen in 
two-fifths of the area previously controlled by Rafolatsane. Matlere’s family and close 
followers were able to secure important headmen’s positions at this juncture. After
51 Gill, A Short History o f Lesotho , p.132. K.J. Wilson reports, however, that Chief Lelingoana told 
him (in 1928) that the Batloka were actively involved in the murder of many San during the 1880s, 
Wilson, KJ., ‘A Memory of Chief Lelingoana of the Batloka Tribe’, Quarterly Bulletin o f the South 
African Library ,47,1,1992, pp.22-27.
52 The following details are based on Ashton (The Basuto) and an anonymous and unpublished report 
titled ‘Analysis of Ritual Murders and their relation to various administrative events’ (unpublished 
report, n.d. from the papers of G.I. Jones). Colin Murray thinks that this report was written by 
Jones but Coplan and Quinlan ( ‘A Chief by the People’) argue that it was probably written by 
Ashton.
53 Lelingoana’s chieftainship was based at Tloha-re-bue and Rafolatsane’s at Molumong.
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1933 tensions between a much weakened Rafolatsane group54 and the Seeiso group 
died down, though friction remained below the surface and occasionally re-appeared 
through the 1930s and 1940s.
The Batloka group also had their power base undermined in the mid-1930s after 
Lelingoana died (1934) and was replaced by his son Mosuoe, who had his rank reduced 
to sub-chief under Seeiso. When Mosuoe refused to send his followers to plough or 
gather firewood for Seeiso, he was fined two head of cattle which he again refused to 
pay. The dispute was taken on to the Paramount Chiefs court in Matsieng, where the 
fine was overturned and Seeiso was told not to make unfair demands on Mosuoe and 
his followers. Nevertheless it was made clear that Mosuoe was subordinate to Seeiso, 
who had judicial and administrative authority over him.
Mosuoe appealed to the Resident Commissioner but he refused intervene, saying that it 
was an administrative decision for the Paramount Chief to adjudicate upon alone. At 
the same time however he assured Mosuoe that his chieftainship of the Batloka would 
not be taken away and that he was looked on as being of the same status as his father. 
These judgements did little to clear up the exact relationship between the two chiefs and 
the dispute simmered on. In 1944 it re-surfaced when the newly appointed Regent, 
‘Mantsebo, demanded that Mosuoe surrender a portion of his district in the same way as 
Rafolatsane’s successor had done. Mosoue contested the demand, first in the 
Paramount Chiefs court, where he not surprisingly lost, and then via the colonial 
judicial system. He eventually won his case, on a technicality, on appeal to the High 
Court55 and, in 1948, he had his gazetted title amended to that of Chief of the Batloka.
Despite the ruling in Mosoue’s favour the dispute between the three local political 
groupings (the Matlere faction, the Rafolatsane faction and the Batloka faction) 
continued. In December 1947 the District Commissioner wrote to the Government 
Secretary in Maseru about re-newed tensions between Matlere and Mosoeu in the 
aftermath of the High Court judgement the previous year.56 There was, however, a very 
different attitude towards Matlere amongst the officials in 1947 to that expressed by 
Pott in 1941-3. The Government Secretary now told the D.C. of Mokhotlong that 
Mosuoe should still accept Matlere’s orders whilst the Paramount Chief considered
54 Accord to Ashton (The Basuto, p.199) Seeiso had supported the succession of ‘Mankata to 
Rafolatsane’s chieftainship as he believed she was a weak leader and her succession would 
strengthen his position in the Ward. Ashton also reports that in 1936 ‘Mankata went insane and 
Lerato, widow of Rafolatsane’s second son, acted in her place (p. 198).
55 Basutoland Civil Record No. H.C.C. 11/46, Mosuoe Lelingoana vs. the Paramount Chief, before 
Justice E.M. de Beer, 30 May 1946 (copy shown to me at Tloha-re-bue, May 1995).
56 LNA 1882, D.C. Mokhotlong to Government Secretary, Maseru, 23 December 1947.
242
CHAPTER NINE: THE 1947 CLOSURE POLICY
making a further appeal against the judgement57 and on the 13 March 1948 the D.C. of 
Mokhotlong reported that Matlere was exercising extreme tact in his dealings with 
Mosoue.58
This change of attitude towards Matlere is even more striking given the large number of
medicine murders in Mokhotlong in which Matlere and his brothers were either directly
or indirectly implicated. G.I. Jones detailed Matlere’s involvement in these medicine
murders in his confidential report to the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1950. In a
passage that was deleted from the final published report, he stated that:
The Mokhotlong murders still remain a mystery. Tw o... have never been 
satisfactorily explained. In a third ... the principal accused was reported to have 
said he was acting under the orders of the Ward Chief and in four others the 
principal accused, Seabatha Lorotholi [sic], Mahlomola Lorotholi [sic], Mabina 
Lerotholi and Tsoteng Griffith were close relatives (half brothers and brothers’ 
son) of the acting ward chief, had been placed there by Chief Seeiso or his 
successor and placed in Chief Seeiso’s own section of the Ward. Until the 
mystery and suspicion which surrounds these Mokhotlong murders is [sic] 
dissipated, the Mokhotlong people will continue to think that the Regent and 
Matlere Lerotholi who acts for her, are involved in them, and people in other parts 
of Basutoland will consider that as long as the Regent and her favourite councillor 
remain under suspicion of using Diretlo medicines, lesser chiefs and headmen will 
be encouraged to do the same.**
Despite the Basutoland authorities’ knowledge of Matlere’s involvement in numerous
medicine murders, he was often described in glowing terms by British officials, mainly
on the basis of his willingness to institute grazing control. After his final trip though
Mokhotlong in 1951 Evelyn Baring eulogised Matlere’s attitude to the grazing control
and reported that the country could do with more chiefs of his stature.60 Pole Evans
was also fulsome in his praise:
One cannot conclude this discussion without referring briefly to the prominent 
part played by Chief Matlere in the destocking scheme, first carried out in his 
ward, and which has now become a shining example for all others to follow in the 
general scheme of pasture rehabilitation. Chief Matlere was most helpful on the 
tour through his area. He took a deep interest in and showed a real grasp of the 
grassland problem with all its ramifications. He was also imbued with a genuine 
determination to do all in his power to get his people to carry out their obligations 
to the land. Full advantage should be taken of the efforts of such enlightened 
leaders by backing them up with all the advantage which scientific investigation 
alone can give.61
57 LNA 1882, Government Secretary, Maseru, to D.C. Mokhotlong, 8 January 1948.
58 LNA 1882, Extract of Report from DC Mokhotlong, 13 March 1948.
59 p r o  D035/4158, Jones, G.I. ‘Report Submitted to Sec. o f State for Commonwealth Relations’ 
(Feb. 1950), p. 34.
60 PRO D035/4010, Visits of High Commissioner to Basutoland.
61 LNA 2476/n, Pole Evans ‘Visit to Basutoland in February, 1950’
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It seems highly likely that the Basutoland authorities were willing to be less harsh on 
Matlere and ‘Mantsebo at the time of Jones’s investigation at least partly because they 
had both apparently embraced the concept of grazing control.62 As we saw in chapter 
7, Baring was particularly keen to stress the role of senior chiefs in the development 
process. Whilst in London shortly before the Jones Report was submitted, he appeared 
to try to pre-empt any recommendations that Matlere and ‘Mantsebo be removed, 
arguing that:
The practice of ritual murder must be broken, but efforts must also be made to
avoid breaking the chieftainship in the process.63
This is not to say that the Basutoland authorities were willing to cover-up Matlere’s role 
in the Mokhotlong murders totally and he was eventually arrested for his part in another 
medicine murder in 1952. He was then accused of having ordered five men to murder a 
man, cut off parts of his body and deliver them to his brother, Mabina, to fly them over 
to Maseru (it was presumed by the colonial authorities for use by ‘Mantsebo). After 
their arrest, three of the men turned state witness and pointed the finger at Matlere and 
his brother, Mabina.64
The tone of the relevant correspondence from Basutoland authorities hints at some 
regret that they had been forced to arrest Matlere.65 Significantly one of first issues
62 Hugh Ashton agrees that this supposition is ‘pretty close to the mark’, pers. cors. 12 June 1996. As 
we saw in chapter 7 Gordon Hector, the Deputy Resident Commissioner in the late 1950s, told 
Marc Epprecht that ‘Mantsebo won ‘grudging respect’ from the British for her willingness to 
institute unpopular anti-erosion policies, Epprecht, ‘Women’s “Conservatism” and the Politics of 
Gender’, p. 42.
63 PRO DO35/4025, Notes by Sir E. Baring on the Political and Economic Position of the HC 
Territories [c.1950]. Baring already had a good idea of what Jones’ report would include. In 
December 1949 he had sent a memo to the Commonwealth Relations Office detailing Jones’s initial 
comments on his investigations: ‘He thinks that the aims of the Government should be: i) The 
removal of the Regent who he believes is almost certainly deeply concerned in the murders. This 
should not be done by direct Government action, but if the Basuto themselves would do it then the 
cessation of ritual murders is possible, ii) All classes of chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen should be 
drawn more into the administration and given specific responsibilities. At the same time there 
should be improved methods of enabling commoners to express their views and so take some part 
in work of government.’. PRO D035/4158, Witchcraft: The Jones Report on Ritual Murder in 
Basutoland.
64 PRO DOl 19/1382, Airowsmith to Wray, 26 November 1952.
65 This is especially apparent when compared to the tone of the correspondence when Matlere was 
arrested for a second time, in July 1960. At this time the Assistant Superintendent of Police wrote:
‘ I feel it is essential that a conviction be obtained against 1st accused [Matlere] as he has been 
involved directly and indirectly in this type of crime for many years and these cases will not stop 
unless he is got out of the way’, PRO DOl 19/1386, Memorandum by Assistant Superintendent of 
Police, n.d. (c. July 1960). Matlere was again able to avoid prosecution, ‘by a hairs breadth’ 
according to Lichtenberg, the Prosecutor; PRO D0119/1386, Prosecutor’s Report, 6 January 1961. 
He was acquitted on the basis of an alibi showing he was in Maseru at the time of the murder and 
there were no flights to Mokhotlong shown in the regular pilot’s log book for the relevant period. It 
was only after Matlere had been acquitted that it came to light that another pilot had made an
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mentioned in the High Commissioner’s report on the case to the Commonwealth
Relations Office was Matlere’s role in grazing control:
Chief Matlere Lerotholi is the Paramount chiefs representative at Mokhotlong, 
and although he is not by birth one of the senior chiefs, he is certainly one of the 
most effective. He has been most useful to Government in enforcing measures for 
grazing control which is more advanced in Mokhotlong than in any other 
district.66
Patrick Ashley-Cooper, an extremely wealthy English businessman who took a close 
interest in Lesotho,67 told the Secretary of State at the Commonwealth Relations Office 
that arresting Matlere was a mistake, and that the authorities should be supporting the 
Chiefs efforts to implement development projects.68 Unlike in the case of Chiefs 
Bereng and Gabashane there was no discussion of how Matlere’s power should be 
curbed if he were acquitted.69 As it turned out the state witnesses changed their stories 
when they got into Court and the case against Matlere and Mabina collapsed.70
Matlere appeared to be angry that the British had put him on trial and wanted to make a 
counter claim against the witnesses who had spoken out against him 71 His annoyance 
at being charged with murder may account for some of the delay in re-opening the areas 
officially closed to grazing. In March 1952 Bowmaker had met with Matlere in 
Mokhotlong to discuss plans for grazing management as the closed areas were thought 
to be ready for re-opening 72 In the end the areas were not officially re-opened until 
1956. Unfortunately I was unable to locate the file covering the period mid-1952 to 
late-1954 in the series Department of Agriculture series ‘Grazing in the Mountains’ in 
the LNA, so it is difficult to determine the exact causes of this delay. As we saw above 
the delay in obtaining accurate maps was no doubt partially to blame, but a cooling of 
relations with Matlere may also have been a factor. Certainly news that he had
unscheduled flight to Mokhotlong at the time of the murder, pers. cors, Sir James Hennessy, 22 
November 1996. Matlere’s brother, Makhahlela, had his conviction for the murder over-turned on 
appeal, PRO DOl 19/1386, Registrar of High Court, Maseru to High Commissioner, 14 June 1961.
66 PRO DOl 19/1382, Arrowsmith to Wray, 26 November 1952.
67 His daughter was married to Patrick Duncan, then a Basutoland Civil Servant, and he visited the 
country on a number of occasions see, Driver, Patrick Duncan, p. 56. He was especially interested 
in agriculture and soil erosion, and discussed these issues with ‘Mantsebo in February 1952. It is 
not recorded if Matlere was present at the meeting, Patrick Duncan Papers, University of York, 
D U 5,20/6, Extracts of Notes on Basutoland: Visit by Sir Ashley Cooper, February 1952.
68 p r o  DO 35/4011, Sir Ashley Cooper’s Suggestions About Basutoland, Together with a 
Commentary by the High Commissioner, February 1954. The High Commissioner argued that the 
police action had been justified.
69 See PRO DOl 19/1378, Note on discussion between HC and RC re: Bereng and Gabashane, 28 
April 1949, where Baring and Forsyth-Tompson discussed banishing the two chiefs if their appeal 
to the Privy Council was upheld.
70 PRO DOl 19/1378,Wray to Marwick, 26 February 1953.
71 PRO DOl 19/1378, Inglis to Marwick, 6 March 1953, covering translated copy of Matlere to Inglis, 
2 March 1953.
72 LNA 2476/n, Bowmaker, ‘Report on Visit to Mokhotlong, 6th - 28th March 1952’.
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overcome his ‘bitterness’ about the trial was linked to his willingness to get on with the
programme of grazing control:
Chief Matlere Lerotholi appears to be getting over the bitterness against the 
government which resulted from his trial on a charge of medicine murder. The 
District Commissioner Mokhotlong reports that his work in regard to agricultural 
improvement and development is most encouraging. He is particularly keen to 
implement without delay the Paramount Chiefs recent order73 regarding the 
demarcation and carry capacity survey of grazing areas in the mountains.74
Even if Matlere’s apparent willingness to accept grazing control policies was not
directly related to the Basutoland authorities turning at least half a blind eye to his
involvement in numerous medicine murders, it is clear that his willingness to advocate
grazing control did give him a vital political boost. Despite the ruling of the Appeal
Court, the Department of Agriculture continued to regard Matlere as the Ward Chief of
the whole of Mokhotlong district. He was always referred to by the title Ward Chief
and never as Paramount Chiefs Representative - Mokhotlong, as officially gazetted.
In short Matlere Lerotholi, a lesser chief by birth, became by the late 1940s one of the
most powerful chiefs in Lesotho and a favourite of the Basutoland authorities. His
support for grazing control measures played no small part in his rise to power. One
section of the 1948 Colonial Annual Report seems particularly apt:
Marked success has been achieved in certain areas by Chiefs who have shown 
they are conscious of their administrative duties. For example the problems of 
soil erosion and grazing control are being energetically tackled by the Chiefs of 
Qacha’s Nek and Mokhotlong and striking results have already been obtained. 
The time is coming when the stature of a chief will be judged not only by his birth 
but more particularly by his achievements.75
In the eyes of the Basutoland authorities Matlere’s stature was very much based on his
achievements in implementing grazing control, but, in the light of my oral history, this
achievement must, at the very least, be regarded with a considerable amount of
scepticism. The obvious question that now arises is: ‘Were the Basutoland authorities
willing accomplices in the invention of a myth about a successful soil conservation
policy, or did they have the wool pulled over their eyes?’ The answer is inevitably
somewhere between the two, though exactly where is a matter of some speculation.
73 Order 1/1955 issued by ‘Mantsebo on 18 November 1955, reproduced as Appendix IV of 
Basutoland, Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1955, p.65-66.
74 PR 0D 035/4361, Extract from Tergos, no.6, Junel956.
75 Great Britain, Colonial Annual Report: Basutoland 1948 , London, 1949, p.7.
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9.5. Explaining the gap between rhetoric and reality
From the evidence presented above it is clear that the Basutoland authorities did know 
there were more problems with the closure policy than the upbeat reports in Department 
of Agriculture Annual Reports and other published documents would suggest, but I 
suspect they did believe that Matlere had at least attempted the policy. James (later Sir 
James) Hennesy, who was the D.C. in the mid-1950s, certainly recalled the policy 
having been enforced, though he could not remember details. He remembered the 
condition of the pastures in Mokhotlong district being much better than elsewhere in the 
country, which he put down to the success of the closure policy. 76
One of the reasons the Basutoland authorities believed that the closure policy had been
instituted was that they trusted Matlere. He was clearly seen in a very different light to
most other chiefs. Hennessy recalled that he carried his reputation before him and that
if he said he was going to do something he would do it J 1 Despite his association with
medicine murders Matlere was seen to be a good influence on ‘Mantsebo and ‘one of
the most effective* chiefs.78 Despite the support of Baring (see chapter 7) ‘Mantsebo
was generally seen by the Basutoland authorities as being the ‘weakest point’ in the
administration.79 Jones argued that she was :
not a person of strong or masculine character. Her health was poor, she had no 
political experience and little aptitude for ruling. People, particularly some of the 
older chiefs, felt she was very much of a woman, and that any chief who 
succeeded in becoming her favourite councillor would be able to exercise undue 
influence in national affairs.80
The Basutoland authorities also believed that her advisers would have a powerful
position and tried to encourage support for ‘Mantsebo from strong (male) advisers such
as Matlere, Bofihla Griffith,81 and Theko Makhaola.82 During the 1950s five chiefs
76 interview with Sir James Hennessy, 12 November 1996, Cambridge.
77 Interview with Sir James Hennessy, 12 November 1996, Cambridge.
78 PRO DOl 19/1382, Arrowsmith to Wray, 26 November 1952
79 See for example Duncan to Government Secretary, 4 July 1951, Patrick Duncan Papers, University 
of York, DU 7.12, Minutes to Government.
Jones Basutoland Medicine Murder, p. 34.
81 Bofihla was the Acting Ward Chief of Likhoele Ward in Mafeteng District and the half brother of
Paramount Chief Seeiso. He was one of ‘Mantsebo’s official advisers between February 1949 and
March 1952, at which point there was a falling-out over ‘Mantsebo* s attitude to a levy to provide 
funds for higher education, see PRO DOl 19/1382, Arrowsmith to Wray, 26 November 1952.
82 Ward Chief of Qacha’s Nek and one of the most senior chiefs in Lesotho. He was at the centre of 
politics for many decades and the uncle and one of the major supporters of Bereng Griffith in his 
succession bid against Seeiso and ‘Mantsebo. Like Matlere he was often described as a forceful 
and effective chief by the Basutoland authorities. His reputation was also largely built on his 
willingness to institute grazing control policies in his ward. Like Matlere he was tried and acquitted 
on a murder charge in the early 1950s, PRO DOl 19/1383, Arrowsmith to Scrivenor, 13 February 
1954. While the Basutoland authorities thought he would be a good influence on ‘Mantsebo their
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came to dominate political life at Matsieng: Nkoebe Mitchel, Leabua Jonathan, 
Leshoboro Majara, Patrick ‘Mota and most importantly Matlere Lerotholi.83
Despite the fact that the Basutoland authorities were willing to trust Matlere over the
implementation of the closure policy they were obviously aware that he could say one
thing and do something else entirely. Even after his arrest and trial Matlere frequently
spoke out against medicine murders in the National Council and other forums.84 One
anonymous Mosotho commented:
People are astonished when they see that people who have dabbled in medicine 
murders are treated with great respect and are in the forefront of the work for the 
nation.85
It was not just over medicine murders that Matlere could be inconsistent In chapter 7
we saw how he changed his mind about his rights as a Ward Chief to control grazing at
the cattle-posts, and he also displayed two very different attitudes to the Agricultural
Improvement Areas. In the 1946 National Council Matlere spoke out against the
contour banks being driven through peoples fields:
There is an outcry from the nation against the contour furrows that are made 
through the lands.
He pointed out that the banks significantly decreased the amount of land available for
ploughing, especially on the more sloping mountain fields:
Some people have already abandoned their lands because of contour banks made 
through them.86
Earlier that year, however, Matlere had told the District Commissioner that he 
supported the plans to establish an Agricultural Improvement Area in the whole area 
north of the Sehonghong and east of the Senqu. He even issued instructions on behalf 
of the Paramount Chief that people should construct furrows above their fields using 
tools supplied by the Agricultural Department.87
Clearly Matlere was a cunning political character. But how was he able to cover-up 
something as obvious as thousands of head of livestock being in an area supposedly 
closed to grazing?
relations were strained, especially after 1953 when it was rumoured Theko had fathered a child by 
MaBereng (mother of Bereng Seeiso, the heir to the throne), PRO D035/4361, Extract from 
Tergos, no. 37, July 1953. At this stage there were even allegations that he was plotting the death 
of ‘Mantsebo
83 Machobane, Government and Change, p. 248. The degree o f intrigue and in-fighting was clearly 
demonstrated in 1955 when there were also rumours that Nkoebe Mitchel was involved in a plot to 
kill ‘Mantsebo, PRO D035/4361, Extract from Tergos no 6, June 1955.
84 p r o  DOl 19/1384, Arrowsmith to Scrivenor, 30 May 1956.
85 p r o  DOl 19/1383, anonymous to How, 27 February 1954.
86 Basutoland National Council Proceedings of 42nd Session, October 1946, p.496.
87 LNA 2351/E, Assistant DC Mokhotlong to Government Secretary 16th January 1946. The plans 
fizzled out over the following year especially as there were no tools forthcoming to carry out the 
works.
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It is notable that every trek around the district was accompanied either by Matlere 
himself or a close member of his clique. Matlere accompanied Pole Evans’s trek and 
made a positive impression on him, perhaps displaying the charm referred to by Pott in 
1942:
From conversations I had from time to time with Chief Matlere on my trip I found 
that he had the highest regard for Mr Bowmaker’s work and placed important 
faith in his judgement and understanding.88
Bowmaker’s 1952 trek was accompanied by Matlere’s brother Seabatha (who had been
arrested for murder in October 1943, and eventually acquitted in November 1946).89
On this trek Seabatha attempted to stop Bowmaker going into the Batloka area where it
appeared to be more obvious that grazing had not been closed:
Chief Seabata [sic.] raised objections to going so thoroughly through the area 
falling under Chief Mosuoe, that is the Batloka country, but I assured him I would 
do it on my own responsibility without approaching Chief Mosuoe and make 
appropriate apologies when we met him later.90
It is very possible that whoever accompanied the trek was able to get word on ahead
and ask herdboys to keep their livestock hidden from view of the party. The physical
geography of Mokhotlong, with its numerous steep sided valleys with many incised
meanders, make this eminently possible.
It is also notable that, with the exception of Baring’s 1951 visit,91 the treks all took 
place during the summer and autumn months in order to avoid the severe cold and snow 
of the winter. At this time of year many of the livestock would have been away at the 
high cattle posts even without regulations. If they had visited the closed valleys in the 
winter months they may have seen more herds brought down to avoid the severe 
weather at higher altitudes.92
It seems possible that Matlere and his followers were able to give the Basutoland 
authorities the impression that he had at least partially implemented the policy when he 
had done no such thing. But what about hiding, from the resident’s of Mokhotlong, the 
fact that he supported a policy that would adversely affect their livelihoods ? To most 
of the individuals I interviewed the political life of Maseru seemed impossibly remote 
in the 1940s and 50s. The political parties organising in the lowlands during this era
88 LNA 2476II, Pole Evans to Forsyth-Thompson, 23 March 1950 [covering report on mountain 
grazing survey, Fed. 1950].
89 Jones Basutoland Medicine M urder, p. 87.
90 LNA 2476/E Bowmaker, ‘Cattle Post Trek, 14th to 26th November 1949’.
91 The exact date of this trek is not in the records, but his report on the trek was written in June,
suggesting the trek took place in May. There is no mention of severe cold or snow so perhaps this
trek was also not quite as late in the year and the report written up later.
92 See Ashton The Basuto , chapter 9 for a description o f the grazing system in this era.
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did not seem to have any impact in the distant mountain valleys. The only interviewees 
who could tell me anything about Lekhotla la Bafo and the Basutoland Congress Party 
in the 1940s and 50s were the two members of the local political elite (7 and 15). One 
interviewee (6) claimed not to have even heard of Lekhotla la Bafo. Discussions about 
the closure policy in the National Assembly would only have been heard by members of 
the Matlere faction and there was no Josiel Lefela to carry the word back to local people 
in Mokhotlong.
The oral evidence suggests that chiefs and headmen issued instructions during the 
1940s and 1950s, forcing people to move their livestock away from the village grazing 
areas during the summer months. A number of oral informants (3, 5,7) told me that 
during the 1940s they were instructed to take all their livestock to the cattle-posts for 
three months a year over the summer period. Another informant (10) told me that it 
was during the 1940s that headmen first started to systematically enforce leboella 
regulations around the villages (though he attempted to resist the rules wherever 
possible). One oral informant (5) recalled that shortly after the Second World War they 
were told that smallstock should not be kept at the lower altitude (winter) cattle-posts 
during the summer and had to be taken up to the high plateaux areas near to the border 
with Qwa Qwa. They were allowed, however, to return to the winter cattle post areas in 
the autumn. These regulations had not been in existence when he was a young man and 
worked as a herdboy for his father, but they were in force when he returned from 
military service in North Africa. Another oral informant (7) reported that people did 
move their smallstock to the high cattle-posts for three months a year during the 1950s 
but there were no regulations forcing them to do this, it was merely as result of personal 
choice in response to increased grazing pressure around the villages. He thought that 
this had only become a regulation sometime after 1966.
One possible explanation of why Matlere was able to tell the Basutoland authorities one 
thing and the people of Mokhotlong another is that there was confusion between 
leboella. the closure policy and possibly the Paramount Chiefs 1946 Order to send 
smallstock to the mountains.93 The Basutoland authorities explained the closure policy 
as an extension of leboella and sometimes referred to the closed areas as such. Four 
oral informants (4,10,11, 14) reported that chiefs often ignored the leboella 
regulations. This, and the fact that Chiefs illegally impounded commoners livestock, 
were both common allegations in Lesotho.94 By ignoring leboella Chiefs and their
93 As we saw in chapter 7 there appeared to be some confusion between the 1946 Order and the 1947 
closure instructions in Qacha’s Nek district.
94 Sheddick, Land Tenure, p. 122. See also speech by Dinizulu Maime (Maseru District) Basutoland
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allies were able to ensure access to grazing areas with little competition from 
commoners herds.
While Hennessy was certain that the closure policy was implemented he also said that a
cynic’s view of the policy (not necessarily his) was that it was the way in which Matlere
reduced competition for grazing between his herds, and those of his close allies, and the
average Mokhotlong livestock owner.95 This testimony tallies with a short section of
Bowmaker’s report on his March 1952 trek:
Two Cattle Posts were seen to be still existing and occupied in the Leboella area 
but otherwise the return of grass in Moremoholo valley was thoroughly 
satisfactory. The Cattle Posts themselves were in very fair condition and it was 
admitted by the Senior caretaker that these Cattle Posts and certain odd groups of 
cattle in them belonged to the Ward Chief, or possibly the Paramount Chief; this 
matter we were unable to sort out specifically.^6
There may be good reason why the chiefly elite in Mokhotlong were particularly keen 
to ensure access to exclusive grazing areas during the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s. 
Rapidly recovering prices for both wool and mohair made the late 1940s and early 
1950s a lucrative time for commercial smallstock producers (see Figure 9.2). Wool and 
mohair were especially important products in the mountain zone: Mokhotlong district 
with about 6 percent of Lesotho’s population97 accounted for about 12 percent of total 
mohair production.98 The distribution of the smallstock population in the mountain 
zone was very skewed and ownership was concentrated into the hands of a few 
individual owners, many of whom were the senior chiefs.99 These commercial 
livestock owners were probably keen to impose more leboella and force commoners to 
take their livestock to the high cattle-posts during summer as a way of ensuring their 
own access to better grazing areas near the villages.
National Council, Proceedings o f 47th Session, September 1951, p. 489.
95 Interview with Sir James Hennessy, 12 November 1996, Cambridge.
96 LNA 2476/n, Bowmaker, P.A.O. ‘A Report on a Visit to Mokhotlong from 6th - 18th March 1952’
97 Based on the de jure population figures given in the 1956 Census.
Calculated from figures for 1960 in Uys, The Lesotho Mohair Industry, p. 68. See footnote 100 on 
the accuracy of these figures.
99 See Table 1.3 and accompanying text.
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Figure 9.2 Total Value of Mohair Exports for Lesotho, 1916 -1957 (£)100
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One of the significant things about the mohair industry for the closure policy is the 
mohair goat’s notoriously high mortality rate in adverse weather conditions. If mohair 
goats get wet, especially after shearing, or if they get caught in winter storms, they tend 
to get ill and die very rapidly.101 Under these circumstances it is extremely unlikely 
that any livestock owner would keep mohair goats on the high pastures during the
100 Figures from Uys, The Lesotho Mohair Industry. These figures need to be treated with a great deal 
of caution especially as there is no doubt that a lucrative illegal export market existed in order to 
avoid the Wool and Mohair Export Levy. One of the most obvious routes for illegal mohair export 
would have been over the uninhabited mountain passes between Mokhotlong and Natal. An 
indication of the size of the illegal trade can be found in figures comparing output of mohair per 
goat in South Africa and the legal output per goat in Lesotho. While South African goats produced 
about 7 lbs of mohair per goat, official mohair production figures for Lesotho indicate an output of 
only around 2 lbs (Uys, The Lesotho Mohair Industry, p. 71). While some of this discrepancy could 
be explained by lower productivity in Lesotho it is likely that it is partially also a function of large 
quantities of mohair in Lesotho not showing-up on official figures.
101 Interview with Daniel Phororo, 25 April 1995, Maseru.
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winter months: though most rainfall falls in the summer there are irregular but frequent 
and sometimes quite heavy falls of snow or rain especially on the high peaks along the 
Drakensberg escarpment While sheep are able to cope with these harsh conditions 
mohair goats are not and if the closure policy had been applied the Mokhotlong mohair 
industry could not have survived.
In addition to the political benefits of telling the Basutoland authorities that they were 
implementing the closure policy there were thus material benefits for Matlere, 
‘Mantsebo and their close allies in applying elements of the closure policy. These 
elements of the closure policy were, I would suggest, understood by commoners in 
Mokhotlong not as a new policy but simply as a more vigorous application of leboella. 
Despite complaints about their abuse of leboella the chiefs seemed to be able to ensure 
that people complied with some fairly severe instructions. Many oral informants made 
comments along the lines that in the 1940s and 1950s you did what the chiefs told you 
to do. The programme of forced villagisation undertaken by the chiefly authorities in 
Mokhotlong meet with only the most clandestine of resistance.102 In this context it 
must borne in mind that Matlere and his followers were directly implicated in a whole 
series of brutal and very public murders and even when Matlere was arrested he as able 
to get off the charges. Jones records that there were ten murders in Mokhotlong 
recorded in between 1938 and 1949, corresponding to a rate of one murder per 3,700 
people compared to a national figure of one murder per 7,900 people.103
In summary I believe that the evidence suggests that the following provides a more 
adequate explanation of events in Mokhotlong district than the official reports of 
success. Firstly, livestock belonging to a few individuals such as Matlere and 
‘Mantsebo were allowed to graze within the officially closed areas without the 
Basutoland authorities asking any questions. Though these individuals only accounted 
for a tiny percent of the population they would have controlled a much larger percent of 
the livestock population. Secondly, poorer livestock owners continued to graze their 
animals in village grazing areas and valley cattle posts during the winter months. In the 
summer months many (but by no means all) livestock would have been taken up to the 
high plateau areas, many of which are above the 9,000 ft contour line. This was not, 
however, in response to government policy but as a way of ensuring access to adequate 
summer grazing. The Chiefly authorities ruled Mokhotlong despotically and most 
people were unwilling to resist their instructions over leboella or the temporary 
movement of livestock to high cattle posts during summer. Nevertheless the chiefly
102 chapter 1.
103 Jones, Basutoland Medicine Murder, appendix B
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authorities, and probably the Basutoland officials, knew that any attempt to fully 
enforce the closure policy would have resulted in a serious impact on people’s 
livelihoods and widespread resistance and the closure policy was, therefore, never 
attempted.
254
CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION
10. Conclusion
This thesis has sought to explore both the causes and consequences of 
conservation/development projects in the mountain livestock sector. Early chapters of 
the thesis explored the development of ideas which shaped the way colonial officials, 
and other conservationists, ‘read’ Lesotho’s mountain environment. Chapters 6 and 7 
examined the regional and national political forces that drove the formulation of policy 
and traced the way in which policy both reflected and, in turn, shaped the political 
landscape. Finally I turned to a specific investigation of the two major projects in the 
mountain livestock sector during the late-colonial period. Both of these projects were 
written-up as hugely successful in the official literature, but from archival and oral 
evidence (and common-sense) I concluded that they suffered from numerous problems 
of implementation. Indeed I argue that the closure policy was never actually 
implemented (certainly not in Mokhotlong and probably not in Qacha’s Nek District). 
Nevertheless, as I indicated in chapter 2, just because a project fails does not mean it 
has no impact on the economy, society or politics. In the case of the closure policy 
these impacts were significant at a local, national and even regional scale - quite a feat 
for something that only ever existed on paper!
10.1. What did the livestock development policies achieve?
As we saw in chapters 8 and 9 there is good reason to believe that the two major 
policies attempted in the mountain zone in the late colonial period could never have 
achieved their objectives. As with the Thaba Tseka project of the 1970s and 1980s 
investigated by Ferguson, this does not mean, however, that they had no impact on the 
local society or economy. In the case of the closure policy this impact extended far 
beyond the local and became an element in international politics. In line with the 
arguments presented by Ferguson this section of the conclusion will briefly address the 
question ‘what did the colonial livestock development policies achieve?’.
10.1.1. Departmental advantage
One of the most obvious achievements of the livestock development policies was to 
increase the relative importance of the Department of Agriculture in the Basutoland 
administration. The significance of the task meant that the Department could claim 
pride of place in the administration. If the Department of Agriculture was challenged 
on any of its policies by other members of the administration, for example over their 
understanding of ‘customary’ rights to mountain grazing, it cited the centrality of 
protecting the pastures to the country’s future.
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Within the administration the constant stress on the importance of the issue of pasture 
conservation led to some criticism of the Department. According to the Chief Secretary 
to the High Commissioner’s Office, Agriculture was ‘not adverse to taking 
departmental advantage of the importance of its task’. This was a position that led to 
some resentment amongst other departments and the various District Commissioners.1
10.1.2. Development funding
One of the elements that other departments may have resented was the concentration on 
soil erosion for CD&W funds. On the other hand the Basutoland authorities were able 
to use the very existence of the soil erosion problem that used to justify the flow of 
development funds to the country. Applications for CD&W funds constantly stressed 
the immediacy and grave danger of the problem of pasture degradation and soil 
erosion.2
Pleas for funding for anti-erosion work were linked to the siltation of South African 
rivers and the transfer question. This extended to other forms of development funding 
and technical work. In 1949, for example, the Basutoland authorities and the High 
Commissioner tried to use the closure policy and its political implications for relations 
with South Africa to pressurise the Directorate of Colonial Surveys to push Lesotho up 
the list of counties waiting to be accurately mapped. On this occasion they were 
unsuccessful, but the administration was able to secure significant contributions from 
London for soil conservation measures. The major funds were for the work in the 
lowlands3 but the state of the mountain environment and the closure policy were an 
important factor in ensuring the continued flow of external funds.
10.1.3. Good publicity against transfer
Despite the fact that the closure policy was probably never implemented it received 
extremely good publicity. This was politically significant as it was used by the British 
to counter South African claims of neglect, and was important in their resistance to 
transfer. The lowland contour bank building programme was frequently used by the 
British to show what they had achieved, and all official visitors to Lesotho were taken
1 PRO DO35/4014, Notes on the visit of the Chief Secretary to the High Commissioners Office to 
Basutoland, Febuary 1952.
2 See for example, PRO D035/1180/Y950/4 and PRO D035/1187/Y1136/23.
3 In October 1946 the CD&W Fund approved a grant of £282,000 over 10 years for the lowland 
contour bank building scheme, PRO D035/1187/Y1136/23.
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on obligatory tours of the lowland schemes. Practical difficulties meant that the 
mountain closure policy was not on the itinerary of visiting dignitaries, though the 
Basutoland authorities did specifically contact Pole Evans to tour the region because 
they hoped to use his comments as part of their publicity strategy in the aftermath of 
the Nationalist election victory in the Union.
The fact that the closure policy was never implemented did not harm its publicity value. 
Indeed the non-implementation could be seen in a positive light in this context. Had 
there actually been attempts to impose the regulations, the closure policy would have 
surely encountered numerous incidents of resistance, as similar policies had just across 
the border in Witzieshoek. Its non-implementation meant, that there was no resistance, 
so it could be reported as a success and acceptable to the local population.
10.1.4. A defence of indirect rule
The Basutoland administration constantly linked the success of the closure policy to the 
system of indirect rule. The support of chiefs such as Matlere and Theko was seen as 
crucial to the implementation of the closures. Their apparent willingness to implement 
the plans was seen as proof that the system of chieftainship did not have to stand in the 
way of development. Colonial development/conservation discourse was full of 
references to the possibility of modernising tradition, without losing the ability of 
customary law to control the rural population. The closure policy itself was seen as an 
example of the successful updating of a customary resource use regulation (maboella)
The role of the closure policy in defending the system of indirect rule might suggest 
that it acted as an ‘anti-politics machine’, to use Ferguson’s phrase. Nationally the 
Basutoland administration did try to use the fact of soil erosion to quieten political 
opposition. When Baring visited the Resident Commissioner in 1947, during an era of 
intense political machinations over the issue of succession to the Paramount Chieftaincy 
and ‘medicine murders’, they decided that their general policy should be to ‘try to 
divert attention from political to agricultural issues’.4
10.1.5. Chiefly politics
Agricultural issue could, however, be intensely political. During the 1940s some of the 
most heated debates in the National Council were around proposals for the 
establishment of ‘Agricultural Improvement Areas’. The closure policy and other 
regulations concerning grazing in the mountains were advocated in a highly charged
4 PRO D035/4007, Baring to Machtig, 24 June 1947.
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political atmosphere. ‘Mantsebo used her powers to issue Orders and Rules about 
conservation and development as an effective political tool in her battle against Bereng 
and Gabashane. In Mokhotlong, Matlere made extremely good use of the closure 
policy to bolster is originally weak political position. Largely on the back of the closure 
policy he was able to transform himself from the position to a local headman to a figure 
of national standing.
In Qacha’s Nek, Theko also made use of the political space granted him by the closure 
policy. Already a powerful chief in the mid-1940s he was able to use his support for 
the closure policy as insurance against any move by ‘Mantsebo to oust him for 
supporting Bereng in the battle over succession. After a 1948 visit to observe the 
closure policy in Qacha’s Nek, Baring told Forsyth-Thompson that the Basutoland 
administration should strive to have Theko appointed as the Paramount Chief s senior 
adviser.5 Given their strained relations it is hardly surprising that this did not occur.
10.1.6. Impact on the local community
By bolstering the political position of two powerful and despotic local leaders it could 
be argued that the closure policy acted against the interests of the local population of 
the mountain zone. Certainly both Matlere and Theko made some use of the powers 
granted to them in the name of development and conservation to undermine local 
political opposition and line their own pockets. In both wards the chiefs applied the 
villagisation programme as a method of curtailing formation of communities beyond 
their control.
There is some evidence in both Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek that elements of the 
closure policy were applied and livestock were ordered out of the valleys during the 
summer months. There is also evidence that Matlere and ‘Mantsebo did not move their 
own herds from the closed areas and the policy was, therefore, to their material 
advantage. The pilot plots in the mountains of Maseru were more clearly used as a way 
for ‘Mantsebo to gain access to a private grazing area for her livestock. In both 
situations this material gains for important chiefs would have been at the expense of the 
ordinary livestock owner. On the other hand by telling the Basutoland authorities he 
was applying the closure policy and then not doing so Matlere potentially saved the 
population of Mokhotlong from more draconian policies controlled more closely by the
PRO D035/4007 Report of High Commissioner on his recent visit to Basutoland, 12 November 
1948.
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Department of Agriculture or perhaps, worst still, by the Union Department of Native 
Affairs.
10.2. Pattern, process, discourse and policy
It is clear that the colonial authorities were frequently unaware of exactly what was 
going on in the Lesotho mountains. They also lacked reliable information about the 
mountain environment. The limited basis of their factual knowledge did not, however, 
prevent them from drawing strong conclusions about the direction of environmental 
change. They were able to do this by the application of ecological theory.
Despite the absence of long-term data on vegetation patterns in the mountain zone 
colonial officials and ecologists such as Pole Evans believed they could determine 
vegetational processes simply by observing contemporary patterns. Their 
understanding of range science (based upon theories of plant succession) allowed them 
to draw strong conclusions from the observations they made in the field. The most 
important observation they made in the field was the presence of indicator species, 
especially sehalahala. It was believed that these species were indicative of a seres plant 
community and the mountain environment had, therefore, been deflected from its 
climax.
Using range science colonial officials were able to construct a process of vegetational 
change simply by observing a spatial pattern of vegetation at one point in time. Recent 
changes in ecological theories of African rangelands could be used to re-interpret the 
observations to indicate a different (more complex) process of change. This is not to 
say that the colonial officials were necessarily wrong to think that the mountain 
grasslands were being over-grazed, merely that the evidence they cited could not 
support the conclusions they drew.
In his rebuttal of Beinart’s exploration of official thinking on conservation, Phimister is 
critical of studies that concentrate on an analysis of discourse.6 In this thesis I have 
attempted to show how an understanding of both general environmentalist and specific 
ecological discourses are central to an understanding of colonial conservation and 
development policy. Ironically, Phimister’s closing quote from E.P. Thompson 
highlights this extremely well: the ‘discipline of history is, above all, the discipline of
Phimister, ‘Discourse and the Discipline of Historical Context’; Beinart, ‘Soil erosion, conservation 
and ideas about development’.
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context; each fact can only be given meaning within an ensemble of other meanings’.7 
The observations made by colonial officials need to be understood not simply as facts 
proving environmental decline but as facts produced within the context of a specific 
scientific discourse.
Colonial conservation and development policies arose in response to a perception that 
the African rural environment was being degraded. That does not mean, however, that 
the environment was actually being destroyed. While this may have been the case at 
certain times and in certain places, it certainly does not hold that it was the case at all 
times and in all places. This thesis demonstrates the problems associated with using 
observations made by colonial officials as indicators of uni-linear environmental 
decline. It also demonstrates the need to take reports of the successful implementation 
of conservation and development policies from publications such as departmental 
annual reports with more than a pinch of salt. Both these observations have important 
implications for much of the existing literature on African social and environmental 
history.
k . •••: v-
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Thompson, E.P. ‘Anthropology and the discipline of historical context’, Midland History, 6,1972, 
p. 45; quoted in Phimister, ‘Discourse and the Discipline of Historical Context’, p. 275.
260
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bibliography
Manuscripts
Lesotho National Archives (LNA)
As the archive has not been catalogued for years after 1931, reference numbers are to 
the original departmental file numbers.
LNA 53/46 Visit of Union Officials to Basutoland, 1953 Bunga 
Delegation.
LNA 153/56 Visit to Basutoland: Mrs Bertha Solomon MP.
LNA 212 Pasture Reclamation Station: Mr Thornton’s Visit.
LNA 335/1 Orange River, Flood Control, Hydro-Electric Power, etc.
LNA 361 SARCCUS - Southern African Regional Committe for 
Conservation and Utilisation of the Soil.
LNA 1012/11 Pasture Reclamation.
LNA 1486 Colletts Report on USA Anti - erosion works.
LNA 1882 Recognition of Chief, Mokhotlong.
LNA 2074 Agriculture: Plans for post-war development.
LNA 2202/11 Cattle Posts: Traders and Missions.
LNA 2351/E Agricultural Improvement Areas - Mokhotlong.
LNA 2476 Grazing Areas in the Mountains.
LNA 2476/11 Grazing Areas in the Mountains.
LNA 2476/II[I] Grazing Areas in the Mountains.
LNA 2476V Grazing Areas in the Mountains.
LNA 2526 Limitation of Stock.
LNA 2537/in Wool and Mohair Fund.
LNA B3597/11 J.J. Machobane’s Agricultural System, 1958.
Public Records Office
PRO CAB 128/5, CM 45(46)8, South West Africa: Cabinet Conclusions on South
Africa’s proposed incorporation in the Union.
PRO CAB 128/6, CM 88(46), South West Africa, Cabinet conclusions on UK attitude
to proposed incorporation.
Distribution of Journals issued by Imperial Agricultural 
Bureau.
Soil Erosion.
Conference papers of Conference of Colonial Directors of 
Agriculture, 1938.
Basutoland Blue Book, 1940.
Report on Proceedings of Conference of the Colonial 
Directors of Agriculture.
Miscellaneous Inquiries: Soil Erosion.
Collett’s Report on Soil Erosion in the USA.
Soil Erosion.
Draft White paper on Transfer.
Soil Erosion in Basutoland.
Application for a Free Grant to Finance Anti-erosion 
measures in Basutoland.
Soil Erosion in Basutoland.
Application for CD&W Funds.
High Commissioner’s Visit to Basutoland.
PRO C0323/1619/1
PRO C0322/1620/7 
PRO C0323/1621
PRO D025/15 
PRO DO 35/930/Y526/7
PRO D035/934/Y556/9 
PRO D035/936/Y579/12 
PRO DO35/940/Y600/146 
PRO DO 35/1172/Y/766/13 
PRO D035/1180/Y950/3 
PRO D035/1180/Y950/4
PRO D035/1180/Y950/5 
PRO D035/1187/Y1136/23 
PRO D035/4007
261
BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRO D035/4010 
PRO DO35/4011 
PRO DO35/4014
PRO DO35/4025
PRO DO35/4061
PRO D035/4158 
PRO D035/4329 
PRO DO 35/4330
PRO D035/4361 
PRO D035/4538
PRO D035/7256
PRO DOl 19/1051
PRO DO 119/1096 
PRO DOl 19/1376 
PRO DOl 19/1378 
PRO DOl 19/1382 
PRO DOl 19/1383 
PRO DOl 19/1385
PRO DOl 19/1386 
PRO DOl 19/1442 
PRO OD6/275
PRO OD6/548
Visit of High Commissioner to Basutoland.
High Commissioner, Visit to UK.
Notes on Visit of Chief Secretary Turnbull to Basutoland, 
February 1952.
Notes by Sir E. Baring on the Political and Economic 
Position of the High Commission Territories.
Basutoland: Orange River Hydro-Electric and Irrigation 
project.
Jones Report on Ritual Murders.
Transfer: discusions with Strijdom, 1956.
A collection of notes on various aspects of the 
administration of the High Commision Territories likely 
to arise in connection wth transfer.
Basutoland Paramount Chief: Regency.
Comparison of expenditure per head on social services as 
between the Union and the Territories.
Regional water supplies in Basutoland: Ox-Bow Lake 
scheme.
Commission of Inquiry: Financial and Economic Mission 
to Basutoland.
Anti-erosion techneques.
Ritual Murders and Witchcraft: Basutoland.
Medicine Murders: Basutoland.
Medicine Murders: Basutoland.
Medicine Murders: Basutoland.
Report to the Government of Basutoland on the origin and 
importance of the bogs in the Basutoland mountains.
Chief Matlere: Basutoland.
Administration: future of the High Comission Territories 
Map production - South African High Commission 
Territories.
Correspondence from survey party - Basutoland.
South African National Archives (Pretoria)
SAB FOR/158/A217/1 Heywood, A.W. Report on Forestry in Basutoland.
South African National Archives (Cape Town)
KAB 3/KIM-4/1/183-039 Orange River Scheme.
Botswana National Archives
BNA S337/16 Transfer to Union, Private and Personal Letters.
Rhodes House, Oxford
Mss. Afr.s.397(9)
Mss.Afr.s.787 
Mss. Afr.s. 1444 
Mss. Afr.s. 1574
Marcant, W.S., Lambert, R.T., and Brown, G.R.B. ‘Notes 
on a visit to the Union and Basutoland, February - March 
1945,’ unpublished report
Howard, J. ‘Notes on a visit to Transkei, Ciskei and 
Basutoland, January 1950.’ unpublished report 
Transcript of a Tape Recording by Sir Robert Latimer, 
CBE (dated 3 May 1972), interviewed by Dr. A. Sillery. 
Transcript of recording of a discussion between Lord 
Howick [Evelyn Baring] and Dame Margery Perhman 
which took place in Oxford on 19 November 1969.
262
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Mss.Brit. Emp. tl( l)  Gurney, H.L.G., Edwards, D.C. and Barnes, R.O. ‘Notes
on a visit to the Union of South Africa and Basutoland, 
March - April 1938.’ unpublished report.
Mss.Brit Emp.t.l(2) Barnes, R.O. ‘Grazing Control: a memorandum prepared
for the Guidance of District Councils for application 
Basutoland.’ unpublished report
P.V. Emrys-Evans Papers, British Library
Add.Mss.58244 Correspondence between William G.A. Ormsby-Gore
(Lord Harlech), High Commissioner, Cape Town/Pretoria, 
1942-45 and Paul V. Emry-Evans, M.P., Under Secretary 
of State for Dominion Affairs, 1942-45.
Patrick Duncan Papers, University of York,
DU 5.20/6 Extracts of Notes on Basutoland: Visit by Sir Ashley
Cooper, February 1952.
DU 5.81/10 Letters to Malcom Roberts.
DU 7.3 Basutoland Miscellany.
DU 7.12 Minutes to Government.
J.C. Smuts Papers, University of Cape Town
A6.14 Botanical matters: Pole Evans, I.B.
Evelyn Baring Papers, University of Durham.
uncatalogued Notebook 3.
uncatalogued Semi-Official Correspondence, 1944-1949.
Records Management Centre, University of West Indies, St. Augustine
uncatalogued Complete ICTA Register.
Official Publications
Basutoland, Laws o f Basutoland, 1960 (Cape Town, 1961).
Basutoland, Department of Agriculture, Annual Reports.
Basutoland National Council, Proceedings o f the xxth Session.
Great Britain Colonial Annual Report: Basutoland.
Government of Lesotho, Hydrological Survey Department, Meteorological Data to 
December 1970 (Maseru, n.d).
Government of Lesotho, Ministry of Agriculture and Marketing, Seminar on the
Productivity o f Mountain Livestock, Mazenod, Lesotho, 16 July 1984 
(Maseru, n.d. [c. 1984]).
Jones, G.I. Basutoland Medicine Murder: a report on the recent outbreak o f
‘liretlo ’ murders in Basutoland (Cmd. 8209, London, 1951).
Pirn, A.W. Financial and Economic Position o f Basutoland: Report o f the
Commission Appointed by the Secretary o f State for Dominion Affairs 
(Cmd. 4907, London, 1935).
263
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Robinson, D.A. Pasture Improvement in Zimutu Reserve (Bulletin No. 1578, Ministry 
of Agriculture and Lands, Southern Rhodesia, Sailsbury, 1951).
Sheddick, V.G. Land Tenure in Basutoland (Colonial Research Studies, No. 13, 
London, 1954).
Staples, R.R. and Hudson, W.K. An Ecological Survey o f the Mountain Areas o f 
Basutoland (Letchworth, 1938).
Stockley, G.M. Report on the Geology o f Basutoland (Maseru, 1947).
Tomlinson, F.R Summary of the Report o f the Commission for the Socio-Economic 
Development o f the Bantu areas within the Union o f South Africa 
(Pretoria, 1955).
Union of South Africa (White Paper), Negotiations Regarding the Transfer to the 
Union o f South Africa o f the Government o f Basutoland, 
Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, 1910-1939 (Pretoria, 
1952).
Union of South Africa, Debates o f the House o f Assembly.
Secondary Sources
ActionAid,
Acocks, J.P.H. 
Alexander, J. H.
Allen, V.C. 
Anderson, D.
Anon.
Anon.
Anon.
Arbousset, T.
Lifestyle Overload ?: Population and Environment in the Balance. A 
Report o f the ActionAid Seminar held at Commonwealth House, 
London, on 20 November 1991, edited by Johnson, V. (ActionAid 
Development Report No. 5, London, n.d. [c.1991]).
Veld Types o f South Africa (Pretoria, 1953).
‘The State, Agrarian Policy and Rural Politics in Zimbabwe: case 
studies of Insiza and Chimanimani Districts, 1940-1990’ (unpublished 
PhD thesis, Oxford University, 1993).
The History o f Black Mineworkers in South Africa (volume 1, 
Keighley, 1992).
‘Depression, dust bowl, demography and drought: the colonial state 
and soil conservation in East Africa during the 1930s’, African 
Affairs, 83, 332, 1984, pp. 321-343.
‘Obituary: C.F.M. Swynnerton’, RhodesiaAgricultural Journal, 35, 8, 
1938, pp. 611-616.
‘Farming Personalities: Mr R.W. Thornton’, Farmers Weekly, 27 May 
1936, p. 839.
‘A Nation Imperiled - Dr Bennett Views South Africa’, Veld Trust 
News, 1, 2, 1944, p. 3.
Missionary excursion into the Blue Mountains: being an account o f 
King Moshoeshoe's expedition from Thaba-Bosiu to the sources o f the 
Malibamatso River in the year 1840, edited and translated by 
Ambrose, D. and Brutsch, A. (Morija, 1991).
264
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ashton, E. H. ‘Political Organisation of the Southern Sotho’, Bantu Studies, 12, 
1938, pp. 287 - 320.
Ashton, E.H. The Basuto: A Social Study o f Traditional and Modem Lesotho (2nd
edition, London, 1967).
Baring, E. ‘Economic Developments under the High Commission in South
Africa’, African Affairs, 51,204, 1952, pp. 222-230.
Bartels, G.B., Norton, B.E. and Perrier, G.K. ‘An examination of the carry capacity 
concept’ in Behnke, R.H., Scoones, I. and Kerven, C. (eds) Range 
Ecology at Disequilibrium: New Models o f Natural Variability and 
Pastoral Adaptation in African Savannas (London, 1993), pp. 89-103.
Behnke, R. and Scoones, I. ‘Rethinking Range Ecology: Implications for Rangeland 
Management in Africa’ in Behnke, R.H., Scoones, I. and Kerven, C. 
(eds) Range Ecology at Disequilibrium: New Models o f Natural 
Variability and Pastoral Adaptation in African Savannas (London, 
1993), pp. 1-30.
Behnke, R.H., Scones, I. and Kerven, C. (eds) Range Ecology at Disequilibrium: New 
Models o f Natural Variability and Pastoral Adaptation in African 
Savannas (London, 1993).
Beinart, W. ‘Soil Erosion, Conservation and Ideas about Development: a Southern
African Exploration, 1900-1960’, Journal o f Southern African 
Studies, 11, 1, 1984, pp. 52-83.
Beinart, W. ‘Introduction: The Politics of Colonial Conservation’, Journal o f
Southern African Studies, 15, 2, 1989, pp. 143-162.
Beinart, W. ‘Environmental Destruction in Southern Africa: Soil Erosion,
Animals and Pastures Over The Longer Term’ in Driver, T. and 
Chapman, G. (eds) Time-scales and Environmental Change (London,
1996), pp. 149-168.
Beinart, W. ‘Vets, Viruses and Environmentalism: The Cape in the 1870s and
1880s’ in Griffiths, T. and Robin, L. (eds) Ecology and Empire: The 
Environmental History o f Settler Societies (Edinburgh, 1997), pp. 87- 
101.
Beinart, W. and Bundy, C. Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa (London, 1987).
Beinart, W. and Bundy. C. ‘State intervention and rural resistance in the Transkei 1900- 
65’ in Klein, M. (ed.) Peasants in Africa: contemporary and historical 
perspectives (Beverley Hills, 1980), pp. 271-315.
Beinart, W. and Coates, P. Environment and History: The Taming o f Nature in the USA 
and South Africa (London, 1995).
Beinart, W., Delius, P. and Trapido, S. (eds) Putting a Plough to the Ground 
(Johannesburg, 1986).
Berry, S. ‘Hegemony on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to Agricultural
Land’, Africa, 62, 3, 1992, pp. 327-355.
265
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Beschomer, N.
Bews, J.W. 
Bews, J.W. 
Birley, M.
Bond, J.
Bowmaker, P.A. 
Bradford, H.
Bradford, H.
Brass, T.
Brown, J.C. 
Bonner, P.
Bundy, C. 
Bundy, C.
Bundy, C. 
Bundy, C.
Burman, S.
Water and Instability in the Middle East, IISS Adelphi paper 273, 
Winter 1992/3.
Plant forms and their evolution in South Africa, (London, 1925).
Life as a Whole (London, 1937).
‘Resource Management in Sukumaland, Tanzania’, Africa, 52,1982, 
pp. 1-30.
‘The Basuto fight to save a mountain jewel’, VeldTrust, April 1951, 
pp. 22-23, 30 & 32.
‘An experiment designed to determine the optimum date to sow 
cotton’ (unpublished AICTA thesis, 1927).
‘Highways, by-ways and cul-de-sacs: the transition to capitalism in 
South African historiography’, Radical History Review, 46,1990, pp. 
59-88.
‘Getting away With Murder: “Mealie Kings”, the State and Foreigners 
in the Eastern Transvaal, C.1918-1950’ in Bonner, P., Delius P. and 
Posel, D. (eds) Apartheid's Genesis 1935-1962, (Braamfontein,
1993), pp. 96-125.
‘Moral Economists, Subalterns, New Social Movements and the 
(Re)emergence of a (Post) modernised (Middle) Peasant’, Journal o f 
Peasant Studies, 18, 2,1991, pp. 173-205.
Hydrology o f South Africa: or Details o f the Former Hydrological 
Condition o f the Cape o f Good Hope, and o f Causes o f its Present 
Aridity (Edinburgh, 1875).
“‘Desirable or Undesirable Basotho Women?” Liquor, Prostitution 
and the Migration of Basotho Women to the Rand, 1920-1945’ in 
Walker, C. (ed.) Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945 
(Cape Town, 1990), pp. 221-250.
‘The Emergence and Decline of a South African Peasantry’, African 
Affairs, 71, 1972, pp. 369-388.
‘The Transkei Peasantry, c. 1890-1914: “Passing through a period of 
Stress’” in Palmer, R. and Parsons, N. (eds) The Roots o f Rural 
Poverty in Central and Southern Africa (Berkeley, 1977), pp, 201- 
220.
The Rise and Fall o f the South African Peasantry (London, 1979).
‘Land and Liberation: popular rural protest and the national liberation 
movements in South Africa, 1920-1960’ in Marks, S. and Trapido, S. 
(eds) The Politics o f Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth 
Century South Africa (London, 1987), pp. 254-285.
Chiefdom Politics and Alien Law: Basutoland Under Cape Rule 1871- 
1884 (New York, 1981).
266
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Carlson, K.A. ‘Forestry in Relation to Irrigation in South Africa\  Agricultural
Journal o f the Union o f South Africa, 5,2, 1913, pp. 219-234.
Carruthers, J. ‘Creating a National Park, 1910-1926’, Journal o f Southern African
Studies, 15, 2, 1988, pp. 188-216.
Carruthers, J. ‘The Dongola Wildlife Sanctuary: ‘psychological blunder, economic
folly and political monstrosity’ or ‘more valuable than rubies and 
gold’, Kleio, 24, 1992, pp. 82-100.
Carruthers, J. ‘Lessons from South Africa: War and Wildlife Protection in the
Southern Sudan, 1917-1921’ (unpublished paper presented to ASA- 
UK Biennial Conference, University of Lancaster, September 1994).
Carruthers, J. ‘Nationhood and National Parks: Comparative Examples from a Post-
Imperial Experience’ in Griffiths, T. and Robin, L. (eds) Ecology and 
Empire: The Environmental History o f Settler Societies (Edinburgh,
1997), pp. 125-138.
Chakela, Q.K. Review and Bibliography: Water and Soil Resources o f Lesotho, 
1935-1970 (Uppsala, 1973).
Chanock, M. ‘Making Customary Law: Men, Women and Courts in Colonial
Northern Rhodesia’ in Hay, M. and Wright, M. (ed.) African Women 
and the Law: Historical Perspectives (Boston University Papers on 
Africa, Vol. 7, 1982).
Chanock, M. Law, Custom and Social Order (Cambridge, 1985).
Chapman, G. ‘Environmental Myth as International Politics: the Problems of the
Bengal Delta’ in Mukheijee, A. and Agnihotri, V.K. (eds) 
Environment and development: views form the East and West (New 
Delhi, 1994).
Chapman, G. and Driver, T. ‘Time, Mankind and the Earth’ in Driver, T. and Chapman, 
G. (eds) Time-scales and Environmental Change (London, 1996), pp. 
1-24.
Chapman, G. and Thompson, M. (eds) Water and the Quest o f Sustainable 
Development in the Ganges Basin (London, 1995).
Cliffe, L. ‘Nationalism and the Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change in
Tanganyika during the Colonial Period’ in Cliffe, L. and Saul, J. (eds) 
Socialism in Tanganyika (volume 1, Nairobi, 1973), pp. 17-24.
Clements, F. Plant Succession: Analysis o f the Development o f Vegetation
(Washington, 1916).
Clements, F. and Pound, R. The Phytogeography o f Nebraska (Lincoln, 1898).
Coetzee, H. and Cooper, D. ‘Wasting Water: Squandering a Precious Resource’ in 
Cock, J and Koch, E. (eds)Going Green: People Politics and the 
Environment in South Africa, (Oxford, 1991) pp. 129-138.
Comaroff, J. and Comaroff, J. Ethnography and the Historical Imagination,
(Boulder, 1992).
267
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Conley, A.H. ‘A synoptic view of water resources in southern Africa’ (unpublished 
paper presented to SAFER Symposium, Zimbabwe, 16 November
1995).
Coplan, D. and Quinlan, T. ‘A Chief By the People: Nation versus State in Lesotho’, 
Africa, 67,1, 1997, pp. 25-59.
Coppock, D.L.
Cotton J.S.
‘Vegetation and Pastrol Dynamics in the Southern Ethiopian 
Rangelands: Implications for Theory and Management’ in Behnke, 
R.H., Scoones, I. and Kerven, C. (eds) Range Ecology at 
Disequilibrium: New Models o f Natural Variability and Pastoral 
Adaptation in African Savannas (London, 1993), pp. 42-61.
‘Range Management’ in United States, Department of Agriculture, 
Yearbook o f die Department o f Agriculture (Washington, 1906), 
pp.225-238.
Cowen, M.P. and Shenton, R.W. ‘British Neo-Hegelian Idealism and Official Colonial 
Policy in Africa: the Oluwa Land Case of 1921’, Journal o f Imperial 
and Commonwealth History, 22, 2, 1994, pp. 217-250.
Cowen, M.P. and Shenton, R.W ‘The Invention of Development’ in Crush, J. (ed.) 
Power o f Development (London, 1995), pp. 27-43.
Cowen, M.P. and Shenton, R.W. Doctrines o f Development (London, 1996).
Cronin, W. Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists and the Ecology o f New 
England (New York, 1983).
Crush, J. ‘Introduction: Imagining development’ in Crush, J. (ed.)Power o f
Development (London, 1995) pp. 1 - 23.
Davidson, B. ‘Crisis in the Protectorates’, New Statesman and Nation, 25 August
1951.
Delius, P. ‘Sebatakgomo: Migrant organisations, the ANC and the
Sekhukhuneland revolt’, Journal o f Southern African Studies, 15, 3, 
1989, pp. 581-615.
Delius, P. A Lion Amongst the Cattle: reconstruction and resistance in
Northern Transvaal (Oxford, 1996).
Dobson, B. and Goudie, S.C. 'Environment, ideology and politics: soil conservation in 
South Africa 1910-1948’ (unpublished paper, Department of 
Environmental and Geographical Science, University of Cape Town,
1996).
Dobb, A. J. ‘The Organization of Range Use in Lesotho, Southern Africa: A
Review of Attempted Modifications and Case Study’ (unpublished 
Masters dissertation, Washington State University, 1985).
Douglas-Home, C. Evelyn Baring: The Last Proconsul (London, 1978).
Downing, B.H. ‘Environmental Consequences of Agricultural Expansion in South
Africa Since 1850’, South African Journal o f Science, 74, 1978, pp. 
420-422.
268
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Drinkwater, M. 
Drinkwater, M.
Driver, C .J. 
Driver, T.S.
Dubow, S.
Dubow, S. 
Duncan, P. 
Duncan, P.
Du Plessis, E.
The state and agrarian change in Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas 
(London, 1991).
‘Cows eat grass, don't they? Evaluating Conflict over Pastoral 
Management in Zimbabwe’ in Croll, E. and Parkin, D. (eds) Bush 
Base: Forest Farm (London, 1992), pp. 169-186.
Patrick Duncan: South African and Pan-African (London, 1980).
‘Political Ecology’, Southern Africa Review o f Books, 33,1994, pp. 
12-13.
‘Race, Civilisation and Culture: the Elaboration of Segregationist 
Discourse in the Inter-war Years’ in Marks, S. and Trapido, S. (eds) 
The Politics o f Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century 
South Africa (London, 1987), pp. 71-94.
Racial segregation and the origins o f apartheid in South Africa, 1919- 
36 (Basingstoke, 1989).
‘Review of Land Tenure in Basutoland by Vernon Sheddick’,
Man, January 1957, pp. 11-12.
Sotho Laws and Customs: A handbook based on decided cases in 
Basutoland together with the Laws ofLerotholi (Cape Town, 1960).
‘Obituary: John Frederick Vicars Phillips (1899-1987)’, Bothalia, 17, 
1987, pp. 267-8.
Eldredge, E.A. 
Eldredge, E.A.
Edgar, R.
Ellis, J.
E. M.P [aimer] 
Epprecht, M.
A South African Kingdom: the Pursuit o f Security in Nineteenth 
Century Lesotho (Cambridge, 1993).
‘Medicine murder and power: the consolidation of colonial control in 
British Basutoland in the 1940s’ (unpublished paper presented to The 
South African Historical Society, 16th Biennial Conference, 
University of Pretoria, 6 July 1997)
Prophets with Honour: a Documentary History ofLekotla la Bafo 
(Johannesburg, 1990).
‘Climate Variability and Complex Ecosystem Dynamics: Implications 
for Pastoral Development’ in Scoones, I. (ed.) Living with 
Uncertainty: New Directions in Pastoral Development in Africa 
(London, 1995), pp. 37-46.
‘Basutoland-Heart of the Union’, Veld Trust News, 1, 2, 1945, pp. 3- 
17
‘Women’s “Conservatism” and the Politics of Gender in Late 
Colonial Lesotho’, Journal o f African History, 36,1995, pp. 25-56.
Fairhead, J. and Leach, M. Misreading the African Landscape: Society and Ecology in 
a Forest-savanna Mosaic (Cambridge, 1996).
269
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ferguson, J. The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development*, De-politicisation and
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Cambridge, 1990).
Franklin, A. Land Law in Lesotho: The Politics o f the 1979 Land Act (Aldershot,
1995).
Food and Agriculture Organisation and World Bank, Draft Report o f the Lesotho First 
Phase Mountain Development Project Preparation Mission, Report 
No. 11/75, LES 1. (Rome, 1975).
Food and Agriculture Organisation, Advancing Forestry in Lesotho, FAO Forestry 
Project Profile (Rome, n.d. [c. 1986]).
Ford, J. The Role ofTryanosomiases in African ecology: A study o f the tsetse
fly problem (Oxford, 1971).
Foucault, M. Discipline and Punishment; The Birth o f the Prison, translated by
Sheridan, A. 1977 (Harmondsworth, 1991).
Furedi, F. ‘The Social Composition of the Mau Mau Movement in the White
Highlands’, Journal o f Peasant Studies, 1,4, 1974, pp. 486-505.
Genovese, E.D. 
Giblin, J.
Gill, S. J. 
Glacken, C.
Gocking, R.
Greenberg, S. 
Grove, R.
Grove, R.
Grove, R. 
Grove, R. 
Grove, R.
Roll, Jordon Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York, 1974).
The Politics o f Environmental Control in North-eastern Tanzania, 
1840 -1940 (Philadelphia, 1992).
A Short History o f Lesotho (Morija, 1993).
Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western 
Thought from ancient times to the end o f the eighteenth century 
(Berkely, 1967).
‘Colonial Rule and the ‘Legal Factor’ in Ghana and Lesotho’, Africa, 
67, 1, 1997, pp. 61-85.
Race and State in Capitalist Development (New York, 1980).
‘Early themes in African conservation: the Cape in the nineteenth 
century’ in Anderson, D. and Grove, R. (eds) Conservation in Africa: 
People, Policies and Practice (Cambridge 1987), pp. 21-40.
‘Scottish Missionaries, evangelical discourses and the origins of 
conservation thinking in southern Africa 1820-1900’, Journal o f 
Southern African Studies, 15, 2, 1989, pp. 163-87.
‘The Origins of environmentalism’, Nature , 345, 3 May 1990, pp. 11-
14.
Green Imperialism: Science, Colonial Expansion and the Emergence 
o f Global Environmentalism, 1660-1860 (Cambridge, 1994).
‘Scotland in South Africa: John Crombie Brown and the roots of 
settler environmentalism’, in Griffiths, T. and Robin, L. (eds) 
Ecology and Empire: The Environmental History o f Settler Societies 
(Edinburgh, 1997), pp. 139-153.
270
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gunn, M.D. ‘Dlytd Buller Pole Evans (1879-1968)’, Bothalia, 10, 1968, pp. 131-5.
Guy, J. ‘Ecological Factors in the Rise of Shaka and the Zulu Kingdom’ in
Marks, S. and Atmore, A. (eds) Economy and Society in Pre- 
Industrial South Africa (London, 1980), pp. 102-119.
Guy, J. and Thabane, M. ‘Technology, Ethnicity and Ideology: Basotho Miners and
Shaft-Sinking on the South African Gold Mines’, Journal o f Southern 
African Studies, 14,2, 1988, pp. 257-278.
Guy, J. and Thabane, M. ‘Basotho Miners, Oral History and Workers Strategies’ in
Kaarsholm, P. (ed.) Cultural Struggle and Development in Southern 
Africa (Harare/London, 1991), pp. 239-258.
Haigh, M.J.
Hall, T.D.
Hamnett, I.
Hamnett, I.
Haraway, D.J.
Haraway, D.J.
Hardin, G. 
Herskovits, M.J.
Hirson, B.
‘Deforestation in the Himalaya’ in Roberts N. (ed.) The Changing 
Global Environment (Oxford, 1994).
‘South African Pastures: Retrospective and Prospective’, South 
African Journal o f Science, 31,1934, pp. 59-97.
‘Koena Chieftainship Seniority in Basutoland’, Africa, 35,3, 1965, 
pp. 241-251.
Chieftainship and Legitimacy: An Anthropological Study o f Executive 
Law in Lesotho (London, 1975).
Primate Visions: Gender, Race and Nature in the World o f Modem 
Science (London, 1989).
Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Re-invention o f Nature (London, 
1991).
‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science, 162, 1968, pp. 1243-1248.
‘The Cattle Complex in East Africa’, American Anthropologist, 28, 
1926, pp. 230-272, 361-388,494-528,633-664.
‘Rural Revolt in South Africa’, The Societies o f Southern Africa in the 
19th and 20th Centuries (Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 
Collected Seminar Papers), 8, 22, 1976.
Hoffman, T. and Cowling, R. ‘Vegetation Change In The Semi-Arid Eastern Karoo 
Over The Last 200 Years: An Expanding Karoo - Fact or Fiction?’ 
South African Journal o f Science, 86, 1990, pp. 286-294.
Hughes, F. ‘Conflicting Uses for Forest Resources in the Lower Tana River Basin 
in Kenya’ in Anderson, D. and Grove, R. (eds) Conservation in 
Africa: People, Policies and Practice (Cambridge 1987), pp. 211 - 
228.
Illife, J. Africans: History o f a Continent (Cambridge, 1995).
Issacman, A. ‘Peasants and Rural Social Protest in Africa’, African Studies Review,
33, 2,1990, pp. 1-120.
271
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Issacman, A., Stephen, M., Adam, Y., Joro Homen, M, Macamo, E. and Augustinho, P., 
‘Cotton as the motor of poverty: peasant resistance to forced cotton 
production in Mozambique, 1938-1961’, The International Journal o f 
African Historical Studies, 13, 1980, pp. 581-615.
Ives, J.D. and Messerli, B., The Himalayan Dilemma: Reconciling Development and 
Conservation (London/New York, 1989).
Ivy, D. and Turner, S., ‘Range Management Areas and Grazing Associations -
experience at Sehlabathebe, Lesotho’ in Centre for Development Co­
operation Services (eds) Successful Natural Resource Management in 
Southern Africa (Windhoek, 1996), pp. 117-146.
Jacks, G.V. and Whyte, R.O., The Rape o f the Earth: A World Survey o f Soil Erosion 
(London, 1939).
Jacobs, N. ‘The Flowing Eye: Water Management in the Upper Kuruman Valley,
South Africa, c. 1800-1962’, Journal o f African History, 37, 1996, pp. 
237-260.
Jochelson, K. ‘Moral Tribes and Corrupting Cities: Explanations of African
Susceptibility to VD’ (paper presented to Societies of Southern Africa 
in the 19th and 20th Centuries seminar series, Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 25 October 1991).
Kanthack, F.E. ‘The Destruction of Mountain Vegetation: its effects upon the
Agricultural Conditions in the Valleys’, Agricultural Journal o f the 
Cape o f Good Hope, 33, 2, 1908, pp. 194-204.
Kasere, S. ‘Campfire: Zimbabwe’s Tradition of Caring’ in United Nations Non-
Governmental Liaison Service, Sustainable Development (Voices 
from Africa, No. 6, Geneva: 1996), pp. 33-40.
Keegan, T. ‘The sharecropping economy, African class formation and the 1913
Native’s Land Act in the highveld maize belt’ in Marks, S. and 
Rathbone, R. (eds) Industrialisation and Social Change in South 
Africa: African class formation, culture and consciousness, 1870- 
1930 (London, 1982), pp. 195-211.
Keegan, T. Facing the Storm: Portraits o f Black Lives in Rural South Africa
(Athens, Ohio, 1988).
Khan, F. ‘Re-writing South Africa’s Conservation History: The Role of the
Native Farmers Association’, Journal o f Southern African Studies, 20, 
4,1994, pp. 499-516.
Kimble, J. ‘Clinging to the Chiefs: Some Contradictions of Colonial Rule in
Basutoland, c. 1890-1930’ in Bernstein, H. and Campbell, B. K. (eds) 
Contradictions o f Accumulation in Africa: Studies in Economy and 
State (London, 1985), pp. 25-69.
Kimble, J. ’Labour Migration in Basutoland, 1870-1885’ in Marks, S. and
Rathbone, R. (eds) Industrialisation and Social Change in South
272
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Africa: African Class Formation, Culture and Consciousness, 1870- 
1930 (London, 1982), pp. 119-141.
Kimble, J. ‘Towards an Understanding of the Political Economy of Lesotho: the
Origins of Commodity Production and Migrant Labour, 1830-C.1885’ 
(unpublished Masters thesis, National University of Lesotho, 1978).
King, J.G.M. ‘The diversification of cocoa’ (unpublished AICTA thesis, 1931).
Kirk Greene, A.H.M., A Biographical Dictionary o f the British Colonial Service, 1939- 
1966, (London, 1991).
Kjekshus, H. Ecological Control and Economic Development in East African
History: The Case o f Tanganyika: 1850-1950 (Berkeley, 1977).
Klosterman, E.W., Livestock Production in Siloe, Nyakosoba and Molumong Areas
(Agricultural Research Technical Bulletin, RD-B-11, Maseru, 1983).
La wry, S. Livestock and Range Management in Sehlabathebe (Land
Conservation and Range Development Project (USAID), Range 
Management Division, Ministry of Agriculture, Maseru, 1986).
Lawry, S. ‘Communal Grazing and Range Management: the Case of Grazing
Associations in Lesotho’, African Livestock Policy Analysis Network 
(International Livestock Centre for Africa, No. 13, Addis Ababa, 
1987).
Lawry, S. ‘Private Herds and Common Lands: Issues in the Management of
Communal Land in Lesotho’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Wisconsin, 1988).
Lazar, J. “‘Verwoerd versus the “Visionaries”: The South African Bureau of
Racial Affairs and Apartheid, 1948-1961’ in Bonner, P., Delius P. and 
Posel, D. (eds) Apartheid’s Genesis 1935-1962, (Braamfontein, 
1993), pp 362-392.
Leach, M. and Meams, R., ‘Environmental change and policy: challenging received 
wisdom in Africa’ in Leach, M. and Meams, R. (eds) The Lie o f the 
Land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the African Environment 
(London, 1996), pp. 1-33.
Leiss, W. The Domination o f Nature (New York, 1972).
Limbach, W. E. ‘Current State of Range Management and Development in Lesotho’ in
O'Rouke, J. T. (ed.) Institutions for Rangeland Development: 
Strategies and Lessons Learned. Proceedings o f the 1987 
International Rangeland Development Symposium (Boise, Idaho,
1987), pp. 71-80.
Lindblade, K. ‘Discrepancies in understanding historical land use changes in
Uganda’ PLA Notes, 28, February 1997, pp. 59-63.
Lindblade, K., Tumuhairwe, J.K., Carswell, G., Nkwiine, C. and Bwamiki, D. ‘More 
People, More Fallow: The Myth of Over-cultivation in Kabale 
District, Uganda’ (unpublished paper, 1996)
273
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Lindsay, W. K. ‘Integrating Parks and Pastoralists: some lessons from Amboseli’ in 
Anderson, D. and Grove, R. (eds) Conservation in Africa: People, 
Policies and Practice (Cambridge 1987), pp. 149 - 167.
Lonsdale, J. ‘Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa’, Journal o f African 
History, 9, 1,1968, pp. 119-146.
Marks, S. 
McCann, J. 
McCracken, J. 
McCracken, J.
McGregor, J. 
McGregor, J.
Mackenzie, F.
MacKenzie, J.
MacKenzie, J. 
MacKenzie, J.
Reluctant Rebellion: the 1906-08 disturbances in Natal (Oxford, 
1970).
Green Land, Brown Land, Black Land: An Environmental History o f 
Africa, 1800-1996 (in press).
‘Experts and Expertise in Colonial Malawi’, African Affairs, 81, 1982,
pp. 101-116.
‘Colonialism, Capitalism and Ecological Crisis in Malawi: a 
reassessment’ in Anderson, D. and Grove, R. (eds) Conservation in 
Africa: People, Policies and Practice (Cambridge 1987), pp. 63-78.
‘Review Article: Environmental Knowledge Under Scrutiny’, Journal 
o f Southern African Studies, 1994, 20, 2, pp. 317-324.
‘Woodland Resources: Ecology, Policy and Ideology: An Historical 
Case Study of Woodland Use in Shurugwi Communal Area, 
Zimbabwe’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Loughborough, 
1991).
‘Selective Silence: a Feminist Encounter with Environmental 
Discourse in Colonial Africa’ in Crush, J. (ed.) Power o f Development 
(London, 1995), pp. 100-114.
‘Chivalry, Social Darwinism and Ritualised Killing’ in Anderson, D. 
and Grove, R. (eds) Conservation in Africa: People, Policies and 
Practice (Cambridge 1987), pp. 41-62.
The Empire o f Nature: Hunting, Conservation and British 
Imperialism (Manchester, 1988).
‘The Natural World and Popular Consciousness in Southern Africa: 
the European appropriation of Nature’ in Kaarsholm, P. (ed.) Cultural 
Struggle and Development in Southern Africa (Harare/London, 1991), 
pp. 13-31.
Machobane, L. B. B. J. The Political Dilemma o f Chieftaincy in Colonial Lesotho with 
Reference to the Administration and Court Reforms o f1938 (Institute 
of Southern African Studies, National University of Lesotho, 
Occasional Paper, No. 1, Roma, 1986).
Machobane, L. B. B. J. Government and Change in Lesotho, 1800-1966: A Study o f 
Political Institutions (Basingstoke, 1990).
Maddox, G., Giblin, J and Kimambo, I.N. (eds) Custodians o f the land: ecology and 
culture in the history of Tanzania (London, 1996).
274
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Maguire, G.A. Towards Uhuru in Tanzania: the politics o f participation (London, 
1969).
Mair, L. ‘Correspondence: The Cattle Complex’, Man (n.s.) 20, 1985, p. 743.
Mallon, F.E. ‘The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from
Latin American History’, American Historical Review, 99, 1994, pp. 
1491-1515.
Malthus, T. An Essay on the Principle o f Population (Harmondsworth, 1986
[1798]).
Manzo, K. ‘Black Consciousness and the Quest for a Counter-Modernist
Development’ in Crush, J. (ed.) Power o f Development (London,
1995) p. 228-252.
Maloka, T. ‘Basotho and the Mines: Towards a History of Labour Migrancy, c.
1890-1940’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cape Town,
1995).
Maloka, T. ‘All Chiefs are Shepherds: Populism and Labour Migration in
Colonial Lesotho, 1886-1940’ (unpublished paper presented at 
Societies of Southern Africa Seminar Series, Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 21 October 1995).
Maloka, T. ‘Khomo Lia Oela: Canteens, Brothels and Labour Migrancy in
Colonial Lesotho, 1900-40’, Journal o f African History, 38, 1997, pp. 
101- 122.
Mamdani, M. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy o f Late
Colonialism (London, 1996).
Mager, A. ‘The People Get Fenced: Gender, Rehabilitation and African
Nationalism in the Ciskei and Border Region, 1945-1955’, Journal o f 
Southern African Studies, 18,4, 1992, pp. 761 - 782.
Mbeki, G. The Peasants revolt (London, 1984 [1964]).
Meadows, M.and Linder, H.P., ‘A Palaecological Perspective on the Origin of the 
Afromontane Grasslands’, Journal o f Bio geography, 20, 1993, pp. 
345-355.
Melanchthon [Duncan, P.] The Enemy (Morija, 1943).
Mentis, M.T., Grossman, D., Hardy, M. B., O’Connor, T.G. and O’Reagain, P.J.,
‘Paradigm Shifts in South African Range Science, Management and 
Administration’, South African Journal o f Science, 85, 1989, pp. 684- 
687.
Merchant, C. The Death o f Nature: Women Ecology and the Scientific Revolution
(San Francisco, 1980).
Mitchell, P. J. ‘Archaeological research in Lesotho: a review of 120 years’, African 
Archaeological Review, 10, 1992, pp 3-34.
Mitchell, P.J. ‘Revisiting the Robberg: new results and a revision of old ideas at
Sehonghong Rock Shelter, Lesotho’, South African Archaeological 
Bulletin, L, 161, 1995, pp. 28-38.
275
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Milton, S.
Milton, S.
Moroney, S. 
Mukherjee, M.
Mullin, G.W. 
Murray, C.
‘The Apocalypse Cow: Russell Thornton and State Policy towards 
African Cattle Husbandry in the Union of South Africa, 1929-39’ 
(unpublished paper presented to African History Seminar, School of 
Oriental and African Studies, 30 November 1994).
“To Make the Crooked Straight”: Settler Colonialism, Imperial 
Decline and the South African Beef Industry, c. 1902-42’
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1996).
‘1950 Witzieshoek rebellion’ Africa Perspective, 3, Feb. 1976, pp. 1-
15.
‘Peasant Resistance and Peasant Consciousness in Colonial India: 
Subalterns and beyond’, Economic and Political Weekly, 8 October 
1988, pp. 2109-2120 and 15 October 1988, pp. 2174-2185.
Flight and Rebellion: Slave Resistance in Eighteenth Century Virginia 
(New York, 1972).
‘From Granary to Labour Reserve: An Economic History of Lesotho’, 
South African Labour Bulletin, 6,4,1980, pp. 3-20.
Neocosmos, M. ‘Towards a History of Nationalities in Southern Africa’ (unpublished 
paper presented at Dimensions of Economic and Political Reform in 
Contemporary Africa conference, Kampala, 8 April 1994).
Nobe K.C. and Seckler, D. W., An Economic and Policy Analysis o f Soil Water
Problems and Conservation Programmes in the Kingdom o f Lesotho 
(LASA Research Report No. 3., Maseru, 1979).
Nyamapfene, K. ‘Adaptation to Marginal Land Amongst the Peasant Farmers of 
Zimbabwe’, Journal o f Southern African Studies, 15, 2, 1989, pp. 
384-389.
O’Meara, D. Volkskapiyalisme: Class Capital and ideology in the development o f 
Afrikaner nationalism, 1934-1948 (Cambridge, 1983).
Parsons, N. ‘Colonel Rey and the Colonial Rulers of Botswana: Mercenary and
Missionary Traditions in Administration, 1884-1955’ in Ade Ajayi, 
J.F.and Peel, J.D.Y. (eds) People and empires in African history : 
essays in memory o f Michael Crowther (London, 1992), pp. 197-216.
Parsons, N. and Palmer, R. ‘Introduction: Historical Background’ in Palmer, R. and
Parsons, N. (eds)77ze Roots o f Rural Poverty in Central and Southern 
Africa (Berkely, 1977), pp. 1-32.
Perry, J.A.G. ‘Land, Power and the Lie’, Man, 16, 2, 1981, pp. 235-250.
Perry, J.A.G. ‘Land and Politics in Lesotho’, African Studies, 42, 1, 1983, pp. 57-
66.
Peters, P. ‘Manoeuvres and debates in the interpretation of land rights in
Botswana’, Africa, 3, 62,1992, pp. 413-434.
276
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Phillips, J.
Phillips, J. 
Phillips, J.
Phillips, J. 
Phillips, J. 
Phimister, I.
Phimister, I
Phororo, D. R.
‘Fire: its influence on biotic communities and physical factors in 
South and East Africa’, South African Journal o f Science, 27,1930, 
pp. 352-367.
‘The Biotic Community’, Journal o f Ecology, 19, 1931, pp. 1- 24.
‘Succession, development, the climax and the complex organism: an 
analysis of concepts’, Journal o f Ecology, Part I, 1934, 22, pp. 554- 
571, Part II, 1935,23, pp. 210-246, Part III, 1935, 23, pp. 488-508.
‘Deterioration in the vegetation of the Union of South Africa’, South 
African Journal o f Science, 35,1938, pp. 476-484.
‘A Tribute to Frederic E. Clements and his Concepts in Ecology’, 
Ecology, 35, 1954, pp. 114-115.
‘Discourse and the discipline of historical context: conservationism 
and ideas about development in southern Rhodesia, 1930-1950’ 
Journal o f Southern African Studies, 12, 2, 1986, pp. 263-275.
‘Rethinking the Reserves: Southern Rhodesia’s Land Husbandry Act 
Reviewed’, Journal o f Southern African Studies, 19, 2, 1993, pp. 223- 
239.
Livestock Farming in Lesotho and Pasture Utilisation: Analysis and 
Suggested National Policy (No. 4 in Series, The Anatomy of 
Lesotho's Agricultural Development Section, Maseru, 1979).
Pollock, N.C. ‘The Economic and Social Geography of Basutoland’ (unpublished 
B.Litt, Oxford, 1956).
Porter, D.J. ‘Scenes from Childhood: The Homesickness of Development
Discourse’ in Crush, J. (ed .)Power o f Development, (London, 1995) 
pp. 63-86.
Posel, D. The Making o f Apartheid 1948-61: Conflict and Compromise
(Oxford, 1991).
Quinlan, T. ‘Grassland Degradation and Livestock Rearing in Lesotho’, Journal
o f Southern African Studies, 21, 3, 1995, pp.491-507.
Quinlan, T. The Livestock Economy in the Mountain Zone o f Lesotho (Socio­
economic Project Report of the Maluti/Drakensberg Catchment 
Conservation Programme, May 1989).
Ranger, T. ‘Connections between “Primary Resistance” movements and Modem
Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa’, Journal o f African 
History, 9, 3, 1968, pp. 437-454.
Ranger, T. ‘Growing from the Roots: reflections on peasant research in Central
and Southern Africa’, Journal o f Southern African Studies, 5, 1, 1978, 
pp. 99-133.
Ranger, T. Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe (London,
1985).
211
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ranger, T. ‘The Invention of Tradition Revisited: the case of Colonial Africa’ in 
Ranger, T. and Vaughan, O. (eds) Legitimacy and the State in 
Twentieth Century Africa: essays in honour ofA.H.M. Kirk-Greene 
(London, 1993), pp. 62-111.
Ranger, T. and Hobsbawn, E. (eds) The Invention o f Tradition (Cambridge, 1983).
Readers Digest, Atlas o f South Africa (Pretoria, 1984).
Rich, P. ‘The Origins of Apartheid Ideology: the case of Earnest Stubbs and
the Transvaal Native Administration, c. 1902-1932\  African Affairs, 
79,315,1980, pp. 171-194.
Rich, P. State Power and Black Politics in South Africa 1912-51 (London,
1996).
Richards, P. Indigenous Agricultural Revolution (London, 1985).
Robertson, A.F. ‘Popular Scientist: James Jacob Machobane and Mantsa Tala', 
African Affairs, 93,1994, pp. 99-121.
Rowland, J. ‘Notes on the study of plant succession in relation to grazing’, South 
African Journal o f Science, 30, 1933, pp. 307-316.
Rugege, S. ‘The Chieftainship and Society in Lesotho: a study in the political 
economy of the Basotho chieftancy from pre-colonial times to the 
present’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Oxford, 1993).
SADC-ELMS, History of Soil Conservation in the SADC region: a collection o f eight 
national studies and a summary report (Maseru, 1987).
Samatar, A.I. and Oldfield, S. ‘Class and Effective State Institutions: the Botswana
Meat Commission’, Journal o f Modem African Studies, 33, 4, 1995, 
pp. 651-668.
Sanders, P.B. ‘Sekonyela and Moshweshwe: Failure and Success in the Aftermath 
of the Difaqane’, Journal o f African History, 10,1969, pp. 439-455.
Schwarz, M. and Thompson, M. Divided we Stand: Re-defining Politics, Technology 
and Social Change, (New York, 1990).
Scoones, I. ‘Livestock Populations and the Household Economy: A Case Study
from Southern Zimbabwe’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
London, 1990).
Scoones, I. ‘Why Are There So Many Animals: Cattle Population Dynamics in
the Communal Areas of Zimbabwe,’ in Behnke, R.H., Scoones, I. and 
Kerven, C. (eds) Range Ecology at Disequilibrium: New Models o f 
Natural Variability and Pastoral Adaptation in African Savannas 
(London, 1993), pp. 62-76.
Scoones, I. ‘Politics, Polemics and Pastures: Range Management Science and
Policy in Southern Africa’ in Leach, M. and Meams, R.(eds) Lie o f 
the Land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the African Environment 
(London, 1996), pp.34-53.
278
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Scoones, I. and Wilson, K. ‘Households, Lineage Groups and Ecological Dynamics’ in 
Cousins, B., Jackson, C. and Scoones, I. (eds) Socio-economic 
Dimensions o f Livestock Production in the Communal Lands o f 
Zimbabwe (Harare, 1988).
Scott, J.C. Weapons o f the Weak: everyday forms o f peasant resistance (New
Haven, 1985).
Sears, P. Deserts on the March (London, 1949, [1935]).
Seidman, A. ‘Postscript: the economics of eliminating rural poverty’ in Palmer, R.
and Parsons, N. (eds) The Roots o f Rural Poverty in Central and 
Southern Africa (Berkeley, 1977), pp. 410-421.
Shand, N. ‘Report on the Regional Development of the Water Resources of
Basutoland’ (unpublished, Feb. 1956).
Sheddick, V. The Southern Sotho (International African Institute, Ethnographic
Survey of Africa, Southern Africa, Part n, London, 1953).
Showers, K. ‘Soil Erosion in the Kingdom of Lesotho: Origins and Colonial
Response, 1830-1950s’, Journal o f Southern African Studies, 15, 2, 
1989, pp. 263-286.
Showers K. and Malahleha, G. M. ‘Oral Evidence in Historical Environmental Impact 
Assessment: Soil Conservation in Lesotho in the 1930s and 1940s’, 
Journal o f Southern African Studies, 18, 2, 1992, pp. 276-296.
Simelane, H.S. 
Singh, M.V.
Smit, P.
Smuts, J.C. 
Spence, J.E.
‘Landlessness and the Imperial Response in Swaziland, 1938-1950’, 
Journal o f Southern African Studies, 17,4, 1991, pp. 717-741.
‘Geological, historical and present-day erosion and colluviation in 
Lesotho, Southern Africa’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Cambridge, 1994).
Lesotho: a Geographical Study (Pretoria, 1967).
Holism and Evolution (London, 1926).
‘British Policy Towards the High Commission Territories’, Journal o f 
Modem African Studies, 2, 2,1964, pp. 221-46.
Stafford Smith, M. and Pickup, G. ‘Out of Africa, Looking In: Understanding
Vegetational Change’ in in Behnke, R.H., Scoones, I. and Kerven, C. 
(eds) Range Ecology at Disequilibrium: New Models o f Natural 
Variability and Pastoral Adaptation in African Savannas (London, 
1993), pp. 196-226.
Steinhart, E.I. ‘Hunters, poachers and game keepers: towards a social history of
hunting in colonial Kenya’, Journal o f African History, 30, 1989, pp. 
247-264
Swallow, B. M., Mokitimi, N. and Brokken, R.F. Cattle Marketing in Lesotho.
(Research Division Bulletin RD-B-49/ISAS Research Report No. 13, 
Maseru, 1986).
Swallow, B. M., Motsamai, 'M., Sopeng, L., Brokken, R. F. and Storey, G.G. A Survey 
o f the Production, Utilisation and Marketing o f Livestock Products in
279
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Lesotho (Research Division Report RD-R-81/ISAS Research Report 
No. 17, Maseru, 1987).
Swallow, B. M., Motsamai, 'M., Sopeng, L. and Storey. G.G. Livestock Development 
and Range Utilisation In Lesotho (Research Division Report RD-R- 
82/ISAS Research Report No. 18., Maseru, 1987).
Swynnerton, C.F.M. ‘Nature Notes: Adaptation’, Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, 14, 3, 
1917, pp. 339-356.
Swynnerton, C. F. M. ‘The entomological aspects of an outbreak of sleeping sickness 
near Mwanza, Tanganyika Territory’, Bulletin o f Entomological 
Research, 13,1922, pp. 317-370.
Swynnerton, C. F. M. ‘An experiment in control of Tsetse flies in Shinyanga,
Tanganyika Territory’, Bulletin o f Entomological Research, 15, 1924, 
pp. 313-337.
Swynnerton, C. F. M. ‘The tsetse-fly problem in the Nzega sub-district Tanganyika
Territory’, Bulletin o f Entomological Research, 16, 1925, pp. 99-109.
Swynnerton, R.J.M. A Plan to Intensify the Development o f African Agriculture in 
Kenya (Nairobi, 1954).
Tansley, A.G. 
Tansley, A.G. 
Tapson, D.
Thompson, M.
Thornton, R.W. 
Thornton, R.W.
Thornton, R. W.
Throup, D.W.
Tiffin, M.
‘The classification of vegetation and the concept of development’, 
Journal o f Ecology, 8, 2, 1920, pp. 118-144.
‘The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms’, Ecology, 
16, 1935, pp. 284-307.
‘Biologial Sustainability in Pastoral Systems: The Kwazulu Case’ in 
Behnke, R.H., Scoones, I. and Kerven, C. (eds) Range Ecology at 
Disequilibrium: New Models o f Natural Variability and Pastoral 
Adaptation in African Savannas (London, 1993), pp. 118-135.
‘Policy Making in the Face of Uncertainty: the Himalayans as 
Unknowns’ in Chapman, G.P and Thompson, M. (eds) Water and the 
Quest for Sustainable Development in the Ganges Valley, (London,
1995).
The Basuto Pony (Morija, 1938).
‘Anti-erosion measures and reclamation of eroded land’, Proceedings 
of the South African Society o f Civil Engineers, 40, 1942, pp. 79-104.
and Leckie, W. G. The African and his Livestock (African Welfare 
Series, Cape Town, 1944).
The Economic and Social Origins ofMau-Mau, 1945-1953 (London,
1988).
‘Land and Capital: Blind Spots in the Study of the ‘Resource-Poor’ 
Farmer’ in Leach, M. and Meams, R. (eds) The Lie o f the Land: 
Challenging Received Wisdom on the African Environment (London,
1996), pp. 168-185.
280
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Tiffen, M., Mortimore, M. and Gichuki, F. More People, Less Erosion: Environmental 
Recovery in Kenya (London, 1994).
Tiffen, M. and Mortimore, M. Environment, Population Growth and Productivity in 
Kenya: A Case Study ofMachakos District (International Institute of 
Environment and Development Drylands Network Programme Issue 
Paper, No. 47, London, 1994).
Tyson, P.D. Climate Change and Variability in Southern Africa (Cape Town,
1986).
Tyson, P.D. and Lindsay, J.A. ‘The Climate of the Last 2000 Years in Southern Africa’, 
The Holocene, 2, 3,1992, pp. 271-278.
Uys, D. S. The Lesotho Mohair Industry: History and Evaluation, 1970 and 5 
more years (Maseru, 1971).
Van Onselen, C. ‘The Reconstruction of a Rural Life from Oral Testimony: Critical 
Notes on the Methodology in the Study of a Black South African 
Sharecropper’, The Journal o f Peasant Studies, 20, 3, 1993, pp. 494- 
519.
Van Onselen, C. The Seed is Mine: the Life ofKas Maine, a South African 
sharecropper, 1894-1985 (London, 1996).
Van Rensburg, C.J.J. and Palmer, E.M. New World to Win (Bloemfontein, 1946).
Vail, L. ‘Ecology and History: the example of Eastern Zambia’, Journal o f
Southern African Studies, 1977, 3, pp. 129-155.
Wagner, R. ‘Zoutpansberg: the dynamics of a hunting frontier, 1848-67’ in Marks,
S. and Atmore, A. (eds) Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South 
Africa (London, 1980), pp. 313-349.
Wallman, S. Take Out Hunger: Two Case Studies o f Rural Development in
Basutoland (London, 1969).
Wallman, S. ‘Conditions of Non-development: The Case of Lesotho’, Journal of 
Development Studies 8,2,1972, pp. 251-262.
Wallman, S. ‘The modernisation of dependence: a further note on Lesotho’,
Journal o f Southern African Studies 3, 1, 1976, pp. 102-108.
Watts, M. ‘A New Deal in Emotions: Theory and Practice and the Crisis of
Development’ in Crush, J. (ed.) Power o f Development (London,
1995) pp. 44-62.
Weisfelder, R. F. Defining National Purpose in Lesotho (Papers in International 
Studies, Africa Series No. 3, Athens, Ohio, 1969).
Weisfelder, R. F. The Basotho Monachy: A Spent Force or a Dynamic Political Factor?
(Papers in International Studies, Africa Series No. 16, Athens, Ohio, 
1972).
281
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Weisfelder, R. F.
Wilcocks, W.
Wilken, G.C.
Wilson, K.
Wilson, K.J.,
Winai-Strom, G.
World Bank, 
Wolpe, H.
Worster, D. 
Worster, D.
Worster, D.
‘Early Voices of Protest in Basutoland: The Progressive Association 
and Lekotla la Bafo’, African Studies Review, 17,1974, pp. 397-409.
Report on Irrigation in South Africa (London, 1901), Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office Library, South African Pamphlets, Vol. 2.
Agro-climatology o f Lesotho (LAS A Discussion Paper No. 1, Maseru, 
1978).
‘Trees in fields in Southern Zimbabwe’, Journal o f Southern African 
Studies, 15, 2,1989, pp. 369-383.
‘A Memory of Chief Lelingoana of the Batloka Tribe’, Quarterly 
Bulletin o f the South African Library , 47,1, 1992, pp.22-27.
Migration and Development, Dependence on South Africa: a study o f 
Lesotho (Uppsala, 1978).
Lesotho: a Development Challenge (Washington, 1975).
‘Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: from 
segregation to apartheid’, Economy and Society, 1,4,1972, pp. 425- 
456.
Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s (New York, 1979).
‘Seeing Beyond Culture’, Journal o f American History (Roundtable: 
Environmental History), 76, 1990, pp. 1078-1106.
Nature* s Economy: A History o f Ecological Ideas (2nd edition, 
Cambridge, 1994).
Yawitch, J. Betterment: the myth o f homeland agriculture (Johannesburg, 1981)
282
